- Metamorphosis of the civic democratic party attitudes to european integration; on the new cleavage in the Czech party system
Recherches récentes Mes recherches
1 As the last EP elections results have shown, in major new member countries, parties leaning toward Euroskepticism took an overwhelming lead in ‘transferring’ their cause to the institutional and political framework of the EU (the Czech Republic - 17 of 24 seats, Poland – 27 of 54 seats  For Czech political representation, the Euroskeptic camp...
suite, Hungary - 12 of 24 seats  Taking 12 of 24 Hungarian MEPs as Euroskeptic refers to...
suite ). This text is a study of the Czech case in which the interplay of Euroskepticism with still not - fully settled transition agenda has been playing a crucial role in the emergence of a new cleavage in the Czech party system.
2 The 90s transitory regime as an essential background for the evolution of party system and the shifts in analytical assessments of this unique and specific regime existing on its own right (distinguished both from advanced free-market democracies and real-socialist regimes) are summarized in two tables (N° 1 and 2 in appendix). In the process of facilitating the development of free market - process which at the same time involved in post-socialist economies an unprecedented redistribution of resources (privatization) - the institutions of economic and political transition reached a stage when it has been in their interest to maintain transition features of the socio-economic and political system, thereby depriving the transitional system off crucial, self-preserving elements of the free market system as characteristic for Western free-market democracies. Thus, attempting to replicate Western European economic and political patterns, post-communist societies have reached in the 90’s, the stage where, despite implementing an extensive share of the components attached to the free market/democratic societal model (speaking in terms of law-making and institutional arrangements), the social, economic, and political structures in place have not represented this model, but seemed rather to constitute a political, economic and socio-institutional frame of distinctive, self-sustaining character. In common sense understanding, those structures represented transitory phase. It has gradually emerged that the temporary existence of those structural and functional forms became more permanent then expected. Rent-seeking tendencies from the beginning firmly imbedded in an unconstrained and unregulated overlap of post-communist politics and economy led to the institutional lock-up preventing the full switch to advanced free-market society of Western European sort. The successful finishing of the transition to Western European like advanced free-market system in post-communist countries depends on the degree of integration within the EU and associated EU interference with the distorted and deformed functional patterns that characterized the transitory regime.
3 In this sense, still extensive elements of the transitory regime and related practices which are to be eliminated through Europeanization have had brought a backlash and led to breakthrough of the political forces representing these rudimentary elements of transitory regime at the European level. That effectively means creation of institutional space for limiting the impact and effects of Europeanization processes in newly integrated countries. This process unfolding at the EU level may be possibly described as Easternization.
4 Differentiated party positions to the EU in the Czech Republic may be related more then to ideological heading of single parties (in the transition context has got just declarative character) rather to implemented transition and modernization strategies. The text highlights how shifts in these strategies and their changes may explain the development and differentiation of single party positions to the EU.
5 The inquiry is based on the content analysis of the Czech parliamentary parties’ program documents addressing the issue of integration into the Euro-Atlantic and European structures and covers party documents issued in the period from 1990 to 2003  The research has been carried out as part of the larger...
suite. The actual content of the party documents is the primary criteria to determine the positions held by single parties regarding this integration. This in view of the relatively recent emergence of party alternatives and their rather fluid character stands for somehow comprehensive base for the inquiry.
6 The development of the European agenda of Central/Eastern European political parties yields substantial research questions. Research of political parties has uncovered and established in a quite comprehensive and all-inclusive manner determinants of change in party systems and parties themselves. Changes are classically conceptualized in terms of social context as the matter of changing social structure or type of electoral behavior  Michigan and Rochester models represent the basic conceptual...
suite dominating particular electoral market, alternatively or simultaneously, changes are conceptualized in terms of institutional context (e.g. in view of degree of proportionality, disproportionality of electoral system or parliamentary or presidential form of political system).
7 However the question is how far the indicators based in those contexts can throw light on the mysteries of appearance of political parties in the transitory environment that has been characteristic of Central/Eastern European countries. Still, a relatively recent study of the post-communist party systems - for illustration - claims that “habitual party identification often is not option due to the recent emergence of the party alternatives” and “rational voting can be impaired where politics do not present voters identifiable program alternatives” (Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, Toka 1999,19).
8 At the same time, it comes out that the all-sweeping radical social sea-change that has been taking place throughout the last 15 years has not resulted in total abolition of the historic parties’ heritage. At the minimum, we deal with some form of continuity of communist parties from the previous real socialist period  In principle, two types can be distinguished - parties...
suite - but frequently also with other parties that survived in the shadow of the communist party dominance in the real socialist period, often carrying the tradition of pre-second world war parties (e.g. Christian Democratic Union - Czech Peoples’ Party) if not reestablished only after 1989 (Czech Social Democratic Party).
9 The degree of consolidation of the Czech party system and its growing similarity to Western party systems is extensively discussed, particularly in view of the unique power-sharing arrangement between 1998 and 2002  Under so called “Oppositional Agreement” the Czech Social...
suite. Two relatively sharply outlined positions may be distinguished; for example, in the view of M. Novak (1999, 133-145), the Czech party system in the mid 1990’s achieved a configuration corresponding closely to Western patterns (at the time, the closest among the other party systems of the current Central/Eastern European EU member states). In contrast, a qualitatively low degree of consolidation of the Czech party system and incomplete ‘learning process’ is noted by M. Strmiska (1999,162-168; 1999,11-36; 2001,31-32). In spite of the sharpened positions, an agreement on the decisive cleavage in the Czech party system exists. The social-liberal split (Novak 1999,136) or also “socio-economic conflict line of transformation” (Hlousek 2000,381) are considered as the key cleavage on the Czech political scene  “Socio-economic conflict line of transformation” is...
suite. A right-left understanding of the political split (Vlachova, Mateju 1998) in accordance with social-class diversification (Mateju, Rehakova, Evans 1999,231-251) is taken as the long term basic arrangement of the Czech party system. In this view the CDP and Czech Social Democratic Party are taken as basic poles and the Christian Democratic Union - Peoples’ Party and Freedom Union - Democratic Union are understood as right-center or pivotal centrist parties mediating transfers among these poles (the list of parliamentary parties in table N° 3). However, with a quite explicit polarization of party stances on the European agenda and its coming into the center of domestic politics a new cleavage emerges. P. Fiala initially named this cleavage “European integration versus national state” (Fiala 2001,37) while noting that this more and more obvious cleavage has not yet had potential to result in new parties. On this note, though, it is necessary to emphasize that this advancing cleavage (of course among other factors) already played a role in establishing of the Freedom Union in 1998 and more recently in the case of European Democrats (2002).
