Journal of Innovation Economics
De Boeck Université
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196 pages
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De Boeck Université
I.S.B.N.sans
196 pages
p. 171 à 191
doi: en cours
Veille sur la revue
Veille sur l'auteur
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n° 2 2008/2
Between developmentalism and instrumentalization: the comeback of the producing state in Russia
Cédric Durand CEMI-EHESS and CEPN-CNRS, Université de Paris 13/France
The comeback of the State in the economy seems to define a significant inflexion in the trajectory of post-soviet Russia. This article specifies the extent and the characteristics of this re-engagement of the Russian State. It also proposes a twofold interpretation: the implementation of a developmentalist strategy and/or an instrumentalisation of public authorities in order to proceed to a redistribution of economic power within the ruling class.
JEL Codes: H82, P26, O25 Keywords : Russia, public property, developmentalism, capitalism.
JEL Codes: H82, P26, O25 Keywords : Russia, public property, developmentalism, capitalism.
Introduction
The comeback of the State seems to mark a significant shift in the trajectory of post-Soviet Russia. Terms such as “state capitalism”, “corporate state” or “strategic turning point”
[1] have been used by commentators and experts to suggest a bifurcation. This article aims at specifying the extent and the characteristics of this comeback. It also proposes a twofold interpretation: the implementation of a developmentalist strategy and/or an instrumentalization of public authorities in order to proceed to a redistribution of economic power within the ruling class.
Kebabdjian (2005) identifies four economic figures of the State which grew simultaneously in the advanced capitalist economies after World War II: the regulating state which organizes and regulates markets; the welfare state which provides collective goods and social services; the Keynesian state which, through its macroeconomic policy plays a stabilizing role and influences the level of employment and prices; finally, the producing or entrepreneurial state which intervenes through various institutional tools in order to increase the power of the state and the nation more than to deal with market failures. The decline of the producing state is the most significant withdrawal of the state resulting from neo-liberal policies.
In Russia (Durand, 2005a), as in all post-socialist countries, privatization led to a dramatic decline of the function of organizing production. However, since the beginning of the second term of Vladimir Putin in 2004, certain changes broke with this trend. The State has set up new instruments in order to play a more active role in guiding economic development (mobilization of resources in national projects, special economic zones, creation of a public investment fund). Above all, public ownership has extended and has been restructured. This article is primarily devoted to the analysis of this amplification / reorganization of public ownership.
Section 2 presents some general stylized facts about the comeback of the producing state. This evolution is examined more precisely at the sectoral level in sections 3 and 4 respectively devoted to energy and to other industries. Section 5 outlines a socio-economic framework of interpretation through the concept of instrumentalized developmentalism.
A re-involvement of the state in industrial affairs
The years 2004 and 2005 marked a clear shift in the trend towards a retreat of the state away from the economy observed since 1992. The privatization process remains on the agenda, but it continues at a very slow pace. In 2004, significant operations have taken place with the sale of stakes in state oil company Loukoïl and in the Magnitogorsk metallurgical plant. Since 2005, however, the continuation of privatization remains on the agenda but only with second-order operations: all major operations have been postponed such as the privatization of the Svyazinvest telecommunications holding company, and most profitable state owned assets have stayed out of the privatization process (OECD, 2006; IET, 2006a and 2007; Malginov, Radygin, 2008).
Meanwhile, a new emphasis is given to public ownership. A presidential decree of 4 August 2004 established a list of 1,064 enterprises which cannot be privatized and joint stock companies in which the State share cannot be reduced
[2]. Beyond the defence sector, the wide list includes facilities whose "production has a strategic significance for the preservation of defence capabilities and state security, protection of morality, health, law and legal interests of Russian citizens". It comprises 65 Gazprom affiliates, about twenty maritime and river harbours, airports, explosives factories, elevators, building plants, banks, bread factories… Among state-owned enterprises, there is also a conglomerate of amber, the Mosfilm studio and the news agency RIA Novosti.
Moreover, as shown in Table 1, we observe since 2004 a significant extension of public ownership. The movement has accelerated in 2005 with a value of acquisitions put at more than $17 billions (EBRD, 2006) and continued in 2006 and 2007. In addition to the magnitude of the phenomenon, the diversity of methods used to get companies under public control should be noted. It is not, strictly speaking, nationalization but a pragmatic combination of administrative methods and market mechanisms. Thus, tax procedures and / or judicial authorities have forced owners to sell their assets. The first well known case is the dismantling of Yukos in 2003 – officially because of tax evasion – which led to the imprisonment of its CEO, Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Even before, the director of the Petrochemical holding Sibour was jailed in 2002 in the middle of a battle for the control of the firm led by the new management of Gazprom. Since 2006, the instrumental use of environmental standards against the multinationals involved in the hydrocarbon sector is another illustration of this dynamic. These events have sent to business a very clear message: when state enterprises or agencies are interested in your business, it’s better to negotiate a transfer of property – seemingly a normal market transaction - than to resist it and then face a de facto expropriation.
Table 1
Major state acquisitions (2004-2006)
A new strategic positioning of public actors in the energy sector
The operations shown in Table 1 highlight the existence of a process of consolidation of the energy sector under the aegis of the State
[3]. After the failure of the merger between Gazprom and Rosneft in 2005 and with the persistent rivalry between the two companies, the issue of the unification of the state involvement in the sector is still pending. Another key issue is the positioning of the State vis-à-vis the multinational corporations. The years 2006 and 2007 have thus been marked by an increasing pressure on foreign firms
[4], indicating a significant policy shift but not one devoid of ambivalences.
Multinationals under pressure
In September 2006, the Minister of Ecology withdrew the accreditation granted to the international consortium Sakhalin-Energy for the project Sakhalin II, arguing that the required environmental standards were not respected. He also threatened the group Exxon-Mobil, leader of the Sakhalin I project, to not allow the extension of the project because of similar problems. The Department of Natural Resources – supported by environmental NGOs
[5] – pretended to act exclusively on the basis of environmental standards
[6]. However, there are obvious and powerful economic motivations for these actions
[7]. The Sakhalin II project is worth $20 billion worth and Gazprom has long wished to take a significant stake in the consortium
[8]. However, administrative procedures blocking the project have dramatically accelerated the discussions on this issue: British (Shell) and Japanese (Mitsui, Mitsubishi) companies that completely controlled the project have finally accepted the sale of a 50% share to Gazprom in December 2006
[9]. Total’s investment in the deposit Khoriaga was also under the threat of a suspension of exploitation licences
[10], even if it failed to materialize
[11].
