In Ireland, a country which has long been riddled with political upheaval, violence and division, it may be viewed as surprising that jury trial has endured. Indeed the survival of the jury in this context may be seen as a powerful symbol of the triumph of an institution that has endured throughout the years in very different legal and political landscapes and a living testament to the adaptability of the common law tradition with which the jury system is often associated. Not only did the jury survive the political troubles in eighteenth and nineteenth century Ireland but it has also survived the constitutional changes of the twentieth century which brought about the partition of the island into two separate legal jurisdictions, the Republic of Ireland, an independent state comprising 26 out of the 32 counties on the island, and Northern Ireland comprising the other six counties and remaining part of the United Kingdom. [2] Although jury trial was imposed under the English common law in Ireland, this mode of trial was enshrined for criminal cases in the Irish Constitution of 1937 and remains an important constitutional right in the Republic of Ireland.

At another level, however, jury trial in Ireland (both North and South) may be viewed as a dying remnant from the past, more deeply in decline perhaps even than in England and Wales, with only the force of tradition saving it from complete extinction. Jury trials have almost entirely disappeared in civil cases both north and south of the border. [3] In the Republic of Ireland civil juries are only retained for libel, slander, assault and false imprisonment cases. [4]

This essay will focus on the distinctive features of criminal trial by jury in the Republic of Ireland in order to explain, on the one hand, how the jury continues to survive within modern Ireland, and, on the other hand, how it has also managed to decline in significance. Despite the constitutional guarantee of jury trial in criminal cases in the Irish Republic, it will be seen that this is subject to important exceptions with the result that most criminal accused are tried before a judge sitting alone rather than a jury.

Jury trial in Ireland has often had to operate in a turbulent society. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in particular, when violence and sectarian tensions abounded, the jury system came under considerable strain. At certain periods and in particular parts of the country intimidation of both jurors and witnesses, antipathy towards the state, close community ties between jurors and accused and juror sympathy with accused combined to create serious difficulties in securing convictions. Jurors were particularly reluctant to enforce the law in agrarian and political cases but there is also some evidence of a reluctance to convict even in cases of ordinary, everyday crime. This has been borne out by evidence that in the latter half of the nineteenth century conviction rates were lower than in England and Wales for all categories of crime. [6] Legal folk-lore has also abounded with stories of perverse jury acquittals. [7] In one of these a judge is said to have dismissed a prisoner with the words, “You have been acquitted by a Limerick jury, and you may now leave the dock without any other stain upon your character !” [8] It has been suggested that the root problem stemmed from the dual function of the system of jury trial. [9] On the one hand it is supposed to enforce the law of the land; on the other hand, it is supposed to represent judgement by one’s peers. Where, however, many of the laws are out of harmony with jurors’ own convictions and where jurors have sympathy with many of their peers who are put on trial, the jury system can undermine the entire system of criminal justice.

As a result of these problems, a number of remedial tactics were employed by the Crown and the prosecuting authorities in order to ensure the conviction of offenders. One tactic was the trial, where possible, of offences without the use of a jury by, for example, the extension of the jurisdiction of the summary courts and the use of non-jury trials, before “resident magistrates” as they were called, for the trial of a large proportion of offences. Although the sentences handed down in these courts of summary jurisdiction would inevitably be lighter, it was hoped that this tactic would result in more convictions. [10]

Where, however, the use of jury trial could not be avoided a number of more subtle tactics were developed by the Crown in an effort to ensure the punishment of offenders. Such strategies included the extensive use of the Crown’s right to ask potential jurors to stand-by, the transfer of trials to different venues in order to avoid local prejudices, the use of “special jurors” [11] and the reduction of charges in order to convince defendants to plead guilty. [12] The use of the prosecution’s right to ask potential jurors to stand-by was particularly controversial and frequently led to accusations of jury packing. Indeed, it was believed by some that the prosecution used this right in order to select a jury more sympathetic to the prosecution’s case, for example, a predominantly Protestant jury where the accused was a Catholic. [13] The Crown on the other hand contended that the right of ‘stand-by’ was used merely to ensure an unbiased jury in cases where the impartiality of potential jurors was in doubt. There was also some suggestion that the sub-sheriffs who empanelled the jury were also involved in jury packing, calling only on particular categories of jurors for particular cases. [14] If it was suspected that a sheriff had manipulated the jury in this way the English procedure of ‘challenge to the array’ was open to the accused or the prosecution. The potential for such ‘packing’ by sheriffs was, however, greatly reduced in 1873 when the Juries (Ireland) Act 1871 came into force. This Act provided for a system of jury service by alphabetical rotation and consequently significantly curtailed the discretion of the sheriff in empanelling the jury.

