2003
Le travail humain
Operator’s self confidence to detect mobile robot trajectory errors
J.-P. Gaillard
Laboratoire de psychologie expérimentale, Université de Rennes Haute-Bretagne, 8, avenue du Recteur Le Moal, 35043 Rennes Cedex. E-mail : jean-pierre. gaillard@ uhb. fr
D. Freard
E. Colle
Centre d’études et de mécanique d’Île-de-France, IUP Évry, Université d’Évry, 40, rue du Pelvoux, 91000 Évry Cedex. E-mail : ecolle@ cemif. univ-evry. fr
P. Hoppenot
Centre d’études et de mécanique d’Île-de-France, IUP Évry, Université d’Évry, 40, rue du Pelvoux, 91000 Évry Cedex. E-mail : ecolle@ cemif. univ-evry. fr
Le but de cette étude était de savoir si un opérateur pouvait correctement superviser un robot mobile de faible coût et doté d’une interface de contrôle visuel minimal. L’expérience réalisée simulait des déplacements du robot en mode automatique avec ou sans erreurs de trajectoires. Deux groupes de sujets ont été définis en fonction de leur niveau de connaissance technique. La tâche des sujets ayant une formation technologique et de sujets n’en ayant aucune était de détecter les erreurs de trajectoire et de donner un degré de confiance à chacune de leurs décisions. Une partie des résultats a été analysée dans le cadre de la Théorie de la détection du signal (TDS). Les principaux résultats indiquent que tous les sujets peuvent correctement détecter les erreurs de trajectoire, mais que leurs stratégies de décision dépend de leur degré de connaissance technique. La confiance qu’ils accordent dans leurs réponses varie en effet selon ces connaissances et le type de réponse qu’ils donnent. La comparaison entre les sujets ayant une formation technologique et ceux n’en ayant aucune, montre que ces derniers sont plus laxistes dans leurs décisions. Les premiers sont plus prudents mais aussi plus confiants que les seconds lorsqu’ils commettent des erreurs de jugement de type omission. D’une façon plus générale, on remarque que les opérateurs, dans leur ensemble, ont tendance à être trop confiants dans leurs réponses, excepté pour la détection d’erreurs de trajectoires. Ces résultats sont discutés dans le cadre des systèmes coopératifs entre opérateurs et machines. Selon Moray, Hiskes, Lee et Muir (1995), le critère de passage d’un mode automatique à un mode manuel et réciproquement est déterminé par le rapport entre le degré de confiance des opérateurs dans le mode automatique et le degré de confiance en eux-mêmes lorsqu’ils opèrent en mode manuel. À cet égard, le biais de surestimation de la confiance des opérateurs ayant une culture technologique, pourrait les conduire à privilégier un mode de commande manuel au détriment d’un mode automatique. La comparaison entre des opérateurs ayant des niveaux de connaissance technologique différents nous a conduit à proposer un modèle de décision de passage d’un mode de commande à l’autre en fonction de l’habileté de l’opérateur, de sa charge de travail et du ratio confiance dans chacun des deux modes.
Mots-clés :
Robotique, Coopération homme/machine, Contrôle/commande, Activités métacognitives, Confiance, Théorie de la détection du signal.
The aim of the present study is to know if an operator could correctly supervise a “low-cost” mobile robot with a minimal visual interface. An experiment was conducted simulating robot displacements, some of them with trajectory errors. Despite their technological background, the operators’task was to detect these errors when they occurred and to give a self-confidence decision. The classical Signal Detection Theory was applied to the results and an estimation of operators’ self-confidence associated to the type of decisions was calculated. The main results indicate all operators could correctly detect trajectory errors. Operators with no technological background were more lax in their decisions than those with a technological background, but the latter were more overconfident in their omission decisions than the former. Results are discussed in terms of human/machine cooperation.
Keywords :
Robotics, Human/Machine Cooperation, Command/Control, Metacognition, Self-Confidence, Signal Detection Theory..
