Charles Tilly, « War Making and State Making as Organized Crime », in P. B. Evans et al. (eds), Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 170.
Charles Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1975 ; Thomas Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan : Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Otto Hintze, « Military Organization and the Organization of the State », in F. Gilbert (ed.), The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, New York : Oxford University Press, 1975, pp. 178-215.
Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990, Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1990.
Oil rentier states are those states in which revenues from oil exports contribute well over 40 % of the state’s overall revenues (Hazem Beblawi, « The Rentier State in the Arab World », in G. Luciani (ed.), The Arab State, London : Routledge, 1990, pp. 85-98 ; Giacomo Luciani, « Allocation vs. Production States : A Theoretical Framework », in G. Luciani (ed.), The Arab State, op. cit., pp. 65-84).
John Waterbury, « The State and Economic Transition inthe Middle East and North Africa », in N. Shafik (ed.), Prospects for Middle Eastern and North African Economies : From Boom to Bust and Back ?, Houndmills : Macmillan, 1998, p. 168.
Hossein Mahdavy, « The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States : The Case of Iran », in M. A. Cook (ed.), Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, London : Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 428-467 ; Hazem Beblawi, op. cit. ; Giacomo Luciani, op. cit.
Hazem Beblawi, op. cit., p. 85.
Mike Moore, « Revenues, State Formation, and the Quality of Governance in Developing Countries », International Political Science Review, Vol. 25, N° 3, 2004, p. 305.
Rolf Schwarz, Rule, Revenue and Representation : Oil and State Formation in the Middle East and North Africa, Dissertation, University of Geneva : Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2007.
State capacity is infrastructural state power, namely « the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm » (Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1993, Vol. 2, p. 55)
With respect to the view that taxation capacity is the key test for state capacity, see Michael Barnett, Confronting the Costs of War : Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel, Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1992 ; Christopher Hood, « The Tax State in the Information Age », in T. V. Paul et al. (eds.), The Nation-State in Question, Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2003, p. 213 ; Christine Fauvelle-Aymar, « The Political and Tax Capacity of Government in Developing Countries », Kyklos, Vol. 52, N° 3, 1999, p. 391.
Christine Fauvelle-Aymar, op. cit., p. 406.
Rolf Schwarz, « The Political Economy of State-Formation in the Arab Middle East : Rentier States, Economic Reform, and Democratization », Review of International Political Economy, 2008. As historians of taxation have shown, this distinction is indeed an important one : « The true magnitude and significance of the tax load have in the past been concealed from the people. The fiscal principle would have to yield to the economic principle ; the direct method of raising state revenues should become the rule and the indirect method the exception ». See Knut Wicksell, « A New Principle of Just Taxation », in J. Gwartney, R. Wagner (eds), Public Choice and Constitutional Economics, London : Jai Press, 1988, p. 128 ; John Waterbury, « From Social Contracts to Extraction Contracts : The Political Economy of Authoritarianism and Democracy », in J. Entelis (ed.), Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa, Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1997, p. 171.
Income taxes were first introduced in 1909 under Ottoman rule. After World War I they were abolished and an income law was only reinstated in 1927. Modifications and refinements came through laws no. 36 of 1939 and no. 63 of 1943, and the passing of an intermediate law no. 85 in 1956 and eventually a regular tax law no. 44 of 1968. Up until the 1960s, income taxes contributed modestly to the ordinary budget, ranging from between 3.4 % to 5 % depending on the year (Siham Sharif, « Income Tax in Iraq », Bulletin of International Fiscal Documentation, Vol. 22, N° 12, 1968, p. 543 and p. 549).
In 1927, exploration rights were granted to the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC), which despite its name was a British oil company. Questions of nationalisation came to the forefront after the revolution of July 1958 ; in December 1961 the Government seized 99 % of the IPC and in 1973 it become fully nationalised.
Hossein Askari et al., Taxation and Tax Policies in the Middle East, London : Butterworth, 1982, p. 108.
