2001
Revue internationale de droit pénal
Interaction between lay assessors and professional judges in German mixed courts
Stefan MACHURA
[*]
[1]
1. A Culture of Co-operation Between Experts and Laypersons
Not only at the German courts but in numerous social settings professionals
and laypersons are working together in order to fulfill social functions. These
range from work in welfare organizations to, for instance, political tasks in the
local community. New social settings of this type continue to be created.
However, there is a potential for tension between experts, who have learned and
exercised their trade over years and laypersons who bring in their lay views and
experiences from other walks of life. Increasingly the German public became
skeptical of professionals because the supremacy of science has resulted in
social costs. A certain one-sidedness of trained experts has been claimed by
social movements. Laypersons no longer want to be dominated by professionals.
They are striving for the role of respected partners and they know intuitively that
professionals do depend on their co-operation in order to achieve the desired
results. Also, experts in a certain field need to employ their lay knowledge in other
fields in order to address problems. But here, their clients might be better
informed. On the other hand, blind faith in experts can still be found. The social
dominance of experts in German society has, at least, been challenged, and is no
longer taken for granted.
[2]
Much of this is true for the participation of laypersons in the German criminal
courts. Their traditional name stemming from medieval times is
Schöffen: People
who “make order between the parties through judgment.”
[3] However, since the
19
th century their main function is to represent the popular control in the process
of the application of law
[4]. It is modern, codified and positivistic state law which
regulates in the jurisdiction. Professional judges learned in law and trained by the
state run the German court system. Their professionalism assures the legal
system and a degree of equality in the application of law. On the other hand, it is
felt that there are costs of such an arrangement. No longer do German judges
come almost exclusively from the higher social classes
[5] and no longer are they
mere servants of the executive. The current generation of judges cannot even be
called “conservative” in a political sense. But they enjoy a wealthy middle-class
lifestyle and they are subjugated to the bureaucratic routines and structures of the
courts
[6]. There is reason to let other people take part in the decision-making of the
courts, at least when serious criminality is at stake. The
Schöffengerichte (courts
of lay assessors) in the lower criminal courts are decide cases in which a
maximum penalty of four years in prison may be imposed (cases up to two years
imprisonment can be decided by a single judge). Lay assessors are probably
closer to the public’s perception of what is just and unjust than the officials of the
justice bureaucracy.
[7] Schöffen in adult court are seen as representatives of the
citizenry,
[8] while
Jugendschöffen (juvenile lay assessors) are expected to bring
educational experience into the work of the juvenile criminal court.
[9]
S
chöffen for the adult court are not really representative of the population as
a whole
[10]. Foreigners cannot become lay assessors even if they have lived in
Germany for decades
[11]. Germany has a strong migrant minority, especially in the
Western part of the country and Berlin. The most important minority is Turkish.
People between 40 and 50 years of age, men and the civil servants are overrepresented.
[12] In addition, the lower social classes are underrepresented among
lay assessors. This is particularly true for industrial workers. There is an
overrepresentation of civil servants, who find greater support in being selected to
be a lay judge. It has also been said, that in order to provide the courts with
candidates really interested in being a lay judge, the authorities in charge actually
select people with a judge-like social background and attitude
[13]. Although citizens
may volunteer to serve, the pre-selection process usually is in the hands of the
major local political parties, the local public employers, the unions, the churches
and local associations. They care little about the quality of their candidates, but
there is a certain social screening process through which candidates from the
community can standard for candidacy. One can generally say that
Schöffen are
typically people who take duties seriously and care for their reputation as lawabiding citizens. Having noted this, lay judges still differ much one from another
with respect to their personal life experiences, political orientation, education and
so on. Compared to professional judges they are a more diverse group.
While lay judges and professional judges supposedly have the same rights
when working in a tribunal, the organization of the courts and the procedural rules
give the professional presiding judge a dominant position. This is obvious in the
disciplinary rules of the courts. Lay judges, in contrast to professional judgeassessors, can be fined on the spot if the presiding judge ascertains a violation of
court rules.
[14] More importantly, the presiding judge conducts the court hearing.
He grants the right to ask questions and he leads the deliberation and voting of
the panel.
[15] Until a very recent decision of the German Federal High Court
(
Bundesgerichtshof), lay assessors were denied the right to read the case file
[16]. It
remains to be seen whether the presiding judges now change their behaviour.
The professional judge always has knowledge of the case. He or she has set the
trial after studying the file. Lay judges are thus not really equals.
This remains true even though most criminal cases are legally simple.
[17] The
major problem for the tribunal is not that of correctly applying the penal code. For
this task the learned judges are educated. Instead, the tribunals’ attention is
occupied by questions of fact-finding and seeking an appropriate sentence (length
of prison term, educational measure, e.g.). It may well be that lay assessors are
not typically weaker than professional judges when it comes to the evaluation of
the evidence. Regarding the determination of sentences, tribunals have a rather
wide scope of possible outcomes. There is much room for personal values to
influence the decision.
Christoph Rennig showed that lay assessors do not prefer
“extreme sentences” more than professional judges. “Extreme sentences” he
defined as beyond the range given by the pleas of the defending attorneys and
the prosecutors.
[18]
As most of the empirical studies on lay assessors date back to the 1980s and
before
[19], the following chapters refer mainly to a survey of the author. Most
criminal cases in which lay assessors function are dealt with in the lower criminal
courts (
Amtsgerichte) by the
Schöffengericht (court of lay assessors) or in juvenile
cases by the
Jugendschöffengericht. Here also, the highest number of lay
assessors serve. (The jurisdictions of these courts covers a middle range of
crimes. The
Schöffengericht deals with criminal cases in which a penalty between
two and four years of imprisonment are expected. The
Jugendschöffengericht has
to deal with cases in which a juvenile might get a prison sentence of up to five
years.) The number of lay assessors involved in, and the percentage of crimes
tried in these courts, explain our choice of focussing thereon.
Lay assessors were been asked about their experience at the lower criminal
courts (
Amtsgerichte) of Bochum and Frankfurt am Main. Both cities are in the
Western part of Germany. Frankfurt is the bigger city and known as a banking
center while Bochum is situated in an industrial area. This different social and
political background influenced the composition of the lay assessors. Lay
assessors at the adult and juvenile courts participated in the study. The number of
lay assessors actually available was about 190 for Bochum and about 530 for
Frankfurt. 151 persons in Bochum and 417 in Frankfurt returned their
questionnaires on time. The lay assessors of Bochum filled out the questionnaire
in the last two months of their term duty, in 1996. The lay assessors from
Frankfurt had finished the first year of their four-year term, when questioned in
1997. In Bochum and Frankfurt some of the lay assessors were serving for a
second term. A few had even more past terms in the courts. Since the Frankfurt
court has compiled lay assessor lists, including a great number of names,
Frankfurt lay assessors served four times per year on the average compared with
eight times for Bochum
[20]. The difference in experience is welcome for the
facilitators testing whether the amount of service asa lay assessor affects their
judgments in individual cases.
In the questionnaire, the respondents were asked to provide information
about their personal background, their opinions about German courts in general,
the role of lay persons in the criminal courts, and about how they perceived their
last day in court and their general experience as lay assessors over the time they
served. When asked about their last trial day, this was in relation to the “ordinary”
constellation, in which the bench is made up of one presiding professional judge
and two lay assessors.
In addition to the material obtained by written questionnaire from Schöffen in
both courts, there also were in-depth-interviews with Schöffen in Bochum. In
these 51 interviews conducted between January and April 1997, the respondents
were invited to speak freely about their experiences.
The study deals with mixed tribunals as a working group under clear
authority of the presiding judge. It was originally intended to test theories of
procedural justice. In a later chapter, the most prominent theory will be described.
In addition, lay assessors should be considered as just one example of the
numerous types of lay participation in state affairs. It thus forms part of the
broader topic of citizen’s participation.