Recent developments in areas such as Computer Supported Cooperation Work (CSCW) emphasize the concept of cooperation between humans and machines. Following several pioneering works in the area of teleoperation, the necessity of human supervision of automated machines has come into question, notably in the field of industrial robotics (Bejkzy, 1976; Sheridan, 1976; Vertut & Coiffet, 1984). Different types of architecture for such CSCW, for example in air traffic control, have also been proposed (Millot, 1988; Millot & Mandiau, 1995).
One of the first advances in the specific area of teleoperation came from the medical field and its attempt to supply manipulative functions for physically handicapped people. Cooperation, instead of interaction, between operator and machine appeared early on (Guittet, Kwee, Quétin, & Yclon, 1978). It implies that some functions be performed by machines and others by humans. Since the conception of function allocation (Fitts, 1951), several conceptualisations have been put forward. Some of them against Fitts’rationalist method (Mc Carthy, Fallon, & Bannon, 2000). We have suggested that the question of function allocation between humans and machines shows that at least five different strategies can be used (Gaillard, 1997), embeded in the three approaches propounded by Hollnagel and Bye (2000): “left-over”, “compensatory” and “complementary” approaches.
— Allocation by default: When the machine cannot perform the task due to its technological limitations, the task is allocated to a human operator. This is the left-over approach which assumes all tasks can be performed by a human operator.
— Allocation on comparative performance: In the original method provided by Fitts in the form of MABA/MABA (Man is Better At/Machine is Better At) list. For each task, performances by operator and by machine are compared. The operator or the machine then allocates the task to the most efficient agent. In this compensatory approach, the operator’s workload criteria can be used as a global predictive statement regarding its performance. Many general comparative presentations have been outlined (For example, Woodson & Canover, 1978; Kolski, 1993).
— Allocation based on economic criteria: Each task execution has an economic cost. When operator and machine can perform a task equally, one chooses the more economical agent. This type of strategy does not consider human or social consequences.
— Allocation based on human criteria: We deliberately choose to consider the human and social consequences of allocating certain tasks to operator or machine. When the task is new or difficult for the operator, this strategy induces costs for operator training.
— Dynamic allocation: The allocation is temporally limited and conceived as a complementary approach in which computer and operator support each other. Some or all tasks can be performed by both operator and machine in a so called “vertical cooperation” when only the operator decides the workload division between human and machine or a “horizontal cooperation” when both operator and machine can decide on the allocation (Millot & Mandiau, 1995). Sometimes the machine performs a task, and at others the operator executes it. Actions and supervision are then dynamically distributed between agents, operator and artificially intelligent machine. In this case, it is the artificial intelligence (AI) system that decides the distribution of tasks. Task allocation is executed in real time and, at the outset, it must be specified which agent will allocate tasks, artificial intelligence, operator or both.
The supervision paradigm has recently been considered as ironical as a result of developments in automation it is also ironical in robotics in that operators using automatic modes eventually lose their ability to operate machines manually. This in turn, reduces their expertise, and therefore, their competence in the supervision of automatic systems (Bainbridge, 1987). Implicitely, engineers of human/machine systems used allocation by default until AI systems were able to perform highly skilled tasks. Subsequently, allocation based on expected performance became standard. In these situations, perceptual and some cognitive tasks could be allocated to machines regardless of cost. In our case, when we choose to use low-cost perceptual technology, task allocation involves considering the human operator as a cognitive resource cooperating with a mobile robot.
Furthermore, we value human perceptual and cognitive abilities. In this study, we chose not to use sophisticated perception equipment, firstly for economic reasons, and secondly so as to restore environmental control to disabled persons. We deliberately chose a vertical cooperation system design and allocated some detection and decision-making tasks to the human operator.
II. ASSISTANCE SYSTEM COMPONENTS The assistance system is composed of a control station for the person and a manipulator arm mounted on a mobile robot (fig. 1).
Fig. 1. System ComponentsComposants du système
II . 1. MOBILE ROBOT COMPONENTS
With cost control in mind, the robot was designed with limited means of perception, an odometer and an ultrasonic ring. Odometry gives the robot’s position and the orientation in relation to angular rotation of the wheels. The method is simple and low-cost but presents a systematic error, a lack of precision when measuring distance, and a non-systematic error, mainly due to wheel spin and sliding. As a result, the actual position of the robot may differ from its theoretical position as calculated by the wheels. An ultrasonic ring measures the distance between the robot and obstacles the robot’s environment. The accuracy of this ultrasonic technology is limited by proximity. At close range, a high rate of erroneous measures may occur, as the algorithms operate inaccurately under such difficult conditions.