10 The CDP (Civic Democratic Party)  w www. ods. cz,all quoted party documents if not otherwise...
suite in its first election program “Freedom and Prosperity” in 1992 rejected the concept of Czechoslovakia as “the bridge between West and East”, hypothesis of “stabilizing factor” for whole of Central and Eastern Europe and “utopian dreaming about the whole of Central European space as a base for the whole European security system” as associated with foreign policy approaches of prominent politicians of Civic Forum and later of Civic Movement. According to the CDP program at the time, this taking form of Pentagonal later Hexagonal which were engaging us into “problems of all the time unstable South-Eastern Europe at the expense of our integration with Western Europe” was only “replacement for our nonexistent politics regarding western Europe”. Consequently, in view of the program, the “consideration that economic and political integration of the west three countries  Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. ...
suite is necessary precondition of our integration into Western Europe” was the fundamental mistake. Regarding these contested points the CDP clearly designated itself as the proponent of ‘the fastest joining of NATO”, radically refused the proposal of simultaneous dissolution of NATO and Warsaw Pact and straightforwardly declared as its main goal “inclusion of Czechoslovakia in Western World and particularly in Western Europe as their integral part” and “fast integration in the EC”. In its election program “Freedom and Prosperity” for 1996 Lower House elections, the CDP upheld prointegration position – “full membership in the EU is the main foreign policy goal of the CDP” and declared that “European integration is prospective process that ensures peace, stability, security, freedom and economic prosperity for the citizens of the member countries”. In the program though appeared the first elements of restraining demarcation of the CDP in view of the advancing integration processes of the first half of the 90’s : “We are at the same time convinced that the process of European integration should not artificially limit variety of states, nations and cultures which is one of the European civilization’s values. We are convinced that even in the future the single states will be building blocks of the European Union and that sovereignty and competencies of Union will be above all our inner task”.
11 The elements of negative assessment of the advancing integration processes were more openly formulated in the first election program after the split of long-time governing right-wing coalition (CDP, Christian Democratic Union - Czechoslovak Peoples Party, Civic Democratic Alliance)  At the end of 1997 the coalition government resigned in...
suite. In the program titled “Heads up” from 1998, the key shift may be recognized in the program formulations concentrating on a ‘national interest’ (the section “We defend national interests”). This radicalizing shift in the rhetoric of CDP program documents tended to be interpreted in the context of particular pre-election situation in 1998 as an attempt of CDP to attract extreme right-wing voters of the disintegrating Republican party (Union for Republic - Republican party of Czechoslovakia) and compensate this way for voters of Freedom Union after the split in the CDP at the end of 1997 and consequently only later was taken as a fundamental redefinition of CDP political and ideological origins and program goals.
12 With the advancement of accession negotiations and decisive entry of integration themes on the domestic political scene this program trend emerged though as the key one in the ad hoc produced document titled – “Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism” (April 2001)  w www. zahradil. cz/ html/ publikace/ old/ manifest. htm...
suite, supplement to CDP foreign policy outline “National interests in the real world” from October 1999, which openly declared the Euroskeptic position of the CDP. This document extensively criticized the EU approach to candidate countries by stating that EU takes candidate countries in the first place as markets for its production, as advantageous job opportunities for excessive numbers of specialists from the EU countries, as the source of natural wealth and cheap qualified labor and also as a potential buffer zone for potential political and security risks from East and Balkans. The Manifesto stated too that “at present the EU is profiting from asymmetric economic exchange among the EU and candidate countries”. Similarly, EU negotiation tactics “changed enlargement into competition among single candidates and this way in numerous areas prevented common proceeding towards the goals”  In this point there has been certain discontent with the...
suite. The Manifesto criticized the negotiation process itself in view of the fact that the EU in the process acted as participating party and arbitrator at the same time. The Manifesto presented the consequences of the entrance into the EU as a factual loss for the Czech Republic : “overtaking European laws is to demand from the candidate countries many times more costs then is the value of pre-accession aid”. This extensively reflected CDP’s attitude to the issue of the role of legal regulations in establishing the rule of law – the neglect of which decisively affected the course of transition and the extent of transition costs and losses.
13 A specific view of the historic and intellectual origins of the EU and their historical contextualization was presented in the chapter titled “EU in the light of the Concept of the Czech State and National Interest” as follows : “In particular these concepts of European integration which are drawn from beyond liberal democratic principles tend to clash with the ‘Concept of the Czech state’; among these concepts - besides the earlier extreme Fascist or Marxist visions of forced European integration - are also today’s distributive European social democracy and Christian-democratic politically centralizing Catholicism”. The Manifesto continued to underline that “further unnatural ‘deepening’ of European integration towards federalization should be rejected, among other things because of the historic experience with the heterogeneous federal union (Czecho-Slovak federation)”. In this way the CDPs’ crucial role in the break up of Czechoslovakia has been retrospectively legitimized through premeditated criticism of European integration. According to the Manifesto “for similar reasons, it is necessary also to reject another fashionable theory - the dissolution of nation states in the name of ‘regionalization’, which is presented as a ‘progressive’ historical process”. Through this point the Manifesto supported the centralist and unitarian arrangement of governance as being in the CDPs' view optimal for maintaining the free-market and was defended by the CDP against the course of re-establishing the pre-communist democratic regional self-governance even in the entirely internal and historically bounded context of the Czech Republic.
14 In the fundamental program elements section, any extension of the EP powers was rejected in the first place. The degree of the CDP coming to terms with the Czech Republics' entry into the EU is characterized in the Manifesto by the dubious identification with the idea of a “multiple-speed” or perhaps “flexible Europe”: “Fundamentals” of “flexible” or multi-speed Europe have existed de facto for a long time. Such a set-up should resemble a menu, in which the countries may choose the areas into which they want to integrate. The risk of flexibility though, is the possibility that instead of a multi-speed Europe, in which all speeds are equally justified, a Europe of “first” and “second” class and more equal among equals is created. A skeptical attitude towards the EU and its future prospects is further exposed in the Manifesto by the following claim : “the European integration process must be assessed and approached realistically with common sense. The Czech lands were throughout the last few centuries a part of already few integrated bodies which sooner or later disintegrated; that is why it would be a mistake to consider the present EU as the definitive ‘finality’ of European development. It is necessary to take into account both the tendency for integration as well as disintegration, consequently, there is no way to avoid being open to both options in accordance with our national interests”. This approach was directly reflected more and more in the attitudes of the CDP leading figures at the time of putting together the Manifesto and following discussion with concentration on the desirable option of deliberate delaying of entry into the EU till the moment “we are adequately prepared for membership” (repeatedly V. Klaus, I. Langer, J. Zahradil, M. Riman particularly in TV interviews and debates)  I. Langer (the Shadow Minister of Interior) and M. Riman...
suite. This has been explicitly reflected and reacted on in the program documents of other parties (Czech Social Democratic Party, the Coalition of Fourth  In 1999, right-center parties confronting the practices...
suite ), which were categorically stating the rejection of “any delay of entering the EU”.