An analysis of the interaction between professional judges and lay assessors
might begin with a description of a typical day. The events start in the presiding
judge’s chambers, or, perhaps, in the corridors, continue in the courtroom, and, of
course, the court cafeteria, and are finally resolved in the deliberation room, and
so on.
2. Reception and Briefing in the Judge’s Chambers
In German courts, there are no assembly rooms for lay assessors. Thus lay
assessors sometimes complain about having to wait in the corridor while exposed
to the looks of the people gathering around. Sometimes they hear talk between
defendants and their lawyers, friends and relatives. This already demonstrates
that judges and court administrations usually care little about the situation of lay
assessors
[21].
Just before the trial is about to start, the presiding judge asks the lay
assessors to come into his chambers. The
Schöffen normally do not know
anything in advance about the cases. The welcoming ceremony in the presiding
judge’s chambers is often very brief, its occupant is in a hurry. In the Bochum and
Frankfurt study, a respondent remarked that a judge did not even ask him about
his profession, which could be considered as the minimum of courtesy. Often the
lay assessors do not hear enough about the cases
[22] and they have to figure
things out while listening to the testimony at trial. Unlike an American or English
jury trial, the presentations are not really designed to facilitate understanding by a
lay person without knowledge of the investigative file. The opening statement of
the prosecutor is often read out in a hasty manner that does not allow anyone to
understand.
[23] Some judges try to “prepare” their
Schöffen in a way that attunes
them to the intended outcome. During her apprenticeship in court a young lawyer
witnessed a presiding judge who always looked through the window, his back to
the
Schöffen, while talking in an unintelligible manner about the morning’s cases.
Other judges take their duties more seriously and try to inform the Schöffen in a
way that helps them grasp the case. Since researchers as observers have no
access to the court briefing and to the files, so as to compare them, the extent of
such behaviour is unclear.
“I really love judge (...)”, a woman said in an interview. Liking and disliking
matters in social relations. Some actors often already know each other. This
depends on the number of judges at the court, the system of assignment of
Schöffen, the length of the
Schöffen’s term and pure chance. It does make a
difference whether the presiding judge remembers an assessor’s face or not. The
judge remembers a previous confrontation or co-operation and may take that into
account. The lay assessor has his or her own memories and consequent
anticipation of the events which will follow. Often prejudices connected with
gender matter in the court. In the interviews and questionnaires from Bochum and
Frankfurt, housewives often felt discriminated (“only a stupid housewife”). Some
men moaned about the female judges’ behaviour and timing : to them female
judges rush through the trials in order to be back home at lunchtime. Some
women stressed that men took too long to come to the point. Each panel at the
juvenile court is staffed with a male and a female lay assessor.
[24] Although the
vast majority of defendants saw the presiding judge as not being biased against
them, thirteen percent of the
Schöffen in Bochum and 14% in Frankfurt suspected
some bias.
The relationship between the individual lay assessors and the presiding
judge is but one side of the coin. The other is the relation between the two lay
assessors. Here also, prejudice sometimes appears between different sexes,
occupations and age groups
[25]. Lay assessors appeared, in the interview, to want
others to be people like themselves : old, young, women, female, self-employed,
workers and so on. Old-style authoritarian personalities favoring harsh sentences
and left wing social workers or teachers pleading for education instead of
punishment confronted each other. Engaged lay assessors emphasized a
recurrent problem : They found most of their colleagues to be too reluctant and
passive, too much compliant in relation to the presiding judge. One of them stated
that he became happy when he saw a female lay assessor known for her special
courage.
It would be interesting to know the presiding judges, already wear their black
robes when meeting the Schöffen. When the panel enters the courtroom, the robe
of the presiding professional judge reflects her authority among the group.
3. “Like Bodyguards of the Judge” – Are They Forced to Be Silent During
the Hearing ?
About courts in Moscow
George Feifer
[26] once wrote : “The lay assessors
would simply be in attendance, like bodyguards of the judge.” Observers of trials
regularly note the inaction of the lay assessors. They are simply listening. Only
few of them feel inclined to ask.
[27] What are the reasons for this ?
The German “inquisitorial” method of procedure is there from the outset. The
presiding judge conducts the trial. He or she has the dominant role. Only after he
or she has examined the witness or the defendant, do the others get a chance. In
this respect, the prosecution and the defense, the professional judge assessors
and the lay assessors are equal.
Of course, there are extremes. An authoritarian presiding judge might not
accept another tribunal members’ desire to ask additional questions since that
means that he or she failed to ask about all relevant aspects of the case.
[28] In
tribunals with several professional judges, the younger judges, whose career may
depend on the protection of the presiding judge, may also feel pressure to remain
passive
[29]. But this is not all.
There often is a fear that laypersons may not find an appropriate way to ask
questions. An impression of bias may be the effect. In order to avoid this,
professional judges tell lay assessors from the outset that there are dangers to
asking. Some questions
Schöffen take that so seriously that they never ask
questions. One presiding judge explains to the lay assessors; that if they have a
question they should tell him and he will ask it for them
[30].
After finishing their examination, the presiding judge must ask other
members of the bench whether there are additional questions for the witness.
Often lay assessors complain that they are asked : “Are there any questions ?”, in
a tone which makes it more than clear that such questions are not welcome.
However, the fact that nearly all judges comply with this rule, may contribute to
the view of the majority of lay assessors that they were given a fair opportunity to
ask. Only 7%
[31] and 14%
[32] stated that they had less than sufficient opportunity to
ask questions during their last trials.
An important reason for lay assessors remaining silent during the trial is their
lack of information about the case. On the one hand, this forces them to listen
carefully to the testimony in order to understand the case
[33]. It is difficult to
develop useful questions when occupied with understanding what is going on.
[34]
On the other hand, requires some knowledge in order to ask questions. Since lay
assessors are denied access to the case file and many presiding judges give
insufficient orientation prior to the hearings, lay assessors often simply do not
have a level of understanding such as would enable them to explore alternatives
to the aspects which the presiding judge has checked. Given this informationbased influence of the presiding judge on lay assessors, his or her questions may
seem to be exhaustive, at least for the moment.
Thus access to information is crucial for the lay assessors to make effective
use of their right to ask questions. However, there is clearly a minority of lay
assessors which does not bother to play an active role. It is also often reasonable,
not to ask additional questions, such as in cases where the evidence is clear, the
defendant has confessed, and the presiding judge, prosecutor and defense have
seemingly exhausted all aspects of the case. Given that lay assessors do not ask
questions during most of the hearings, what can they achieve during the
deliberations ? Before addressing this, some other topics have to be discussed.
One of these especially contributes to the social cohesion of the working group
which comprises the mixed court.
4. About Breaks, Coffee with the Judge, Bargaining in the Corridor and Fait accompli
A social scientist detects social rites in the courts which might be considered
irrelevant from the point of view of legal dogmatism. However, such aspects of
court life make a certain sense to the participants. According to a social
psychological theory of procedural justice
[35] people learn about their social
standing in a group from the way they are treated by the authority. A presiding
judge who invites his lay assessors to join him at the cafeteria during the break
gives a signal of acceptance. In interviews with lay assessors such behaviour was
considered as a positive gesture by the presiding judge. Of course, there may be
small talk about personal or local affairs or hobbies. From such small signs of
social acceptance, lay assessors develop a sense of group membership in the
panel. And it helps them developing interpersonal trust. If there are repeated
encounters between judge and lay assessor, this feeling grows on both sides up
and may reach the stage of “old acquaintanceship”. Both sides, professional and
layperson, may benefit by this if there is an argument in the tribunal. But, given
the skewed power balance, the professional judge benefits more from such social
accreditation.
Breaks during the hearing may be provide an opportunity to exchange ideas
about the case. Sometimes lay assessors ask for additional information from the
judge or request that additional questions be asked during the next court session.
