Règles de concurrence et partenariat euro-méditerranéen : échec ou succès ?
Damien Géradin
Nicolas Petit
« Competition rules and Euro-Mediterranean partnership : Failure
or success ? » deals with the Community’s mediterranean policy to the extent
that the association and cooperation agreements, which the Community has
concluded with most of the non-member coastal States of the Mediterranean,
require or imply the introduction and the protection of a system of undistorted
competition both within the free trade areas established by these agreements
and within the Member States of the agreements. Following a summary
description of the purpose and scope of the agreements, a first main section is
devoted to explaining the reasons for inserting competition rules into these
agreements. It does so by comparison to and distinction from the similar
approach used in the European Agreements, which the Community has concluded
with those States of Central and Eastern Europe, which are candidates for
accession to the Community. The section then gives details of the scope of the
competition rules and the mechanisms used to implement and to enforce them, a
particular stress being put on the lack of direct applicability of these rules.
A fundamental difference between the agreements concluded with the States of
the Mediterranean relates to their purpose, since only three States (Cyprus,
Malta, Turkey) are actual or likely candidates of adhesion. It is, therefore,
with regard to these countries and again by comparison to the candidate States
of Central and Eastern Europe, that a specific section deals with the
interrelationship between the adhesion process and the introduction of
competition rules in the agreements and in the national legal systems of the
candidate countries. However, as even almost all non-candidate States have
introduced competition rules into their domestic law, the article extensively
examines the nature, scope and enforcement mechanisms of such domestic rules on
competition. The picture that emerges is one of a relatively homogeneous set of
national rules (Israel making a notable exception), which, however, seem to be
enforced rather reluctantly and differently in the various countries (the
candidate States and, again, Israel being the pro-active exceptions). The
article explains the reasons for this not unexpected failure, i.e. the lack of
sufficient capacity building and the existence of political resistance, and
then opens an entire new section on the issue of convergence between the
domestic competition rules of the Mediterranean States, non-members of the
Community, and the Community’s competition rules. In particular, the pros and
cons of such a conver~gence for both the Community and the partner States are
examined in some detail, with particular attention being given to the
globalisation context of such conver~gence.
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Règles de concurrence dans le cadre des accords de coopération
et d'association
— 2.1 L’insertion de règles de concurrence dans les accords
conclus avec les pays Euromed
— 2.2 Examen des règles de concurrence insérées dans la nouvelle
génération d’accords conclus avec les pays partenaires
— 2.3 Examen de l’effet utile des dispositions de concurrence
insérées dans les accords d’association
• 3 Règles de concurrence et processus d'adhésion
— 3.1 L’étendue des obligations imposées aux pays candidats en
matière de règles de concurrence
— 3.2 Les mécanismes d’accompagnement et d’évaluation des pays
candidats en matière de règles de concurrence
• 4 Règles de concurrence dans un cadre domestique
— 4.1 L’état d’adoption de règles de concurrence domestiques par
les pays partenaires
— 4.2 Le contenu des règles de concurrence domestiques
— 4.3 La mise en œuvre des règles de concurrence
domestiques
• 5 Une convergence des règles domestiques de concurrence
— 5.1 La notion de convergence dans le cadre du partenariat
Euromed
— 5.2 Bénéfices d’une convergence des pays Euromed sur le modèle
CE
— 5.3 Coûts d’une convergence des pays Euromed sur le modèle
CE
— 5.4 Alternatives à la convergence autour des règles
communautaires
• 6 Conclusions