In fact, these proceedings against multinationals result from the government’s will – already announced in August 2006 – to revise Production Sharing Agreements that were signed in the 1990s and which are very disadvantageous for the state. These proceedings also supported Gazprom’s growth strategy. Thus, in autumn 2006, the Anglo-Russian TNK-BP was referred by judicial authorities for its investment in the Novo Urengoy and Vostotchno Ourengo gas fields and in the Kovytka East-Siberian deposit
[12]. TNK-BP consortium was also forced to sell most of its participation in the Kovytka Gas field to Gazprom in June 2007. However, the deal has been repeatedly delayed while there is also speculation that Gazprom is seeking to buy out the Russian half of TNK-BP. Tension escalated during the first part of 2008 with visa, fiscal, espionage and environmental inquiries
[13].
This greater involvement of Russian authorities within natural resources affairs reflects the changes observed in several countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador or Chad
[14]. It takes place in a context characterized, on the one hand, by high world prices and, and the other hand, by increasingly critical views of the record of the policies of undifferentiated attraction of foreign direct investment (CEPAL, 2004; UNCTAD, 2001 and 2003; Durand, 2005b), especially in the energy sector (see case of the gas sector in the Caribbean Republic of Trinidad and Tobago: Barclay, 2003).
The ambivalences of a pragmatic energy policy
The strengthening of the weight of the State in the energy sector and the increased pressure on multinationals show that Russian authorities’ energy policy forms part of a strategic reorientation (Larsson, 2006; Boussena, Locatelli, 2006 and 2008) that aims to prevent Russia becoming a subordinated country. Indeed, energy resources are a crucial lever for public action. This is true, first of all, at the geopolitical level through export prices and investment choices regarding hydrocarbon export routes. Secondly, the revenues generated by this sector, but beyond this the impact on the overall economy of internal prices of energy, are of crucial relevance for growth policy and major macroeconomic balances. Gazprom’s case is emblematic: its role in economic and social stability as well as in the country’s foreign policy is such that the State can only be concerned about it, which explains the extension of public participation above 50% in 2005. The discussion concerning the merger with Rosneft may thus appear as a tentative towards expanding the political logic of management of the energy sector.
However, the extension of state control is not uniform and does not mean that market mechanisms are neglected. For example, in July 2006, Rosneft has made one of the largest operations in its financial history by introducing on to the London and Moscow stock exchanges nearly 15% of its capital amounting to 10.4 billion dollars, while the plan to privatize the firm is still on the table
[15]. In 2006 also, Gazprom lifted restrictions on the participation of foreign companies. The case of Lukoil also illustrates that we are far from seeing a pattern of pure nationalization: the second oil company in the world in terms of proven reserves is not principally controlled by the State. Its chairman, Vaguit Alekperov, is close to Vladimir Putin and his action, especially at the international level, seems perfectly articulated with the strategic aims of the Kremlin (Larsson, 2006). The liberalization of the electricity sector has even led to a clear retreat of the State. Headed by Anatoly Chubais, Unified Energy System (UES), which provides 70% of electricity and one-third of the heating, has been broken up and ceased to exist on June 30 2008. Russian and foreign investors have bought for $34 billions generating companies, the state retaining control of UES’s hydro-plants, the transmission network and nuclear power industry. However, the degree of liberalization, its enforcement and the role of Gazprom, which is expected to control more than 20 per cent of generating capacity, remain unclear
[16].
The energy policy of Russian authorities is thus characterized by a combination of pragmatic administrative intervention and instrumentalization of market mechanisms resulting from three kinds of concerns, partly contradictory. First, Russian state power aims to ensure the loyalty of all energy players, either directly through state structures or by ensuring the submission of allies in the private sector to the strategic objectives of the State. Then, the energy sector should be given at least an appearance of liberalization in order to not jeopardise the ability of Russian companies to develop themselves abroad, to raise funds on international financial markets and to attract foreign direct investment in order to fund the huge investments needed in the Russian energy sector. Finally, most of the cases against some multinationals may be considered as conventional conflicts about the sharing of energy rent (Sweezy, Magdoff, 1974); the possibilities for cooperation remain open, and numerous areas are still open to foreign investment in order to revive exploration and to cope with threats of gas and electricity shortages resulting from ageing infrastructure, increasing, and depletion of major gas fields currently under exploitation.
A vast movement of industrial restructuring
An attempt to reorganize civilian assets and defend the military-industrial complex
After experiencing a particularly acute crisis during the 1990s
[17], the military-industrial complex is newly considered as a matter of interest by the authorities for various reasons: geopolitical, social - the sector employs about 2 million people, up to 70% of the workforce in some localities
[18], and has been affected by strong mobilizations
[19] – but also economic reasons, as Russia stands just ahead of the USA as leading global arms exporter
[20].
Thus we have observed a strengthening of the State presence in major defence enterprises
[21] and above all the establishment of holding companies dominated by the State, particularly in the aviation industry, in shipbuilding and in helicopter production. The creation of a military tank-builder holding is also being discussed
[22]. The objective of these amalgamations is to improve the sector’s performance through better business management, less dispersion of projects and better articulation between civilian and military activities so as to facilitate the revival of an hypertrophied defence productive apparatus.
Aeronautical industry
The civil aviation industry is completely devastated. In the military sector, the situation is also very degraded. However, the collapse was limited because of the persistence of export opportunities. Dealing with this very difficult situation, the government officials declared that the state was ready to invest massively in order to reconstruct this industry
[23]. The creation in November 2006 of the Unified Aircraft Building Corporation (Îáúåäèíåííàÿ àâèàñòðîèòåëüíàÿ êîìïàíèÿ – ÎÀÊ)
[24] which includes the flagship of the sector
[25] seems to be a decisive step in this perspective.
