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Europeanness
Something Important Escapes Us

Ryszard Piasecki & Jan Woroniecki

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Introduction

After the end of the Second World War two attitudes were clashing in Europe, more precisely, in its democratic and free part: national antagonisms and Europeanness in statu nascendi among intellectual elites understood at that time as activities promoting the integration of societies and economies—the best guarantor of peace. The other part of Europe, which liberated by the Soviet army, could join neither the Marshall Plan nor the free world. The European Project, which was then endorsed, despite many obstacles and crises, included initially six and now twenty-eight states. Other countries are aspiring to accede to European Union (EU).

However, recent years have witnessed the growth of centrifugal tendencies such as the popularity in member states of the parties openly or factually anti-European and nationalistic. Until recently half a billion of EU citizens have been taking safety and peace in Europe for granted; young generations are used to thinking that studies, trips and work on the whole EU territory is a norm. The formation of the European consciousness has faded into the background before it had a chance to take root.

And yet, the experience of seventy postwar years shows that the creation of that consciousness is the process, which requires coordinated activities of the
whole system of European institutions, national states and NGOs. That type of consciousness is necessary for the EU to function and to motivate member-states’ citizens and the Union itself to actively support European integration—the integration which managed to effectively guarantee the longest period of peace and prosperity in Europe in several past centuries. It is the highest value, which—just like freedom and democracy—demands from succeeding generations of Europeans to stay constantly on the alert. It is not given once and for ever. The events of 2013/2014 as well as the ones of 2008 which occurred due to the Kremlin politics remind us about that. Nevertheless in the recent years, after the enlargement of the EU, we could observe a distinct fall of interest in the activities promoting the formation of the European consciousness on the part of European institutions and member-states and, in parallel, further dramatic weakening of pro-European social movements. That process led to the growing désintéressement of the EU countries who probably decided that the goal had been reached and that there is no need for wide pro-European education among their populations.

Against this background, we put forward the following hypothesis:

The lack of proactive measures mobilizing the citizens to keep on struggling for common Europe will lead to the erosion of existing achievements of integration within the EU, and of European values. It is going to seriously threaten the future of the EU which is not an ordinary integration grouping but a great peaceful, civilizational, social and economic project. It leads us to the conclusion about an urgent need to propagate Europeanness.

The significance and sense of the European identity, which we define as Europeanness, its parallel and collision-free co-existence with the sense of national belonging, have not been adequately appreciated. The vision of the united Europe and institutional concepts of its deeper integration has faded into the background, and its unity started to crumble owing to internal and external reasons, political and economic crises. We believe that the fight for Europeanness, the social dimension of ‘being in the Union’, being and feeling European—become an important factor in the battle for its survival, not just for ‘our’ part of Europe but for the whole continent and Western civilization as well. Moreover, this is important in order to counteract those dangerous tendencies of nationalism which are reviving on the old continent.

For that reason it is worth examining the origins and, more importantly, the significance of this vital issue which is so neglected in Europe. Without the propagation of the European identity among the EU inhabitants (more often than not unaware of their dual citizenship) it would become more and more difficult to maintain the unity of in the EU and to continue the membership of certain states, to ensure development of the European Project, without excluding, albeit in rather distant perspective, federalization or some other closer form of politi-
cal integration within the EU. However, we must be very careful not to link (in the sense of cause and effect) the development of European identity, or generally Europeanness, with the potential European statehood. Citizens not elites should decide at some point about the creation of the ‘state of Europe’ or ‘the United States of Europe’, and only on a certain level of European consciousness, which is currently very low. It will not happen, as some have thought, spontaneously as the result of progress in economic integration, nor automatically after the strengthening of that awareness and identity, because, e.g., of fear of excessive centralization and of the scope of the decision-making.¹

It is worth remembering that when over fifty years ago Robert Schuman presented his vision of the ‘European Federation’ which would provide historic opportunity to guarantee peace, stability, democracy and welfare in this part of the world, hardly anyone believed this project would succeed. No wonder, people in Europe, devastated by the war, torn, and divided—people that were in many cases filled with mutual hatred and mistrust—could hardly imagine a peaceful and stable Europe. But it did happen! In the 20th century the European integration was the best thing that had ever happened to Europe and when screening that, rather sad century, it ought to be qualified as undoubtedly an outstanding achievement.

Here a question can be asked—do the judgment and the perception of average member-states’ nationals catch up with the ambitions and vision of their ‘enlightened’ leaders? Do we feel and think about ourselves as Europeans? European citizens (in fact, citizens of the European Union)? We are citizens—and hopefully patriots—of our country, even when it is temporarily deprived of statehood or effective sovereignty over the whole or a part of its territory. The European Union however is neither a state nor a federation but an integrating (with some resistance and setbacks) union of states, and an international (intergovernmental) organization with some supranational powers. Unlike other institutions to which states belong, it brings about the concept of citizenship for EU people. No other organization—even the United Nations which issues passports to the secretariat officials and their missions members—intervenes in citizenship issues. A cliché ‘citizen of the world’, which precedes and matches well globalization, is only a witty metaphor.