III . 2. HUMAN MACHINE COOPERATION
To command the robot, the operator chooses a goal on the plan and the planning function is performed to calculate the path. Then, the navigation function plots the path followed by the robot.
— Planning: This is the first step in executing a mission. Both operator and machine have the capacity to determine the path to be followed on the map, but the goal can only be decided by the person (fig. 2).
Fig. 2.Path plottingPlanification de la trajectoire
Goal designation can be very simple, the person gives the position of the goal by pointing it out on the outline drawn on the screen. Designation can also be complex. If the person wants to reach the refrigerator, the goal is defined, the machine computes intermediate subgoals using its pervious knowledge of the environment. The planning method is based on the visibility graph and the A* algorithm (Benreguieg, Hoppenot, Maaref, Colle, & Barret, 1997). It is also possible for the person to give some subgoals before the machine computes the path to the ultimate goal.
— Navigation: The problem is following the planned trajectory. Navigation is therefore divided into two forms of behavior: goal-seeking and obstacle avoidance. A fusion of the two is achieved to provide robot commands (fig. 3).
Fig. 3. Fusion of two forms of behavior: obstacle avoiding and goal-seeking for robot navigationFusion entre deux façons de se comporter : évitement d’obstacles et recherche du but pour la navigation robot
Entirely automatic navigation can be performed. Goal-seeking depends on the relative positions of the robot position and the next subgoal, which defines the direction to follow and the speed (depending on the distance). If an unmodeled obstacle stands in the robot’s path, it must be avoided. Ultrasonic sensors (US) detect these obstacles and fuzzy logic manages obstacle avoidance. The aim is to create a human-like behavior by passing as far as possible from obstacles. The fusion of those two forms of behavior is achieved by taking into account only obstacle avoidance when an obstacle is near the robot. When the distance between obstacles and the robot grows, goal-seeking behavior takes on more importance in the robot command. These results are detailed in Benreguieg et al. (1997).
II . 3. CONTROL CONFIGURATION
The control station is composed of a screen which displays different types of information via enhanced reality techniques (fig. 4): the robot position on the 2D flat plan, the US measures and robot operating indicators.
Fig. 4. Control screen representing the robot’s position, previous trajectory inside the room and US impactsÉcran de contrôle représentant la position du robot, sa trajectoire précédente dans la pièce et les impacts ultra sonores
We assume that trajectory errors may occur, the operator must detect errors and categorize them before manual intervention. We are then faced with the question of the operator’s detection capabilities and self-confidence in making such decisions.
III . 1. OPERATOR SIGNAL DETECTION
Even if the trajectory on the screen is correct in relation to the goal, the actual robot trajectory could be erroneous. The only visual information available to indicate a trajectory error is dots plotted on the screen, representing US impacts. Trajectory error detection can, therefore, be analyzed as a signal detection situation. In this type of situation, the signal is the specific pattern of US dots on the screen compared to the US pattern that is supposed to correspond to the walls and object surfaces. We are also faced with the problem of some “lost” US dots that appear on the screen as noise, or dots not corresponding to the walls and objects in the environment. The signal is, therefore, the relative alignment of some US dots corresponding to the surface of an object, and the noise, some non-aligned US dots. Fortunately, at an early stage of the visual perception process, a colinearity function occurs to detect object edges (Perterhans & Von der Heydt, 1989; Boucard, Delord, & Giersch, 1994), which means that aligned dots will be interpreted as object surfaces in this situation. As a result, the detection of a trajectory error is based on the subject’s visual capacity to detect aligned dots and to recognize the line, corresponding to the wall’s position on the screen. If the perceived alignment of the US dots, representing the wall, does not correspond to the supposed position of the wall, it will mean that the robot’s actual distance from the wall is different to the supposed distance. In this case, the robot’s trajectory can be corrected.
