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Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique

2001/1 (Tome XL)

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The traditional model of a capitalist economy, where capital pays workers fixed wages/benefits for doing what management wants, has morphed in advanced companies and economies into something quite different. In place of the historic capital/labor dichotomy modern firms have developed a system where employees share in the financial fortunes of the firm, make many of the decisions that determine firm performance, and depend on pension fund ownership of equity for much retirement income. These changes are likely to continue into the foreseeable future, creating what I call the shared capitalist model of work and compensation (Freeman, 1999).


How far down the path toward shared capitalism have major advanced economies gone ? What are the advantages and disadvantages of shared capitalism ? How will shared capitalism affect economic efficiency and distribution ?


This essay seeks to answer these questions. It describes the main features of shared capitalism, documents the growth of shared capitalist institutions, and assesses their impact on economic well-being. My main focus is on the United States, which is arguably the lead economy in shared capitalism, but I also consider developments in the United Kingdom and France.


My main findings are :

  1. Financial sharing and shared decision-making have grown rapidly in the United States and to a lesser extent in the United Kingdom and France.

  2. Firms that use shared capitalist modes of pay also devolve decisions to workers, indicating that these two practices are complementary.

  3. Shared capitalism improves efficiency; but has ambiguous effects on distribution.



« The only problem with capitalism is that there are not enough capitalists» – Jeff Gates, advocate for employee ownership and author of US law on employee stock ownership plans.


Shared capitalism is a variant of the traditional capitalist system of private ownership of property, employment contracts in the job market, and market-based determination of prices and wages. It diverges from traditional capitalism by dividing the benefits and risks of capitalism among workers and retirees as well as among capitalists, blurring the capital/labor dichotomy that has dominated traditional economic relationships. As exhibit 1 indicates, the sharing occurs in three ways :

  1. Through financial participation in one’s own firm. There are diverse mechanisms for this : profit-sharing, where workers get immediate or deferred cash rewards, bonuses, or other remuneration when the firm/branch/work site exceeds some profit goals; gain-sharing systems that relate rewards to other measures of local group performance, such as reducing costs; employee stock ownership plans (ESOP), where workers own shares of the firm in a trust fund, over which they have some voting rights; all employee stock option plans (AESOP), which grant options to a broad base of employees; and programs that reward workers for buying and holding shares in their own firm.

  2. Through pension fund ownership of shares in one’s own firm or in equity more broadly. In The Unseen Revolution, Peter Drucker argued that the increasing proportion of equity in pension funds was transforming modern capitalism. But when he wrote, virtually all pension funds were defined benefit plans, where the firm promises workers a fixed retirement benefit but keeps control of investments and bears the risk of the investment. By contrast, the defined contribution plans that grew in the 1980s and 1990s give the responsibility for the risk and reward from pension contributions to employees. Rather than a promisory note (in effect, a bond), workers have equity in their pension fund, which makes retirement income dependent on capital earnings. This turns workers into capitalists, and gives them an incentive to monitor the governance of the firms where their pension moneys are invested.

  3. Shared decision-making at the workplace. Here also there are diverse sharing mechanisms. US firms set up employee involvement committees under various guises. Some firms flatten the corporate hierarchy by reducing middle management layers. Japanese firms rely on consensus building among management and have extensive formal consultative and information committees with employees. In the EU, works councils can play a similar role. Germany mandates workers on boards of companies.


Shared capitalism alters modern economies in several ways. Sharing financial rewards strengthens the incentive system for production and aligns the interests of capital and labor more than traditional employer/employee arrangements. At the same time it places greater risk on employees. Sharing of decision-making reduces the boss/worker divide inside firms and increases the power of workers to affect outcomes. Shared capitalism also changes the social welfare state. Defined contribution pensions ease the burden on taxpayers to fund pay-as-you-go social security systems while placing responsibility on individuals to invest their moneys wisely. Shared decision-making at workplaces also changes traditional modes of regulating workplaces and production sites. Devolution of decisions means that labor and management can enforce laws at local sites rather than relying on state command and control center. This will make some regulation more efficient but risks aligning workers and firms against the broader public in other areas.