15 This program highlights of the Manifesto were further embodied in the fact that a quarter of the Manifesto consisted of the chapter titled “Alternatives, replacement and other solutions; the Czech Republic outside the EU” - by which was meant entering the European Economic Area (EEA) and the European Free-trade Area (EFTA). According to the views of the authors of the Manifesto EFTA may soon be extended through the participation of Canada and that way become interconnected with the North American Free-trade Area (NAFTA - USA, Canada, Mexico). The nature of this ‘alternative’ or rather the meaning of its political exposure, may be indicated by the comparison with programs of political parties in other recent Central/Eastern European EU member countries. For example - in Poland, similarly obscure suggestions were in the program of the nationalist party ‘League of Polish families’.
16 The prevailing pro-integration trend in Czech politics, pre-accession negotiations coming to a close and the decisively prointegration preferences of CDP voters lead the Civic Democratic Party, in its election program “Forward to a New Fate” in May 2002, to state that : “entering the EU must be fulfilled as soon as possible”. They also insisted on a less one-sided description of the EU as a mixture of liberalizing and regulating elements, intergovernmental and supranational decision-making, cooperation, but also an uncompromised clash of interests. However, in the body of the actual program negative characterization and defining the demands towards the EU prevailed, particularly in the chapter titled “No to the European superstate” in which the “artificial univerzalization of European states into one legislative, political, economical and institutional frame irrespective of national traditions” was rejected, along with the “increasing the powers of the European Commission or attempts of shifting the Commission into the position of ‘European Government’ as well as increasing the powers of the European Parliament”; and at the same time, with the rejection to “creating a Europe of the ‘first’ and ‘second’standing - more equal among equals”. In the area of foreign policy the program emphasized that “no European project in security and defense should lead to the weakening of NATO and transatlantic relations with the US” and “the right of national veto in the key questions of national sovereignty, fiscal sovereignty or foreign policy and security issues” must be preserved. “National state for us is not a useless anachronism but an entirely natural product of social development” the election program from 2002 proclaimed, and in the symptomatically titled section “CDP chooses Czech national interests” the CDP exposed its nationalistically colored position regarding the issue of postwar forced expulsion of Sudeten Germans and associated terror by : “total unanimous refusal of the opinions spread in the media and in the academic sphere requiring revision of the postwar settlement which lead up to putting the Czech statehood in doubt”. The 2002 CDP program interconnected these claims directly with the issue of Czech Republic involvement in European integration as the issue of Czech-German relations extensively and consistently dominated the election campaign in 2002 and the CDP representative V. Klaus from his key position of the head of the Lower House shifted the whole Czech mainstream political scene towards extensive accentuation of this issue and even invited the hitherto consensually ostracized Communist Party among the democratic parties (resulting in the common declaration on Czech-German relations in the line with the Communist Party traditional demands). By defense of the “Czech national interest” against “German revanchism” and “clericalism of some Czech political parties” the CDP adopted to a substantial degree the populist vocabulary of the Communist Party, most likely with the intention of attracting protest voters from the disintegrated Republican Party (Union for Republic - Republican Party of Czechoslovakia) and preventing their move among the Communist Party protest voters. This specific discourse has taken over the media extensively and enabled the Communist Party representatives and their marginal populist agenda to shift to the mainstream politics which most likely contributed to their prevailing in this election (the Communist Party was the only party in these elections which increased its support and established itself as the third strongest party). Paradoxically, by early 2003, the need of the Communist Party to distance itself from the CDP’s “Europessimism and Euroskepticis” and pursue a distinctive way of “Europessimism and Euroskepticism” reflecting more comprehensive vision of the EU was debated in higher echelons of the Communist Party  Sociological and social psychological aspects of entering...
suite and the call for denouncing potential tactical cooperation with the CDP was voiced.
17 The first extensive material that deals with the agenda of integration of the Czech Republic into EU in a more detailed manner appeared in the text produced by the CDP shadow government “Towards entering EU” in Spring 2003. In the text, newly elected CDP leader M. Topolanek critically assessed the accession negotiations and criticized the course of harmonization procedures. Following that, he proclaimed the necessity of “revising the norms which unreasonably embitter and make life for our citizens and firms more expensive” and added that further “steps towards greater liberalization, dissolving unnecessary regulative elements and the factual return to the original principles of the European Economic Area”  It is necessary to note that still in the major CDP publication...
suite (Towards entering to EU, p. 6). Similarly V. Tlusty (the Shadow Minister of Finance) in the section devoted to “EU and finances of the Czech Republic” rather incongruously described the consistency of CDP program principles with the general principles of the EU : “the Four basic principles on which the EU is based : the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is absolutely in line with the fundamentals of the CDP program : the freedom of individuals, the freedom of the market and the respect for the traditional values of Christian civilization”, and indicated the further intentions of the CDP as “enforcing the original sense and the values of the community” (Towards entering to EU, p. 8). In the same vein J. Pospisil (the Shadow Minister of Justice) in his section was pressing for “passing EU/EC legislation particularly in the spheres which are related to safeguarding the four freedoms as in the other areas we are very skeptical about, notably communitarian legislation’ (Towards entering to EU, p. 45). M. Topolanek similarly proclaimed : « We support EU membership under the condition that the present intergovernmental character of EU functioning is not to be substantially violated’(Towards entering the EU, p. 7). Though Topolanek’s declaration gives confusing impression in view of the substantial and long-term limitation of intergovernmental principle in the EU institutional frame, the statement precisely characterized the CDP intentions regarding the future prospects of EU.
18 Although each of the CDP shadow ministers represents his/her field in the light of entering the EU, the contesting character of the CDP program fundamentals in specific areas was methodically united in the section by the Shadow Minister of Foreign Affairs - J. Zahradil : Besides the referendum on EU membership it is necessary to have a referendum on the treaty establishing a constitution for Europe (2005-2006). If the result is to be a too federal treaty, the CDP must openly stand up against its endorsement, recommend voting against it, and attempt to set up an alliance of the states with similar positions, either those which prefer a looser or more flexible integration (Ireland, Great Britain, Scandinavia) or the ones that wish to preserve the current strategic arrangement with US. It is necessary to insist on the interpretation of this view of integration, so that in the case of a state rejecting the treaty establishing a European constitution, the given state, in accordance with international law, remains involved under the conditions of the treaty of Nice. In the case of more member countries not ratifying the treaty which establishes a European constitution, a flexible EU is created de facto and the current universal unification pattern is unbounded’.