The process of consolidation does not automatically ensure a new consistency of assets but it highlights the determination of the State, eventually forcing the cooperation of private actors
[26]. It should be noted that in parallel, Russian leaders promote international partnerships in the field of civil aviation, for example by relaxing the rules on foreign investment in the sector
[27]. The ongoing rapprochement with EADS, a group also dominated by public capital, is a signal even more important
[28]. Finally, it should be added that the take-over of the main global producer of titanium VSMPO-Avisma by Rosoboronexport in July 2006 brings in an important asset for the Russian share in any future collaboration as this firm is a key supplier of Boeing and Airbus
[29]. VSMPO-Avisma is one of the first assets to be consolidated in the state-owned speciality steel company, Russpetstal. This company is an affiliate of Rosoboronexport which has also taken control of the metallurgical plant “Krasny Octyabr” and the Stupino Metallurgical Company, two leading producers of high quality steel dedicated in particular to the aeronautical industry.
Shipbuilding industry
The shipbuilding industry has been the most dynamic sector among the defence industries in recent years, its growth rate being faster than that of GDP. The year 2005 was also marked by a clear trend towards consolidation
[30]: on the one hand, the State has organized the consolidation of assets related to the construction of submarines; on the other hand, Mejprombank (International Industrial Bank), which is close to Rosoboronexport, has taken over the process of reorganization of the surface naval vessel industry. The next step was the creation in November 2007 of the United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC) based on the same logic as in the aeronautical industry. Acknowledging the slow pace of reorganization of the sector
[31], Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has appointed the Vice Premier Igor Sechin as CEO of the public holding company with the mission to constrain private firms which have been reluctant to join the public holding
[32].
The State producer as a guarantor of the preservation of the national productive apparatus
Energy, defence, aeronautics, and to a lesser extent, shipbuilding, are economic sectors where the involvement of the state remains important in many countries. However, the current reinvestment of the Russian State in organizing the economy seems to go beyond a simple shock return after a decade of blind faith in the virtues of the market. On the one hand, some of the public take-overs have a very clear political logic, in particular with the establishment of the crucial Gazprom-Media group
[33]. On the other hand, various operations seem to fall within the continuity of those already mentioned, i.e. participating in a dynamic of preservation / reconstruction of the national productive apparatus. Marina Deryabina from the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences sums up the new doctrine: “Russia’s progress on the global markets (…) can be attained only by large corporations comparable to multinationals, or set up by the State, or working according to rules coordinated with the State”. “Moreover, the Russian political and business communities regard the strengthening of the State presence in the economy and State assistance to some sectors as a guarantee of their growth and a more stable position on the market”
[34].
Key assets of the automotive sector under the control of Rosoboronexport
If the prospect raised by the Federal Agency for Industry (Rosprom)
[35] to create a national car producer – with the merger of Gaz, Kamaz and AvtoVaz – has not yet materialized, the State has not remained idle in this sector. In the autumn of 2005, Rosoboronexport (which since entered the new public holding Rostechnologii) has taken control of AvtoVaz, Russia’s biggest car-maker. The presidential administration decided to intervene because of the difficulties of the company in facing the competition of Western and Asian car-makers but also because it was linked to the affairs of Boris Berezovsky and embedded in various mafia networks
[36]. AvtoVaz was already engaged in a joint venture with General Motors, but since the change of management, it has turned instead towards a co-operation with Renault which took a 25% stake in December 2007. Renault is now starting to exert a dominant influence on the executive direction while supplying four members of Avtovaz’s five-person executive committee
[37]. This scheme articulates two elements: a key foreign partner as minority shareholder in order to get access to technological and management capabilities, and public control of the firm. Such a scheme is also likely to be developed in Kamaz, Russia’s biggest truck-maker
[38]. Moreover, the connection with the State agency for arms exports has also opened up some foreign military outlets for both firms
[39].
A public holding dedicated to the atomic industry
The federal law creating the Rosatom state corporation came into force on December 6, 2007. It creates a special corporation that combines power production with nuclear plant building
[40]. There will be a transition period of up to three years during which government property in the atomic complex will be transferred to the new state corporation. Among the main assets that should be consolidated in the new corporation we may mention: AtomStroïExport, which constructs nuclear plants overseas and where Gazprombank has a 49 percent stake; OMZ which is one of the main machinery building factories in Russia and produces nuclear tanks, and where Gazprom also took a stake in November 2005; Siloviye Mashiny in which a controlling interest was sold during the same year by the company Interros to RAO-UES at the expense of Siemens
[41].
Towards a consolidation in air transport
A consolidation process of the air transport sector seems to be on the agenda with the State-run corporation Aeroflot and the company Air Union as main actors
[42]. However, the Economic Development Ministry which favours a broader privatization of the sector has been opposed to the transfer of a 25% stake of the company S7 held by the State to Aeroflot
[43] and is resisting the transfer of various airline assets to the state corporation Rostechnologii
[44]. The Ministry of Transport also plans to create a unified publicly-controlled company for airport management
[45].
A growing role of the State in the banking sector
The Russian State is the owner of a controlling stake in the three main banking institutions of the country (Sberbank, VneshTorgbank and Gazprombank) (Vercueil, 2007). Moreover, two important public financial institutions have been set up: in 2007, the VneshEkonomBank was transformed into a development bank in order to foster investment projets intended to boost infrastructure and high technology industries; in 2006, the Rossiskaïa Ventchournaïa Kompaniïa was created as a Venture-Capital institution mainly funded by the state and oriented towards riskier sectors. These financial tools are important assets for the State in order to implement its industrial policy and to fund the expansion or the consolidation of the new public holdings.
Supporting the consolidation of others in private metallurgy
There are entire sectors of the economy where the state is active without intervening through participations. This is particularly the case in the chemical industry
[46] and in metallurgy, where the consolidation of assets has led to the creation world-class private firms. The authorities have thus accompanied the establishment of Rusal as world aluminium leader, supported the attempted merger between Severstal and Arcelor (Durand, 2007) and fostered the entry of Roman Abramovich into the steel business. These moves have been interpreted by some as a precursory indication of a future consolidation of this industry
[47] in a global context of gigantic mergers and acquisitions.
With the exception of specific issues in the energy sector, what is going on in metallurgy suggests that the extension of public ownership examined previously responds in government eyes to a palliative logic: gather assets scattered in areas where domestic industry is weakened and unable to reorganize endogenously on a national basis. The year 2007 offers other examples of this logic: for example the inability of the private sector to guarantee the building of Russian capabilities in the nanotechnologies industries explains the creation in 2007 of the state-run corporation Rosnanotekh, similarly to the creation of the state corporation Olimpstroï in order to coordinate the infrastructure building for the 2014 Olympic games in Sotchi.