To see how extensive shared capitalist modes of compensation have become in the US, I gathered statistics on particular forms of shared capitalism compensation from diverse sources and mined the compensation questions from the 1994-95 Workplace Representation and Participation Survey (WRPS; Freeman and Rogers). My estimates, summarized in exhibit 1, suggest that approximately half of the US private sector work force is paid through some form of financial sharing (Dube and Freeman, 2000).


Roughly 8% of American workers participate in an ESOP or related employee ownership scheme. ESOPs grew rapidly in the 1980s, due in part to favorable tax treatment, but stabilized in the 1990s. ESOPs aside, many firms have introduced 401k or other defined contribution pension plans that invest heavily in company shares. Some 35% of US private sector workers were covered by defined contribution plans in 1998, and about 11% have sufficiently large investments in their own firm to make company performance an important determinant of their retirement moneys.


In the 1990s the fastest growing form of shared compensation was all employee stock options. The National Center for Employee Ownership estimates that approximately 8% of workers are covered by an all employee stock option plan, but this may be a high number. By contrast, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that just 1.7% of workers were granted options in 1999. The BLS numbers are lower in part because the BLS did not count workers given grants in other years or workers eligible for grants that were not given. Adjusting for these differences could produce estimates of workers in firms that have ever given all employee stock options as high as 5-6%. However, the BLS figures may also be lower than the NCEO estimates because the BLS survey is more accurate. Looking over time, even the modest BLS estimate shows a large increase in the proportion of workers granted options in the 1990s. Before the 1990s, options were limited to top executives; but in that decade, many firms extended options to workers in lower parts of the hierarchy, and some unions bargained for options for members. In Summer 2000 the House enacted a « Super Stock Option Bill » that adds tax breaks to options for all employees, which should increase the popularity of this form of compensation.


Many firms also give employees the opportunity to purchase shares of their firm at discounts through tax-qualified « 423 plans » or other schemes; and a sizeable proportion of workers take advantage of this opportunity. Surveys of workers suggest that 11% of American workers had such plans. Estimates from company records suggest a higher proportion, with 15.7 million workers or about 14% of private sector employees owning shares through discount plans (Conyon).


Turning to profit-sharing modes of compensation, on the order of one quarter of US private sector workers are covered by profit or gain-sharing. Profit-sharing systems range from plans that place the profits into trusts for worker retirements to plans that pay workers with bonuses at years’end and plans give awards more frequently in the form of cash. Gain-sharing systems are invariably cash systems.


Because there is considerable overlap among these modes of pay, one cannot simply add the numbers covered to obtain the share of the US private sector work force with shared capitalist forms of compensation. Adjusting for overlaps, I estimate that 45% of US private sector workers are covered by some shared compensation system. Consistent with this, 54% of workers in the WRPS reported that they were so covered, though on this survey (as on others) the proportion of workers who reported that they were in an employee owned firm exceeded estimates from other sources. In short, about half of US workers are paid through some form of variable compensation related to firm performance. Existant data do not, however, tell us the proportion of employee pay or wealth that is variable compensation dependent on firm performance as opposed to fixed compensation.



As noted earlier, the growth of defined contribution pension funds, invested in a firm or in the equity or bond market more generally, is changing the ownership structure of capitalism. In 1998 some 37 million US workers (35% of the non farm private employment) had a defined contribution pension plan, with the typical employee holding $40,000 in assets. For public sector and non-profit sector workers pension fund are their major way of holding a stake in the capitalist system. TIAA-CREF, one of the 20 top firms in the Fortune 1000 listing, invests the pension moneys of American academics. CALPERS, perhaps the most aggressive pension fund in the area of corporate governance, invests the pension moneys of California public employees.


Ownership of pension fund shares gives workers pecuniary interests similar to other shareholders, and thus often puts them on the side of management rather than of other workers in labor/management disputes. When the United Airlines pilots union threatened industrial action against the employee owned airline in the late 1990s, share prices fell, leading some senior pilots to complain to union leaders that union activity was reducing their retirement income. When business executive « chainsaw » Al Dunlop raised the share value of International Paper by downsizing its work force, unions representing workers outside the firm who had International Paper shares in their pension funds saw their members’ pensions rise, but at the expense of laid-off workers.