19 This CDP document may be seen as a CDP attempt through criticism of negotiated accession conditions (in view of financial concessions in the case of Southern European enlargement) to put in doubt solidarity and communitarian character of the EU and consequently restrain the factual meaning of the EU to the recognized four freedoms. This way, the purposeful redefinition – is, through the insistence on “the return to the original values of the European Economic Area’, used politically to freeze the EU at the level of a mere free trade zone. It seems that in the spirit of “the Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism’, discussion about the entry to the European Economic Area is still present in CDP program documents, however, to be fulfilled in an alternative way - through stopping further deepening of European integration and strictly limiting it to the four freedoms at the maximum. The reference apparatus of the CDP program documents has been fundamentally ambiguous and only the latest documents have clearly switched from European Economic Area (membership promoted originally in “Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism’) to the Single Economic Space under I. pillar (e.g. M. Topolanek in “If to EU then with CDP, the CDP positional documents on entering the EU’, 2003).
20 A surprising CDP campaign drawing on the “defense of national interests’ (previously dominated the vocabulary of the extreme-right Union for Republic - Republican Party of Czechoslovakia) which overlapped extensively with the Communist Party’s appeals to denounce “German domination of Europe’ and “Sudeten German political representation in the EP’ has driven other parties into presenting their European agenda in an extensive and detailed manner. The other parties clearly disassociated themselves from this stream of campaigning on Europe and focused extensively on the key meaning of inclusion into the EU, specifically, on transition legacies hampering the shift toward advanced free-market societies. Since entering the EU has been the precondition for overcoming the legacies of transition and the pace and the degree of beating these legacies and catching up with Western European societies depends on the push from the EU level, other parties overwhelmingly ended up in contraposing their support for further deepening of European integration to the CDP position and clarifying “misconceptions and misapprehensions’ of the EU and European integration by the CDP.
21 Based on the presented program documents of the CDP and their comparison with the program documents of other parties, the following three areas of diversification of the attitudes of Czech political parties regarding the EU and the Czech Republics' membership in the EU have been indicated : the institutional set up of the EU, European security and foreign policy and the general social value of EU membership.
22 The basic dividing line in view of institutional reform of the EU lies in the degree of application of inter-governmental versus communitarian solutions in the institutional framework of the EU. In the period 1998 – 2002 the coalition of opposition parties (Christian Democratic Union - Czechoslovak Peoples Party, Freedom Union – Democratic Union and Civic Democratic Alliance) and the governing Czech Social Democratic Party shared the vision of communitarian solutions to institutional reform. The consensus on accepting communitarian solutions was affirmed after 2002 as the Czech Social Democratic Party formed government together with the Christian Democratic Union - Czechoslovak Peoples Party, and Freedom Union - Democratic Union.
23 The precarious development of the CDP attitude has ended by refusing any reform including the extension of the communitarian principle. Though the CDP in its documents omitted more explicit proposals of EU institutional reform, even in the key party documents devoted extensively to scenarios of future developments in the EU, it definitively refuses any increase in powers of the European Parliament. Only institutional changes reinstalling intergovernmental principle and strengthening intergovernmental elements in the EU are acceptable to CDP.
24 The Communist Party in view of the upcoming reform of the institutional organization of the EU “accepts communitarian solutions’ and it is cautious that : “in connection with increased powers of the Council and the Commission in the Maastricht treaty it is necessary to increase the powers of the European Parliament and straighten its democratic composition” (the manifesto of the Communist Party “For Democratic Europe”  w www. kscm ...
suite from 10th March 2003). Interests of smaller countries in the European Council must be ensured consistently in connection with the transition from a unanimous vote towards a qualified majority and due to new membership. The reform of the voting system in the Council must safeguard “small and economically weak countries”. The concern of the Communist Party comes from “the danger of concentration of power in the hands of European Central Bank’ and “measures to limit democracy” (rotation of representation in the Commission, the number of official languages).
25 Further key moments of attitudes diversification have been represented by the discussion of the possibility of harmonizing European security and defense policies and in this connection also foreign policy concerning Euroatlantic relations. The CDP ruled out this possibility. It is clearly declared by the CDP that “creating authentic European foreign policy would lead to the weakening of TransAtlantic relations between Europe and the USA and even competition between the two” which could result in “our country being logically absorbed by the centripetal force of the political core of European integration” and “becoming the de facto feeble vassal of the continental European power-cartel, which amongst other things is looking for its strategic partner in Russia”. (J. Zahradil in Towards entering the EU, P. 36). For the CDP, shifting European security, defense and foreign policies beyond the sphere of international politics and the use of voting by the qualified majority in these areas is not acceptable.
26 Czech Social Democratic Party associates itself with the deepening of European integration even in the areas of security and foreign policies as one of the forms of political integration. For the Czech Social Democratic Party, in the era of globalization, taking part in establishing the EU as a formidable global player is the only practical possibility of safeguarding the developmental prospects of the Czech Republic (Euromanifesto of Czech Social Democratic Party  w www. socdem. cz/ vismo/ bar. asp ...
27 Similarly, the ex-Coalition parties (Christian Democratic Union - Czechoslovak Peoples Party, Freedom Union – Democratic Union and Civic Democratic Alliance) agree on the necessity of the deepening of foreign and security policies and the development of the EU as an economic power but also as a political power - respected on the global scene (4th section of the Rapport on the state of preparing the Czech Republic for entering the European Union  w www. kdu. cz/ clanek. asp ?Id=853 ...
suite ). For the Christian Democratic Union - Czechoslovak Peoples Party (ChDU-CPP) this is not violating the Euroatlantic basis of the Czech Republics’ security policy and thus ChDU-CPP stands for the continuation of building up European defense policy along with maintaining Euroatlantic relations.
28 The issue of security and foreign policy in respect to the EU is not developed substantially in the Communist Party documents but the party’s openness to communitarian solutions even in this area is evident in the criticism of the fact that the European Parliament may only comment on the policies in this area but may not block them or change them.
29 The polarization divide regarding the general social value of the membership in the EU can be presented at three levels. First, at the level of understanding the historic and ideational points of departure of the EU, secondly, in view of the acceptance of the EU as specific historical chance for the Czech Republic and, thirdly, as the matter of understanding the meaning of entering and integration of the Czech Republic into the EU on the background of the existing state of political, economic and social transformation in the Czech Republic.
