Le principal, l’agent et l’évaluateur : comment expliquer l’échec du FMI en Argentine ?
Jérôme Sgard
Principal, Agent and Evaluator: Explaining
the IMF’s Failure in Argentina
In 2004 the Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF
published a report on this institution’s interventions in Argentina between
1991 and 2001. This document provides all the elements for a sociological
analysis of an institutional failure. Three main relationships proved dysfunctional: the realist interaction between the Fund and the Argentine authorities, the hierarchical link between management and staff, and the principal/
agent relation with the G7 governments, whose representatives within the
Fund should have made sure that operating rules were respected.
• Qui gouverne le FMI ?
• La défaillance argentine
• L’expertise économique
• Le gouvernement du FMI et le rôle du G7