A developmentalism instrumentalized
It is difficult within the confines of this article to undertake an urgently needed socioeconomic analysis of the growth of the producing State. To outline a framework of interpretation of the observed process, we should first of all situate the extension of public ownership in a very specific historical context: the exit of the Great Russian Post-socialist Depression and a backlash against the Western influence of the 1990s. The specificity of the context thus suggests an interpretation of the stylized facts presented in terms of nationalist developmentalism; however, it is necessary to consider the process of redistribution of control over productive assets and financial flows which is consubstantial to the extension of public control over the economy.
The economic and socio-political conditions of the reconstruction period
The evolution of the Russian economy in the early twenty-first century is a backlash of the transformational crisis of the 1990s (figure 1). The neo-liberal reforms have resulted in economic and political chaos (Sapir, 1996) that led to a considerable economic regression (Burawoy, 2001; Petrovski, 2006). Thus, the strong growth of the early 2000s is based on a modification of the structure of the productive apparatus now relying even more heavily on a rent economy of sectors such as oil and metallurgy (Durand, 2004, 2007; Benaroya, 2006).
Figure 1
The evolution of Russian GDP since 1989
Abundant budgetary resources and partial continuity with the neo-liberal reforms
The strong progression of the GDP – between 4.5% and 10% of annual rate since 1999 – is based on high world prices of raw materials and led to the creation of a substantial trade surplus until the end of 2007. This performance was accompanied by a rigorous macroeconomic policy which resulted in a dramatic restoration of public finances (IET, 2006a and 2006b; OECD, 2006). Throughout the period there were net public budget surpluses up to the considerable level of 12% of GDP. These surpluses helped to absorb the bulk of external debt and allowed the constitution of a substantive stabilization fund in order to protect the federal budget against the fluctuations of hydrocarbons prices. The weight of public expenditure in the economy is still modest. The total income of the consolidated budget of the Russian Federation in 2005 amounted to 35.2% of GDP (GKS, 2006), a figure very close to the OECD average (36.3% in 2003: OECD, 2006). But given the size of the budget surplus, the level of public spending is very low (approximately 25% of GDP: IET, 2006a): the drastic reduction of the share of public budgets of the nineties has now been questioned by the comeback of the State in industrial affairs. This macroeconomic orthodoxy is one of the elements of continuity with the neo-liberal spirit of the transition that we find also in several important reforms – labour codex, flat tax, pension reforms… – and in the prospect of accession to the WTO. Incidentally, EBRD normative indicators of transition show a deepening of the process in most areas with the exception of the field of competition policy and privatisation of large firms (EBRD, 2006).
Rise of the far-right and renewed of social mobilizations
On the socio-political plan, this period of post-crisis is marked by the rise of the ideological and organizational far right (Parland, 2006). The events of 2006 illustrate this significant evolution: the riots against Caucasian people in several Russian towns and the violent rhetoric of President Putin against the Georgians. One should add the move towards nationalism of the KPRF (Communist Party of Russian Federation) as illustrated by the invitation made to the Movement against Illegal Immigration to participate in the May 1 2006 demonstration.
The establishment of an authoritarian rule in the post-soviet era is an assumption on which political scientists have been working for many years (e.g. Robinson, 2000). Among the Russian people, this evolution is powered by the geopolitical fall of Russia and the hostility to Western powers which have both played a significant role in shaping the process of transformation (Appel, 2004; Hough, 2001; Sapir, 2001; Wedel, 1998) also, last but not least, the deep economic and social crisis.
In terms of social struggles, the years 2004 and 2005 suggest the entry into a new phase. For the first time in a country in transition, a government was forced to relinquish the bulk of the reform under pressure from the street (IET, 2006a). These mobilizations showed a new militant generation (Clement, 2007). They occurred while wage growth and poverty reduction allowed people to express collectively their immense accumulated social frustration since the early 1990s. In 2007 there also occurred numerous strikes mainly in the automotive industry, in railway transportation, in the post-office, and in the ports.
A nationalist developmentalism
National and social frustration fuelled a strong feeling of nostalgia for the Soviet era and an urgent social demand for development policies. Combined with the requirements for reconstruction of the productive apparatus and the availability of budgetary resources, they create the conditions for the implementation of a nationalist developmentalism. This policy is materialized through an explicit concern of the authorities for national independence and the return of the producing State that we have examined. The extension of public-controlled corporations in energy, defence and other sectors corresponds to three interlocking trends: (1) to maintain state control over large income flows related to energy resources, (2) to provide an autonomous national presence in sectors deemed to be of crucial importance and/or where foreign firms are heavily involved and (3) to concentrate resources in order to foster the emergence of national champions where the domestic industry seems to be in jeopardy.
More broadly, an objective is to realize a certain centralization of resources, which is reflected in the definition of priorities for national projects and the newly established investment fund (OECD, 2006; IET, 2006a): short-term improvement of living conditions of the population and the massive development of infrastructures. A quote from the CEO of Oboronprom, Denis Mantourov, reflects this new direction in the field of industrial policy: “I am sure that our national industry competing with financially successful western transnational corporations will find its survival through maximum intellectual, productive and financial concentration”
[48].
In order to face threatening competition from western companies, the survival of domestic industry calls for the concentration of resources. The voluntarism to strengthen the “structural power” (Strange, 1996) of the Russian elite can thus rely on popular frustration resulting from the brutal regression of the 1990s.
A redistribution of assets and flows of wealth within the elite
The centralization of assets and flows of wealth is not only to be understood from the perspective that we have just described. The redistribution taking place increases the concentration of economic power within a small group of people holding forefront political positions or closely allied with the new political leadership
[49]. From the standpoint of the interests of these individuals, the implementation of a kind of nationalist developmentalism may have an instrumental value.
Several factors argue in favour of such an interpretation. First, the arbitrary nature of the discrimination made between the various business interests. If the dismantling of the Yukos group and prosecutions against Boris Berezovsky are grounded on serious violations of the law, it is almost certain that most of the other leading business groups are also guilty of serious violations of the law. Then, it must be stressed that the return of the State in the economy does not formally involve an institutional break with the liberalization and the privatization inherited from a decade of post-socialist transformation. Hence, there is nothing to prevent assets passing today under public scrutiny from being privatized tomorrow to the benefit of high profile officials who are engaged in implementing the state-run reorganization of assets. Finally, unlike the political momentum that has accompanied the return of the State in Venezuela or Bolivia, the current process is not supported by any organic process of social mobilization. On the contrary: on the one hand, a form of authoritarian political power has been theorized as a “guided democracy” by Vladimir Putin, while on the other hand there is a corporatist integration of the capital-labour nexus through domesticated labour unions. These elements tend to strengthen the passivity of the population and prevent any dynamic of effective socialization of extended public ownership.