We studied signal perception and detection to consider the degree of human cognitive skill needed to perform this function and the risk involved in allocating this task to the human operator.
Human detection has been largely studied since the middle of the nineteenth century by historical psychophysical experimentalists. Detection at absolute threshold and differential threshold are formulated in well-known laws such as the Weber-Fechner law or Steven’s power law. Nevertheless, the signal detection theory (SDT) remains an appropriate theoretical and empirical frame to model human operator detection and decision activities (Green & Swets, 1966). The SDT modulates a perceptual and a decisional process. The SDT assumes that a signal will be detected in relation to the sensitivity of the receptor and the strength of the signal (distance measure of sensitivity d’in the mathematical model). A decision process is mathematically modulated in the SDT according to decision criteria. The decision itself and therefore the criterion level, depends on decision consequences perceived as rewards or penalties. For the same sensory receptor sensibility, the same signal strength and the same criterion level of decision, an operator can be more or less confident in his “yes” or “no” answer. The outcome matrix for a defined situation corresponds to four types of response traditionally labeled: “Hit” when the signal+noise is present and is detected by the operator; “False alarm” when only the noise is present and the subject decides the signal is present; “Miss” when the signal+noise is present and not detected; “Correct negative” when only the noise is present and the subject decides the signal is not present.
A similar SDT model has been applied with success to the field of aeronautics. For example, it has been established that the model fits experimental results in detection and decision for air traffic control (Bisseret, 1981).
III . 2. OPERATOR’S SELF CONFIDENCE
In this study, self-confidence is defined as a human judgment on the acuity of a decision. When an operator detects an error, it is the result of perceptual and decisional processes. The decisional process itself is determined by rewards and penalties following each response, or social consequences in the form of the perceived effect the decision will have on the operator or others. Then, after the decision, when the sensory receptor sensibility remains constant, and/or there are the same decision criteria, an operator can be more or less confident in the “yes” or “no” responses. Self-confidence regarding a judgment is, therefore, a kind of meta-cognitive activity. For intellectual judgments Dawes (1980) showed that the subjects overestimate their capacities to judge correctly, but underestimate their capacities for perceptual judgments. For intellectual judgments, such as those involving memory, knowledge or deduction, overestimation in self-confidence is generally accepted. Recent works have shown controversial results regarding perceptual judgments (Winman & Juslin, 1993; Petrusic & Baranski, 1997). Human trust in automated processes and operator’s self-confidence in performing manual interventions has also been studied (Lee & Moray, 1992, 1994; Moray, Hiskes, Lee, & Muir, 1995). Results of these studies show that the operator’s intervention in an automatic process depends on the ratio of confidence calculated by the operators trust in automated systems and their self-confidence in manual control. The degree of automation the operator decides to employ varies according to the difference between trust in automatic control and self-confidence in manual control; this in turn depends on perceived failures in each mode. In this study, the human/machine reliability system is composed of the operator’s confidence in the robot’s displacements and the operator’s self-confidence in detecting the robot’s false trajectories. In other words, the system’s performance depends not only on the machine’s reliability and the operator’s ability to correctly detect the trajectory errors of the robot, and to correct it manually, but also on the operators level of self-confidence in their decisions.
The operator’s decision regarding robot trajectory involves the following visual and cognitive processes:
— Visual to perceive the sketch of the robot, its trajectory, US dots, and obstacles.
— Cognitive to interpret visual information and estimate spatial trajectory and position relative to obstacles and a goal. In these cases, it is not clear that operators would under-or overestimated their capacity to detect and categorize errors.
Self-confidence in the operator’s decisions leads us to investigate three ratios of confidence/accuracy relationship (Liberman & Tverski, 1993; Petrusic & Baranski, 1997).
— Over-or under-self-confidence: this is a global index. An operator is over-confident if the subjective performance estimation is above the real performance. An operator is under-confident if the estimated performance is under the real performance (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977). We could predict a possible self-confidence overestimation if the decision is mainly cognitively directed and a possible underestimation if a decision is mainly directed by a visual process.