Among the more critical experiences of lay assessors are moments in which
the presiding judge, the prosecutor and the defense attorney bargain about the
outcome of the case
[36]. Often such deals are made without participation of the lay
assessors. Then they must simply accept the outcome, which is not only
embarrassing for the lay assessors but also contrary to law. The tribunal as a
whole should decide the case. It is more appreciated when the presiding judge
invites the lay assessors to attend the bargaining session.
One does not know the extent between presiding judges, lawyers and/or
prosecutors are the tip of an iceberg. The extent of this practice is unknown.
Comparing the survey results from the criminal courts in Bochum and Frankfurt it
was clear that some judges in Frankfurt routinely deal with the parties. And in
order to achieve the desired result, the professional judges have to “lead” the
hearing and the tribunal in “the right way”. It certainly has aspects of a theatre.
Several lay assessors in Frankfurt were upset about being effectively curtailed in
their rights. And they raised doubts about the justice of the verdicts achieved
through method of “procedural economy.” Again, it is hard to estimate the extent.
These tactics may be personal to some judges. The appropriate approach would
be to inform the lay assessors about the bargaining and to speak openly about
the pros and cons of the deal. Lay assessors should not be brought into a
situation in which all is nailed down before.
5. Behind Closed Doors : The Deliberation between Lay Assessors and Professional Judge
Outsiders like sociologists are not allowed to witness the deliberation of a
German tribunal. What we know comes from accounts of professional judges and
lay assessors.
The professional judge sets the trial schedule and several trials are often
heard on a morning. By presiding over the deliberation, the professional judge
also influences whether there is time pressure for the deliberations or not. In the
Bochum and Frankfurt sample, 85% and 80% of the respondents stated that there
was no or hardly any time pressure for the deliberations, while 10% and 12%
recognized “some”. Taken together, 6% in Bochum and 8% in Frankfurt reported
“quite” and “very” much time pressure.
In beginning the deliberations, the presiding judge may sum up the
evidence
[37] or invite spontaneous comments. Sometimes there are no additional
remarks by the lay assessors. Otherwise the lay assessors express their feelings
about the case, ask for additional information or suggest a certain ruling of the
court.
Schöffen in Bochum and Frankfurt were asked about the degree of their
participation in deliberations on their last day in court. While in Bochum 43%
indicated they participated “very often”, in Frankfurt this group made up only 26%.
In Bochum 47% said they participated “quite often”, as compared to 53% in
Frankfurt. While only 9% in Bochum participated “sometimes” or “hardly”, twice as
many gave such responses in Frankfurt. An initial informal exchange of opinions
often precedes a more systematic discussion a to the amount of basic information
the presiding judge gave them about the case, 40% of the Schöffen in Bochum
stated “very” much, 45% “quite” much, 12% “some” and 3% “hardly” enough. In
the Frankfurt sample 36% indicated “very” much, 45% “quite” much, 12% “some”,
4% “hardly” enough and 3% “nothing at all”. The presiding judge must inform the
lay assessors about the minimum and maximum sentences provided by law. In
most cases, they await a suggestion by the presiding judge regarding the verdict.
A common response is nodding or at least compliance. But conflicts also occur in
the panel. The more a lay assessor leans to a harsher or more lenient view, the
greater the chance for debate. Among the respondents in the Bochum and
Frankfurt study, there are many such examples. Persons demanding more severe
sentences are not only disappointed about the law which does not allow more
radical options. They also curse about “soft” judges and “soft” or “weak” fellow lay
assessors. Sometimes a lay assessor wants the tribunal to react less severely to
a crime. This may be motivated by social or pedagogical views or by feelings of
“just desert”. Sometimes dissenting opinions are fueled by a conviction which is
neither reflected in the law nor shared by the rest of the panel. Conflicts of values
occur, e.g. regarding sexual behaviour or drug-related offenses.
Sometimes lay assessors bring new aspects into the discussion. Asked
whether they stated an opinion different from that of the presiding judge during
the deliberations, 3% in Bochum stated “very often”, 16% “quite often”, 70%
“sometimes”, 9% “hardly” and 1% “never”. In Frankfurt, the figures were 4%, 15%,
60%, 13% and 6%. The lay assessors also rated the extent of the presiding
judge’s efforts to understand their positions. 67% in Bochum and 83% in Frankfurt
indicated “very” and “quite” much. But the rest thought different, which is an
indicator for a problematic work relation. Two examples from the oral interviews
show how lay assessors’ interventions sometimes lead to a change of opinion. A
lay assessor recalled how he convinced the panel that some juveniles did not
have enough strength to destroy a particular amount of material. In another case,
the defendant claimed to have been maltreated by the police. A Schöffe told
about a relative’s experiences at the same police station, which resulted in a
different ruling favorable to the defendant.
Because of a lack of candidates with a degree or experience in education,
many persons become Schöffen in the juvenile court with the sole “qualification”
of parenthood. During deliberations, many professional juvenile judges value the
opinions of teachers, social workers or others in education. In such cases, the
relationship is one between experts, some in law, others in education. It is no
wonder that lay assessors in German juvenile courts often have better standing
than their colleagues in the “ordinary” Schöffengerichte.
6. Why Is There So Few Formal Voting ?
While there is a detailed regulation of voting in the courts
[38], in practice little
formal voting takes place in German criminal courts. This applies not only to
courts with lay assessors but seems to be a general trait of all German criminal
courts. The reason for this is the great emphasis on discussion and consensual
decisionmaking
[39]. Judges prefer unequivocal decisions in an informal
atmosphere. If the lay assessors have a somewhat different opinion, the presiding
judge tries to persuade and in case of stable divergent opinions prefers to
compromise rather than being formally outvoted by the lay assessors. This is
overlooked by critics of lay participation who simply focus on one question : how
often are professional judges outvoted ? The culture of consensus has such deep
roots, that many participants, if asked about the discussion later, honestly say that
there was no real conflict.
[40]
Professional judges also prefer informal deliberations because discussion is
easier and there are less conflicts. And they prefer to give in instead of fighting
because this leaves their personal authority untouched.
7 Co-operation after Conflict and the Frequency the Professional Judge is
Outvoted
In case of conflict in the panel, the professional judge usually isolates the
dissident
[41]. Years of experience in the courts provide the presiding judge with an
arsenal of arguments to persuade at least one lay assessor. However, most of the
lay assessors in the Frankfurt (49%) and Bochum (54%) samples declared that
they “sometimes” were successful with their own opinion during the deliberations
on the last trial day, 23% “quite often” and 6% “very often”. Nine percent in
Bochum and 11% in Frankfurt stated they were “hardly ever” successful, 1%
(Bochum) and 2% (Frankfurt) “never”. They were not necessarily, nor even
typically important points as to which the lay assessors had a direct influence.
The answers of “sometimes” successful could be characterized as “not often”.
Respondents were also asked about their general experience during their
terms as lay assessors. About two of three respondents stated that court would
have decided differently without lay assessors “in a few cases”, while about 20%
said that the court would have “almost never” decided differently. Here, lay
assessors who are proud of a strong influence on court decisions are in the
minnority
[42]. Obviously, lay assessors count even small effects when they are
asked about their contribution to the deliberation. But having “influence” for them
means to change the opinion of the professional judge (Gerken 1986,119).
Whenever this happens, it helps to forget a lot of disappointing experiences.
While some lay assessors reported that they never outvoted the presiding
judge, others have made such an experience. The following observations are
based on personal interviews with lay assessors in Bochum (n = 44 for this topic).
The frequency of such outvoting ranged from one time (n = 10) to more than ten
times (n = 2). How does the professional judge react to a defeat ? The normal
response is to keep calm and friendly. The professional judges go on in their
duties as usual without showing disfunctional behaviour. Very few lay assessors
remembered that a judge became angry, shouted or had problems to work on. Of
course, this is truly professional behaviour. But there are also ways at the
presiding judges‘ disposal to indicate his discontent to the prosecutor or defence
attorney
[43]. It may well be that the prospect of an appeal against the sentence
helps to deal with the situation.