Thus, the rise of public ownership should be analysed with caution. Given the importance of the principle « going for the flow » in contemporary Russia
[50], it is especially important not to keep the analysis on the sole level of the forms of, and to look for real property relationships that are sometimes hidden behind legal forms. The very rich reflections on the nature of property in the USSR retain a great interest for examining this issue (Durand, 2002).
Conclusion
The extension-consolidation of public ownership which has accelerated since 2004 concerns the energy sector, various types of industrial activities (aerospace, shipbuilding, armament, automotive, construction nuclear…) but also financial institutions. It occurs sometimes in mobilizing administrative methods (fiscal or environmental legislation), but takes always, at least formally, market mechanisms. Two public companies – Gazprom and Rosoboronexport (now Rostechnologii) – are frequently involved in these operations and appear as the main tools of the state intervention. More recently, the financial crisis that hit Russia violently in September 2008 seems to open a new phase as far as the involvement of the state in the Russian economy is concerned. Indeed, the main private Russian banks and some important non-financial firms have been destabilized by the huge credit squeeze on the Western markets and survived only thanks to massive State support. Moreover, public institutions have also actively participated in stock markets while trying to halt the downward spiral of share prices. This move implies a new extension of public ownership, although it is not clear for the moment whether it would lead to effective control and the building of a new range of industrial policies.
The importance of the process observed suggests a significant reorientation of the economic trajectory of post-soviet Russia whose objective is twofold: on the one hand, to enable the state to regain control of flows of wealth associated with the use of hydrocarbon reserves and, secondly, to preserve an autonomous national productive apparatus. However, this shift in the post-Soviet trajectory is realized without major institutional break. The liberalization of the economy continues in numerous areas, and the absence of formal nationalizations makes the current process largely reversible. Moreover, the reorganization of property is not neutral for the dominant agents. It leads to a redistribution of control over the assets and flows of wealth for the benefit of a small group of politicians, high profile officials and their allies. Between nationalist developmentalism and oligarchic recomposition, social and economic ties remain to be disentangled.
At the top of the agenda of research opened by the return of the producing State lie sharpening socio-economic contradictions (Durand, Petrovski, 2008). First, while infrastructure and production tools inherited from the Soviet era are becoming increasingly obsolete, the chronic under-investment threatens Russian growth prospects. Then, the extension of public ownership brings up new problems of coordination, especially so far as the consistency of the huge movement of consolidation of assets is concerned. Moreover, in a context of exacerbated polarization, the emphasis on competition with Western economies and the logic of national power are partially contradictory with an economic development oriented towards satisfying the social needs and aspirations of the Russian people. Finally, the hardening of authoritarian rule weakens the reconstruction process; indeed, the limitations of peoples’ involvement in political affairs restrict the cognitive resources mobilized and reduce the legitimacy of the decisions. More broadly, a comparative and theoretical work on the dynamics of the process described is urgently needed, in particular through comparison between the current involvement of the Russian state in industrial affairs and previous developmentalist experiences in Asia, in Latin America and in Europe after WWII.
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NOTES
[1]
A. Illarionov (2006), “When State Means Business”, International Herald Tribune, January 25; A. Illarionov (2006), “The rise of the corporate ste in Russia”, conference, The Cato Institute, march 7, http:// www. cato. org/ event. php? eventid= 2764; Zlotowski (2006); J. Sapir (2007).
A. Illarionov (2006), “When State Means Business”, International Herald Tribune, January 25; A. Illarionov (2006), “The rise of the corporate ste in Russia”, conference, The Cato Institute, march 7, http:// www. cato. org/ event. php? eventid= 2764; Zlotowski (2006); J. Sapir (2007).
[2]Oukaze n° 1009 dont le texte est disponible ici: hhttp:// document. kremlin. ru/ doc. asp? ID= 23799&PSC= 1&PT= 3&Page= 1; %20ID= 23799&PSC=1&PT=3&Page=2
Oukaze n° 1009 dont le texte est disponible ici: hhttp:// document. kremlin. ru/ doc. asp? ID= 23799&PSC= 1&PT= 3&Page= 1; %20ID= 23799&PSC=1&PT=3&Page=2
[3]“How Russia is nationalized: the oil sector”, Kommersant, Sept. 19 2007, http:// www. kommersant. com/ p804680/ Oil_Sector/
“How Russia is nationalized: the oil sector”, Kommersant, Sept. 19 2007, http:// www. kommersant. com/ p804680/ Oil_Sector/
[4]http:// webu2. upmf-grenoble. fr/ iepe/ Publications/ publicRech1. html
http:// webu2. upmf-grenoble. fr/ iepe/ Publications/ publicRech1. html
[5]“Environmentalists back Putin over Shell’s energy permit”, The Guardian, Sept. 25 2006, http:// business. guardian. co. uk/ story/ 0,,1880102,00. html; Pacific Environment, Sakhalin II Overview of Problems, March 2006, http:// pacificenvironment. org/ article. php? id= 1316; Sakhalin II update; The Project and Russia’s People, ECA Watch Campaign, http:// www. eca-watch. org/ problems/ eu_russ/ russia/ sakhalin/ index_people. html
“Environmentalists back Putin over Shell’s energy permit”, The Guardian, Sept. 25 2006, http:// business. guardian. co. uk/ story/ 0,,1880102,00. html; Pacific Environment, Sakhalin II Overview of Problems, March 2006, http:// pacificenvironment. org/ article. php? id= 1316; Sakhalin II update; The Project and Russia’s People, ECA Watch Campaign, http:// www. eca-watch. org/ problems/ eu_russ/ russia/ sakhalin/ index_people. html
[6]“Shell makes Sakhalin offer”, The Moscow Times, Dec. 12 2006.
“Shell makes Sakhalin offer”, The Moscow Times, Dec. 12 2006.