— Calibration: self-confidence calibration refers to the subjective probability of the occurrence of a particular event. For example, a trajectory is correct or not, and the empirical probability such events really occur (Kerren, 1991). If the probability of a correct trajectory is high and the operator decides correctly the self-confidence should be high (good calibration). If the operator decides it was an incorrect one (false alarm), the self-decision should be low (good calibration). Calibration can be estimated by comparing the levels of self-confidence between response types. Good calibration will mean high self-confidence for correct responses compared to low self-confidence for incorrect ones (false alarms and omissions).
— Resolution: resolution refers to the local use of the self-confidence levels to distinguish correct from incorrect responses. For example, if an operator gives a correct response, the level of self-confidence should be higher than for an incorrect one. Self-confidence is then compared to each of response and function of the response frequency. Resolution can be estimated by the correlation between the level of self-confidence and the frequency for each response type.
An experiment was performed to see if a human operator is able to detect errors with only two kinds of information: the robot’s position given by the odometer and the US measures.
IV . 1. MATERIAL
The material included a mobile robot, a control system and a screen, described earlier in the assistance system components.
IV . 2. SUBJECTS
34 subjects, all students and able-bodied, aged from 18 to 26 years old. 25 students in psychology out of the total of 34 subjects had No Background in Technology (NBT). The other 9 subjects were students in technology and therefore had a Background in Technology (BT). They were considered as more familiar with robotics compared to subjects with NBT.
IV . 3. PROCEDURE AND DESIGN
The room was presented to the operator on a video screen (fig. 2). Feedback to the operators, available on the screen, was information relative to the robot’s past trajectory, robot’s present position, US past and present dots and a numerical matching between US dots and wall position.
The three kinds of trajectories were:
- 1 / With a position error;
- 2 / With an odometrical error;
- 3 / Without error.
In a first session, subjects were instructed to visually control the robot’s displacements on the screen. The experimenter first presented the following 5 points.
1 / You will be presented with a mobile robot interface and you will have to detect trajectory errors.
2 / The robot moves in a room where it should realise an ideal trajectory marked on the screen by a white line.
3 / The robot’s general tendency to go to the center in the room produces small gaps on the trajectory. It can also slow the robot when it has to pass through the door to go out of the room.
4 / Two types of failure are possible: Initial position failure when the robot started at a point in the room other than expected and Odometric failure when the real position does not correspond to the distance on the screen.
5 / Four visible cues were displayed on the sceen: The robot’s memorised trajectory – The robot’s actual position –The US dots– A numerical indication of matching between US dots and the wall’s theoritical position.
After the presentation, each subject performed 9 learning trials with the experimenter’s explanations. The subject had to detect trajectory errors as quickly as possible in order to categorise the errors as either initial position error or odometric error. At the end of each the subject had to give a self-confidence estimation of the decision on a 4 points Likert scale (0,1,2,3).
There were two groups of subjects: 25 with no BT and 9 with BT.
Trajectories were presented to each subject at random: 6 correct trajectories, 6 with odometric errors and 6 with initial position errors.
Each trajectory was repeated twice in the same conditions.
V . 1. DETECTION ANALYSES
According to the typical matrix of the SDT we calculated the number of detected trajectory errors (Te) corresponding to a signal detected (Hits), un-detected trajectory errors corresponding to an un-detected signal (Misses), detected correct trajectory (Tc) corresponding to an absence of correctly detected signal (Correct negatives) and an un-detected correct trajectory corresponding to a false detection of a trajectory error (False alarms) (table 1).
Trajectory errors were detected equally well by novices and experts, respectively 95,7% and 93,5% of Hits (t (32)=0,70; p>.10). There was also no difference between TB and NTB subjects when trajectory errors occurred for Hits and Misses (χ² (1, N=612)=0,44; p>.10). When correct trajectories occured, results indicated a significant difference between them. NTB subjects gave more false alarms than TB subjects, respectively 33,33% vs 22,22 % (χ² (1, N=612)=3,08; p<.10).