Turning to shared decision-making, the WRPS shows that 55% of US workers in firms with 50 or more employees report that their firms have employee involvement committees of some form. A third say that they serve on such committees. The extent to which committees are able to make decisions or influence them in a major way varies widely among decisions and firms, but workers who serve on employee involvement committees are more likely to be satisfied with their role in decisions at their workplace than other workers (Freeman and Rogers).


In the EU, legally mandated works councils create a natural forum for workers to participate in some decisions. In all countries, management must share information with the councils, but beyond that the laws governing works councils varies by country. France allots a proportion of the wage bill to councils to spend on employee benefits, such as cafeterias. The Belgium works council law encourages labor and management cooperation. German law requires that firms consult with works councils on some decisions and requires co-determination on other decisions.


In addition to works council Germany requires that firms place workers on boards of directors, creating dialogue about higher-level corporate decisions.


I know of no study that examines whether US employees, with company instituted involvement committees, or EU employees, with legally mandated works councils, have a greater say in actual work place decisions. In both areas, the highly educated and skilled workers, who have the knowledge needed for firms to improve their operations, have achieved a much greater say in decisions than the traditional less skilled industrial employee in « Fordist » production.



The EU endorsed shared capitalist modes of compensation in its 1989 PEPPER (=Promotion of Employee Participation in Profits and Enterprise results) Report, but this did not have any marked effect on member countries. Many European trade unions were leery of profit-sharing and ownership, and most countries were unwilling to encourage shared compensation through tax concessions when national budgets were in deficit. The review of profit sharing by the OECD in 1995 shows modest profit-sharing in most EU countries. Two EU countries, the United Kingdom and France, have, however, sought to increase worker participation in the financial performance of their firms. Both countries gave tax concessions to firms that introduced profit-related pay in the late 1980s. Since then the UK has favoured employee share ownership or share option schemes, while France has strengthened its system of wage related savings from profits, while generally eschewing ownership schemes.

The United Kingdom


Exhibit 2 provides a capsule summary of UK policies toward shared compensation from the late 1970s to 2000, divided between schemes that give tax advantages if they cover all employees and schemes designed for top management and other special workers.


Profit-related pay, under which the Treasury did not tax compensation paid to workers based on an approved profit-related pay system, was widely adopted in the 1980s and 1990s. In the 1990s some 50% of UK private sector workers were receiving part of their pay for profit-related reasons. However, the Treasury came to view the system as a « scam » with firms finding ways to classify any sort of pay as « profit-related » to take advantage of the tax break, and began phasing the program out in 1997. As of 2000, profit-related pay will be history in the UK.


The UK has instead gone for shared compensation programs that encourage firms to pay workers in shares or stock options or that encourage employees to invest in shares. The motivation is best expressed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown in a 1999 consultation paper : « Share ownership offers employees a real stake in their company… I want, through targeted reform, to reward long term commitment by employees (and) to encourage the new enterprise culture of team work in which everyone contributes and everyone benefits from success » (UK Treasury, foreword). The 2000 All employee Share Plan allows firms to give free shares to workers tax free and gives tax breaks to employees who buy shares as long as they hold the shares for 5 years (with smaller tax breaks to workers who hold them for 3 years). Another important UK plan is the Save as You Earn (SAYE) share option scheme, which gives tax relief to workers who enter a special savings contract to buy the shares when the period ends.


In addition to these schemes, the UK gives some tax breaks to Company Share Option Plans that go largely to top management. In 2000 the government introduced an Enterprise Market Incentive system to allow small companies to give tax-advantaged options to 15 key employees.



« La Participation, voilà la grande réforme de ce siècle ! » Charles de Gaulle, quoted in PEPPER Report, p. 67.


French governments of differing political persuasion have mandated some forms of profit-sharing and encouraged others. Exhibit 3 provides a capsule summary of the two major French programmes from the late 1970s to 2000.