These attempts by the Crown to influence the composition of the jury and thereby the outcome of the case were matched on the defence side by the frequent use of the extensive right of peremptory challenge. Each defendant was given the right to challenge 20 jurors if accused of a felony and, from 1876, six if charged with a misdemeanour, [15] and this meant that, despite the efforts of the Crown, conviction rates were kept low, particularly in ‘agrarian’ and political cases. Although many of the strategies adopted by the Government and prosecuting authorities in Ireland to increase the prospect of conviction, such as the extensive use of the summary jurisdiction and the use of stand-by, were also utilised in England and Wales, [16] periods of particular political and agrarian tension in some parts of Ireland caused these tactics to place even greater strain on Irish jury trial.

Indeed, in times of particular unrest jury trial was suspended altogether for specified periods for certain offences and in particular locations with the substitution instead of a variety of special courts. In 1882, for example, in the aftermath of a number of particularly sensational murders known as the Phoenix Park murders, legislation was enacted which was to allow for the non-jury trial of certain serious offences. The Prevention of Crimes (Ireland) Act 1882 intended to create a “Special Commission Court” comprising three senior judges who would try such serious offences in the absence of a jury. Although the Special Commission Court was never used, the very enactment of this legislation illustrates that Ireland has never been a stranger to the concept of non-jury trial, particularly during troubled periods, and this may go some way to explaining the ease with which jury trial, regarded by some as a fundamental right, continues to be withdrawn from certain categories of offenders well into the twentieth century.

Given the political tensions and divided nature of Irish society in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the notion of trial by an impartial jury of one’s peers which would result in a conviction where the evidence of guilt was clear was always going to be a difficult achievement. There are differing views as to the extent of the difficulties encountered by the jury system in Ireland and their impact on the institution. On the one hand, it has been contended that, despite its problems, jury trial was never truly doubted as the most appropriate mode of trial for criminal offences in Ireland, [17] whereas on the other hand it has been argued that given the difficult circumstances in which jury trial was forced to operate the persistence of a jury system in Ireland at all is “an achievement of note.” [18] Although we cannot be sure of the extent to which jury trial was truly threatened during this turbulent time, we shall see that the difficulties of the past have left their mark on the modern jury system in Ireland. If the troubles have cast a shadow on the operation of the modern jury, however, the system has been bolstered in the Republic of Ireland by a constitutional guarantee which protects the right to jury trial in criminal cases. We turn now to consider the significance of this constitutional guarantee.

The importance of the constitutional guarantee in light of the troubled nature of Irish history has been expressed by one senior judge as follows :

“The bitter Irish race-memory of politically appointed and Executive-oriented judges, of the suspension of jury trial in times of popular revolt, of the substitution therefor of summary trial or detention without trial, of cat-and-mouse releases from such detention, of packed juries and sometimes corrupt judges and prosecutors, had long been implanted in the consciousness of the people, and, therefore, in the minds of their political representatives, the conviction that the best way of preventing an individual from suffering a wrong conviction for an offence was to allow him to “put himself upon his country”, that is to say to allow him to be tried for that offence by a fair, impartial and representative jury, sitting in a court presided over by an impartial and independent judge appointed under the Constitution, who would see that all the requirements for a fair and proper jury trial would be observed, so that, amongst other things, if the jury’s verdict were one of not guilty, the accused could leave court with the absolute assurance that he would never again “be vexed” for the same charge.” [21]

This statement goes some way to explaining why it was thought necessary to entrench trial by jury in the new Constitution of the Republic of Ireland. In the eyes of many the criminal justice system had been corrupted by those in authority during the troubles of the eighteenth and nineteenth century and the constitutionally protected jury provided a safeguard against future tyranny. This continues to provide an enduring rationale for the continuation of the jury system in other countries, [22] but in Ireland of all places where there had been such enormous political upheaval and strife, the risk of future tyranny could not be discounted until well into the twentieth century. It would therefore seem that although the troubles provide an explanation as to why the jury system never established as firm a grasp on the Irish legal system as it did in England and Wales, they also provide an explanation for its continued existence under the new Constitution.