8 Standard and other Types of Mixed Courts
In the previous chapters, a type of mixed tribunal was presupposed
consisting of one professional judge and two lay assessors. This constellation can
be found in the
Amtsgerichte (lower courts) for juvenile and adult cases
(
Schöffengericht and
Jugendschöffengericht), but in the lower chambers of the
district courts (
Kleine Strafkammer at the
Landgericht), again for juvenile and
adult cases. Most cases with participation of lay assessors are handled in these
courts. They are therefore called “standard” courts for the purposes of this paper.)
There are other configurations. As a rule-of-thumb it can be said that the
proportion between professional and lay judges is important.
[44] When lay persons
are in a minority, their influence diminishes.
The law permits a second professional judge to sit in the
Schöffengericht as
a judge-assessor.
[45] But the proportion of trials before such an “extended court of
lay assessors”
(Erweitertes Schöffengericht) is very small. In these courts there
are two professional judges and two lay assessors. This quite likely results in less
chances for the lay assessors to influence the outcome. Some interview partners
in the Bochum study once found themselves in such a court and did not sense a
different atmosphere
[46].
The constellation at the
Große Strafkammer of the district courts staffed with
three professional judges and two lay assessors, is much more important. Now
the lay assessors are likely to feel that they are in a minority. Although some
interview partners in Bochum experienced no difference, in the
Große
Strafkammer, others did, which is in line with previous studies
[47]. The Große
Strafkammer may also be made up of only two professional judges and two lay
assessors. However, at the Große Strafkammer, there is a greater exchange of
legal arguments between the professional judges. Lay assessors are thus often
isolated.
9 Interpersonal Fairness and a Sense of Justice Being Done
It turns out that lay assessors are deeply influenced by their evaluations of
fairness and justice in the court. Procedural fairness and the justice of outcomes
are the topic of a growing branch of social scientific research
[48]. While outcome is
about “what the decisions are”, procedure relates to “how decisions are made”.
[49]
Often it is hard to decide whether an outcome is just or not. This is especially true
for many criminal verdicts. Judgment about outcomes are less certain than those
relating to procedure, about which much is known beforehand.
[50] Psychologists
E.
Allan Lind and
Tom Tyler
[51] developed a “group value theory” of procedural
fairness. This theory, according to the research results from Frankfurt and
Bochum, is especially relevant for the way lay assessors experience the work
relationship with presiding judges. Lay assessors are typically concerned about
just verdicts. Thus there are two dimensions of fairness and justice which are
relevant to the following analyses.
Group value theory was also reformulated as “relational model of authority in
groups”.
[52] “[B]eyond communicating a message about access to resources,
procedures communicate messages about a person's status within society”.
[53]
People use a „fairness heuristic“ in order to determine their status in a social
group.
[54] Authorities symbolize the group. According to the “relational model of
authority in groups”, the fair or unfair behaviour of the person in authority tells an
individual whether or not he or she is accepted as a full member of the group.
[55] It
is important to have a good personal relationship with the authority. During their
socialisation people acquire the values of their society, including what is
procedural fairness.
[56] Daily encounters with authorities sharpen the individual‘s
sense for fair and unfair treatment. According to
Lind
[57] and
Tyler,
[58] there are
three main criteria for procedural justice :
“neutrality”, whether the authority appears biased or unbiased;
“benevolence”, whether the authority is perceived as trying to be fair; and
“status recognition”, whether the authority respects the individual’s status as
an equally entitled group member.
Another aspect was stressed by the early studies of
John Thibaut and
Laurens Walker,
[59] but appeared less relevant in the subsequent studies of
Lind
and
Tyler:
[60]
(4) “voice”, whether persons have the opportunity to state their case.
“Status recognition” might be especially important for lay assessors in a
mixed tribunal. In his study of German lay assessors,
Ekkehard Klausa
[61] pointed
out that the “deliberation atmosphere” is decisive for the function of lay assessors
in the mixed court. The presiding judge should treat his lay colleagues as equal
partners, take them seriously, show interest in their opinion and seek a “fair
compromise” with them. Similar results are reported from studies in Hungary and
Poland
[62].
As can be seen from table 1, majorities positively rated the presiding judge’s
fairness to them as lay assessors as well as the justice of the verdicts.
Respondents were given five-point-scales for their answers
[63]. The respondents
from Frankfurt were more critical than those in Bochum. Both groups felt less
comfortable about the verdicts as they were satisfied with the fairness in the work
relation.
Table 1:
The presiding judge’s fairness to lay assessors and the justice
Table 1: The presiding judge’s fairness to lay assessors and the justice
of verdicts - in percent
Fairness to lay assessors Justice of verdicts
Bochum Frankfurt Bochum Frankfurt
Very 72 65 42 27
Quite 19 28 42 52
Somewhat 5 4 9 8
Less 3 1 5 4
Not at all 0 1 0 2
Don’t know 0 0 1 2
No answer 1 1 2 5
According to
Geert Hofstede,
[64] there are cultures in which people typically
have what he called “high power distance orientation,” i.e., a social distance
between those in power and those who are to obey. A person of low social status
does not expect that a person of higher social status will listen to his opinion
before reaching a decision. “Low power distance orientation” means that those in
authority are not seen as a special class of people who generally have more
rights. People of lower status claim some influence for themselves. Even within
cultures, the degree of power distance varies. There are always persons with
different degrees of power distance orientation in each society.
Tyler, Lind and
Huo employed
Hofstede‘s theory in a number of empirical studies. They came to
the result that persons with a high power distance orientation evaluate encounters
with authorities more on outcome terms and less on relational or procedural
terms.
[65] If a person is ready to accept that superiors will decide what is to be
done, the way decisions are made by the authority appears less important. Lay
assessors with high power distance orientation are expected to be less critical
than others.
An attempt to measure power distance orientation was made for the
respondents from Frankfurt by adapting five of six items from a study by
Tyler,
Lind and
Huo
[66] to the situation of lay assessors. After analysing their correlations,
the final measure was formed by the following three items (Cronbach’s
α = .68):
- In order for the courts to function, lay assessors should follow the
- presiding judge's opinion without question.” (answers declining from 72%
“do not agree at all” to 1% “fully agree”).
- “There are few qualities more admirable in a lay assessor than dedication
and loyalty to his/her court.” (answers declining from 48% “do not agree at all” to 9% “fully agree”).
- “If lay assessors trust professional judges completely, the court will be most
successful.” (answers declining from 50% “do not agree at all” to 4%
“fully agree”).
Of course, some people are so proud of being entrusted with a public office,
that this alone makes them more satisfied, regardless of the results of their
activity. The same people often like the idea of having the opportunity to exert
power but they do not necessarily use this power, or they tolerate a broad range
of outcomes as long as they have the chance to vote in the decision-making
process. In a sense, such persons “consume” superficial aspects of their work
instead of focussing on its political function. To determine whether respondents
are so pleased about being entrusted with the position of a lay assessor and
about having the opportunity to decide at court that this alone makes them
satisfied, two questions were included in the Frankfurt questionnaire :
- “Do you enjoy having the opportunity to participate in court ?” (44%
“very” and 39% “quite”);
- Do you consider it an honor to be a lay assessor ?” (30% “very” and 29%
“quite”).
The two items were correlated.
[67]
10 The Presiding Judges‘ Fairness and the Lay Assessors‘ View of the Cooperation
If the theory of Lind and Tyler holds true for German lay assessors, we would
expect a strong correlation between the presiding judge’s fairness towards the lay
assessors and the lay assessors evaluation of the quality of the co-operation. The
lay assessors were questioned about the quality of the co-operation with the
presiding judge on their last day in court. The answers were quite positive (tab. 2).
Table 2:
Co-operation with the presiding judge, answers in percent
Table 2: Co-operation with the presiding judge, answers in percent
Bochum Frankfurt
very good 53 43
good 29 42
satisfactory 13 10
less good 3 3
badly 0 1
no answer 1 1
Table 3:
Quality of co-operation with the presiding judge - multivariate
Table 3: Quality of co-operation with the presiding judge - multivariate
analysis
Bochum Frankfurt
Beta z Prob. Beta z Prob.