30 At the most general level the clash involves understanding the historic and ideational points of departure of the EU. For the Czech Social Democratic Party and ChDU-CPP, in view of the fact that representatives of these ideological orientations took decisive part in the initiation and development of the European Communities, it is not a problem for them to accept the historic roots of European integration as connected with the idea of solidarity. CDP for a long time have refuted and discredited “European social democracy and Christian-democratic politically centralizing Catholicism” (Manifesto of Czech Europeanism)  w www. zahradil. cz/ html/ publikace/ old/ manifest. htm...
suite and have focused on the EU as an economic project based on and preferably limited to four freedoms - free movement of goods, persons, services and capital irrespective of the historical background of the launch of the Communities. On this basis the idea of solidarity is also disapproved. The Freedom Union, the Civic Democratic Alliance and more recently the European Democrats have emphasized, in line with their liberal doctrines, and in stark contrast with the CDP, the critical role of the EU in the process of improving the rule of law as the basic precondition for establishing an advanced free-market system and accept communitarian foundations of European integration and its reaching beyond a strictly economic sphere. The Communist Party at this level understands the EU to a certain degree as a federalization project potentially enabling the compensation of economic inequalities among single European regions and countries.
31 At the next level, attitudes have diversified in view of the acceptance of the EU as specific historical chance for the Czech Republic. For the Christian Democratic Union - Czechoslovak Peoples Party, Freedom Union and Civic Democratic Alliance entering the EU and the Czech Republics' active involvement in the EU and further development within the EU all have value of their own. Similarly, the membership is assessed by the Czech Social Democratic Party. The Czech Republics’ existence in the EU is indispensable as the only possible solution in a contemporary global context of giant economic blocs. The Communist Party at this level slips away from a federal stand and brings in the issue of Czech-German relations and “German danger” within the EU.
32 The CDP at this level takes the entry and participation of the Czech Republic in the EU only as means to an end and tolerates this undesired necessity in view of their “mission” of “national interest management”. In this sense the CDP is open to other alternatives and does not understand the EU as the “be all or end all’of European development and is ready to contribute actively to limiting European integration to less ambitious forms, including loosening of the EU institutional structure through blocking the reforms of institutional re-organization and the EU structure, retarding these arrangements into multispeed form, and returning the EU to the level of a mere free-trade zone.
33 At the third level of polarization, the crucial issue is understanding the meaning of entering and integration of the Czech Republic into the EU bearing in mind the background of the exisisting state of political, economic and social transformation in the Czech Republic. It is possible to recognize in this sense the critical meaning attached to EU membership and the irreplaceable benefits of this change in the program documents of the Christian Democratic Union - Czechoslovak Peoples Party, Freedom Union and Civic Democratic Alliance, and in particular, extensively in the materials of Czech Social Democratic Party (particularly from the times of V. Špidla’s leadership) and to a certain degree in the written documents of the Communist Party. Recognition of the changes in values as a consequence of accessing the EU became one of the foundations of the program of the Coalition of Four - the original coalition of right wing parties after 1998 (Freedom Union-Democratic Union, ChDU-CPP, Civic Democratic Alliance). Harmonization as has been taking place and is still continuing through the forcing of European legislation in the Czech Republic is understood as being the key to setting down the application of law and the rule of law in the Czech Republic after more than a decade of hesitation, intentional neglect and purposeful delay of the steps in this critical sphere. At the same time, the parties of the original Coalition of Four view entering the EU as a precondition of essential value changes that are to shift Czech society in terms of capabilities of social self-regulation on the level of advanced free-market countries. This way “completing the law framework regulating the economy and creating truly functional free-market institutions based on tried principles’ (St. Venceslav agreement of the Coalition of Four  w www. kdu. cz/ clanek. asp ?Id=803 ...
suite ) through pressure from the EU has been the predicament for finishing never ending and long unrealized and unfulfilled transition undertakings and also changing the values and overcoming the value-set attached to the peculiar and temporal transition regime. Similarly for the Czech Social Democratic Party only the moment of entering the EU and with its associated procedures are decisively contributing to “stability of the state of law, the enforcement of law and safeguarding competition in the economy” and in this way also contribute to the “successful completion of the transformation of Czech society” (Euromanifest of Czech Social Democratic Party  w www. socdem. cz/ vismo/ bar. asp ...
34 The CDP turned a blind eye to the general social value of entry and membership to the EU in view of the particular state of political, economic and social transition of the Czech Republic. This was particularly true after finishing the negotiations on accession and harmonization, when the CDP came out with criticism of overtaking the communitarian law in “excessive extent and too much in advance” (M. Topolánek in Towards entering the EU  w www. ods. cz/ akce/ ideovky/ 4. ik/ materialy/ PDF. php...
suite ) and outlining the political program of “revising the laws, which are not necessary for harmonization of our laws with communitarian law” and “the factual return to original principles of the European Economic Area” (M. Topolánek in Towards entering the EU). In this approach of the CDP to legislation and regulation, the incapability of reflecting the problematic aspects of transformation (with which the CDP is unavoidably associated) is exposed. However, this is usually associated with the rather rhetorical influence of Thatcherism, disregard for the rudimentary character of the transitional economy of the 90’s as related to the reliance on self-regulation, the self-cultivation of the environment and the intentional omission of the creation of regulating laws (the alleged precondition for the stormy expansion of a market-economy) emerged as a specific and particular transition environment related doctrine.
35 The relatively recent emergence of party alternatives and their rather fluid character is reflected in the frequent revising and reworking of the fundamental features of party programs and documents. This in turn has resulted in party descriptions and alignments being more dynamic than is usual in long-entrenched party systems. Two typologies of structuring party attitudes to European integration and the EU have been used widely to indicate party positions (Conti and Verzichelli, 2002, Kopecky and Mudde, 2002, see table n°4 and 5). Although, these two typologies came into being relatively independently of each other most of the party alignments and stages in party alignments correspond closely.
36 Still, playing the dynamic element down, from the party programs and other party documents two major current positions on the Czech scene of the parliamentary parties can be indicated : A) pro-integration position - anticipating the deepening of European integration and its further overlap into the political sphere - as taken by majority of ‘democratic’ parliamentary parties : B) integration process rejection position, which among ‘democratic’ parliamentary parties has been taken up by the CDP. In between those two stands, the Communist party ambiguously positions itself as combining a declarative profederalist appeal with real populist-nationalist anti-German motives.
37 The issues of Europeanization in view of party systems and Euroskepticism within the ranks of political parties have been by now extensively debated. Numbers of analytical findings have been widely taken for granted. One of the key findings is that, however, “Europe has clearly generated new parties, particularly within that segment of opinion that is hostile or skeptical towards (further) European integration”, “strictly speaking … their impact on the format of domestic party systems has been almost non-existent” and “they have typically confined themselves to contesting the elections to the European Parliament and have eschewed strictly domestic competition” (Mair 2000,31).
