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Vous consultezThe european security and defence policy : a fourth system of european foreign policy ?
AuteursMalena Britz du même auteur
Arita Eriksson  The authors are researchers at the Department for Security...
suitedu même auteur
The emergence of defence policy on the EU’s agenda has been almost explosive since the end of the 1990s. Although security and defence have been on the European political agenda since the end of the Second World War, defence has not been developed further within the EU before. One of the latest formal additions is the European Defence Agency, established in 2004. The idea that the EU should have a defence agency (or an armaments agency) is not new, but there was no political consensus on the issue within the EU until 2003.
2 In this article we aim to analyse how the policy area of defence can be situated in the study of European foreign and security policy. The questions addressed here are first, what developments in the area of European defence have enabled the creation of a European Defence Agency ? And second, what does this mean for the study of European Foreign and Security Policy ?  We focus here mainly on the military aspects of defence...
suite When we discuss the implications of the development for the study of the European Foreign and Security Policy we use Brian White’s (2001) categorisation of European Foreign Policy as our point of departure. White’s categorisation has been quite influential in the discussion on European Foreign Policy, and has for example been used by John Peterson & Michael E. Smith in Elizabeth Bomberg and Alexander Stubb’s introductory book on the EU from 2003.
3 The research community still knows little of the internal dynamics of the security and defence policy process, and it is seldom that the security and defence policy are separated analytically from foreign and security policy. One of the issues we are interested in is if a separation could be useful and theoretically motivated, in spite of the political merger of the policy areas of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) that was the result of Amsterdam (on alternative political discussions relating to this topic, see Whitman, 1999). Indeed, this political construct is rather new as defence for a long time has been discussed separately from foreign policy. The role of defence in European politics was again raised in the discussions of the European Convention on the Future of Europe, and then in the (non-ratified) Constitutional Treaty. Though it seems that the Constitutional Treaty in its current form will not enter into force any time soon, many of the issues concerning defence have already been decided upon, as is the case with the European Defence Agency. This leads us to the conclusion that it is important to study not only what is written in the treaties, but also political declarations and what happens in practice.
4 Brian White states that there are three different dimensions of European Foreign Policy, the first is labelled Community Foreign Policy and includes the EU’s external relations undertaken in the realm of the first pillar, e.g. trade policy and foreign aid. The second dimension is the Union Foreign Policy, i.e. the CFSP, and the third is National Foreign Policy, which are the member states’ foreign policies (White, 2001). These dimensions are sub-systems of the wider European foreign policy and all represent different types of governance. It is, however, important to note that White’s division of European Foreign Policy into three sub-systems is analytical, and does not correspond to the political division of the EU into three pillars.
5 When analysing the different types of governance in different sub-systems, White investigates : actors and policy making; capabilities and instruments; and the policy context (White, 2001,41-44). Each governance system’s elements is characterised with different content. White states that the European security and defence policy cannot be analysed as a fourth sub-system of the European Foreign Policy, because it does not have the features of a Common Defence Policy as defined by Roper in 1995. However, the development within the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been both rapid and intense since the end of the 1990s. Therefore, we will here re-evaluate White’s conclusion.
6 According to Roper, which we relate to here because it is upon his conceptualisation that White builds his argument, a Common Defence and a Common Defence Policy in the European context would imply a wide interpretation of ‘defence’, comprising not only self defence as in “collective defence”, but a broader range of tasks related to defence, such as the kind of activities that are included in the Petersburg tasks : humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and peacemaking. (These have been extended in the European Security Strategy to include joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation.) However, the collective defence part of a Common Defence Policy is important to Roper. (Martin & Roper, 1995,2)
7 Roper maintains that a Common Defence Policy will not merely be a co-ordination of policies and a Common Defence will be more than closer integration of the armed forces for a collective defence : it will cover a range of functions of the armed forces. A Common Defence Policy would :
9 A strong version of a Common Defence would imply organisation of armed forces of member states in common, and a weaker version would imply common organisation of activities. The stronger version would also “in its ultimate form […] presumably imply common procurement, logistics, training, a common budget, common communications, intelligence and command structures” as well as restrictions on the scope for national defence policies (Roper, 1995,10).
10 In the following we will go through the development of defence related policies in and “around” the EU since the 1990s. The first part of the article deals with the development of the ESDP. The second part deals with related developments primarily with regard to efforts to create a European defence industry market, where some of the development has taken place “outside” the legal framework of EU, but among EU member states. Thirdly, we come back to the creation of a European Defence Agency, where the developments of the ESDP and the efforts to create a European defence industry market meet. In the fourth part of the article, we go back to Roper’s discussion of a Common European Defence Policy, and a Common Defence. Based on our results, we conclude that the ESDP should at least be seen as a fourth sub-system of European Foreign Policy.