Gender .06 .82 .4116 .01 -.38 .7013
< 40 y. .12 2.47 .0136
Age .05 .63 .5273 < 50 y. .11 2.15 .0313
< 60 y. .07 1.25 .2098
Years in service -.01 -.06 .9496 -.02 -.57 .5712
Board member/
representative .17 2.39 .0167 -.08-1.96 .0497
very .25 2.10 .0360
Deliberation under quite .16 1.54 .1228
time pressure .11 1.42 .1542 somewhat .23 2.71 .0068
hardly .09 1.35 .1776
very often -.09-1.72 .0846
Getting the others to quite often .05 -.80 .4235
agree -.02 -.25 .8058 sometimes -.06 -.86 .3893
hardly .03 .60 .5456
Justice of verdicts .18 2.27 .0230 .20 4.75 .0001
Fairness to lay
assessors .63 5.71 .0001 .71 9.27 .0001
Pleasure/pride - - - .02 .58 .5602
Power distance
orientation - - - .08 1.99 .0461
R² .60 .73
N 133 323
Beta standardized regression coefficient
z z-values of unstandardized coefficients
N number of cases in the regression
R² multiple determination coefficient
Prob. significance
y. years of age
A multivariate analysis
[68] was computed (table 3) to test the hypotheses. The
main correlation was the fairness of the judge to the lay assessor (Beta = .63 and
.71, respectively), as was expected. Some additional factors can be taken into
account in this model. The presiding judge is preparing the timetable for the trials.
Thus he can to a certain degree control the time pressure at a trial day. For the
sample of Frankfurt there were significant correlations for deliberation under time
pressure. In both samples, whether the lay assessor managed to get other
members of the tribunal to agree with his opinion made no difference. The justice
of the verdicts was a minor factor compared to the judge’s fairness to the lay
assessor.
There was no gender effect and but a small age effect for the lay assessors
in Frankfurt only. Feelings of pleasure and pride had no impact and the power
distance orientation only minimal influence for the respondents serving in the
Frankfort court. The time in service made no difference. Board membership or
functions as a representative
[69] were among the minor influences. Overall, the
explained variance of the models (R²) was remarkably high.
11. The Presiding Judges‘ Fairness as a Precondition for the Lay
Assessors‘ Influence
The percentages of respondents claiming success in pushing through their
own opinion during the deliberations was mentioned above (in chapter 7). It is
interesting to investigate the preconditions under which lay assessors get the
impression they have direct influence. Table 4 shows the results of a multivariate
analysis. The result is quite clear. There was no correlation or none worth
mentioning, for the age and gender of the Schöffen, for their experience as a lay
assessor, for having “voice” (measured by the opportunity to bring their own
opinion into the deliberation) or for having enough opportunity to ask questions
during the trial. For respondents in Frankfurt, where this was measured, the same
has been true for feelings of pleasure and pride connected with the office and the
individual power distance orientation.
The greatest correlation could be found for the variable “acceptance of the
lay assessor by the presiding judge”. For this measure, the respondents rated
whether they felt accepted by the presiding judge as an equal partner. Forty
percent of the Schöffen in Bochum indicated “very”, 43% “quite”, 12%
“somewhat”, 4% “hardly” and 1% “not at all”. For Frankfurt, the figures are 33%,
45%, 12%, 6% and 4%, respectively. The correlation is in line with the hypothesis,
developed according to Tyler, Lind and Klausa, that the presiding judge supports
or hinders participation through his personal fairness or unfairness.
Table 4:
Getting others to agree with their own opinion - multivariate
Table 4: Getting others to agree with their own opinion - multivariate
analysis
Bochum Frankfurt
Beta z Prob. Beta z Prob.
Gender -.05 -.616 .5377 .09 1.778 .0754
Years in service -.01 -.140 .8884 -.01 -.090 .9285
Board member/ representative .18 1.976 .0482 .00 .078 .9375
< 40 y. .02 .273 .7851
Age .15 1.588 .1124 < 50 y. -.07-1.030 .3029
< 60 y. .01 .078 .9376
Participation in Deliberation .19 2.155 .0311 .23 3.968 .0001
Acceptance by presiding
judge .29 2.481 .0131 .33 4.348 .0001
Voice -.02 -.174 .8616 .07 .867 .3857
very much -.04 -.314 .7534
Opportunity to ask questions .11 1.039 .2986 much -.02 -.147 .8832
sufficient -.07 -.639 .5231
Pleasure/pride - - - .04 .700 .4840
Power distance orientation - - - .03 .521 .6023
R² .23 .25
N 135 322
Beta standardized regression coefficient
z z-values of unstandardized coefficients
N number of cases in the regression
R² multiple determination coefficient
Prob. significance
y. years of age
Also, lay assessors who reported more activity in deliberations felt they had
more direct influence. Only in Bochum was the hypothesis confirmed that persons
with experience on boards or as a representative in the local, political or church
communities have more influence.
Overall the explained variance (R²) is low. This is due to factors beyond the
scope of this study. For instance, from the face-to-face interviews it seems likely
that the personal character or habits of the lay assessor are important. There
were interview partners who clearly had difficulties in communicating and
cooperating with others. It is also likely that many lay assessors had
uncontroversial or “clear” cases on their last trial day. There might have been no
reason to engage in a real confrontation, in which the behavior of the presiding
judge and other factors might have been more decisive.
-
Lay assessors need better training. They should learn more about their
procedural rights and they should receive a practical training in how to ask
questions and how to argue in court. All this would improve their self-esteem
as well as their abilities. There should probably be a basic course first with
follow-up training later to build on their experiences in office.
-
Lay assessors need more prior information about the cases. During training,
they should be informed about how to read a case file. They should have the
right to see the files. In complicated trials this would be the best way to help
them track the proceeding.
-
Those who nominate candidates for the office of a lay assessor should think
more about their individual abilities. Neither persons tending to avoid conflict
and to compromise at all costs nor persons unable to co-operate in a taskrelated group, are suitable. Such individual traits should be known in political
parties, churches, firms, administrations and voluntary associations, which
do the nominating.
-
Candidates who are finally elected by the election committee
- (Schöffenwahlausschuß) should be offered an orientation course and they
should sit on a trial for a day. Persons realizing that they are unsuited for the
job should have a right to step back.
-
Judges should be offered training in fair behaviour. Role play in training
courses and quality circles consisting of judges may sharpen the sense for
fairness in the trial and during the preliminary hearings.
-
Judges with problems working in a group should not act as presiding judge.
- These (prestigious, of course) positions should be staffed with judges who
like to work in groups and value an exchange of arguments, even with
laypersons.
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TYLER, TOM R. (1990). WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, New Haven : Yale University
Press.
·
Tyler, Tom R. (1994). The psychology of legitimacy, American Bar Foundation
Working Paper Series, no. 9425.
·
Tyler, Tom R., and Maura A. Belliveau (1995). Tradeoffs in justice principles :
Definitions of fairness. In Barbara Benedict Bunker and Jeffrey Z. Rubin
(eds.), CONFLICT, COOPERATION, AND JUSTICE, San Francisco : Jossey-Bass,
pp. 291-314.
·
TYLER, TOM R., ROBERT J. BOECKMANN, HEATHER J. SMITH UND YUEN J. HUO
(1997). SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY, Boulder/Colorado : Westview
Press.
·
Tyler, Tom R., and E. Allan Lind (1992). A relational model of authority in groups.
In M. Zanna, (Hg.), ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. 25,
New York : Academic, pp. 115-191.
·
Tyler, Tom R., E. Allan Lind, and Yuen J. Huo (1995). The relational model of
authority : Social categorization and social orientation effects on the
psychology of legitimacy. American Bar Foundation Working Paper Series,
Nr. 9504.