38 In this line, European integration is designated as a “touchstone of domestic dissent” for peripheral parties (Taggart 1998,384). L. Hooghe, G. Marks and C. J. Wilson (2002) argue that besides ‘strategic responses’-involving predominantly peripheral parties - the ideology is another key factor in structuring party positions on European integration. However, ideology coincides with peripheral extreme parties - core parties distinction, L. Hooghe, G. Marks and C. J. Wilson indicate that “conventional left/right dimension” structures the party positions to European integration and, thus, political control of the economy, in the sense of degree of regulation, is in the center of contestation.
39 A distinctive pattern of Euroskepticism among Central Eastern European newcomers to the EU has been noticed by P. Taggart and A. Szczerbiak (2002), though the attempt to explain it through the potential given by long-time loss of sovereignty during the communist period is highly speculative. At the minimum, the Czech case can hardly be analyzed and interpreted with reference to the factors used to explain the structure of party positions on European integration and impact of Europeanization on party systems in the pre-accession Western European context (as used e.g. by Mair 2000, Taggart 1998). The format of the Czech party system has been substantially shaped in view of European integration and the EU and spectrum of the major non-peripheral parties have gradually suffered clear-cut and deep split on European integration and the EU. The battle for the EU membership on the domestic front became the source of pro-integration opposition parties-coalition building (1999 – the Coalition of Fourth – ChDU-CPP, CDA, FU, DU) and an emergence of the new party (Freedom Union - later to be one of the governing parties). This party cleavage has been significant to the extent that the first EP elections in the Czech Republic resulted in the breakthrough of recently founded decisively pro-european party - European Democrats, though, at the same time, Euroskeptic Independent Movement got into the EP too. The structure of party positions on European integration may not be explained through applying “conventional left/right dimension” as it has been implied for the pre-enlargement EU by L. Hooghe, G. Marks and C. J. Wilson. Within the Czech domain, even the parties which have for long shared the position on the left/right scale and fundamental transition and modernization strategies are, in terms of attitudes to European integration and the EU, positioned on very opposite parts of axis (e.g. CDP and CDA). What is then the prevailing factor in the development of this ‘twisted’and, frequently, somewhat reversed structure of party positions on European integration and the EU ? The answer lies beyond the realm of political parties per se and involves the complex issue of transition developments in the pre-accession period.
40 Almost all major Czech political parties after 1989 explicitly supported ‘return to Europe’ - in practice most frequently associated with the approach to membership in EC/EU. This long-running consensual position of the majority of political parties has been differentiated and questioned only with close prospect of becoming an EU member (the CDP gradually exposed itself as an even more explicit and determined Euroskeptic party than the traditionally nationalistic agenda utilizing Communist Party). This scenario - regarding the party positions’ evolution conspicuously contrasts with the maturation of the party positions towards entering NATO; initially the membership was supported unanimously only by certain parties (differentiated attitudes - from the refusal through neutrality up to an extensive cooperation with NATO) but the actual moment of entering was distinguished by wide consensus. The explanation of the rather unusual shift from the consensus to differentiated party positions in the case of approaching and entering the EU is not likely to be found in the autonomously and evolutionarily understood development of the single parties’ approaches in the course of gaining EU membership but is related extensively to the transition strategies applied by single parties. Differentiated party positions regarding EU membership may be topologically related to the basic transition strategies (the way they were outlined by e.g. Machonin, Štastnova, Kroupa, Glasova (1996)  The typology distinguishes : Right-wing authoritative strategies,...
suite, see table N° 3) and the shifts in these strategies themselves and their changes can explain the diversification of party stands towards the EU. Most importantly, while using the categories of Machonin, Stastnova, Kroupa, Glasova (1996), this can be illustrated by the case of the CDP.
41 At the beginning of the 90’s, the Civic Democratic Party (CDP) together with Civic Democratic Alliance represented the key liberally defined reform-oriented parties which launched the initial extensive transition impulse. Clear foreign policy orientation implying the fastest possible integration into the Euro-Atlantic and European structures – NATO and European Community was an inherent part of the transition and modernization plan. Declining the initial reform impetus of the CDP as connected to its key position and enormous involvement with the extensive transition agenda (the political actors responding to new emerging economic interests taking advantage of the unique and specific conditions of the transitory regime) resulted in a substantial shift in transition strategy and the trend of maintaining centrally controlled regime  Delaying the reestablishment of regional self-government,...
suite blocking alteration of the specific transition conditions of a non-regulated rudimentary market which effectively led the CDP to the adaptation of more conservative etatist position. Reluctance to the Czech Republic becoming an EU member emerged as one of the features when distinguishing ‘conservative etatist neo-liberalism’ from ‘liberal democratism of right-wing orientation’ already in the mentioned study of Machonin, Stastnova, Kroupa, Glasova (1996). The ideological shift in this direction was intensified further by the split of the long-time governing right-wing coalition (CDP, Christian Democratic Union - Czechoslovak Peoples Party, Civic Democratic Alliance), which released the CDP from a common pro-integration position, and the secession of the group of CDP pro-integration politicians establishing the Freedom Union at the beginning of 1998 as an outspokenly pro-European right-wing party (liberal democratism of right-wing orientation). In the course of Zeman’s social democratic government the issue of relations with Sudeten Germans emerged as a crucial theme, which started to be interconnected with the issue of European integration (e.g in the Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism).
42 Euroskeptic exposés were multiplied in their effect by the fact that CDP figures occupied key parliamentary posts in the consequence of the “Oppositional agreement” (e.g. V. Klaus exposé at the meeting of the heads of candidate countries parliaments in December 2001). The undertaking of Sudeten German issue represented a radical program shift which brought CDP closer to extreme and populist groupings (Communist Party). A certain move from ‘conservative etatist neo-liberalism’ to ‘radical authoritative right-wing populism with nationalist undertones’ may have been indicated.
43 The current new arrangement of the party system in view of the distinction between pro-integration parties (Czech Social Democratic Party, Christian Democratic Union - Czechoslovak Peoples Party, Freedom Union) and outspoken Euroskeptic parties (Civic Democratic Party), may hinder the Europeanization effect on still extensively incomplete transition and currently existent transitory order in the Czech Republic and other new member countries in general, particularly in the sense of contesting further deepening of integration and forcing integration-minimizing agenda at the European level. Thus, the political representation of the actors involved in sustaining and taking advantage of the ‘temporary’ transitory regime in the Czech Republic while attempting at the European level to limit the impact of Europeanization on transitory regime may cause certain ‘Easternisation’ of the EU along with the resulting blocking of further development of the EU.