Despite this entrenchment, however, jury trial in the Republic of Ireland has been significantly eroded in recent years. Firstly, as previously mentioned, the Constitution itself considerably qualifies this right by exempting minor offences, special courts and military tribunals from jury trial. Secondly, this right is further diminished by the acceptance of majority as opposed to unanimous jury verdicts. It will become evident, when these distinctive features of trial by jury in the Republic of Ireland are examined in more detail, that despite the apparent strength of the constitutional guarantee official policies on jury trials in criminal cases have become decidedly abolitionist in modern Ireland. But before we examine these issues, we need to examine how the constitutional guarantee has affected the composition of the modern Irish jury.

All five members of the Supreme Court agreed that the property qualification was unconstitutional. Two of them held that it constituted an invidious discrimination which violated the equality clause of the Constitution. Two others held that it produced a lack of representativeness which failed to comply with the notion of a jury as required in criminal cases by Article 38.5 of the Constitution. The fifth member concurred without stating a specific reason. On the issue of women on juries, four members of the Supreme Court found the effective exclusion of women to be unconstitutional, partly on the ground of inequality and partly on the grounds of lack of representativeness. The Chief Justice, O’Higgins CJ, dissented on this issue. He held that since the State, while allowing women to serve as jurors, “permits each woman to decide for herself, in accordance with her own circumstances and special responsibilities, whether service on a jury is a right she ought to exercise or a burden she ought to undertake”, [26] it could not be regarded as engaging in invidious discrimination. The 1976 Act which was implemented partly as a result of this decision, provides simply that, subject to certain exceptions, every citizen between 18 years of age and 70 and entered on the register of Dáil electors in a jury district shall be eligible for jury service. [27] There is no discrimination on the basis of gender or property ownership. The exceptions consist of persons who are ineligible [28] for or disqualified [29] from jury service, and persons excusable as of right. [30]

Turning to the rules governing the selection of juries, panels of potential jurors are first of all drawn up by each County Registrar from the register of Dáil electors for the county using “a procedure of random or other non-discriminatory selection”. [31] These jurors are then summoned to attend at court on a particular date and at the beginning of each jury trial jurors are selected from the jury panel by ballot in open court. [32] Before jury selection is commenced, however, the judge must warn potential jurors that ineligible or disqualified persons must not serve on the jury and outline the penalty for doing so. The judge must then go on to call upon any person who knows that he or she is not qualified, or is in doubt as to whether he or she is qualified to serve on the jury, or any person who may “have an interest in or connection with the case or the parties”, to inform the judge of this fact, either orally or otherwise, if selected. [33] Although having an interest in the case or the parties is not itself grounds for disqualification from jury service, such an interest or connection may form the basis of a challenge.

Like Northern Ireland, but unlike England and Wales, [34] the right of peremptory challenge still exists in the Republic of Ireland alongside the right of challenge for cause. Indeed in jury trials in this jurisdiction, both the defence and the prosecution may challenge up to seven jurors without cause. [35] In a case involving many co-defendants, each defendant may challenge seven potential jurors without cause, whereas the prosecution may never challenge more than seven jurors notwithstanding the number of co-accused. [36] No explanation whatever need be given for these peremptory challenges. Any number of jurors may subsequently be challenged with cause. [37] Finally, it appears that the right to ask potential jurors to ‘stand-by’, once enjoyed by the Crown, no longer exists in Ireland. [38]

Unlike the situation which prevails in the United States, potential jurors in the Republic of Ireland may not be questioned by the parties to the proceedings before challenges are made. Indeed accused persons and the prosecution are armed with little or no insight into the sympathies and prejudices of potential jurors with which to make the decision to challenge or not. Although any member of the public is entitled to reasonable facilities to inspect a jury panel and any party to a proceedings is entitled to apply to the County Registrar for a copy of the jury panel list free of charge, [39] these lists generally contain only the names and addresses of potential jurors and occasionally their occupation and consequently provide little information for either the accused or the prosecution to decide whether to exercise their rights of challenge.