The European Union has strictly limited supranational prerogatives and calls itself ‘Europe’ (such statement is very common though not precise; however, this distinction is diminishing as Europeans from outside the EU discover the community of values²). Its every citizen has a right to the EU citizenship. As they al-

ready have citizenship of a member state. But... the awareness of this fact is negligible or inexistent, particularly regarding rights and obligations of an EU citizen, which in fact were never fully determined. Only in the Treaty of Maastricht of 1991 a small step was taken in the direction of a political union (in our opinion, also of a social one) in the form of introducing the concept of European citizenship, which—just like common currency—was also meant to unify the societies of member-states and not just their economies (in practice only those of the euro area, contributing *nolens volens* to a new internal division within the EU).³

The unification progress has meanwhile significantly stagnated and the euro-enthusiasm has largely dissipated despite the expectations that the 21st century would belong to Europe and despite the hope that the sense of identity, of European solidarity, of common values (for the whole Western world) and those emerged after the two horrible wars would get stronger⁴ and that like-mindedness based on those values would cement the European nations and the EU. So far the 21st has witnessed the opposite trends. Individual interests often weigh more than recognized common values while populism gains growing support. The proclamation of the birth of the European nation after the publication of the manifesto of 15 February 2003 turned out to be premature. Europeans care little about European issues; Europe was called into being but where are the Europeans?⁵

"Although the EU is 'real' for European elites, it is more remote for European citizens"⁶ and not present in people's minds. Although it strongly affects their lives, Europeanness, inscribed into the sense of belonging and of identity, remains peripheral at best, or even secondary or 'lite', unlike the national one.⁷ According to John McCormick,⁸ Europeans are the healthiest and happiest people in the world and ‘Europeanism’ (as he and Anthony Giddens call it; we prefer the term *Europeanness*), is both a realistic and analytically valuable concept. People either have or are searching for group consciousness in order to share with others their sense of belonging and support for common values and standards. However, there still is a long way to the emergence of a mass sense of Europeanness...

In the 21st century only a small percentage of people, at least on the old continent, is ready to die or risk their lives and health even for their own country. Although neither the Union nor the majority of its members requires the life sac-
rifice from their citizens, but there are problems even when they have to manifest solidarity within the EU. We do not try to assess what has led to this situation: decreasing patriotism, globalization, being used to peace and stability since the end of the Second World War, and, particularly after the Cold War, attracted by temptations of consumerism and love of comfort, individualism combined with the supremacy of one’s own interests and ‘mind privatization’, common disgust with politicians and politics.9 One way or another, the phenomenon is unquestionable. And to die or suffer for Europe? The case of Ukraine, which is not EU member-state and which has no realistic perspectives to join soon, seems to confirm this conclusion—as an exception. Shaming the member-states. “For the first time in the history people were killed [and still are!] by bullets holding the European flag in their hands”10 and fighting at the same time for their national independence. “The Ukrainians demonstrated their Europeanness, dignity, their desire for freedom”—declared Petro Poroshenko.11 It can be seen from this example that the EU has become the indicator and symbol of Europeanness. The position of a state in relation to the EU defines this state’s Europeanness better than its geographical location on the old continent.12

The problem is that European integration failed to transfer its focus from cooperation between governments onto the care for European citizens.13 “What has struck me most about the creation of the European society is the degree to which people in Europe are unaware of it”14 and the percentage of those who consider themselves Europeans is marginal and unequally distributed in Europe and within individual member-states. Moreover, some tend to treat the EU with suspicion as an attempt against the national consciousness and sovereignty.15 Why is that happening?

The genesis of the problem

“In spite of its many successes, the Union has not put down emotional roots anywhere among its citizens [...] The sense of ‘enlarged patriotism and common citizen-
ship’ of which Churchill spoke has simply not arrived […] the EU must move closer to its citizens […] or it will not survive in recognizable form at all.”

Although it exists by now for over half a century, despite crisis (partly thanks to them?) and recognized weaknesses, despite never-ending disputes regarding its role and functions, the Union keeps enlarging and so far has not shrunk. However, the Union has not managed (or has not regarded that issue as important enough) to form among its citizens (in fact the citizens of the member-states) the sense of Europeanness and bonds with ‘mother Europe’ which would be parallel to the bonds with their motherland, not at its expense. The formation of the European society has remained for a long time (much too long!) a by-product of the economic integration, particularly of the opening of the markets which led to the increase of interactions among the citizens, mainly in the areas of business and management. “The identities of these people have shifted as they came to view themselves, as having not just a national identity but also a European identity. This dynamics at the core of the creation of Europe.”