11 At the European Council meeting in Cologne in June 1999, shortly after the Amsterdam treaty had come into force, the EU adopted the decision that can be seen as the launch of the ESDP process. It was stated that
(European Council, 1999a)  The Amsterdam treaty substantially developed the CFSP and...
13 The EU’s new ambitions in ESDP and crisis management required an autonomous decision-making capacity within this field. Therefore, it was decided in Helsinki in 1999 that permanent political and military bodies should be established within the Council structures; a standing Political and Security Committee, a European Union Military Committee, and a European Union Military Staff.
14 Still, the issue of how to deal with the operational level(s) remained to be solved. The EU has no autonomous capability for operational planning – This has to be conducted either at NATO Headquarters within the framework of Berlin+ (an agreement between the EU and NATO that took place in December 2002) or at the national level, with a member state adopting the role of “Framework nation”. In order to make it possible for an EU member to lead operational planning as a “Framework nation” the EU Military Staff needed to enhance its civil-military components. In December 2003, a document was agreed which concerned the establishment of a civil/military cell within the EU Military Staff (Council 2003a). This could be seen as the beginning of a European planning capacity.
15 Whereas concepts and procedures for the management of operations on the political-strategic level have been developed within the institutional framework of the EU, procedures and standards for the lower levels (military strategic, operational and tactical) have often been adopted from NATO (Wedin, 2004). This process of creating what could be called a EU military doctrine, taking place from 2000 onwards, has preceded the adoption of a strategy which was too difficult to handle politically at the time. As the ESDP process started, it was goal oriented but no substantial guiding policy document existed. Along the way, conclusions from European Councils have constituted guiding principles. In December 2003 the European Security Strategy was adopted. For the first time, common threats were identified and contextualised (European Council, 2003a). The problems this development constitute for the practice of democratic accountability has been emphasised by Bono (2004).
16 Expenditures related to external operations have at least three budgetary options. (Missiroli, 2003,8) A Commission Communication clarifies the matter :
- operations under a Community instrument, which are financed under the appropriate Community budget line;
- CFSP operations not having military or defence implications, which are financed under the CFSP budget line;
- ESDP operations having military or defence implications, which fall outside the Community budget.
18 For the latter case, a general framework for financing of EU operations having military or defence implications was approved at the European Council in Seville (Council, 2002a). The content of this decision was, in principle, that administrative costs for the institutions involved are charged to the EU budget and operational costs are covered by the member states. As regards operations, a division is to be made between common costs (decided upon on ad hoc basis) and individual costs, which “lie where they fall” (Council, 2002b).
19 As stated in the Cologne declaration from 1999, the development of ESDP “also requires efforts to adapt, exercise and bring together national and multinational European forces”(European Council, 1999a). At the European Council in Gothenburg 2001 the EU adopted an initial exercise policy. (European Council, 2001a) Since 2002 crisis management exercises have been held regularly. The EU does not conduct exercises involving military troops in order not to duplicate NATO. The main EU exercises are instead high-level exercises of the crisis management structures involving ambassadors, generals and high-level civil servants (Wedin, 2004). In the autumn of 2003, an EU Training Policy was approved, and a proposal for a European College for Security and Defence was presented. These initiatives were seen as fostering the creation of a European security culture and were taken further in 2004 and 2005 (Council, 2003b; European Council, 2004a).
20 Concerning military capabilities for the Petersberg tasks it was decided in Helsinki in 1999 that the EU member states should work towards being able, in 2003 at the latest, to put together (on a voluntary basis) an EU-led military self-sustaining force consisting of 50-60 000 men. The force should be able to deploy within 60 days notice and be capable of functioning for at least one year. This decision constitutes what would be called the Helsinki Headline Goal. It was also decided in Helsinki to develop collective capability goals, for example strategic airlift (European Council, 1999b).
21 The capabilities issue underwent its first significant review during winter and spring 2004. At the same time, the ESDP structures started working on the development of a new rapid response element, based on the so-called “Battle Group” concept. A Battle Group is
In all cases, interoperability and military effectiveness will be key criteria. A Battlegroup must be associated with a Force Headquarters and pre-identified operational and strategic enablers, such as strategic lift and logistics.
(Brussels, 2004, paragraph 9)
23 The Battle Group would become an important element of the new capability goal, Headline Goal 2010, which was adopted in the summer of 2004. In particular, the work was to focus on interoperability, deployability and sustainability.
(European Council, 2004c, B8).