The sensitivity measure d’was approximately the same for TB and NTB subjects, respectively 2,18 and 2,14. The decision criterion β was lower for TB subjects, β=1,93, compared to that for the NTB subjects β=3,88. This result indicates an equal sensory capacity to detect trajectory errors in each group but a difference at the stage of the decision process. NTB subjects were more lax than TB subjects when it came to deciding if they detected a trajectory error. Nevertheless, the values of β are, for both groups, higher than 1 and we must consider that the TB subjects as well as NTB subjects were not conservative in their decisions.
TABLE 1 :Outcome matrix for the operator’s detection of the robot’s correct trajectory or trajectory error. Tc for correct trajectory and Te for trajectory error in percentagePourcentages de détections des trajectoires correctes (Tc) et des erreurs de trajectoires (Te)
Self-confidence analyses
As the maximum of responses was not equal in each cell of the outcome matrix, we calculated the frequency for each level of self-confidence in the decisions. As there was no or few 0 level self-confidence ratings for TB and NTB subjects, at first approximation, we reduced the sensitivity of the confidence criteria to two levels, low and high confidence. Levels 0 and 1 and levels 2 and 3 were combined (fig. 5).
Fig. 5. All subjects’ frequencies of self confidence levelFréquences des niveaux de confiance tous sujets confondus
Incorrect responses, False alarms and Misses, induced lower level of self-confidence, 0 and 1, than correct responses, Hits and Correct negatives (χ² (7, N=612)=210,85; p<.01). This result indicates that subjects were able to roughly calibrate their self-confidence.
For NTB subjects’ (fig. 6) and TB subjects’ (fig. 7) levels of self-confidence, the same effect was observed (respectively : χ² (7, N=162)=135,64; p<.01 and χ² (11, N=450)=269,88; p<.01).
Fig. 6. Frequency of self-confidence level for each type of responses for subjects with no technological background (NTB subjects)Fréquences des niveaux de confiance en fonction du type de réponse pour les sujets sans formation technologique
For the Misses (“no” responses for expected “yes”) TB subjects were more self-confident in their decisions than NTB subjects (χ² (7, N=612)=88,47; p<.01) than when they detected correct trajectories (Correct negatives) (χ² (7, N=612)=21,94; p<.01). Otherwise, for False alarms (“yes” responses for expected “no”) and error trajectories detected (correct “yes” responses), we notice the same tendency but differences were marginal or non significant, respectively χ² (7, N=612)=13,19; p<.10 and χ² (3, N=612)=5,21; n. s.
There was no correlation between the number of correct or incorrect decisions and the corresponding self-confidence. For example, NTB and TB subjects’number of False alarms does not correlate with their self-confidence: respectively ρ(21)=.08 (p>.10) and ρ(6)=.47(p>.10). This indicates that they are equally self-confident in their decisions even if they produce a different amount of False alarms. This result indicates a poor resolution, as subjects were not able to correctly use the self-confidence levels for each response type.
Fig. 7.Frequency of self-confidence level for each type of responses for subjects with technological background (TB subjects)Fréquences des niveaux de confiance en fonction du type de réponse pour les sujets ayant une formation technologique
V . 2. CALIBRATION ANALYSES
Good calibration means that the operators are confident in their correct decisions, hits and correct negatives and unconfident in their incorrect decisions, misses and false alarms. For example, if the percentage of trajectory errors detected (hits) is 93,5% and the average confidence rating under 93,5%, this means operators are under-confident in their decisions. If their average confidence rating is over this percentage they are over-confident in their decisions. Following Petrusic and Baranski (1997), we analysed the over/under confidence by computing a percent confidence rating C. We assume the four confidence levels as a scale with three intervals. C=nj(l)/3 with n self confidence frequency, j level on the self-confidence scale and l value on the three intervals scale (table 2).
TABLE 2 :
Over or under self-confidence in decisions. Clearly indicates operators were under-confident when they detect a trajectory error. Conversely, they were over-confident for other types of responses. Particularly for incorrect responses, False alarms and Misses, they are extremely over-confident.