[7]“Sakhalin Oil and Gas Projects: what is behind Russia’s coercive behavior?”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Oct. 3, 2006, http:// jamestown. org/ edm/ article. php? article_id= 2371502; « Russie : révision des accords sur gaz et pétrole », Le blog finance, http:// www. leblogfinance. com/ 2006/ 05/ russie_rvision. html
“Sakhalin Oil and Gas Projects: what is behind Russia’s coercive behavior?”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Oct. 3, 2006, http:// jamestown. org/ edm/ article. php? article_id= 2371502; « Russie : révision des accords sur gaz et pétrole », Le blog finance, http:// www. leblogfinance. com/ 2006/ 05/ russie_rvision. html
[8]“Gazprom holding talks with Shell”, Financial Times, Oct. 11 2004.
“Gazprom holding talks with Shell”, Financial Times, Oct. 11 2004.
[9]“Shell offers to cut Sakhalin-2 stake by 30%”, Financial Times, Dec. 11 2006; “Gazprom strikes $7.45bn Sakhalin-2 deal”, FT.com, Dec. 21 2006.
“Shell offers to cut Sakhalin-2 stake by 30%”, Financial Times, Dec. 11 2006; “Gazprom strikes $7.45bn Sakhalin-2 deal”, FT.com, Dec. 21 2006.
[10]« La Russie menace Total d’un retrait de licence d’exploitation », Les Echos, 30 octobre 2006.
« La Russie menace Total d’un retrait de licence d’exploitation », Les Echos, 30 octobre 2006.
[11]« Vérifications concernant Total à Khariaga: le groupe français s’en sort à peu de frais », Vedomosti, 30 mars 2007, http:// fr. rian. ru/ business/ 20070330/ 62844527. html
« Vérifications concernant Total à Khariaga: le groupe français s’en sort à peu de frais », Vedomosti, 30 mars 2007, http:// fr. rian. ru/ business/ 20070330/ 62844527. html
[12]« Генпрокуратура занялась добычей газа », Коммерсантъ, 8 novembre 2006, http:// www. kommersant. ru/ doc. html? docId= 719680; « L’offensive de Moscou contre la major russe TNK-BP », Le monde, 13 novembre 2006, hhttp:// abonnes. lemonde. fr/ web/ article/ 0,1-0@ 2-3234,36-833855,0.html?xtor=RSS-3234
« Генпрокуратура занялась добычей газа », Коммерсантъ, 8 novembre 2006, http:// www. kommersant. ru/ doc. html? docId= 719680; « L’offensive de Moscou contre la major russe TNK-BP », Le monde, 13 novembre 2006, hhttp:// abonnes. lemonde. fr/ web/ article/ 0,1-0@ 2-3234,36-833855,0.html?xtor=RSS-3234
[13]“BP recalls staff from Russia as pressure mounts on joint venture”, Financial Times, March 26 2008; “BP office raid raises fears over Russia ventureé, FT.com, May 20 2008, http:// www. ft. com/ cms/ s/ 0/ 8f554ca2-2695-11dd-9c95-000077b07658. html
“BP recalls staff from Russia as pressure mounts on joint venture”, Financial Times, March 26 2008; “BP office raid raises fears over Russia ventureé, FT.com, May 20 2008, http:// www. ft. com/ cms/ s/ 0/ 8f554ca2-2695-11dd-9c95-000077b07658. html
[14]“Bolivia’s energy move follows nationalisation trend”, Financial Times, May 2 2006; « Nationalismes en sous-sol », Le Monde, 5 décembre 2007.
“Bolivia’s energy move follows nationalisation trend”, Financial Times, May 2 2006; « Nationalismes en sous-sol », Le Monde, 5 décembre 2007.
[15]« Pétrole : Rosneft privé à 100% d’ici 3 à 10 ans », Le blog finance, http:// www. leblogfinance. com/ 2006/ 09/ ptrole_rosneft. html
« Pétrole : Rosneft privé à 100% d’ici 3 à 10 ans », Le blog finance, http:// www. leblogfinance. com/ 2006/ 09/ ptrole_rosneft. html
[16]« Газ перетек на декабрь », KОММЕРСАНТЪ, 23 November 2006; “UES head casts light on his uphill task”, FT.com, Sep. 11, 2007, hhttp:// search. ft. com/ ftArticle? queryText= UES&y=0&aje=true&x=0&id=070911011302&ct=0; “Electricity: A giant generation game”, Financial Times, Apr. 17, 2008, http:// search. ft. com/ ftArticle? queryText= UES&y= 0&aje= true&x= 0&id= 080417000293&ct= 0
« Газ перетек на декабрь », KОММЕРСАНТЪ, 23 November 2006; “UES head casts light on his uphill task”, FT.com, Sep. 11, 2007, hhttp:// search. ft. com/ ftArticle? queryText= UES&y=0&aje=true&x=0&id=070911011302&ct=0; “Electricity: A giant generation game”, Financial Times, Apr. 17, 2008, http:// search. ft. com/ ftArticle? queryText= UES&y= 0&aje= true&x= 0&id= 080417000293&ct= 0
[17]“ Russia: output of the military–industrial complex, 1991–2002”, http:// www. sipri. org/ contents/ milap/ milex/ aprod/ nat_data. html; (Sapir, 1994); “Military-Industrial Complex 1991-2000”, Kommersant, Dec. 4, 2001, hhttp:// www. kommersant. com/ tree. asp? rubric=3&node=36&doc_id=300257.
“ Russia: output of the military–industrial complex, 1991–2002”, http:// www. sipri. org/ contents/ milap/ milex/ aprod/ nat_data. html; (Sapir, 1994); “Military-Industrial Complex 1991-2000”, Kommersant, Dec. 4, 2001, hhttp:// www. kommersant. com/ tree. asp? rubric=3&node=36&doc_id=300257.
