L’économie politique du brevet au sud : variations Indiennes sur le brevet pharmaceutique
Samira Guennif
Julien Chaisse
Depuis sa signature en 1994, l’Accord sur les aspects des droits de
propriété intellectuelle qui touchent au commerce (Accord ADPIC) suscite de vifs
débats au regard du régime de droits de propriété intellectuelle (DPI) fort qu’il
impose. Les conséquences d’un tel régime sur le développement socio-économique
des pays en développement membres de l’Organisation mondiale du commerce
(OMC) inquiètent. Cet article propose de discuter la validité de ces inquiétudes
en mobilisant les faits passés et présents sous-tendant la trajectoire industrielle et
sanitaire de l’Inde. Ces faits rappellent que l’industrie indienne a joué ces dernières
années un rôle important dans l’accessibilité des traitements antisida dans les pays
en développement grâce à l’adoption d’un régime de DPI souple jusqu’en 2005.
Contrainte par ses obligations juridiques vis-à-vis de l’OMC, l’Inde a dû adapter
sa législation nationale pour se conformer à ses engagements internationaux.
L’Inde entend toutefois utiliser toutes les flexibilités offertes par l’Accord ADPIC
et montre que des adaptations judicieuses des législations sur les brevets pour un
pays émergent restent possibles.Mots-clés :
OMC, ADPIC, brevet, Inde, médicament.
The rationale behind patenting of an invention can be traced to the community of
interests between the society and the inventor. For the society, an individual can
be guaranteed access to new, safe and efficient therapies and obtain full disclosure
of an invention to promote innovation. For the inventor, he (or she) benefits from a
monopoly for the use of the product or process and recover the resources devoted
to research and development. Accordingly, patents induce innovation in a sector
where firms are exposed to problems of appropriation. This compromise between
diverging interests was always at the heart of modifications made in patent protection
in developed countries ; since the granting of patents on processes alone to ensure
the diffusion of innovation and the growth of a competitive pharmaceutical industry,
to the granting of patents to both processes and products from the fifties onwards.
In the eighties, bowing to constant pressure from the pharmaceutical industry, the
term of a patent was extended to twenty years in developed countries. As of the
same period, we witness a strengthening of patent regimes in the world, especially
in developing countries with the ratification of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1994. Beginning 1st January 1996,
developed countries amended their national legislation to comply with TRIPS while
a twenty-year moratorium was provided for least developing countries. Yet, other
developing countries have benefited from a ten-year moratorium, which ended in
1st January 2006, and have or are amending their patent law to be compliance with
the agreement.
At this occasion, there has been sharp questioning and criticism, and disputes arise.
While it has been constantly reminded to developing countries that the TRIPS is
not inconsistent with the aims of industrial development and public health, there
have been expressions of acute fear and sharp protests from Brazil, India and even
the “African group” within the World Trade Organization. The flexibility provided
for in the agreement fail to reassure developing countries. The aim of this article is
precisely to shed light on the ins and outs of the extension of intellectual property
rights (IPR) to developing countries, by scrutinizing the particular pattern followed
by India, which brings about feasible industrial and sanitary improvements while
the country is progressively currently amending with delay its patent law to comply
with TRIPS.
To understand better the stakes involved in the ratification of the TRIPS agreement in
India, we will begin by establishing that opting for a stringent intellectual property
regime is not without consequences. It determines the extent of progress achieved in
the industrial and health sectors both in the developed as well as developing countries. In particular, through the implementation of a weak IPR regime in the past,
India has largely contributed recently to the access of patients infected by HIV/AIDS
to treatments through sharp reduction of prices. Then, we shall see how the TRIPS
establishes a strong IPR system that aims to reconcile protection of innovation and
public health promotion by providing for “exceptions” at the global level. Finally,
after having dealt in detail with Indian reticence and tardiness in making its legislation TRIPS compliance, we will analyse the legal path followed by India to carry
on improvements regarding access to medicines.Keywords :
WTO, TRIPS, patent, India, medicine.
• 1 INTRODUCTION
• 2 DÉVELOPPEMENT INDUSTRIEL
ET PROMOTION DE LA SANTÉ PUBLIQUE :
L’IMPORTANCE DU RÉGIME DE PROTECTION
DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE
— 2.1 Concurrence générique indienne et accessibilité
des traitements antisida
— 2.2 Les ressorts institutionnels des progrès industriel
et sanitaire indiens
• 3 LE RENFORCEMENT INTERNATIONAL DU RÉGIME
DU DPI : LA BREVETABILITÉ SELON L’ACCORD
ADPIC
— 3.1 Les conditions de la brevetabilité
— 3.2 Les exceptions à la protection conférée par un brevet
— 3.3 Les nouvelles perspectives ouvertes par la Déclaration
ministérielle de Doha
• 4 LA MISE EN CONFORMITÉ DU DROIT INDIEN
AU DROIT OMC : L’INERTIE PUIS LE PRAGMATISME
— 4.1 L’inertie indienne dans l’adaptation de la législation
nationale sur le brevet
— 4.2 Un amendement judicieux de la loi indienne sur le brevet
• 5 CONCLUSION