Sur-estimation ou sous-estimation du degré de confiance dans les décisions
As of late, robotics has been conceived as a way to exclude operator from the control loop. Consequently, there are very few evaluations in the area of human performance in robot control. Teleoperation situations lead us to the general idea of cooperation between robots and humans and emphasises the necessity to develop experimental studies. Nevertheless, knowledge in this type of application is poor. Theoretical frame should necessarily come from the general field of human/machine interaction, interaction between operators and more recently from human/machine cooperation (Hoc & Millot, 1999). For the last, empirical studies refer to very different work and technological contexts and system analysis is often a privileged methodology to propose general and theoretical frame of human/machine cooperation. One attempt of this work was to know if robotics cooperation was at least similar or not to human/machine interactions. This experiment sought to discover if human subjects could detect trajectory errors with only minimal information displayed on the screen (robot’s trajectory, US impacts and walls). We deliberately chose to use the antiquated signal detection model used in previous human/machine studies to analyse the data, even if the number of observations was small and the subjects were unfamiliar with the task. This is often the case when exploring new technology developments with little or no engineering or ergonomic background.
Analyses under SDT clearly indicate information representing the “signal” was strong. Consequently, the subjects’sensitivity was high and this allowed them to correctly detect trajectory errors when they occurred. The discriminating criterion d’ was high and there was no difference in function of the operator’s technological background. The Misses rate was approximately 5%. According to other results (Bisseret, 1981) the decision criterion β indicates that operators with no technological backgrounds (NTB) were more lax in their decisions than those with technological backgrounds (TB). The higher number of false alarm decisions made by NTB subjects indicates they are more anxious to detect trajectory errors at the risk of producing decision errors. As noticed by Bainbridge (1978), it seems to be the result of increased uncertainty for NTB operators. We suggest an information process involving the degree of perceived uncertainty influences operators’ decisions. When perceived uncertainty is high, operators produce more false alarms than when uncertainty is lower. Self-confidence, as a secondary response, might be related with the perceived uncertainty.
From a practical viewpoint, the concept of such a robot for severely physically handicapped persons with a cooperative architecture between the person and the robot will be valid if the operator can easily detect trajectory errors. In case of erroneous decisions, specifically Miss responses, self-confidence in response will be also a critical point.
In general, operators are under-confident when detecting trajectory errors, response type Hit. They are over-confident for all other response types. Classical interpretation of under and over confidence can explain this contradictory result. (Dawes, 1980). It could be assumed perceptual skills for Hit responses, and cognitive processes for other responses mainly direct judgements on confidence. When a trajectory error occurs, visual US impacts visually fail to correspond to objects on the screen. Then, the Hit response is mainly triggered by perceptual judgement. Other responses are triggered when no such visual detection occurred and are mainly based on guessing if the visual signal occurred or not. This interpretation should be valid in terms of the comparison between TB and NTB subjects. d’ is a perceptual criteria and β a cognitive decisional criteria in the SDT model. In fact, there was no difference between them for Hit responses and perceptual sensitivity d’has the same value. In return, for other responses directed by cognitive processes where decision criteria β represent a cognitive stage in the detection task, we can notice a difference between TB and NTB subjects, the latter are more lax than the former.
The rough calibration of self-confidence indicates operators perceived differently the uncertainty of their correct and incorrect decisions. Incorrect decisions, as False alarms and Misses, are probably produced by uncertainty to perceive the signal. These results could involve practical considerations. Following Moray et al. (1995), automatic mode should be more used than manual mode as self-confidence in manual performance decreases and confidence in the automatic one increases (see also Muir & Moray, 1994; Muir & Moray, 1996). Operators should prefer automatic trajectory error detection when their self-confidence in correctly detected trajectory errors decreases. For example, instead of producing Misses, operators could be relatively confident in an automatic trajectory error detection.
Nevertheless, operators with TB are more cautious than NTB operators, but are also more self-confident in their decisions. As human error analyses revealed, it is a well-known behaviour in experts to be more confident in their skills as they are more experienced (Nicollet, Carnino, & Wanner, 1990). In this experiment, subjects had TB or NTB. TB subjects overconfidence in decision errors could be linked to a cognitive bias involving them to build a self-representation as more competent to decide about a robot’s behaviour than NTB subjects. As a consequence, operators would not behave the same way with an automatic trajectory error detector depending of their TB. As pointed out by Debernard, Vanderhaegen and Millot (1992) for air traffic controllers, experts feel suspicious about automatic detection. Muir and Moray (1996) have also pointed out that operator’s subjective rating of trust in automation were mainly based upon the perception of their competence.