25 At the military capabilities commitment conference in November 2004, it was stated that the EU would have initial operational capability in 2005 and full capability in 2007. Member states indicated their commitment to form a total of 13 Battle Groups and several states announced that they would offer niche capabilities. (Brussels, 2004)
26 The Helsinki Headline Goal did not contain any formal obligation to submit forces to the EU registers. The pressure to take part in the development of capabilities, and, later the operations, was instead political. Force requirements were defined relatively broadly, and member states could pick and choose what they wanted to submit to the EU registers. Commitments did not contain any assurance that the forces submitted to registers would actually be available and able for deployment. The new Headline Goal 2010 is much more specific, both when it comes to force and deployment requirements. Indeed, it uses the term “benchmark” repeatedly, indicating stronger pressure upon member states.
27 For the development of an ESDP capabilities were needed. The development of military capabilities within the EU started with an analysis of requirements given certain scenarios. Based on this analysis, a requirement catalogue was produced. Member states then contributed forces to EU registers, forces that were collected in a force catalogue. To deal with shortfalls was difficult, but at the end of 2001 member states agreed on a European Capability Action Plan (ECAP). (Brussels, 2001)
28 In the beginning of 2002 the ECAP was started in order to provide a more organised framework for dealing with the remaining capability shortfalls from a military expert viewpoint. The ECAP produced a report on the progress of its work, consisting of recommendations, by 1 March 2003. The next phase of the ECAP concerned implementation. To this end, ECAP project groups were started. Since spring 2003,15 new ECAP project groups have been established.  The project groups (PGs) concerned the following areas (some...
suite Each group dealt with individual or groupings of ECAP recommendations. However, the ECAP project groups would not be able to deliver all shortfall capabilities, instead work focused on qualitative aspects such as harmonising and defining concepts and procedures and issues concerning organisation and personnel. By 2004 some of the project groups had stopped working, as no further progress was considered possible.  Already before ECAP, bilateral initiatives had been taken...
29 In 2002 the Spanish presidency had as one of its objectives to work towards a European armaments policy, without which a true ESDP was not considered possible (Trillo, 2002). The same year, Solana elaborated on the connection between capabilities development and armaments :
31 This defence industrial area seemed by 2003, to have become actively involved in the capability development process, although the first part of the ECAP did not involve the defence industry.
32 In January 2003, the ESDP process entered its operational phase.
33 Since then, the EU has established a civilian police operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a military operation, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), a military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a police mission in Macedonia, a rule of law mission in Georgia, a civil and military operation following SFOR in Bosnia Herzegovina, a police mission and a security sector reform mission in the DRC and, with respect to Iraq, the European Council has agreed that the EU could contribute with an integrated police, rule of law and civilian administration mission.  http :/ / ue. eu. int/ cms3_ fo/ showPage. asp ?id=268&lang=en&mode=g...
34 Even before the EU decided that it should be able to undertake the Petersberg tasks, efforts to create a European defence industry market started. Initially, this process was driven by the changed security situation after the end of the Cold War; member states wished to decrease their defence expenditures, and the increased costs of defence acquisitions due to the quick technological development. The efforts to create a defence industry market started off from two angles, one was to restructure the defence industry and ideally create European defence industry companies, and the second was to create European rules for defence industry collaboration.
35 In the 1990s a consolidation process of the defence industry in Europe started on a national basis, but national restructurings were not perceived to be enough. During the 1990s there was a change of philosophy on international co-operation with regard to the production of defence equipment. Bi-and multilateral co-operation projects, through a change in philosophy on international co-operation, increasingly developed into different forms of co-ownerships, such as joint ventures. Programmes that started as co-operation projects developed into mergers and acquisitions. This led to a restructuring that embraced all of Europe and in some cases resulted in the creation of European companies. (Britz & Eriksson 2000; Defence Systems Daily, 2003).
36 Military aircraft production led the changes in the structure of the European defence industry. The French, German, and British governments at the end of 1997 gave Aérospatiale, DASA, and British Aerospace the task of proposing how the European aircraft sector could be restructured. These companies, in co-operation with Spanish Casa, answered with a report on how a competitive European defence industry could be created (Britz, 2000,23; Britz & Eriksson 2000, 203).
37 The discussion intensified, particularly in the latter part of the 1990s, among both politicians and company leaders, about the need for one or more big Western European defence industry company(ies). To a large extent, the discussions concerned the planned European Aerospace and Defence Company (EADC). The basis for this company was supposed to be the already-existing civilian company Airbus. The intention was to augment Airbus with a military part and in that way create a European company, with civilian and military aircraft production as its main activity. The politicians in the dominating arms-producing states showed some ambivalence towards how this should be done in practice. This ambivalence on the part of the government also seems to have given industry the initiative. When restructuring on a European level began, it was industry that led the way. One result of this restructuring process was the EADS (as it became, instead of EADC), which after some difficulties was created from a merger of German DASA and French Aerospatiale (Britz 2004,63-74,91-94,213-222,235).