44 At the beginning of the 90’s, the Civic Democratic Party (CDP) together with Civic Democratic Alliance belonged to the key liberally defined reform-oriented parties which launched the initial extensive transition impulse. Clear foreign policy orientation which implied the fastest possible integration into the Euro-Atlantic and European structures – NATO and the EU was an inherent part of the transition and modernization plan. The CDP has gradually shifted from ‘liberal democratism of right-wing orientation’ to ‘conservative etatist neo-liberalism’, after 1998, even attaining features of ‘authoritative right-wing populism with nationalist undertones’. This, however, may explain the sociologically significant paradox of a pro-European CDP following  Exit Polls among CDP voters in June 2003 (referendum on...
suite - still voting on the initial transition and modernization strategy including the original clearly and outspokenly pro-integration position of CDP.
Table 1 -
Table 2. -
Table 3. -
Table 4. -
Table 5. -
Chavance, B. et Mognin, E. (1997), “Emergence of Path-Dependent Mixed Economies in Central Europe”, in : Crawford, B., Lijphart, A. (dirs), Liberalization and Leninist Legacies; Comparative Perspectives on Democratic Transitions, University of California, Berkeley.
Conti, N. et Verzichelli, L. (2002), The European Dimension of Political Discourse in Italy : A longitudinal Analysis of Party Preferences, mimeo, Circap, Siena.
Conti, N. (2003), “Party Attitudes to European Integration : A longitudinal Analysis of the Italian Case”, Sussex European Institute working paper 70, Brighton.
Fiala, P., Holzer J. et Strmiska M. (2003), Politické strany ve střední a východní Evropě; Ideově-politikcý profil, pozice a role politických stran v postkomunistických zemích, Masarykova univerzita, Brno.
Grapher, G. et Stark, D. (dirs) (1997), Restructuring Networks in Post-socialism; Legacies, Linkages, and Localities, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Habermas, J. (1976), Legitimation Crisis, Heinemann, London.
Hellman, J., Jones, G. et Kaufmann D. (2000), “Seize the State, Seize the Day : State Capture, Corruption, and Influence in Transition”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2444.
Hoogh, L., Marks G., Wilson C. (2002), “Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration ?” Comparative Political Studies, 35 (8), p 965-989.
Hloušek, V. (2000) “Konfliktní linie v ‘postkomunistických’ systémech politických stran”, Politologický časopis, vol.7 (4), p 337-395.
Kitschelt, H., Mansfeldova, Z., Markowski, R. and Toka, G. (1999), Post-Communist Party Systems, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Linz, J et Stepan, A. (dirs) (1995) Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation : Southern Europe, South America and Post-communist Europe, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore/London.
Machonin P., Šťastnová P., Kroupa A. et Glasová A. (1996), Strategie sociální transformace české společnosti (a jejich úspěšnost v parlamentních volbách 1996), Doplněk, Brno.
Matějů P., Řeháková B., Evans G. (1999), ”The politics of Interests and Class Realignment in the Czech Republic 1992-1996”, in : Evans G. (dirs) The End of Class Politics ? Class Voting in Comparative Context, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p 231-251.
Myant, M. et Fleischer, F. (1995), Successful Transformations ?, Brookfield, Edward Elgar.
Novák, M. (1999), “Utváření stranického systému v českých zemích; Analýza dosavadních trendů a výhledy do budoucna”, Politologický časopis, 6 (2), 133-145.
Offe, C. (1984), Contradictions of Welfare State, MIT Press, Boston.
Rychard, A. (1996), Czy transformacja sie skonczyla ?, Institut Badan nad Gospodarka Rynkowa, Warsaw.
Stark, D. et Brust, L. (1998), Post-socialist Pathways; Transforming politics and property in East Central Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York/ Oakleigh.
Strmiska, M. (1999), “Pluralita, polarita a geneze nových středo- a východoevropských systémů politických stran”, in : Strmiska M. (dir.) Postkomunistické stranické soustavy a politická pluralita. MPU, Brno, p 11-36.
Strmiska, M. (1999), “Utváření českého multipartismu : příběh na pokračování”, Politologický časopis, 6 (2), p 162-169.
Strmiska, S. (2001), Challenges of Consolidation and the Post-Communist Party Systems, Collection of Essays, MPU, Brno.
Taggart, P. (1998), “A Touchstone of Democratic Dissent Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems”, European Journal of Political Research, 33, p 363-388.
Taggart, P. et Szczerbiak, A. (2002), “The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States”, Sussex European Institute working paper, 51, Brighton.
Tomasek, M. (2001) “Privatization, Post-privatization and the Rule of Law in the Czech Republic,” WeltTrends, 31/summer, p. 31 – 45.
Tomasek, M. (2002), “Systémová konsolidace transformačního režimu - prodlužovaná dočasnost jako system : Transformační režim v ČR z pohledu analýzy krize racionality západoevropského sociálního státu”, in : Kabele, J. et Pscheidt, S (dirs.) Konsolidace vládnutí a podnikání v České republice a v Evorpské Unii; Umění vládnout, ekonomika, politika, Matfyzpress, Praha, p. 424–434.
Vlachová, K., Matějů P. (1998), “Kristalizace politických postojů a politického spektra v ČR”, Sociologický časopis, 34 (2), p 145 – 170.
Wnuk-Lipinski, E. (1999) “Reform, rewolucja, restauracja - trzy cechy transformacii postkomunisticznej”, in : Jasinska-Kania, A. et Slomczynski, K. M. (dirs), Wladza i struktura spoleczna, IfiS PAN, Warsaw.
[ 1] Comments and inquiries are welcame at the address : Dep. of Sociology, School of Social Studies, Gorkeho 7, Brno 602 00, Czech Rep, e-mail address : t email@example.com,phone : +420776389806.
[ 2] For Czech political representation, the Euroskeptic camp consists of 9 Civic Democratic Party (CDP) MEPs belonging to EPP-ED, 6 Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (CPBM) MEPs belonging to EUL/NGL, Independent Movement (IM) representative - V. Zelezny belonging to IND/DEM and the former political talk-show host in V. Zelezny headed TV Nova - J. Bobošíková, originally voted in on the Independent Movement list, though now belonging among non-attached. For Polish political representation, 10 League of Polish Families (LPF) MEPs belonging to IND/DEM, 7 Right and Justice (RJ) MEPs belonging to UEN, 6 Self-defense (S) MEPs belonging among non-attached and 4 Polish Peoples Party (PPP) MEPs belonging to PPE-DE may have initially fallen into the Euroskeptic ranks. The Polish Peoples Party and some representatives of Self-defense, however, have dropped out since June elections (possibly, due to an extensive agrarian EU agenda noticeably improving the standing of Polish farmers following the enlargement). Still, the recent events surrounding the vote on Constitution for Europe in the EP have shown that Euroskepticism has been spreading further into the ranks of Polish center-right MEPs (particularly within the strongest Polish party in the EP - the Civic Platform - represented by 15 MEPs) which may lead to recurrence of the Czech pattern of a core party in the party system pushing for Euroskeptic agenda.