·
Villmow, Bernhard, Heino ter Veen, Annett Walkowiak, and Jutta Gerken (1986).
Die Mitwirkung von Laien in der (Jugend-)Strafgerichtsbarkeit -
Rechtsprechung zwischen Professionalität und Bürgernähe. In Heribert
Ostendorf (ed.), INTEGRATION VON STRAFRECHTS - UND SOZIALWIS -
SENSCHAFTEN. FESTSCHRIFT FÜR LIESELOTTE PONGRATZ, München : J.
Schweitzer, pp. 306-361.
·
Vultejus, Ulrich (1999). Schöffen in Hauptverhandlung und Beratung. In Hasso
Lieber und Ursula Sens (ed.), EHRENAMTLICHE RICHTER – DEMOKRATIE ODER
DEKORATION AM RICHTERTISCH ? Wiesbaden : Kommunal- und Schulverlag, pp.
61-64.
·
Wassermann, Rudolf (1982). Der Bürger als Richter. RECHT UND POLITIK, 18, pp.
117-125.
·
Weigend, Thomas (1990). Abgesprochene Gerechtigkeit. JURISTENZEITUNG, 45,
pp. 774-782.
·
WEIßMANN, ULRICH (1982). DIE STELLUNG DES VORSITZENDEN IN DER
HAUPTVERHANDLUNG, Göttingen : Schwartz.
·
WERLE, RAYMUND (1977). JUSTIZORGANISATION UND SELBSTVERSTÄNDNIS DER RICH -
TER, KRONBERG /Ts. : Athenäum.
·
WOLF, MANFRED (1987). GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSRECHT ALLER VERFAHRENSZWEIGE,
6th edition, München : Beck.
Laws cited
GVG Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (German Judicature Act)
JGG Jugendgerichtsgesetz (German Juvenile Court Act)
StPO Strafprozeßordnung (German code of criminal procedure)
[*]
Sociologist, Ruhr-University Bochum, Juristische Fakultaet, Bochum, Germany
[1]
I would like to thank Professor Klaus F. Röhl (Ruhr-Universität Bochum) and the German
Science Foundation (DFG) for their support of my research.
[2]
For the relation of experts to laypersons in general : HESSE, HANS-ALBRECHT (1998).
EXPERTE, LAIE, DILETTANT. Opladen : Westdeutscher Verlag; Klages, Helmut (1998).
Engagement und
Engagementpotential in Deutschland. AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE, B 38/98, September 11th
1998, at 34.
[3]
Battenberg, F. (1990).
Schöffen, Schöffengericht. In Adalbert Erler et.al. (eds.),
HANDWÖRTERBUCH ZUR DEUTSCHEN RECHTSGESCHICHTE, vol. IV, Berlin : E. Schmidt, at 1463.
[4]
There is a lot of literature on the function of German lay assessors. For the author most
aspects can be reduced to a
control function (influencing the courts) and a
legitimation function
(contributing to the acceptance of court decisions and to the trust of the public in the legal system).
About such functions e.g. HENKEL, HEINRICH (1968). STRAFVERFAHRENSRECHT, 2nd edition, Stuttgart :
Kohlhammer, at 127; Görlitz, Axel (1972).
Laienrichtertum. In Axel Görlitz (ed.), HANDLEXIKON ZUR
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT, München : Ehrenwirth, 265-6; PETERS, KARL (1981). STRAFPROZEß, 3 rd edition,
Heidelberg : C. F. Müller, at 111; Wassermann, Rudolf (1982).
Der Bürger als Richter. RECHT UND
POLITIK, 18, at 117-121; BÖHM, ALEXANDER (1985). EINFÜHRUNG IN DAS JUGENDSTRAFRECHT, 2nd
edition, München : Beck, at 74; Kühne, Hans-Heiner (1985).
Laienrichter im Strafprozeß? ZEITSCHRIFT
FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK, 18,237-239; Villmow, Bernhard, Heino ter Veen, Annett Walkowiak, and Jutta
Gerken (1986).
Die Mitwirkung von Laien in der (Jugend-Strafgerichtsbarkeit - Rechtsprechung
zwischen Professionalität und Bürgernähe. In Heribert Ostendorf (ed.), INTEGRATION VON
STRAFRECHTS - UND SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTEN. FESTSCHRIFT FÜR LIESELOTTE PONGRATZ, München : J.
Schweitzer, at 311-341; WOLF, MANFRED (1987). GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSRECHT ALLER VERFAH -
RENSZWEIGE, 6th edition, München : Beck, at 229-232; KISSEL, OSKAR (1994).
GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ, 2nd edition, München : Beck, at 608-9; OSTENDORF, HERIBERT (1994).
JUGENDGERICHTSGESETZ. KOMMENTAR, 3 rd edition, Köln : Heymann, at 322,327; SCHILKEN, EBERHARD
(1994). GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSRECHT, 2nd edition, Köln : Heymann, at 350-354.
[5]
There is a lack of current studies on the social background of German judges. Since the
times when German sociology of law concentrated on this issue (RAISER, THOMAS (1995). DAS
LEBENDE RECHT, 2nd edition, Baden-Baden : Nomos, at 380-401 for an overview), new generations of
judges have entered the service.
[6]
The socialization of judges in the courts has been stressed especially by WERLE, RAYMUND
(1977). JUSTIZORGANISATION UND SELBSTVERSTÄNDNIS DER RICHTER, KRONBERG /Ts. : Athenäum and
also Drewniak, Regine (1994). Strafrichterinnen als Hoffnungsträgerinnen ? Eine vergleichende Analyse strafrechtlicher Orientierungen von Richterinnen und Richtern, Stuttgart : Enke.
[7]
Kronenberger, Franz Rudolph (1989).
Laien in der Strafrechtspflege ? In Heike Jung (ed.),
ALTERNATIVEN ZUR STRAFJUSTIZ UND DIE GARANTIE INDIVIDUELLER RECHTE DER BETROFFENEN, Bonn :
Forum, at 189.
[8]
Section 42 subsection 2 GVG demands adequate inclusion of all groups of the population
with reference to gender, age and social position.
[9]
Section 35 subsection 2 JGG.
[10]
KLAUSA, EKKEHARD (1972). EHRENAMTLICHE RICHTER. IHRE AUSWAHL UND FUNKTION,
EMPIRISCH UNTERSUCHT, Frankfurt am Main : Athenäum, at 23-52; Casper, Gerhard, and Hans Zeisel
(1979).
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. In Gerhard Casper and Hans Zeisel (eds.), DER LAIENRICHTER IM
STRAFPROZEß, Heidelberg : C. F. Müller, pp. 21-86 [English version :
Lay Judges in the German
Criminal Court. JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 1,1972, pp. 135-191], at 75-78; Langbein, John H.
(1981).
Mixed Court and Jury Court : Could the Continental Alternative Fill the American Need ?
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH JOURNAL, 81,206-208; RICHERT, JOHN P. (1983). WEST
GERMAN LAY JUDGES : RECRUITMENT AND REPRESENTATIVENESS, Tampa : University Press of Florida,
71-176; Kronenberger,
supra, note 7 at 186-7; Lieber, Hasso (1990/91). Besser – aber noch nicht gut.
Die Berücksichtigung aller Bevölkerungsgruppen bei der Schöffenwahl.
Richter ohne Robe, part 1 : 2,
pp. 74-78 and part 2 : 3,5-7; Lieber, Hasso (1995b). Die Aufgaben der Kommunen bei der
Schöffenwahl 1996.
Richter ohne Robe, 7, pp. 147-152. and Lieber, Hasso (1996a). Das Ergebnis der
Schöffenwahlen 1992 nach Geschlecht, Alter und Beruf. Part 2 : Berufsstruktur,
Richter ohne Robe, 7,
54-56; Brusten, Manfred, and Horst Westmeier (1992).