38 The change in philosophy on international co-operation from bi-and multilateral co-operation projects into different forms of co-ownerships, mentioned above, was also closely connected to the need for European rules for the defence industry. The co-operation projects that were most successful at the beginning of the 1990s (and that later came to guide the transnational development) were those run by the companies themselves. Co-operative projects with more political goals did not succeed as well at this stage. The creation in 1996 of OCCAR (Organisme conjoint de co-operation en matière d’armement, in English : Joint Arms Co-operation Agency) was an effort to achieve greater efficiency in the project-oriented co-operation between the states creating the organisation : France, Germany, the UK and Italy. (Britz & Eriksson 2000,15,233-236; see also Axelson & Lundmark 2002.)
39 Two aspects of the EU have been obstacles for the creation of a European defence industry market. The first aspect is the fact that Article 296 of the Treaty establishing a European Union excludes defence equipment from the Common Market. The second aspect has been the lack of European regulation on the merger of companies and company acquisition, and specifically, the lack of European corporate law. In the EU there has been no uniform view on how the defence industry and collaboration in defence equipment production should be regulated. The rules that have existed have mainly dealt with export control and technology transfer. This has meant that defence industry collaborations have taken place through uni-, bi-, or multilateral agreements, and the governments involved in an acquisition have had to agree on whether Article 296 should be invoked. Countries that have favoured a higher degree of competition have not cited that article whereas others have.
40 The earliest attempts to create European rules in the defence industry policy area were made by the European Parliament and the Commission at the end of the 1970s and in the 1980s. The Parliament has been active on issues such as the abolishment of Article 296, the establishment of a European Armaments Agency, and rules for export. Generally the Commission plays an important role in the development of industrial policy in the EU, and at the end of the 1980s and in the 1990s it created merger regulations that were agreed upon by the member states. These rules, although applicable to the common market, affect many defence industries since they are involved in both military and civilian production. The second obstacle concerning the rules of company activity was reduced since there was an agreement on a European company law at the European Council in Nice in 2000. However, the first obstacle, the Article 296, remains. (Guay 1997,405-8,414-17; Sandström 1997,100,110-111; Törnqvist, 1998.)
41 The co-operation between the French, British, and German governments that began with the question in 1997 to the defence industry of how the European aerospace sector could be re-structured (mentioned above) was later extended and developed into more profound political co-operation on defence industry issues. A process that lead to the signing first of a Letter of Intent Concerning Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring of European Defence Industry (LoI) and then to the development of a Framework Agreement Concerning Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring and Operation of the European Defence Industry. This development, between member states of the EU but formally taking place outside the EU structures, could be seen as a reaction to the lack of progress on this issue within the EU (Moderna Tider i Staten, 2001; Interview 20 March 2003). At the same time the US started to restructure its defence industry in order to increase its competitiveness, increasing the pressure on the European companies. The development that led to the signing of this Framework Agreement (also called the Farnborough Agreement after the place where it was signed) will here be called the “LoI-process”. This process was started by France, the UK, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Sweden, the same states that later on also signed the Framework Agreement (and the six states in Europe that count for 90% of the defence equipment production). Through co-operation within the “LoI-process”, work started with the aim of finding common regulations in six key areas : security of supply, export procedures, security of classified information, defence related research and technology, treatment of technical information and the harmonisation of military demands. On 27 July 2000, a development of the LoI in the form of a Framework Agreement was signed (Mörth 2003,10 and end note 15,137; Proposition 2000/01 :49,4 and Appendix, 37)  For a more detailed analysis of what the different working...
42 According to Mörth (2003,120) the relationship between the “LoI-process” and the EU was quite sensitive, as it appeared that the participants in the process had tried to establish that the LoI was an actor in its own right. This relationship became less controversial as the process developed, and it is worth noting that an important reason given in the Framework Agreement for the need to restructure the European defence industry was the creation of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In the Agreement’s introduction it is stated that the parties (the countries that have signed the Agreement):
44 Several analysts have stated that common procurement procedures would be one of the keys to success in the creation of a European defence industry market (Hayward, 1997; Sandström, 1997; Vlachos, 1998; Hartley, 2003). In spite of this, the Framework Agreement did not touch upon this issue in an extensive way. In Article 33, which dealt with the issue of free competition in defence-related research and technology, it was stated that national rules should provide the free competition. Thus, the ‘civilian’ EU regulation would be the basis for competition. Under the section “Harmonisation of military demands”, it was stated that the parties should identify possible co-operation projects within some areas, of which procurement was one. It has become clear from the work within WEU and OCCAR that decisions in this area have been politically difficult, and this drafting could be interpreted as a (rather weak) effort to continue what is known to be a problematic process.