[18]Gazeta Wyborcza, “Arms Are More Than Gold”, interview with Ruslan Pukhov, Dec. 17, 2001, p. 9, disponible en ligne : http:// www. cast. ru/ eng/ publications/ ? id= 62
Gazeta Wyborcza, “Arms Are More Than Gold”, interview with Ruslan Pukhov, Dec. 17, 2001, p. 9, disponible en ligne : http:// www. cast. ru/ eng/ publications/ ? id= 62
[19]Krasnaïa Zvezda, « Горячая пора « оборонки » », 24/12/2005, http:// www. redstar. ru/ 2005/ 12/ 24_12/ 5_01. html
Krasnaïa Zvezda, « Горячая пора « оборонки » », 24/12/2005, http:// www. redstar. ru/ 2005/ 12/ 24_12/ 5_01. html
[20](SIPRI, 2006) and “Russia’s Arms Trade with Foreign States in 2005”, Moscow Defense Brief, n°2, 2006, http:// mdb. cast. ru/ mdb/ 1-2006/ arms_trade/ item2/
(SIPRI, 2006) and “Russia’s Arms Trade with Foreign States in 2005”, Moscow Defense Brief, n°2, 2006, http:// mdb. cast. ru/ mdb/ 1-2006/ arms_trade/ item2/
[21]http:// mdb. cast. ru/ mdb/ 2-2005/ facts/ owner
http:// mdb. cast. ru/ mdb/ 2-2005/ facts/ owner
[22]« Le groupe public Rostekhnologuiï projette de créer un holding de blindés (président du groupe) », Ria Novosti, 28 Nov. 2007. http:// fr. rian. ru/ russia/ 20071128/ 89973324. html
« Le groupe public Rostekhnologuiï projette de créer un holding de blindés (président du groupe) », Ria Novosti, 28 Nov. 2007. http:// fr. rian. ru/ russia/ 20071128/ 89973324. html
[23]Rosbalt, « Авиапром заражён государством », TRAD 22/09/2005, disponible en ligne: http:// www. rosbalt. ru/ 2005/ 09/ 22/ 227525. html
Rosbalt, « Авиапром заражён государством », TRAD 22/09/2005, disponible en ligne: http:// www. rosbalt. ru/ 2005/ 09/ 22/ 227525. html
[25]« Документы посозданию ОАК внесены в Правительство РФ TRAD », 08/11/2005, http:// www. rosbalt. ru/ 2005/ 11/ 08/ 233845. html; see: Алексей Хазбиев, « Лидерство илисмерть », Эксперт, n°10 (504), 13 марта 2006. Disponible en ligne: hhttp:// www. expert. ru/ economy/2006/03/aviaprom_rossii_editorial; « Industrie aéronautique russe: problèmes et solutions », RIA Novosti, 9 octobre 2006.
« Документы посозданию ОАК внесены в Правительство РФ TRAD », 08/11/2005, http:// www. rosbalt. ru/ 2005/ 11/ 08/ 233845. html; see: Алексей Хазбиев, « Лидерство илисмерть », Эксперт, n°10 (504), 13 марта 2006. Disponible en ligne: hhttp:// www. expert. ru/ economy/2006/03/aviaprom_rossii_editorial; « Industrie aéronautique russe: problèmes et solutions », RIA Novosti, 9 octobre 2006.
[26]« Soukhoï coûte plus cher qu’Irkout » (Vedomosti), RIA Novosti, 10 novembre 2006.
« Soukhoï coûte plus cher qu’Irkout » (Vedomosti), RIA Novosti, 10 novembre 2006.
[27]“Russia to relax rules on foreign investment in aviation industry”, Financial Times, Aug. 24 2006.
“Russia to relax rules on foreign investment in aviation industry”, Financial Times, Aug. 24 2006.
[28]« EADS envisage une augmentation de son capital », Les Échos, 7 décembre 2006; « Игорь Шувалов выбрал EADS », Коммерсантъ, 8 décembre 2006,http:// www. kommersant. ru/ doc. html? docId= 728581 ; Reuters, “Russia needs political finesse to boost EADS link » http:// in. news. yahoo. com/ 060927/ 137/ 67zly. html; Airbus Letter, Jan. 2006, http:// www. airbus. com/ store/ mm_repository/ press_kits/ att00006457/ media_object_file_Airbus_Letter_Jan_2006_French. pdf
« EADS envisage une augmentation de son capital », Les Échos, 7 décembre 2006; « Игорь Шувалов выбрал EADS », Коммерсантъ, 8 décembre 2006,http:// www. kommersant. ru/ doc. html? docId= 728581 ; Reuters, “Russia needs political finesse to boost EADS link » http:// in. news. yahoo. com/ 060927/ 137/ 67zly. html; Airbus Letter, Jan. 2006, http:// www. airbus. com/ store/ mm_repository/ press_kits/ att00006457/ media_object_file_Airbus_Letter_Jan_2006_French. pdf
[29]« VSMPO-Avisma Gets under the Govt’s Control », Kommersant, July 19 2006, www. kommersant. com
« VSMPO-Avisma Gets under the Govt’s Control », Kommersant, July 19 2006, www. kommersant. com
[30]Konstantin Makienko (2006), “Consolidation and restructuring of the Russian Shipbuilding Sector during 2005”, Moscow Defense Brief, n°1. www. cast. ru
Konstantin Makienko (2006), “Consolidation and restructuring of the Russian Shipbuilding Sector during 2005”, Moscow Defense Brief, n°1. www. cast. ru
[31]Konstantin Makienko (2007), « Russian Ships Have Run Aground », Expert, 42 (583), http:// eng. expert. ru/ printissues/ expert/ 2007/ 42/ rossiyskie_korabli_seli_na_mel/
Konstantin Makienko (2007), « Russian Ships Have Run Aground », Expert, 42 (583), http:// eng. expert. ru/ printissues/ expert/ 2007/ 42/ rossiyskie_korabli_seli_na_mel/
[32]ARMS TASS, « Роспром в 2006 году представит в правительство концепцию реформирования судостроения », 30/06/2005, hhttp:// arms-tass. su/ ? page= article&aid= 16212&cid=94; “Sechin to focus on shipbuilding”, Kommersant, May 14,2008, http:// www. kommersant. com/ p891504/ Sechin_shipbuilding/
ARMS TASS, « Роспром в 2006 году представит в правительство концепцию реформирования судостроения », 30/06/2005, hhttp:// arms-tass. su/ ? page= article&aid= 16212&cid=94; “Sechin to focus on shipbuilding”, Kommersant, May 14,2008, http:// www. kommersant. com/ p891504/ Sechin_shipbuilding/
[33]http:// www. gazprom-media. com/
http:// www. gazprom-media. com/
[34]“Russian state resumes intervention in the economy”, RIA Novosti, Oct. 20, 2006.
“Russian state resumes intervention in the economy”, RIA Novosti, Oct. 20, 2006.
