L’armée américaine après l’Irak
Eliot A. cohen
The American counterinsurgency in Iraq represents a
watershed for the United States military. Quite unlike the operations for which
it had prepared itself since Vietnam, and in some ways counter to the ways in
which it had understood war in those years, it has put tremendous pressure on
the institutions of the Army, in particular. Its initial missteps reflected the disjunction between how the Army saw itself, and what its tasks really were. But
to a remarkable degree the Army has adapted to its mission in Iraq, aided by the
vast store of experience accumulated during the 1990’s, and by certain innate
qualities of professionalism and pragmatism. As of this writing, at any rate, it
remains a formidable, and on the whole healthy, institution.
• De l’invasion à l’insurrection
• Et après l’Irak ?