45 The development of the capabilities issue shown in the first section in this article gave rise to more general strategic questions that needed to be dealt with at the political level. Finding forms for the future development of capabilities within the ESDP was complicated. Something more needed to be done in order to achieve a common approach in this area.
46 The formal writings of the creation of a European Defence Agency appeared at first within the context of the work of the European Convention, working on a future European Constitution. In July 2004 the European Council adopted a Joint Action on the establishment of the European Defence Agency. The Agency is to deal with defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments. Intergovernmental in structure, it will receive political guidance from the defence ministers of the Council and co-operate both with the Commission, defence industries and existing defence industrial structures in Europe. In the 2005 work programme a number of areas were set up in which the Steering Board expected to see the Agency to handle initiatives by the end of 2005 (European Defence Agency, 2004).
47 The issue of common procurement procedures had not been forgotten though and in 2004 the Commission produced a Green Book on Defence Equipment Procurement. In this Green Book the Commission stated that when the EU establishes a defence agency it becomes even more important to have a defence industry market. The Commission here proposes that a new directive with the purpose of co-ordinating defence equipment procurements should be written. The European Defence Agency’s chief executive (Nick Witney) welcomed the Green Book, but even so he stated in April 2004 that he could not imagine compulsory common procurement policies for Europe in the foreseeable future, at least in the next 5-year time frame (Witney, 2004a). The European Defence Agency in the spring of 2005 however decided to explore the possibilities for a voluntary agreement on 296-procurements. It was foreseen that the member states later in 2005 would agree on a voluntary code with the purpose of stop using Article 296 and thereby help the functioning of a European defence industry market and boost competition (European Defence Agency, 2005a).
48 With the new capability goals discussed in the first section of this article, a new phase of implementation starts all over again. This time the European Defence Agency will be engaged together with Council bodies. The issues of capabilities and defence industry are brought together in the work that the European Defence Agency is expected to undertake, and the question of a future common market in the area of defence equipment is also important in relation to this development. That this is no co-incidence, but one of the reasons of being of the new agency, was expressed by the European Defence Agency (EDA) chief executive Nick Witney :
50 The Agency has been tasked to work towards incorporating existing organisations in its area. In April 2005 European Defence Agency’s steering board agreed that the Agency should take over the activities of the WEAG and WEAO, especially the activities covering Research and Technology (European Defence Agency, 2005b; European Defence Agency, 2005c). The capabilities issue within the ESDP thus seems to have driven forward the spread of the armaments issue across policy areas within the EU, from the market field within the Commission where the defence industry policy area had been located so far (Mörth, 2003), to the defence field of the ESDP. The creation of the European Defence Agency also makes it possible to “bring in” the development that so far has been found “outside” the EU.
51 Because of the fact that the European Defence Agency is a fairly recent creation, there is much we do not know about it. Obviously it remains to be seen what effect the Agency will have on the issues it is set to develop, and how it will be able to incorporate or co-operate with existing structures in Europe. As has been shown in this article, the European Defence Agency can be seen as the tip of an iceberg, which expresses an effort to make a number of defence related activities in the EU more coherent. The ambition to create a military crisis management capability has started a process that might have profound consequences both for European countries (not only the EU member states) and for the Union itself. Increasingly, the civilian and military parts of defence are brought together, as has been shown in recent operations.
52 It does seem as if the ESDP is getting very close to being an own sub-system of the European Foreign and Security Policy. This means that it now is time to go back to Roper. A Common Defence in Roper’s strong version, where we have the organisation of the armed forces of the member states in common, is not the case. However, when it comes to the military crisis management operations, we can in the cases of multinational battle groups talk of organisation of parts of the armed forces in common. Given the development and implementation of the Battle Group concept, member states may become more integrated with respect to defence policy, not only with the European level process, but also with each other. Small and medium sized states are likely to become most affected, as they will have difficulties setting up an autonomous Battle Group. Multinational co-operation will therefore be necessary, which in practice will imply long-term, close co-operation with other member states in the development of military units. The effect will perhaps not be as great on the larger EU states that do not have to set up multinational Battle Groups in order to be able to participate. The effect should also be dependent upon how large that part of the member state’s strategy concerning their armed forces is focused upon crisis management operations. This is very close to the weaker version of a Common Defence proposed by Roper, that of organisation of activities in common. What differs here from the “default idea” of a common defence though is that the crisis management actions and the Battle Groups do not engage the whole of the member states’ defence, only parts. This fact leads us to think that the defence that is being developed perhaps is better described as shared rather than common. We will get back to this.