Wie wird man Schöffe ? In Deutsche Vereinigung der Schöffinnen und Schöffen and Stiftung Mitarbeit (eds.), 1. DEUTSCHER SCHÖFFENTAG. MEHR
DEMOKRATIE AM RICHTERTISCH, Bonn : Stiftung Mitarbeit, pp. 53-79; Brusten, Manfred (1999).
Wie wird
man Schöffe ? In Hasso Lieber and Ursula Sens (eds.), EHRENAMTLICHE RICHTER – CEMOKRATIE ODER
DEKORATION AM RICHTERTISCH ? Wiesbaden : Kommunal- und Schulverlag, pp. 74-88.
[11]
Von Plottnitz argues against this. Plottnitz, Rupert von (1999).
Können und sollen
Ausländer ehrenamtliche Richter sein ? In Hasso Lieber and Ursula Sens (eds.), EHRENAMTLICHE
RICHTER – CEMOKRATIE ODER DEKORATION AM RICHTERTISCH ? Wiesbaden : Kommunal- und
Schulverlag, 47-49.
[12]
Bundesministerium der Justiz (1993). Geschlechts- und Berufsstruktur der Schöffen im
Bundesgebiet (alte Länder) im Vergleich mit der Bevölkerungsstruktur. Stand : 1. Januar 1993.
Unpublished paper, at 7-10 and Bundesministerium der Justiz (1997). Geschlechts- und Berufsstruktur
der Schöffen im Bundesgebiet im Vergleich mit der Bevölkerungsstruktur. Stand : 1. Januar 1997.
Unpublished paper, at 7-12.
[13]
Langbein, John H. (1981).
Mixed Court and Jury Court : Could the Continental Alternative
Fill the American Need ? AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH JOURNAL, 81,208. A similarity with
professional judges was also noted by Gerken, Jutta (1986). Bürger als Richter. Eine Studie über
Einstellungen und Erfahrungen von Schöffen in Jugendstrafverfahren. Unpublished dissertation for diploma at the faculty for psychology, University Hamburg, at 48.
[14]
LIEBER, HASSO (1996 B ). HANDBUCH FÜR SCHÖFFINNEN UND SCHÖFFEN, Erfurt : Deutscher
Kommunal-Verlag, at 47-50.
[15]
Section 194 subsection 1 GVG.
[16]
See the recent ruling of the Third Criminal Senate of the German Federal High Court
(Judgment of 26.3.1997 – 3 StR 421/96, printed in
Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 10/1997,506-7).
About the debate on the legal question : KLEINKNECHT, THEODOR, AND LUTZ MEYER-GOßNER (1997).
STRAFPROZEß ORDNUNG, 43rd edition, München : C. H. Beck, at 1423; Lieber, Hasso (1997b). Was
lange währt ... – zur Akteneinsicht durch Schöffen.
Richter ohne Robe, 9, pp. 118-119. And Lieber,
Hasso (1998). Entwicklung der Rechtsprechung über ehrenamtliche Richter – insbesondere Schöffen
– in den Jahren 1996/97.
Richter ohne Robe, 10, pp. 75-77; Hillenkamp, Thomas (1998).
Zur Teilhabe
des Laienrichters. In Hans-Jörg Albrecht et al. (eds.), INTERNATIONALE PERSPEKTIVEN IN KRIMINOLOGIE UND
STRAFRECHT. Festschrift für Günther Kaiser zum 70
. Geburtstag,
2. Halbband, Berlin : Duncker & Humblot,
pp. 1437-1459..
[17]
See Rasehorn, Theo (1990). Die Kompetenz des Schöffen in der Praxis.
Richter ohne Robe,
2,47; Gerstein, Hartmut (1999).
Schöffen im Jugendstrafverfahren. In Hasso Lieber and Ursula Sens
(eds.), EHRENAMTLICHE RICHTER – CEMOKRATIE ODER DEKORATION AM RICHTERTISCH ? Wiesbaden :
Kommunal- und Schulverlag, 98.
[19]
Before 1980 there were the studies of Casper and Zeisel,
supra, note 10 (1979, originally
1972) and Klausa,
supra, note 10. In the 1980s (Gerken,
supra, note 13) and (Gerken, Jutta (1988).
Bürger als Richter. Über Jugendschöffen und den Erziehungsanspruch des Jugendstrafrechts. In Jutta
Gerken and Karl F. Schumann (eds.): EIN TROJANISCHES PFERD IM RECHTSSTAAT. DER ERZIEHUNGSGE -
DANKE IN DER JUGENDGERICHTSPRAXIS, Pfaffenweiler : Centaurus, pp. 101-125); Kühne and Wolfe (only
sparingly reported in Kühne, Hans-Heiner (1989).
Laienkompetenz gegen Expertenkompetenz im
Strafrecht ? In Heike Jung (ed.), ALTERNATIVEN ZUR STRAFJUSTIZ UND DIE GARANTIE INDIVIDUELLER
RECHTE DER BETROFFENEN, Bonn : Forum, 175-183), Kronenberger,
supra, note 7, as well as LIEBER,
HASSO, AND URSULA BURCHARDT (1989). LAIENRICHTER – IEKORATION ODER DEMOKRATIE AM RICH -
TERTISCH ? Dortmund : Pad-Verlag. and [RENNIG, CHRISTOPH (1993). DIE ENTSCHEIDUNGSFINDUNG
DURCH SCHÖFFEN UND BERUFSRICHTER IN RECHTLICHER UND PSYCHOLOGISCHER SICHT, Marburg : N. G.
Elwert] collected their data. Two more recent articles are by Lieber, Hasso (1994). Umfrage zur Arbeit
der Schöffen in Brandenburg. Manuskript [Printed in
Richter ohne Robe, 6, S. 1-13]. and Lieber,
Hasso (1997a). An der Wende zweier Schöffenperioden – Ergebnisse einer Umfrage.
Richter ohne
Robe, 9,118-119).
[20]
Thirty-five lay assessors from Frankfurt never served at court and are therefore excluded
from the analysis.
[21]
See the journal of the German Lay Judge Association,
Richter ohne Robe 1/1998,11, as
well as Lieber 1994,
supra, note 19 at 11; Schmohl, Uta (1998). Zur Praxis des Amts der Schöffinnen
und Schöffen. Der Beitrag der ehrenamtlichen Richterinnen und Richter zur Urteilsfindung.
Richter
ohne Robe, 10,118 and Koch, Klaus-Dieter (1998). Jahresrückblick eines Schöffen.
Richter ohne Robe,
10,121.
[22]
Serious shortcomings regarding the briefing of lay assessors are reported in Lieber 1994,
supra, note 19 at 6-8 as well as LIEBER, HASSO, AND URSULA BURCHARDT (1989). LAIENRICHTER –
DEKORATION ODER DEMOKRATIE AM RICHTERTISCH ? Dortmund : Pad-Verlag, at 14, including cases in
which they had no prior information about the cases.
[23]
Similarly Lieber 1994,
supra, note 19 at 6.
[24]
Section 33a, subsection 1 JGG. (need full cite)
[25]
Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovich (1995a, 1995b, 1996) has addressed status differences in Croatian
mixed tribunals. Kutnjak Ivkovich, Sanja (1995a
). Does gender matter : The role of gender in legal decisionmaking by Croatian mixed tribunals. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, 23,
131-155; Kutnjak Ivkovich, Sanja (1995b). Professional and lay judges in mixed tribunals. Unpublished
dissertation, University of Delaware; Kutnjak Ivkovich, Sanja (1996). Would Increasing Lay Participants' Educational Level Help ? A Study of Croatian Mixed Tribunals. Paper for presentation at the
Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, July 9-13th 1996 in Glasgow, Scotland.
[26]
Feifer, George (1977).
Justice in Moscow. In Lawrence M. Friedman and Stewart
Macauley (eds.), LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, Indianapolis : Bobbs-Merrill, at 1001.
[27]
Gerken,
supra, note 13 and 19; Rennig,
supra, note 19.