The rights of challenge (both peremptory and with cause) have so far escaped critical attention in this jurisdiction, although as we shall it has been the subject of some scrutiny in Northern Ireland. It can without doubt be used to exclude women (or men), or members of racial, religious or ethnic minorities. In the absence of any empirical research on the matter, it is difficult to assess the predominant motivations underpinning the use of this statutory privilege. Each side of a case will obviously wish to have a jury which is most likely to be sympathetic towards it. Age and socio-economic status are therefore likely to be the more predominant criteria informing peremptory challenges. There is evidence that peremptory challenging was commonplace in nineteenth century trials. Kenny records that in Ireland in the past the policy of some lawyers, presumably acting for the defence, was to challenge anyone who wore a necktie. [40] It is possible that the same mentality may underpin many challenges made today.

There is no statutory requirement for gender balance on Irish juries. The Law Reform Commission recently considered the matter in the context of rape law but decided against recommending a minimum number of women on juries in rape trials. [41] Statistics for the years 1979 to 1986 [42] show that the changes made in the 1976 Act have increased the representation of women on juries with the percentage of women on juries varying over those years from 23 per cent to 44 per cent. The Commission did not find any direct correlation between the gender composition of juries and verdict and verdicts of not guilty were returned in several cases in which there had been a majority of women jurors. But there is much still to be investigated about the effect of jury composition on jury verdicts.

It would seem that there is a more general need for empirical investigation into the practice of jury challenges whether with or without cause and into patterns of jury composition. As already noted a wide variety of citizens are eligible to be excused from jury service. Furthermore, the penalty for failure to answer a summons for jury service is merely a fine of £50. [43] It has been suggested that a fairly high percentage of jurors are likely to be unemployed. [44] All of these factors point to the necessity for an investigation of prevailing patterns of jury composition. Much of the official and rhetorical support for jury trial rests on the assumption that it consists of trial by twelve of one’s peers randomly chosen which in turn implies a reasonable guarantee of representativeness. But for the reasons just indicated this can no longer be assumed. Also, as Irish society becomes slowly but surely more multicultural, it is all the more important that peremptory challenges are not being used in a discriminatory fashion.

The first exception to the right of trial by jury in the Republic of Ireland concerns minor offences which may be tried by a “court of summary jurisdiction”, [45] meaning in effect the District Court. One of the more innovative aspects of the judicial system established in 1924 after the achievement of political independence was the substitution of a professional judiciary for the magistracy. This is a curious step in a country which was clearly so suspicious of abuse of power by the state. It has been argued, however, that the lay Justices of the Peace which were used in Ireland prior to partition were perceived as strongly associated with British rule [46] and this may go some way towards explaining why the Republic on independence replaced this office with a professional magistrate. Therefore unlike England and Wales which favours a lay magistracy, legally qualified fact-finders are favoured over lay fact-finders in courts of summary jurisdiction in the Republic of Ireland. Further, as the qualifications for appointment as a District Judge are quite stringent, [47] a reasonably extensive jurisdiction in both civil and criminal matters can be granted to the District Court.

Like the question of what constitutes a jury for the purposes of the constitutional guarantee, the Constitution of Ireland does not provide a definition of a “minor” offence for the purposes of summary trial. In the absence of a constitutional or statutory definition, it has been left to the superior courts to identify the distinguishing characteristics of a minor offence fit to be tried summarily. The main criterion developed so far is the level of punishment which the offence may attract. [48] At present, the District Court is precluded from imposing a prison sentence in excess of one year for any one offence or two years for a combination of offences. It may not impose a fine in excess of £1,000 for an indictable offence although many summary offences now carry fines of up to £1,500. Any offence for which the appropriate punishment would appear, in the opinion of the District Court, to exceed these sentences should not be treated as minor. The defendant should therefore be sent forward to trial to a higher court or if he or she has pleaded guilty, be sent forward for sentence on a signed plea. Another distinguishing criterion is the moral quality of the offence and it has been held that certain offences such as murder and rape should never, on account of their heinous nature, be treated as minor. [49] It is clear therefore that the jurisdiction of the District Courts in criminal matters is quite extensive, with the result that, notwithstanding the constitutional guarantee to jury trial in criminal matters, most criminal accused in the Republic of Ireland are tried before a judge sitting alone without a jury. Indeed in 1997,99.6 per cent of all criminal cases in the Republic of Ireland were dealt with in the District Court before a legally qualified fact-finder sitting alone. [50]