53 In addition, some of the activities mentions by Roper that a strong version of a common defence should imply, are in place. Common elements of training, exercises, and command structures are, as we have seen here, there. The issue of procurement is still unresolved, though it seems as if the work within the European Defence Agency might make it possible for the EU member states to agree on at least voluntary rules. What is interesting with the European Defence Agency is that the Agency, through its work on issues such as defence procurement and a common defence industry market, brings these elements into the ESDP. Through the establishment of the European Defence Agency the ESDP has been extended from the development of civilian and military crisis management capacities, and now also includes defence industry related issues. These elements have, however, not replaced the national – though the common aspects are becoming features of the national systems.
54 According to Roper a Common Defence Policy would deal with the use of armed forces, and how necessary means for the pursuit of (in this case EU) objectives in fields of defence can be created and used. The Common Defence Policy should provide coherence for the development of a Common Defence. This would include development of humanitarian and financial resources for military action and operational action of organisation, training and conduct of military operations. As has been shown here, when it comes to the building of an EU crisis management capacity, this is exactly what has been happening within the EU in the last years. In the area of crisis management the EU can thus be said to have a common defence policy. A dynamic policy process has been established at the European level, involving, as we have seen, most of the central areas of defence. As the process started, it was goal and policy oriented. This dimension can be said to have “grown”, it has increased in scope and has been extended with more aspects of security and defence policy. The efforts concerning defence industry can be seen as part of this. In 2003 the ESDP became operational and started to be used for civilian and military operations. One key question, however, is that of budget. As shown above, civilian expenditures are charged on the EC budget but with military operations the money must come from the member states. This ad hoc way of financing is obviously a constraint to the idea that the EU would have a common defence policy.
55 Concerning the requirement for collective defence guarantees as part of a CDP, these do not exist in the EU, at least not in the traditional sense. Member states declare that NATO is still the organisation providing for their collective defence, and some claim to be militarily non-aligned. Still, the solidarity declaration adopted by the EU member states in March 2004 may be seen as an example of a new security and defence conception which can be interpreted as even more far reaching than the traditional one (NATO’s Article 5), as it concerns both external and internal threats. (European Council, 2004b) Here, it might be that the development since 1999 shows a transformation of defence policy from territorial defence towards crisis management. It might also be the case that the development shows a de-coupling of these two ideas of defence. The old, territorial idea of defence still exists, but is downplayed due to the recent developments in the world, at the same time as increased integration on crisis management means that we, in addition to the national defence policies, develop not a common, but a shared defence policy. Some other constraints that Roper points at for the realisation of a Common Defence Policy and a Common Defence that still are in place are the intergovernmental basis of the ESDP policy area, and the fact that member states are allowed to undertake military actions independently. When it comes to the intergovernmental character of the policy area that is not likely to change soon, but can rather be seen as one of the characteristics of the ESDP. Here there are other mechanisms that can work against the temptation that some member states might have to veto a certain development, socialisation and peer-pressure are two examples. The fact that member states can undertake military actions independently then becomes a consequence of the fact that the European defence policy is a shared defence policy, and not a common defence policy. It is shared with regard to civilian and military crisis management. In practice this may decrease the likelihood of independent military action, especially for the small and medium sized member states.
56 Given that so many of Roper’s characteristics for a common defence and a common defence policy now have been found, we draw the conclusion that defence (common or shared) in 2005 actually constitutes a forth sub-system of European Foreign Policy. However, as suggested in the discussion of a shared defence policy it may be questioned whether White’s use of Roper’s conceptualisations of Common Defence Policy and Common Defence really constitutes the best tools to answer such a question. According to White, what is necessary in order to constitute a sub-system is a distinct type of governance. Thus, what should be focused upon is perhaps not only what is happening within the ESDP in terms of practice, but an analysis of the type of governance that may be found in this area. Defence has some special traits that are important and imply that perhaps this sub-system is slightly different in character than the other sub-systems in European Foreign Policy.
57 If we briefly go back to White’s elements which constitute the sub-system (actors and policymaking, capabilities and instruments, and policy context), the characteristics of this governance system means that the important actors here are not only politicians and diplomats, but also military officers (in some countries conscripts) participating in the process and being deployed around the world to perform the tasks assigned to them. Considering the defence industry part of this sub-system, private actors also become involved. Compared especially to the Union Foreign Policy there is a strong connection between government actors and private actors. The capabilities and instruments in this governance system are quite clear, because the whole purpose of the system is the building of crisis management capacities and instruments. What has become evident here is that it becomes increasingly difficult to separate civilian and military capabilities from each other, even though we have made an explicit effort to do so. The policy context is interesting. The policy context is multi-level in its character, developments that to a large extent take place outside the EU affect what kind of capabilities and instruments are thought to be necessary. At the same time, the development of these capabilities and instruments involves the domestic level, which means that the domestic policy contexts also become important for European policy development.