The most inclusive French program is a wage-related savings program – participation aux fruits de l’expansion – that is obligatory for firms with 50 or more employees. The program was first enacted in 1967 and modified thereafter. This is a deferred profit-sharing system that is in effect a forced saving plan : the profitsharing bonus is invested for 3-5 years before the worker receives any reward, with the investment vehicles ranging from the firm’s own investment program to outside securities. Because the program is obligatory, 4.9 million French non-governmental workers were covered in 1999 – about 30% of the non-governmental work force. But almost no workers in smaller firms are covered. A May 2000 survey for the Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Industry found that most French employees viewed the plan favourably but regarded it as overly complex, and too favourable to large firms and higher income employees. In summer 2000, the French government considered ways to modify the system to bring more small firms into the program and to give workers greater choice in their investment vehicles. The main feature – required savings for workers in profitable firms – will remain. (République Française, Actualités, Mardi 1er août 2000).


France’s second major program – Intéressement des Salariés – is a voluntary cash profit-sharing system, in which small as well as large firms participate. It encourages cash bonuses and is thus quite similar to the UK profit-related pay programme introduced at roughly the same time in the late 1980s. The tax incentive is substantial as long as firms agree that the profit-sharing bonuses cannot substitute for wages. Given industrial or regional level French collective bargaining agreements, this could be an effective way to assure that the plan avoid the substitution of tax privileged profit shares for wage increases, but as firm level agreements have grown in France, the possibility for bargaining for lower pay increases and greater profit bonuses paid in part by the Treasury has increased. Coverage under this plan has expaned greatly since 1986, so that some 2 million workers were involved in profit-sharing in the early 1990s.


By encouraging profit-sharing rather than ownership of shares or options, France has chosen a different road to shared capitalism than the US and UK.


Profit-sharing systems reduce the risk that fluctuations in the stock market unrelated to employee activity will affect rewards, but they are less likely to induce employees to participate in company governance.



Economic analysis makes one key prediction about the development of shared capitalism : that firms which voluntarily choose this mode of operation should introduce financial sharing and shared decision-making in tandem. The reason is simple : it pays the firm to give incentives to workers only when workers have discretion to vary what they do at workplaces, and it pays management to devolve decisions to employees only when employees have incentives to make decisions that raise the value of the firm. Exhibit 4 shows that the incidence of shared compensation systems and employee involvement in the US supports this prediction.


Workers in firms with employee involvement programs are nearly twice as likely to have shared compensation systems. Conversely firms that have shared compensation systems are much more likely to have employee involvement schemes. It is the covariation between the mode of compensation and the mode of decisionmaking that makes shared capitalism a broad « system » for operating a capitalist economy.


Economic analysis suggests that firms which operate under most shared capitalist modes of operation will perform better than firms which operate under traditional hierarchical labor/management modes of operation. Many researchers have examined the effect of profit-sharing, employee ownership, and employee participation in the firm on productivity. The general finding is that profit-sharing raises productivity by around 5% (Kruse and Weitzman, using a meta-statistical assessment of many studies; Doucouliagos, 1995) while employee ownership has weaker and more mixed effects, depending on whether or not ownership carries with it worker participation or not. Dube and I have found that workers in firms that combine profit-sharing, ownership and employee involvement report much greater productivity increasing behaviour on a variety of indicators (such as making suggestions for improving efficiency) than do workers in other firms. Conyon and I have found that British firms tend to have higher productivity when they have some form of shared compensation system. Cahuc and Dormont have found that the French voluntary cash-based profit-sharing improves productivity as well.


An alternative way to assess the efficiency effects of shared capitalism is to contrast the stock market performance of firms that use shared capitalist modes of compensation or decision-making with that of other firms. Consistent with econometric results on productivity, indices of the stock market valuation of firms that are employee-owned or that have shared capitalist compensation systems outperform the overall stock market in the US and UK.


As of this writing, there have been no major studies of the economic impact of all employee stock option schemes or of other programmes that encourage individual ownership of shares (as opposed to collective ownership in ESOP trusts).


Given that almost no worker can affect share prices by their own activity, it is hard to explain the growth of all employee stock option plans and tax-privileged stock purchase plans by incentive theories. Why give a Starbucks (the US coffee chain) or ASDA (the UK supermarket) clerk stock options, when there is no « line of sight » between what the worker does and the share price ? One possibility is that firms use these modes of pay to signal workers that they have a participatory corporate culture, which may affect behaviour. Another possibility is that firms facing financial constraints have passed the risk onto workers in a booming economy when the workers are not fully aware of those risks.