The possibility to assist the operators to decide on a trajectory error was initially founded on an automatic matching between US dots and wall position. A numerical value of this matching was displayed to the operators. Post-experiment interviews with the operators revealed neither TB or NTB subjects used this assistance to the decision. Over confidence in Misses suggests operators had a low confidence in this kind of automatism and preferred to base their decisions on perceptual and cognitive skills. In fact, the system provided feedback on past robot trajectory, present trajectory and US past and present dots, all more realistic information compared to numerical values. In terms of a general human/machine architecture cooperation concerning mobile robots, engineers should be very careful with automation. First, it means that implementing automation in detecting trajectory error could be conflictual with the operator’s decision and the automatic decision rejected by him. Second, here could be another kind of irony in teleoperation with operator in the loop. The more learned in technology an operator is, the less he could accept automatic detection and process to correct erroneous decisions, but the more confident he is when operating wrongly.
As noticed by Hoc (2000), the passage from manual to automatic control or vice versa depends on the operator’s previous knowledge applied to the situation. It also depends on the operator’s technological background. Both form the necessary level of abstraction an operator will use to decide the passage from automatic to manual control.
By linking degrees of confidence and workload, we propose the operator executes a meta-cognitive evaluation of the situation (fig. 8).
Fig. 8. Cognitive model of allocation’s process control mode between manual and automaticModèle cognitif d’allocation du processus de contrôle entre manuel et automatique
According to the classic SRK model proposed by Rasmussen (1983), actions are based on skill, rules and knowledge, to which we would add the meta-knowledge required for the operator to estimate the ratio of confidence (calculated by the operator’s confidence in the machine and the self-confidence), as well as the workload and the skill in manually controlling the robot. There are three levels of cognitive activities. The first concerns the perceptual activities. The second includes the mental representations of confidence, workload and skill, the product of which is available to language and may be verbalized by the operator. Knowledge and meta-knowledge comprise the last level. Meta-knowledge is knowledge relative to the three classes of representation mentioned above. The degree of confidence in machine and operator includes a representation of the machine. These representations form a dynamic cognitive system in which the variations of one produce modifications in the other two. For example, an increase in the operator’s self-confidence will lead the operator to control the robot in the manual mode, and in return, manual control increases the general workload. If the workload is perceived as too high, the operator will decide to give up the controls, or a part of them, to the robot and waiver in automatic mode. We can apply a similar reasoning to the level of skill approximated by the operator. An operator who feels capable of controlling the robot in manual mode will have a higher sense of self-confidence and will take on a greater overall workload than a less self-confident operator.
The result of this study leads to general considerations about the operator’s cognitive evolution regarding his type of cooperation with machine. Operators will frequently use automatic systems and appreciate it when begining. They will probably increasingly prefer to manually control the system when more skilled and experienced until the workload exceeds the operator’s capacity. In human/machine cooperation, it is often assumed operators switching on automatic mode control is related with mental workload. In addition, the decision to operate on manual or automatic mode will depend on meta-cognitive activities such as self-confidence, and confidence in automation as Moray et al. (1995) pointed out. We suggest it also varies with the operator’s percieved competence in controling machines which is in human/machine cooperation related to technological knowledge background. In the theory of motivation perceived competence is considered as a generic factor of motivation. Then the security of a system as well the operator’s satisfaction will also depend on this dynamic decision criteria.
Acknowledgments
The authors are gratefull to Thierry Goater for English corrections of the first version, Wendy Schubring and David Allen for general English revision of the second version of this paper. We thank the two anomymous reviewers and Jean-Michel Hoc for their comments and suggestions.
Un texte en français proche de cet article peut être obtenu auprès de J.-P. Gaillard.
Paper received: November 2000.
Accepted by J.-M. Hoc in revised form: June 2002.
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