58 From the findings shown in this article, it is possible to distinguish at least three characteristics of the governance system of the ESDP. The first is its intergovernmental character when it comes to decision-making. The second is the close interrelationships between military and civilian capacities within the sub-system. This might cause some strains on the intergovernmental decision making in the future, due to the fact that many of the civilian capacities exist within the “community part” of the EU. The third characteristic is that the development of the ESDP not only brings new issues to the EU level; it also brings domestic policy processes and administrative systems together with the European in a more extensive way than foreign policy does. Compared to foreign policy, defence policy concerns issues that to a much higher degree directly involve national structures and economy. In most member states, the defence organisation concerns many employees and large budget shares. This basic trait makes a form of governance necessary that reaches deep into this organisation. Even though this only affects parts of the member states’ defence activities it will have effects on domestic defence planning in a wide sense. For military units from different member states to be able to interact, much more is required than for diplomats to be able to speak to each other.
59 Governance within this shared defence policy is perhaps best seen in the capability development process, with the efforts to harmonise military requirements and solutions. With the European Defence Agency functioning, common acquisition may be undertaken. This is a form of regulative effort at the European level although it is definitely very “soft” and bottom-up in its approach.
60 Now we have established that the ESDP can be analysed as its own sub system of European Foreign Policy, albeit a sub-system with quite special characteristics. If we go back to White, one of his basic arguments is that the more extensive the interrelationships between the governance systems are, the more justified we are to talk about a European Foreign Policy (White, 2001,39. The cross-pillarization of EU foreign policy is also emphasised by Stetter, 2004). What needs to be discussed is to what extent the development of the fourth sub-system contributes to a European Foreign Policy. As has been shown here, the interrelationships between the governance system of this sub-system and especially the sub-system of Community Foreign Policy and the sub-system of Union Foreign Policy are extensive. This means that the development of the ESDP strengthens the idea that there is a European Foreign Policy, especially when it comes to the possibilities to act with other means than diplomacy.
61 Thus, we have two conclusions about the theoretical benefit of studying the ESDP as its own sub-system. The first is that it enhances our possibility to identify the linkages between different sub-systems. Where the traits between different sub-systems are similar (as for example the intergovernmental trait that the ESDP shares with the Union Foreign Policy, and the importance of civilian capacities that it shares with the Community Foreign Policy) we can suspect that there are linkages between the different sub-systems. The second conclusion is that we have achieved an increased understanding of the dynamics of the ESDP sub-system. When disentangling the ESDP from the Union Foreign Policy (i.e. the CFSP), the differences in dynamics, when it comes to the development of the sub-systems, also become clear. We have used the European Defence Agency to illustrate how the dynamics of the economic integration of the EU also affects the development of the ESDP, which is not the case in the Union Foreign Policy.
62 However, as pointed out by Ekengren (2005) the question of whether the ESDP is a sub-system of European Foreign Policy might be slightly miss-posed. Both CFSP (Union Foreign Policy) and ESDP have one important thing in common : security. It might be that what is really important in the development accounted for here is the increase in the tools that the EU has to create security. When White states that defence policy cannot be seen as its own sub-system, he consciously opens up for the possibility that security might be a sub-system of its own. However, White does not really continue this line of reasoning. Security can be created both with civilian and military means, and the importance of the extension of the ESDP then as we have seen here, is not only that it creates tools for a European Foreign Policy, but also that it creates tools that can be used to increase security more generally. This would mean that the issue of ‘defence’ will increasingly not be synonymous only to ‘military capabilities’, but to the maintenance of security in a wider sense : both as a tool for a European Foreign Policy and as a part of the member states’ more comprehensive search for security, outside of the Union as well as inside. This might imply that the ESDP could be analysed as system of its own, on the same ‘level’as the European Foreign Policy, rather than as a sub-system of the same.
63 Conclusions on the features of governance in EU defence policy are somewhat premature, partly due to the recent developments, partly due to the lack of research with this angle. The research community still knows little of the dynamics of this policy process, as well as of the effects it produces within member states. Focus on how member states take part in the Europeanized policy process, and what consequences this participation has, is of course necessary in order to fully evaluate the existence of something “common” (or “shared”) European. This is an increasingly interesting research task, given the evolution of security and defence policy as such and the great diversity of member states, large and small, new and old. Our findings concerning the characteristics of the ESDP should also contribute to Europeanization research, especially when it comes to the depth of the process since we now know that different kinds of actors are involved in different sub-systems.