Options aside, shared capitalism seems to produce modestly or moderately better outcomes than traditional modes of operation, at the minimum. Whether or not shared capitalism reduces income disparities is less clear. On the one side, by linking employee earnings more closely to firm performance, shared capitalism modes of compensation are likely to increase inequality. The variation in profitability among firms is, after all, huge. On the other side, by making the pay of employees depend on comparable factors as the pay of management and shareholders, shared capitalism has the potential for turning workers into capitalists and thus narrowing income gaps. Defined contribution pension fund ownership extends both the benefits and risks of capitalism to many workers.



Does the rise of shared capitalist modes of pay and decision-making in the 1990s mark a watershed in the development of market economies, or is it simply the latest « flavour of the month » in a dynamic economic system ?


To some extent, the rise of shared modes of pay (notably stock options) has been fueled by the 1990s boom and the idiosyncracies of the information technology industries that have led this boom. A sizeable recession could readily change employee attitudes toward these forms of pay, and induce many firms to return to more traditional contracts. But even so I do not expect to see anything like a return to the labor/capital dichotomous capitalism of the 19th and most of the 20th century.


As long as the educated and specialized workers who dominate modern production are more knowledgeable than top management in many key areas, efficiency dictates that those workers participate in decisions, and by the complementary argument given earlier, to receive shared capitalist modes of pay. As long as workers rely on defined contribution pension plans for their retirement incomes, they will truly be substantial owners of the capitalist system.


Economists do not have a good track record in predicting the future development of capitalism (Marx being the best case in point) because they tend to extrapolate then-current trends into the future, but I am willing to bet that the 21st century will see further growth of shared capitalism, and that this will benefit the economy and blur the capital/labor division that has been one of the blemishes of this form of organizing work. Welcome, new and improved capitalism of the new millennium.


Dube and Freeman (2000), table1 ; Freeman and Rogers (1999)


All employee schemes


Profit-Related Pay. Tax relief for wages paid through a profit-sharing scheme :

workers pay no tax on receipt of profit-related pay up to specified. It was set up in 1987, tax benefits were extended in 1991. The scheme was phased out between 1997 and 2000.


Approved Profit-Sharing Share Schemes. Introduced in 1978 Finance Act. Tax relief for shares placed in a trust and given free to employees. The tax relief : value of shares given is deductible from corporate tax; income tax exemption for workers if held for 5 years. Coverage in 2000 : 1.25 million workers. Will be phased out and replaced with New All Employee Share Plans.


Qualifying Employee Share Trusts (QUEST). A trust that acquires shares of firm that are held on behalf of employees. Shares must be distributed to employees within 20 years. Payments are corporate tax deductible. Funds often put in as part of profit-sharing to gain tax relief New All employee Share Plan (2000). Firms can give free shares tax free; employees buy shares out of pre-tax income; firms can match employee purchases. Employees who leave firm must withdraw shares. Firm has flexible performance criterion for.


Tax relief : employees who keep shares for 5 years in « ESOP » trust pay no income tax; pay capital gains only on increase in value. Companies get relief for costs of providing shares for employees..


Save as You Earn (SAYE) share option scheme. Tax relief given for options granted to all employees for 3,5,7 years; workers must enter a special savings contract to buy the shares when the period ends. No tax when option is granted, nor on the savings to buy the shares. Coverage in 2000 : 1.75 million

Management/special employee schemes


Company Share Option Plans. Company can decide to give options to selected employees (directors), with value up to $30,000, based on corporate performance targets. No tax when option is granted, nor on increase in value of shares if held for 3 years; capital gains tax on price paid. Coverage in 2000 : 0.45 million Enterprise Market Incentives. Small companies can give tax-advantaged options to 15 key employees, with value up to $100,000, based on individual or corporate performance. No tax when options are exercised and capital gains tax relief starts from day of grant. Designed to help smaller firms attract or retain key personnel.


Source : wwww. inlandrevenue. gov. uk/ shareschemes Capital Strategies, www. esop. co. uk



Participation in Company Growth – Participation aux Fruits de l’expansion Since 1967 this law has required firms of specified sizes to give profit-sharing bonuses in proportion to wages, with the size of the firm reduced from 100 employees to 50 employees in 1970.


