Le modèle des « insiders-outsiders » : entre théorie et
pratiques
Luc Simar
The paper first attempts to present the insider-outsider theory.
The Belgian system of wage bargaining is highlighted in the second section. The
third section compiles some empirical studies on this issue. The findings do
not allow us to conclude that the insider-outsider theory works. Some countries
with decentralized systems of bargaining, especially the U.S., achieve results
close to ‘corporatiste’ countries. Wage in countries with centralized
bargaining are more responsive to unemployment than in some countries where
wage bargaining is decentralized. The ‘corporatiste’ countries do not seem to
systematically get poorer economic results. The Calmfors and Driffill model
with a U shaped relation between employment and bargaining level does not have
much empirical support according to an OECD study. The main significant result
is the clear relationship between centralization of bargaining and reduction of
wage inequality. The outsiders also share this last objective.
Keywords :
Insiders-outsiders, wages, unemployment, collective bargaining.
• 1. LA THÉORIE « INSIDERS-OUTSIDERS »
• 2. LA FORMATION DES SALAIRES EN BELGIQUE
— Un peu d’histoire
• 2. LES ACCORDS SECTORIELS 2003 -2004
• 3. INSIDERS-OUTSIDERS, ÉLÉMENTS EMPIRIQUES
— 3.1 L’OCDE teste le lien salaire-chômage
— 3.2 Les différences intersectorielles de salaires
— 3.3 La négociation collective revisitée par l’OCDE
• 4. LE POINT DE VUE DES « OUTSIDERS »
• 5. CONCLUSION
• RÉFÉRENCES