Bernard Guetta thinks similarly: “It is impossible to create Europe without European civil society […] until it becomes active, united Europe will be formed far from the citizens, it will fade away and crumble till one day when it completely disintegrates.” He complains that neither national elites nor the citizens of twenty-eight member states do anything to become the builders of the Union; they do not pose the question what they can do for the Union but only what the Union can do for them. The leaders deal merely with the present ignoring to prepare for the future. We fully support both opinions.

Undoubtedly, in the post-war time many NGOs played an important role in raising European consciousness spreading the European message among almost all professional groups (e.g. Centre International de Formation Européenne, Europa Union in Germany, Federal Trust in Great Britain, Collège de Bruges, Institut universitaire européen de Florence, etc.). Those organizations were mainly voluntary with some financial support from the European institutions and national governments. It was then rightly understood that without involvement of pro-European social institutions one cannot even dream about ‘Europeanness’ of the EU societies of the European Communities. Their enthusiasm and involvement gradually decreased until it practically died down; for example at its peak German Europa

17. Fligstein, Euroclash, pp. 1, 10-11 and 18.
18. Ibid, p. 11.
Union had 1.5 million members. In our opinion this is one of key reasons for the collapse of the action to promote the pro-European dimension in member-states’ societies.

In new EU countries (as of 2004) such organizations were marginalized or totally excluded from shaping the ‘European’ attitude before they could expand any meaningful activity in this regard (e.g. European movement in Poland). Those organizations often lost their voluntary character as they started to pursue marginal interests of very narrow elites. A good example are candidates for members of the European Parliament who come from new states who are motivated not by the European interest but by their salary. Many MEPs openly admit that they are driven by such motivation. Or even by the desire to carry out disintegration policy inside of the Parliament for European money… In these circumstances one can hardly expect wide interest of EU citizens in pro-European option. All this is happening unfortunately in the climate of complete passivity of national governments and European institutions.

Roman Kuźniar writes that during the first years of integration the citizens of Western Europe (European Economic Community) had a feeling of being European not only in terms of civilization, but in the social and political sense as well, in the sense of belonging to the community of states following the same political orientation. Thus, social acceptance of that unification process grew, although the process using the community method—i.e. intergovernmental one according to the ECSC/EEC model—started without previous democratic legitimization.

He believes that introducing and enlarging the Schengen Area and the Erasmus program made “invaluable contribution to the fulfilment of the slogan ‘Europe of citizens’” and “sense of unity of the citizens” as “the freedom to travel, live, work and study within the Area, on the territory of the Union (with some restrictions) is a powerful factor which transforms the consciousness of EU citizens;” he admits though that not everyone takes advantage of these possibilities. The majority approaches the development of the Union competencies in the scope of ‘civil Europe’, such as: the establishment of the area of freedom, security and justice, adopting the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in Nice as something natural or simply ignores it. Kuźniar says that “new rights and possibilities (covered by the Charter), which are advantageous for Europeans, did not solve the issue of civil legitimization of European integration which resulted from the lack of the European demos, lack of civil society on the level of the whole Union […] this issue is misdefined and often misrep-

23. Ibid, respectively pp. 134 and 141.
resented by the media but, nonetheless, real and it is going to increasingly hinder the development of integration." 25 And that is exactly what is happening.

Let us make that clear, we do not mean to substitute the sense and the pride of belonging to one's nation or state. The whole point is that a British or a Pole should also feel European. In parallel. Not 'either – or'. Without futile arguments which is more important: ultimately if you are British or Polish you are automatically European—and the citizen of your own state and of 'Europe'! We would like to refer to the federalist thinking which never saw any contradiction there but rightly assumed that the original consciousness of national belonging would neither be diluted nor undermined. On the contrary, the latter should get stronger as a result, one's confidence will be boosted. One can have a couple of collective identities as long as one can choose freely. 26 Those two categories must not be set one against the other. What is the motherland of a citizen of the Swiss Confederation—Switzerland or the canton where he lives? One and the other. And what about Americans? The majority has in fact a dual identity—not just one related to the federation or state, but also that associated with one's ancestry. Thus, those are false dilemmas and fears; those two categories are not on the same plane so they do not collide. We are dealing with a member state and the union of states, even if this union in future changes its international legal status. Each of the twenty-eight current member states forms a part of Europe and the EU. We think about a bond between those two—taking into account half a billion of EU citizens. The relation between an individual member-state and the whole EU is clear as far as the interstate (intergovernmental) relations are concerned. It is not well understood nor perceived correctly by the population. We think that it ought to be changed in the Union. Without waiting for a perspective of the change in its status. We are going to refer to this issue in the next sub-section.