In the mid-1970s, personal income up to an annual level of 500 Dinars was theoretically subject to a 5 % tax, gradually increasing for income between 500-1’000 Dinars to a 10 % tax. The tax drastically increased for the richest of society, where income above 15’000 Dinars was taxed at 75 % (Idem.).
In the 1960s an individual had to earn nearly 7 times the per capita income (based on the year 1963) before being subject to a personal income tax. For a married man with dependants under the age of 18, earnings would have to exceed 14 times the per capita income before tax assessment would occur. Furthermore, about 91 % of all personal income tax paid came from residents of the province of Baghdad. The concentration of income tax payers was so extreme that in 1966 less than 1 % of the entire population paid any income tax (Siham Sharif, op. cit.).
Hossein Askari et al., op. cit., p. 111.
Source : John Waterbury, « From Social Contracts to Extraction Contracts : The Political Economy of Authoritarianism and Democracy », in J. Entelis (ed.), Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa, Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1997, p. 155.
The welfare benefits allocated to society in the form of state-provided jobs have been enormous. At the end of the Gulf War in 1991, the civilian branch of the state employed 21 % of the working population and 40 % of Iraqi households depended directly on government payments (see : Toby Dodge, « US Intervention and Possible Iraqi Futures », Survival, Vol. 45, N° 3, 2003, p. 107).
Isam Al-Khafaji, « War as a Vehicle for the Rise and Demise of a State-Controlled Society : The Case of Ba’thist Iraq », in S. Heydemann (ed.), War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East, Berkeley : University of California Press, 2000, p. 273.
The price of a barrel of oil dropped from 27 US$ in 1985 to 15 in early 1986.
Kamran Mofid, The Economic Consequences of the Gulf War, London : Routledge, 1990.
Peter Sluglett, Marion Farouk-Sluglett, « Iraq Since 1986 : The Strengthening of Saddam », Middle East Report, N° 167, 1990, p. 20.
Isam Al-Khafaji, op. cit., p. 273.
Peter Sluglett, Marion Farouk-Sluglett, op. cit.
Adeed Dawisha, « Footprints in the Sand : The Definition and Redefinition of Identity in Iraq’s Foreign Policy », in Sh. Telhami, M. Barnett (eds), Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2002, p. 129.
Ulrike Freitag, « Writing Arab History : The Search for the Nation », British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 21, N° 1, 1994, p. 31.
Adeed Dawisha, op. cit., p. 129.
Ofra Bengio, Saddam’s Word : The Political Discourse in Iraq, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1998 ; Ofra Bengio, « Saddam Husayn’s Novel of Fear », Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 9, N° 1, 2002, pp. 9-18.
Al-Thawra, 16.01.1982, as quoted in Adeed Dawisha, op. cit., p. 133.
Ofra Bengio, op. cit., p. 183.
In official speeches, Saddam Hussein switched between Modern Standard Arabic and Iraqi dialects in order to create a sense of closeness with the people and his listeners. One such example is given in Nathalie Mazraani, « Functions of Arab Political Discourse : The Case of Saddam Hussein’s Speeches », Zeitschrift für Arabische Linguistik, Vol. 30, 1995, pp. 22-36.
Amatzia Baram, « Neo-Tribalism in Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s Tribal Politics 1991-1996 », International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 29, 1997, p. 7.
In the realm of tribal justice, one can speak of the existence of a parallel legal structure. Tribal law included compensations for murder (diya or blood money) or disgraceful acts (hasham) and became a common feature in some part of Iraq, thereby supplanting state law (M.N. Kadhim, Reaction to Crime under Tribal Law and Modern Codification in Iraq, D. Phil. thesis, Oxford University : St. Catherine’s College, 1961 ; Amatzia Baram, op. cit.).
Charles Tilly, « War and State Power », Middle East Report, Vol. 21, N° 171, 1991, pp. 38-40.
Rolf Schwarz, 2008, op. cit.