[28]
See Vultejus, Ulrich (1999).
Schöffen in Hauptverhandlung und Beratung. In Hasso Lieber
und Ursula Sens (ed.), EHRENAMTLICHE RICHTER – CEMOKRATIE ODER DEKORATION AM RICHTERTISCH ?
Wiesbaden : Kommunal- und Schulverlag, at 61.
[29]
The former judge
Rüdiger Lautmann depicted the social atmosphere in some court
chambers. LAUTMANN, RÜDIGER (1972). JUSTIZ – DIE STILLE GEWALT, Frankfurt a. M. : Athenäum Fischer;
Lautmann, Rüdiger (1973).
Teilnehmende Beobachtungen in der Strafjustiz. In Jürgen Friedrichs (ed.),
TEILNEHMENDE BEOBACHTUNG ABWEICHENDEN VERHALTENS, Stuttgart : Enke, pp. 109-119; Lautmann,
Rüdiger (1985).
Rechtsfindung als Karriereberuf. In Festschrift für Rudolf Wassermann zum
sechzigsten Geburtstag, Neuwied : Luchterhand, pp. 109-121.
[30]
Only when a witness is under 16 years of age does the presiding judge have the exlclusive
right to conduct the examination (paragraph 241a section 1 stop; conducted for a comment and a look
on the practice of monopolization elsewhere, see Lieber, Hasso (1995). Das Fragerecht des Schöffen
und seine Beschränkungen – Umfang, Verfahren, Konsequenzen.
Richter ohne Robe, 7,106-107).
[31]
Frankfurt, n = 378.
[32]
Bochum, n = 148.
[33]
In an experiment professional judges conducted trials without having access to the files.
They stated that it took special effort to understand the cases (WEIßMANN, ULRICH (1982). DIE
STELLUNG DES VORSITZENDEN IN DER HAUPTVERHANDLUNG
, Göttingen : Schwartz, at 231).
[34]
It might be that the vast majority of
Schöffen finally succeeds in making sense of the
evidence. Only around 3% of the
Schöffen in the Frankfurt and Bochum study indicated serious
problems in understanding what was going on in the trial.
[35]
Lind, E. Allan, and Tom R. Tyler (1988). The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice,
New York, Plenum; Tyler, Tom R., and E. Allan Lind (1992).
A relational model of authority in groups.
In M. Zanna, (Hg.), ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. 25, New York : Academic, at
115-191.
[36]
On bargaining in German criminal courts e.g. Weigend, Thomas (1990).
Abgesprochene
Gerechtigkeit. JURISTENZEITUNG, 45, pp. 774-782; BUSSMANN, KAI-D. (1991). DIE ENTDECKUNG DER
INFORMALITÄT, Nomos : Baden-Baden; BUSSMANN, KAI-D., AND CHRISTIAN LÜDEMANN (1995).
KLASSENJUSTIZ ODER VERFAHRENSÖKONOMIE ? Pfaffenweiler : Centaurus.
[37]
Casper and Zeisel,
supra, note 10 at 40.
[38]
See Christoph Rennig‘s article in this volume.
[39]
A similar situation exists in Danish courts with lay participation (Andersen 1990,861).
[40]
See Christoph Rennig‘s article in this volume.
[41]
See Christoph Rennig‘s article in this volume.
[42]
The case was taken from
Rennig, who reported similar results (
supra, note 19,488).
[43]
See Christoph Rennig‘s article in this volume.
[44]
Rennig, Christoph, and Stefan Machura (1999).
Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Schöffen
und Berufsrichtern. In Hasso Lieber und Ursula Sens (eds.), EHRENAMTLICHE RICHTER – CEMOKRATIE
ODER DEKORATION AM RICHTERTISCH ? Wiesbaden : Kommunal- und Schulverlag, at 69.
[45]
An attorney once told the author that this is done when the prosecution fears the presiding
judge may be outvoted.
[46]
The same is true when young jurists sit with the panel during their apprenticeship. They
have no voting rights or rights to question. Interviewees often stressed that these young lawyers are
occupied with learning and repeating paragraphs of the law. Only a small proportion of the court
sessions are touched by this educational measure.
[47]
Casper and Zeisel,
supra, note 10 at 80-3, tables 38 and 39; Rennig,
supra, note 19 at
488-9.
[48]
Overviews on social justice research in TYLER, TOM R., ROBERT J. BOECKMANN, HEATHER
J. SMITH UND YUEN J. HUO (1997). SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY, Boulder/Colorado : Westview
Press, on procedural justice research especially in Röhl, Klaus F., and, Stefan Machura (eds.).
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, Aldershot : Dartmouth and Machura, Stefan (1998).
Introduction : Procedural
justice, law and policy. LAW AND POLICY, 20, at 1-14.
[49]
TYLER, TOM R. (1990). WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, New Haven : Yale University Press, at
5.
[50]
Landis, Jean M., and Lynne Goodstein (1986).
When is justice fair ? An integrated
approach to the outcome versus procedure debate. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH JOURNAL,
682; Lind, E. Allan, Carol T. Kulik, Maureen Ambrose, and Maria V. de Vera Park (1993).
Individual
and corporate dispute resolution : Using procedural fairness as a decision heuristic. ADMINISTRATIVE
SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 38,226.
[51]
Tyler/Lind,
supra, note 35.
[53]
Tyler, Tom R., and Maura A. Belliveau (1995).
Tradeoffs in justice principles : Definitions of
fairness. In Barbara Benedict Bunker and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.), CONFLICT, COOPERATION, AND
JUSTICE, San Francisco : Jossey-Bass, at 308-9.
[54]
Lind, E. Allan (1994a).
Procedural justice and culture : Evidence for ubiquitous process
concerns. ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE, 15,24-36.
[55]
Tyler/Lind,
supra, note 35.
[56]
Tyler,
supra, note 49.
[57]
Lind, E. Allan (1994). Justice and authority in organizations.
American Bar Foundation
Working Paper Series, no. 9420.
[58]
Tyler, Tom R. (1994). The psychology of legitimacy,
American Bar Foundation Working
Paper Series, no. 9425.
[60]
Tyler/Lind,
supra, note 35; Lind, E. Allan (1994b). Justice and authority in organizations.
American Bar Foundation Working Paper Series, no. 9420, at 4-5.
[61]
Klausa, Ekkehard (1972). Ehrenamtliche Richter. Ihre Auswahl und Funktion, empirisch
untersucht, Frankfurt am Main : Athenäum, 67.
[62]
Borucka-Arctowa, Maria (1976).
Citizen participation in the administration of justice :
Research and policy in Poland. In Lawrence Friedman and Michael Rehbinder (eds.),
Zur Soziologie
des Gerichtsverfahrens. JAHRBUCH FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE UND RECHTSTHEORIE, vol. 4, Opladen :
Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 286-99, at 291 and Pomorski, Stanislaw (1975).
Lay judges in the Polish
criminal courts : A legal and empirical description. CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 7,204,206 for Poland; Kulscár 1972,505-6 for Hungary.
[63]
For the formulation of questions on procedural and distributive justice, experiences were
used from a study with German defendants (Machura, Stefan (1995). German criminal procedure in
practice. In Japan Committee for the RCSL95 (ed.),
Legal Culture : Encounters and Transformations.
The Proceedings of 1995 Annual Meeting, Research Committee on Sociology of Law, International
Sociological Association, August 1 - 4,1995, Tokyo, Japan, Papers Section Meetings, volume 4,
Tokio; Machura, Stefan (1996). Fairness and legitimacy of German courts : The defendants' perspective. Conference paper, Third International Workshop on Procedural Justice, Oñati/Spain, April, 1-2.) building on questions from surveys developed by Tom Tyler (Tyler, Tom R. (1984).
The role of
perceived injustice in defendants' evaluations of their courtroom experience. LAW AND SOCIETY
REVIEW, 18, pp. 51-74. and Tyler,
supra, note 49; Tyler/Lind,
supra