[ 3] Taking 12 of 24 Hungarian MEPs as Euroskeptic refers to the FIDES representatives. When ranked as belonging to the Euroskeptic camp it relates to the FIDES position in 2002 national elections. In terms of nationalist and Euroskeptic agenda the party campaign was similarly explicit as in the case of Civic Democratic Party campaign in June 2002 elections in the Czech Republic. When coming to 2004 EP elections, it is to be noted that candidates for the FIDES list were drawn to a certain extent from non-attached public figures which reshaped and mildened FIDES Euroskepticism.
[ 4] The research has been carried out as part of the larger analytical study "The Czech Republic’s entering the area political communication and decision-making in the EU; challenges, problems, origins" released by the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University and the Center for Social and Economic Strategies in 2003. My thanks to both institutions for vigorous support. Preliminary versions of the paper have been presented at the meeting of UACES Specialist Group on “Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe”, Queen’s University, Belfast, 3rd - 4th September 2004 and at the 4th ECPR-YEN research meeting on Europeanization, Brussels, 28th January 2005. Thanks for valuable comments and suggestions to meetings’ participants.
[ 5] Michigan and Rochester models represent the basic conceptual distinction; the first is essentially behavioral as in this model electoral preferences rest primarily on citizens’ effective identification and habitual support and the other is attached to rational deliberation by voters who compare their own ideal policy preferences with those of party policy records and advertised agendas.
[ 6] In principle, two types can be distinguished - parties reformed into essentially social democratic parties (e.g. in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria) and not really reformed communist parties (clearly in the Czech Rep. and Eastern Germany)
[ 7] Under so called “Oppositional Agreement” the Czech Social Democratic Party minority government was put in power and tolerated by the Civic Democratic Party (CDP) in spite of the overall victory of right-wing and right-center parties. Czech Social Democratic Party and the CDP agreed on the electoral reform threatening smaller parties later - after passing through the both houses of the parliament - substantially reversed and alternated by the Constitutional Court.
[ 8] “Socio-economic conflict line of transformation” is delineated in contrast to “nationalist conflict line” which has been for long significant in Croatia and Slovakia.
[ 10] Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.
[ 11] At the end of 1997 the coalition government resigned in the aftermath of revelations of CDP illicit - most likely privatization related - funds (later both independent audit as well as police investigation indicated 40 million CZK of party money of unclear origin). Within the CDP itself, these events were followed by the secession of an opinion platform - soon to be the Freedom Union.
[ 13] In this point there has been certain discontent with the fundamentals of CDP foreign policy principally refusing substantial cooperation with neighboring CEE countries in view of preparations for enlargement of the EU (e.g. skepticism about the Visegrad initiative).
[ 14] I. Langer (the Shadow Minister of Interior) and M. Riman (the Shadow Minister of Industry and Trade) later, at the time of referendum, voted explicitly in the spotlight of media against the Czech Republic’s membership in the EU.
[ 15] In 1999, right-center parties confronting the practices resulting from the‚ Oppositional agreement between the CDP and Czech Social Democratic Party established the “Coalition of Four”.
[ 16] Sociological and social psychological aspects of entering the EU’ - conference held by the Communist Party on 15th March 2003.
[ 17] It is necessary to note that still in the major CDP publication from 2003, M. Topolanek is consistently speaking of the European Economic Area and Single European Space, essentially, not distinguishing them - frequently referring to one while meaning the other.
[ 25] The typology distinguishes : Right-wing authoritative strategies, Liberal democratic strategies, Left-wing authoritative populist strategies. Right-wing authoritative strategies split into 1. Radical authoritative right-wing populism with nationalist undertones 2. Authoritative radicalism with anticommunist undertones. For extensive category of Liberal democratic strategies there are further under-categories 1. Conservative etatist neo-liberalism 2. Liberal democracy of right-wing orientation, 3. Liberal reformism of social orientation, 4. State interventionist social reformism, 5. Democratic socialism. Communism is taken as the only significantly prevailing Left-wing authoritarian populist strategy and further under-groups are not distinguished.
[ 26] Delaying the reestablishment of regional self-government, unfavorable approach to the recovering structures of civil society.
[ 27] Exit Polls among CDP voters in June 2003 (referendum on the EU membership) showed a high percentage of yes vote (up to 91%).
[ 28] The transitory regime has been suffering from systemic breaches of rationality that can be conceptualized in similar manner as by J. Habermas and C. Offe for Western European welfare state, however, the relations and dependencies are substantially alternated. The state in transition context is in an ambiguous position as in Habermas' and Offe's frame, although, the distortion presses are reversed - state's mission is comodification; but the economic subsystem experiences a dubious momentum and the crucial push goes in reversed direction - towards nationalization of investment risks and capital attainment. The easiest "escape" from the inconsistencies resulting from this principal arrangement represents an alteration and distortion of normative ends of the transition, particularly, as this is easy to be done since the normative ends delineating the transition agenda can be presented on the level of general statements for public in an uncompromised form and, simultaneously, at the level of expert and technical discourse may turn-out to be an entirely different story satisfying more the particular political-economical arrangements and reflecting the concrete interest set up (this incongruity has been the most easily identifiable in the case of Civic Democratic Party led governments of the 90’s).
[ 29] From among non-parliamentary parties the representatives of 3 other parties entered EP in 2004: - Independent Union (EPP-ED, 2), European Democrats (EPP-ED,1) - IU and ED had a joined candidate list - Independent Movement (IM) (IND/DEM, 1), J. Bobošíková originally voted in on the Independent Movement list is non-attached
At the beginning of the 90’s, the CDP together with Civic Democratic Alliance belonged to the key liberally defined reform-oriented parties which launched the initial extensive transition impulse. Clear foreign policy orientation implying the fastest possible integration into the Euro-Atlantic and European structures NATO and the EU - was an inherent part of transition and modernization plan. Declining the initial reform impetus of the CDP as connected to its key position and enormous involvement with the extensive transition agenda (political actors responding to new emerging economic interests taking advantage of the unique and specific conditions of the transitory regime) resulted in a substantial shift in transition strategy and trend of maintaining centrally controlled regime blocking alteration of the specific transition conditions of a non-regulated rudimental market which effectively led the CDP to the adaptation of more conservative etatist position. The Euroskeptic agenda emerged along with this process as the accession to the EU threatened the political-economic structures of the transitory regime.
Marcel Tomasek « Metamorphosis of the civic democratic party attitudes to european integration; on the new cleavage in the Czech party system », Politique européenne 2/2005 (n° 16), p. 125-154.
URL : www.cairn.info/revue-politique-europeenne-2005-2-page-125.htm.