64 The evolution of defence as a policy area is also a topic that would merit further investigation. How does defence policy relate to foreign policy and to security policy in today’s Europe ? Can it still be seen as an area “fundamentally different” from other policy areas, given, for example, the increasing Europeanization of security and defence (Britz, 2004; Eriksson, 2006)? There should be different ways to approach this issue, and answers probably will diverge. As suggested above, defence is something that safeguards security and not necessarily has to do with military capabilities; and the increasing interface of the civil and military dimension of security and defence, are also aspects that need further research. These aspects may affect the systems of governance in this area – both at national and at European level. Indeed, if the European defence we have is neither collective, nor common, but rather shared, the whole approach to peace and security may be changing, as suggested by Bigo (2000) when he claims that the difference between internal and external security in the EU is vanishing (c.f. Ekengren, 2005).
65 An issue related to the governance structure of the ESDP is what mechanisms there are to foster consensus in this policy area. The intergovernmental trait means that consensus is needed for development of defence policy, a policy area that traditionally has been politically sensitive. As suggested above these might have to do with socialisation and peer pressure, but this needs to be investigated further.
66 Finally, if the importance of the EU in defence is increasing, what can be said about the external implications of this process, for the relations within the transatlantic area, in the EU‘s neighbourhood, and globally (for an early assessment concerning the transatlantic area, see Eriksson, 2006)? What role NATO plays in this development would also deserve clarification. From the above it is clear that the EU is an actor of importance to its member states, and that Europeanization seems to deepen. Externally, the EU has only recently become an actor with a military capacity. The EU’s actorness in this area is certainly a problem, as it does not fit into the traditional conception of an actor with a military capacity.
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[ 1] The authors are researchers at the Department for Security and Strategic Studies at the Swedish National Defence College. All views expressed are, however, those of the authors and do not constitute an official view of the Swedish National Defence College.
[ 2] We focus here mainly on the military aspects of defence and of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Civilian aspects are not in focus though the civilian dimension has also been developed within the ESDP.
[ 3] The Amsterdam treaty substantially developed the CFSP and set out a light framework for an ESDP. (The Petersberg tasks were then included in the treaty. They include; humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (WEU, 1992).)
[ 4] The project groups (PGs) concerned the following areas (some project groups were also divided into subgroups): Headquarters (HQ), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Air to Air Refuelling (AAR), Special Operation Forces (SOF), Nuclear, Bacteriological and Chemical Weapons (NBC), Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR Information Exchange Framework), Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), Interoperabilitiy for Humanitarian and Evacuation Operations, Tactical Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD), Strategic Air Lift, Strategic Sea Lift, Space Assets, Medical group, Attack Helicopters and Support Helicopters. All shortfalls were not dealt with in PG :s (Försvarsmakten 2004).
[ 5] Already before ECAP, bilateral initiatives had been taken concerning some of the areas where shortfalls were identified. For example, a Memorandum of Understanding between Germany and the Netherlands was concluded in 2001. Shortly afterwards, the European Air Group made an agreement on a European Air Transport Co-ordination cell. (European Air Group, 2001) These initiatives were later lifted into the ECAP and EU framework.
[ 6] http ://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp ?id=268&lang=en&mode=g (accessed 21 Sept 2005)
[ 7] For a more detailed analysis of what the different working groups dealt with and the development that took place from the LoI to the Framework Agreement, see Mörth, 2003 :110-120. Other states were welcomed to join the agreement, and the Netherlands, Greece, Finland and Belgium expressed their interest. However, new states could not sign the Agreement until all founding states had ratified it. Italy did not do this until the summer of 2003, which meant that all the implementation agreements were not signed until the end of 2003.
[ 8] In the LoI there was no reference to the construction of a common European Security and Defence Policy, but a common statement from the same governments from April 1998 said that that “a strong, competitive and efficient defence industry is a key element of European security and identity as well as of the European scientific and technological base” (LoI 1998 Annex A).
The development of defence activities related to the European Union has been rapid since the end of the Cold War. The creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2004 might contribute to greater coherence in the Union’s defence related activities. This article investigates the development that has enabled the creation of the EDA and what these developments mean to the study of European foreign policy. The authors argue - in opposition to Brian White (2001) - that defence should, by 2005, at least be seen as a fourth sub-system of European foreign policy.
PLAN DE L'ARTICLE
- 1. Analysing a Common Defence Policy
- 2. The development of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)
- 3. Efforts to create a European defence industry market
- 4. Bringing defence industry issues into the ESDP : the creation of a European Defence Agency
- 5. ESDP : A fourth sub-system of European Foreign and Security Policy
- Conclusion : Future research
POUR CITER CET ARTICLE
Malena Britz et Arita Eriksson « The european security and defence policy : a fourth system of european foreign policy ? », Politique européenne 3/2005 (n° 17), p. 35-62.
URL : www.cairn.info/revue-politique-europeenne-2005-3-page-35.htm.