[35]« AvtoVAZ, KAMAZ, GAZ to Consolidate into National Automobile Corporation », Kommersant, Jan. 27 2006, hhttp:// www. kommersant. com/ p-8021/ AvtoVAZ_KAMAZ_GAZ_to_Consolidate_into_National_Automobile_Corporation/
« AvtoVAZ, KAMAZ, GAZ to Consolidate into National Automobile Corporation », Kommersant, Jan. 27 2006, hhttp:// www. kommersant. com/ p-8021/ AvtoVAZ_KAMAZ_GAZ_to_Consolidate_into_National_Automobile_Corporation/
[36]“Reviving Up Russia’s Automotive Industry”, Russia Profile, July 4 2006.
“Reviving Up Russia’s Automotive Industry”, Russia Profile, July 4 2006.
[37]« Avtovaz to offer up to 25% of its shares », FT.com, Mar. 01 2008, hhttp:// search. ft. com/ ftArticle? queryText= avtovaz&y= 12&aje= true&x= 10&id= 080301000184&ct=0; « Les Usines VAZ pourraient sacrifier la Lada-Kalina au profit de la Logan », Ria Novosti, 23 octobre 2006, http:// fr. rian. ru/ russia/ 20061023/ 55042805. html
« Avtovaz to offer up to 25% of its shares », FT.com, Mar. 01 2008, hhttp:// search. ft. com/ ftArticle? queryText= avtovaz&y= 12&aje= true&x= 10&id= 080301000184&ct=0; « Les Usines VAZ pourraient sacrifier la Lada-Kalina au profit de la Logan », Ria Novosti, 23 octobre 2006, http:// fr. rian. ru/ russia/ 20061023/ 55042805. html
[38]« "Тройка Диалог" выкатит КамАЗ за границу », Kommersant, Apr. 02 2008, http:// www. kommersant. ru/ doc. aspx? DocsID= 875463
« "Тройка Диалог" выкатит КамАЗ за границу », Kommersant, Apr. 02 2008, http:// www. kommersant. ru/ doc. aspx? DocsID= 875463
[39]« ‘Рособоронэкспорт’ нацелился на КамАЗ », Коммерсантъ, 8 février 2006, http:// www. kommersant. ru/ doc. html? docId= 647650 « ‘Rosoboronexport’ is interested in development of ‘KAMAZ’ and Kazan helicopter plant », Tatar-inform, May 13 2006, http:// www. tatar. ru/ ? DNSID= 552490b8a167dc50d036797ff817c8a1&full= 22826
« ‘Рособоронэкспорт’ нацелился на КамАЗ », Коммерсантъ, 8 février 2006, http:// www. kommersant. ru/ doc. html? docId= 647650 « ‘Rosoboronexport’ is interested in development of ‘KAMAZ’ and Kazan helicopter plant », Tatar-inform, May 13 2006, http:// www. tatar. ru/ ? DNSID= 552490b8a167dc50d036797ff817c8a1&full= 22826
[40]“Nuclear Agency will close next Month”, Kommersant, Feb. 06 2008, http:// www. kommersant. com/ p-12017/ atomic_energy/ ; « How Russia is nationalized », Kommersant, Sept. 24 2007, http:// www. kommersant. com/ p806717/
“Nuclear Agency will close next Month”, Kommersant, Feb. 06 2008, http:// www. kommersant. com/ p-12017/ atomic_energy/ ; « How Russia is nationalized », Kommersant, Sept. 24 2007, http:// www. kommersant. com/ p806717/
[41]Interros website www. interros. ru/ eng/ assets/ powermachines Dec. 11 2006.
Interros website www. interros. ru/ eng/ assets/ powermachines Dec. 11 2006.
[42]“Aviation Companies form a Flock”, Kommersant, April 11 2006, www. kommersant. com/ page. asp? id= 665357; “Aeroflot, Dalavia and Sakhalin Airlines Propose to Establish Far-East Aviation Company”, Press release from Aeroflot web site, Nov. 20 2006, www. aeroflot. ru/ eng/ news. asp? ob_no= 712&d_no= 5335
“Aviation Companies form a Flock”, Kommersant, April 11 2006, www. kommersant. com/ page. asp? id= 665357; “Aeroflot, Dalavia and Sakhalin Airlines Propose to Establish Far-East Aviation Company”, Press release from Aeroflot web site, Nov. 20 2006, www. aeroflot. ru/ eng/ news. asp? ob_no= 712&d_no= 5335
[43]“Russian airline S7 may form alliance with Aeroflot”, Ria Novosti, http:// en. rian. ru/ russia/ 20060731/ 52065104. html
“Russian airline S7 may form alliance with Aeroflot”, Ria Novosti, http:// en. rian. ru/ russia/ 20060731/ 52065104. html
[44]« МЭРТ нарушил госпакетное соглашение », Kommersant, April 10 2008 http:// www. kommersant. ru/ doc. aspx? DocsID= 878518
« МЭРТ нарушил госпакетное соглашение », Kommersant, April 10 2008 http:// www. kommersant. ru/ doc. aspx? DocsID= 878518
[46]“Chemical Industry Development Strategy”, Kommersant, 2 december 2006 http:// www. kommersant. com/ p726907/ Chemical_Industry_Development_Strategy/ et http:// www. kommersant. ru/ doc. html? docId= 726907
“Chemical Industry Development Strategy”, Kommersant, 2 december 2006 http:// www. kommersant. com/ p726907/ Chemical_Industry_Development_Strategy/ et http:// www. kommersant. ru/ doc. html? docId= 726907
[47]“An Iron Grip on the Metals Industry”, Kommersant, Sept. 8 2006, www. kommersant. com
“An Iron Grip on the Metals Industry”, Kommersant, Sept. 8 2006, www. kommersant. com
[48]www. oboronprom. ru
www. oboronprom. ru
[49]“Back in Business – How Putin’s Allies are turning Russia into a Corporate State”, Financial Times, June 19 2006.
“Back in Business – How Putin’s Allies are turning Russia into a Corporate State”, Financial Times, June 19 2006.
[50]“State Corporations: going for the flow”, Kommersant, Dec. 26 2007, http:// www. kommersant. com/ p838756/ state_corporations/
“State Corporations: going for the flow”, Kommersant, Dec. 26 2007, http:// www. kommersant. com/ p838756/ state_corporations/
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