The firm sets aside a proportion of profits in a Réserve Spéciale de Participation (RSP) fund for five years, according to specified formula. All workers receive shares in the fund proportionate to their salary, up to some limit. The funds can be spent in various ways, in the firm or in other securities, including in the enterprise’s Savings Plan (see below). Tax concessions include : RSP funds are deducted as a cost of business, and are exempt from income and social security charges. In 1986 collective bargaining agreements could modify these agreements. Covers 1/3 of non-governmental employees, with 4% of gross wages for those paying bonuses.


Cash based profit-sharing – Intéressement des Salariés.


This regulation encourages firms to pay part of wages through profit-sharing, up to a maximum of 10% of wages. The 1959 law introduced a voluntary system of cash-based profit-sharing, with the bonuses exempt from company tax and social security. The 1986 law eased administrative burdens and offered workers tax benefits by exempting the bonus from income tax if the employee put the money into the firm’s Plan d’épargne d’entreprise – saving plan. Covers about one-fifth of non-governmental employees, with 2% of gross wages in firms and 3% for those paying bonuses.


Source France, wwww. finances. gouv. fr/ press/ dossiers_de_presse/ fichte. htm(8 /09 /00 )


Hanatouz, (2000), Commission of the European Communities, (1991).


Dube and Freeman (2000).


  • CAHUC, Pierre and Brigitte DORMONT « Profit-sharing : Does it Increase Productivity and Employment ? A theoretical model and empirical evidence on French micro data » Labour Economics (4) 1997,293-319
  • Capital Strategies, Employee Ownership Index, http :// www. esop. co. uk
  • Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General for Employment, Industrial Relations, and Social Affairs, The PEPPER REPORT : Promotion of Employee Participation in Profits and Enterprise Results in the Member States of the European Community, Social Europe, Supplement 3/91 (1991 edition, Florence and Brussels)
  • CONYON, Martin and Richard FREEMAN « Shared Modes of Compensation and Firm Performance : UK Evidence,» Draft, LSE and University of Pennsylvania, November 13,2000
  • DOUCOULIAGOS, C. « Worker Participation and Productivity in Labor-Managed and Participatory Capitalist Firms : A Meta-Analysis, » Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Oct 1995
  • DRUCKER, Peter, The unseen revolution (Harper & Row, 1976)
  • DUBE, Arin and Richard FREEMAN, « Shared Compensation Systems and Decision-Making in the US Job Market » Commission for Labor Cooperation, North American Seminar on Incomes and Productivity 2000, http :// www. naalc. org/ english/ publications/ seminar2000_papers. htm
  • ESTRIN, Saul, Paul GROUT, and Sushil WADHWANI « Profit sharing and employee share ownership » Economic Policy 4 April 1987, pp 14-62
  • France, wwww. finances. gouv. fr/ press/ dossiersde presse/fichte.htm (8/09/00)
  • FREEMAN, Richard, The Road to Shared Capitalism and Economic Justice, Robbins Lectures, London School of Economics, Spring 1999
  • FREEMAN, Richard and Joel ROGERS, What Do Workers Want (Cornell University Press, 1999)
  • HANATOUZ, Pierre, « L’Epargne Salariale » Regards sur l’actualité, bi 262m juin 2000, pp 3-28
  • KRUSE, Doug and Martin WEITZMAN « Profit-sharing and Productivity » in Alan S. Blinder ed Paying for Productivity : A Look at the Evidence Washington DC, Brookings 1990, pp 95-140
  • OECD, Employment Outlook, July 1995 (Paris, OECD, 1995),
  • US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Pilot Survey on the Incidence of Stock Options in Private Industry in 1999, Fact Sheet, October 11,2000. hhttp :// www. bls. gov/ ncs2/ ncrp0001.pdf
  • United Kingdom, www. inlandrevenue. gov. uk/ shareschemes, Treasury, Consultation on Employee Share Ownership (London, 1999)



Richard FREEMAN is associated with the London School of Economics.

Plan de l'article

    1. The United Kingdom
    2. France
    1. All employee schemes
    2. Management/special employee schemes

Pour citer cet article

Freeman Richard, « The Shared Capitalist Model of Work and Compensation », Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique, 1/2001 (Tome XL), p. 169-181.

DOI : 10.3917/rpve.401.0169

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