The other two exceptions to the right of trial by jury relate to circumstances when jury trial would be inappropriate or would be ineffective to secure the conviction of offenders. Military tribunals may be established to try persons subject to military law and to try offences during a “state of war or armed rebellion”. But Article 38.3 of the Constitution also provides for the establishment by law of special courts “for the trial of offences in cases where it may be determined in accordance with such law that the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice, and the preservation of public peace and order.” Advantage has been taken of this provision on three occasions since 1939 to establish Special Criminal Courts, the most recent of which was in 1972 when the Court was re-established in response to the spill-over effects of violence within Northern Ireland. [51] The Special Criminal Court is governed by the Offences against the State Act 1939 which provides most significantly that this court sits without a jury and that it must comprise an uneven number of members not below three. [52]

The jurisdiction of the Special Criminal Court is potentially quite expansive, extending both to certain “scheduled” offences and “non-scheduled” offences. Under section 36 of the 1939 Act the Government can schedule “offences of any particular class or kind under any particular enactment” for trial by the Special Criminal Court. This has meant that a wide range of offences have been scheduled, including offences under the Malicious Damage Act 1861, section 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875, the Explosive Substances Act 1883 and the Firearms Acts 1925-71. Persons charged with such offences must be tried before the Special Criminal Court, unless the Director of Public Prosecutions directs otherwise. In addition, section 46 of the 1939 Act provides that non-scheduled offences can also be tried by the Special Criminal Court where the Director of Public Prosecutions certifies that in his opinion the ordinary courts are inadequate in a particular case to secure the effective administration of justice, and the preservation of public peace and order. Although the rationale for the establishment of the Special Criminal Court was largely anxiety about jury intimidation by terrorist organisations, the jurisdiction of this court is not restricted to such cases but can extend also to ‘ordinary’ criminal conduct. For example, in November 1997 a defendant was tried and convicted in the Special Criminal Court of possession of cannabis for sale or supply. [53] However, despite the potential within the 1939 Act for the extensive use of the Special Criminal Court, the court has been employed very infrequently in recent years and indeed between 1990 and 1997 the number of accused persons indicted in the Special Criminal Court fell from 49 to only 26, with as few as 12 and 15 accused persons facing trial in the Special Criminal Court in 1995 and 1996 respectively. [54]

“The verdict of a jury in criminal proceedings need not be unanimous in a case where there are not fewer than eleven jurors if ten of them agree on the verdict.”

O’Callaghan argued that the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury demanded unanimity and as such section 25 was unconstitutional. In arriving at their decision the Supreme Court recalled that the requirement of unanimity had previously been relaxed by the Juries (Protection) Act 1929 and rejected O’Callaghan’s submission that unanimity was embedded in the Constitution by Article 38.5. Delivering the opinion of the court, O’Flaherty J took the opportunity to shed some further light on the fundamental characteristics of jury trial as protected by the 1937 Constitution :

“The purpose of trial by jury is to provide that a person shall get a fair trial, in due course of law, and be tried by a reasonable cross-section of people acting under the guidance of the judge, bound by his directions on law, but free to make their findings as to the facts. The essential feature of a jury trial is to interpose, between the accused and the prosecution, people who will bring their experience and commonsense to bear on resolving the issue of the guilt or innocence of the accused. A requirement of unanimity is not essential to this purpose.” [56]

It is arguable, however, that O’Flaherty J’s statement of the essential features of the constitutionally protected jury represents a considerably watered down version of the 1937 notion of jury trial, which at that time required the agreement of all twelve jurors. Indeed it is questionable whether a majority verdict, where up to two jurors are not convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, adequately protects the rights of the accused. [57] The Supreme Court itself conceded that if the proportion of jurors required for a majority verdict was “substantially lowered” it might be sufficient to raise a doubt about the guilt of the accused. On the other hand, it has been argued that the approach of the Supreme Court may have been influenced by practical considerations such as the vexation of finding section 25 of the 1984 Act unconstitutional and consequently all of the majority verdicts delivered under it invalid. [58]

In view of the approach of the superior courts, the constitutional guarantee does not appear to have rendered trial by jury in the Republic of Ireland inviolable. The courts’ interpretation of the qualifications to the scope of jury trial and the verdicts of the jury have arguably chipped away at this constitutional ‘right’ and indeed further erosion may lie ahead, for as O’Flaherty J noted in O’Callaghan, in spite of the constitutional protection : [59] “The operation of jury trials in criminal cases is not to be regarded as fixed and immutable; this was made clear by the amendment of the law that was brought about as a consequence of de Burca v Attorney General [1976] IR 38.”

This statement begs the question how far the constitutionally protected right to jury trial may be removed from the 1937 notion of the jury system without breaching the constitution. In the light of the Supreme Court decisions to date, it may be thought that the constitutional guarantee does little more than offer rhetorical support for the jury system rather than any substantial protection.

Unlike other systems such as the United States and more recently Canada where the constitutional guarantee would seem to have helped to bolster the institution of the jury, the constitutional guarantee in Ireland has failed to halt the decline. The Supreme Court has adopted a pragmatic approach which in effect would seem to permit the scope of jury trial and the powers of the jury to be influenced by contemporary perceptions of a fair trial. If the prevailing perception is that a fair trial can be guaranteed without a jury, it would seem that the Supreme Court is not necessarily going to stand in the way. Indeed it can be argued that the very existence of a Constitution protecting basic fundamental freedoms reduces the need for jury trial. [61] The enduring rationale for a jury system in criminal cases has been that it provides a buffer between the individual and the state and thereby a guarantee against state tyranny. We have seen that jury trial was entrenched in the Irish Constitution largely because of fear of abuse of power on the part of the state. As the Supreme Court has proved more active in preventing encroachment on constitutional rights by the state, however, this particular justification for the jury becomes more superfluous. [62]

Other justifications, of course, remain. A further attraction of jury trial is that it acts as link between the community of professional participants who operate within the criminal justice system and the community outside, injecting, as it has been put, [63] “lay acid” into the system. This is only an advantage, however, if it is possible to find juries who are representative of the community and who can be trusted to bring a degree of impartiality to the case. We have seen that in the past the jury system was plagued by low conviction rates. At same time many of the traditional reasons for very low conviction rates in Ireland would seem to be diminishing. There is less suspicion of the state and less tolerance of crime which has risen in all areas of Ireland, particularly urban property crime in the Dublin area. [64] The murder of an Irish journalist in 1996 in particular prompted particular concern and caused the Dáil to introduce tougher measures against criminals. [65] All this is likely to make juries more inclined to convict where there is clear evidence of guilt. [66]

But problems of representativeness remain. The small and largely rural nature of this jurisdiction continues to pose problems of jury representativeness and impartiality. The use of peremptory challenges has in the past been used to mitigate some of these problems and, as we have seen, is still defended as an important “safety valve” in the north. At the same time this power hardly affirms confidence in the system as it suggests that certain individuals are unable to put aside their personal prejudices when they serve on a jury. Moreover, the peremptory challenge system runs the risk of perpetuating rather than diminishing religious, political, racial, ethnic and gender discrimination.

It would seem that the future of the jury system in Ireland is poor unless greater steps are taken to build confidence in its ability to render verdicts which are just and reliable and to attune it more to the needs of the modern Irish criminal justice system. It has been argued that the jury is an ideal mode of trial within an adversary system of justice as it helps to ensure that the prosecution’s case is thoroughly presented and examined. [67] Ireland inherited a strong adversary tradition from the English common law and this tradition is maintained by a strong Bar dedicated to effective advocacy. [68] Many also regard lay participation in the criminal justice system as a very valuable means of promoting confidence in the system. [69] At the same time, as this conference illustrates, there are many different kinds of jury system and each has to be suited to the political, cultural and legal contexts in which it is embedded. [70] The prevalent view that juries are unsuited to the Irish context is likely to continue unless steps are taken to look more exactingly at how juries are presently selected and how they are actually working. A contrast has been drawn between the secretive attitude adopted towards juries in the United Kingdom and Ireland and the much more open attitude in the United States and Canada. [71] Openness carries the risk of unwelcome exposure but is arguably a healthier attitude to adopt if one is serious about the longer term future of an institution. [72] Secrecy, on the other hand, is a sign of weakness and is likely to lead to ultimate decline. More open examination of the Irish jury might expose a number of shortcomings with the present system but it might also suggest particular solutions which may in the longer term help to fashion a system that is more suited to the needs of modern Ireland and consequently more robust. Until this happens the likelihood is that the jury system will sink further into the background of everyday practice in the criminal courts, still serving as a symbol of an ideal mode of justice but playing little part in the bulk of actual cases.