European politics has never aspired to a powerful and common development of sense of belonging to the European family under the label of "the Communities." 27 Probably assuming that their unquestionable achievements such as long-lasting peace and prosperity would suffice. However, "the EU as a political organization is seen as remote from the interests of average citizens and its activities misunderstood." 28 "The loyalty of the individual and the group is still to the country of birth and to the nation. And while even such loyalty has become weaker, [...] it is still much stronger than any pan-European sentiment or cosmopolitanism." 29 "Citizenship, democracy, rights and duty are intimately bound up with the state [...] it is not clear how some-

28. Fligstein, Euroclash, s. 15.
29. Laqueur, After The Fall. s. 222.
one in Pombra, say, or Rzeszow, can be an active citizen of Europe.” 30 “The structural make-up of the EU explains a lot about why it is so remote from its citizenry [...] who are nowhere directly involved [...] The EU has only a shallow pool of legitimacy to draw upon, since it has no deep roots in their everyday lives.” 31

The Treaty of Rome focused on the relations between the states constituting the Community although it provided for the freedom of movement for workers, improvement of the standard of living, that is, issues which were significant for nationals of member-states. The preamble speaks about “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe;” 32 the parties committed themselves to lay the foundations of that union. The Treaty of Maastricht mentioned the issue of the citizenship of the Union, but:

1. Firstly: the question how many EU citizens are aware of that fact needs to be asked, because probably a tiny fraction has read the text.
2. Secondly, 33 the article mentioned above and the Treaty of Amsterdam (we are omitting the rejected Constitution which copied articles 1-8) provide that EU citizenship does not substitute (and rightly so) the national one but supplements it (s’ajoute à la citoyenneté nationale et ne le remplace pas). The Treaty of Lisbon maintains this approach, stating that “Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship” (Article 20.1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU). Besides it mentions the contribution of the Union in the protection of their citizens as non-discrimination, direct representation in the European Parliament and rights to participate in the democratic life of the Union (Articles 21-24).

Roger Bootle, the author of the book devoted to Union dysfunctionality, among the four key faults of European integration enumerates electorale alienation and the crisis of EU identity. He asks if the main point of the EU is about uniting the states and peoples considering themselves European or just the ones which are geographically close. 34 He rightly mentions that the Union (Brussels) is commonly perceived as a bureaucratic hydra and that in the public opinion

emotions and sentiments prevail, not necessarily an objective assessment of its achievements; the Union is often blamed for the mistakes of governments.\footnote{Ibid, pp. 58 and 67.}

Marcin Król\footnote{Marcin Król, \textit{Europa w obliczu końca} (Europe facing its end), (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Czerwone i Czarne, 2012). p. 110.} expresses a similar opinion: “\textit{In a democracy it’s not so much an active participation of all citizens in joint decision-making that is essential, as this would be impossible, what matters is the sense [underlined by us – R.P and J.W.] of co-governing.}” And the sense of public interest, not only from the local to the national one but also the sense of the Community, European interest. However, the latter has not been developed enough. Just like the sense of welfare and happiness, the European interest is not determined by the objective standard of living or personal achievements but by a subjective assessment which is not necessarily correlated with this standard attained and, moreover, is often based on (also subjective) comparisons.

According to Fligstein most theories concerning the EU are not complete as they do not take into account how the changes in the EU have been perceived by the European citizens and, then, how they are fed back into European processes.\footnote{Fligstein, \textit{Eurolash}, pp. 26-27.} The debate within the Union focuses on the intergovernmental dimension whereas the citizens are interested how integration would impact their life. No wonder that “\textit{the EU is surprisingly misunderstood by most of Europe’s citizens.}”\footnote{Ibid, s. 125.}

McCormick sees this situation in a more positive way, noticing the progress of the program \textit{People’s Europe} which aimed to make Europe closer and more real in the eyes of the citizens (European citizenship as complementary, propagating the Union attributes, such as a flag, hymn, Europe day; Project—unfulfilled—of exchanging national passports for the uniform European ones). However, he admits that those efforts did not lead to the formation of the sense of belonging and that ‘Europeanization’ is more than just legal acts or politics. He believes that the transfer of European consciousness onto citizenship is of key importance but no one knows what it should imply in practice. The Europeans will not get soon the options of two citizenships to choose, so far there is no institution that would offer them protection on account of the Union.\footnote{McCormick, \textit{Europeanism}, pp. 67-71 and 78-81.} The good-willed initiatives taken by European bureaucrats did not have significant influence on Europeanness: there is no European homeland, nation or state.\footnote{Ibid, pp. 82 and 85.} In fact we have Europe of homelands and not the homeland—even if it is the second one—of Europe, not to mention the common state...
Formulating the principle of subsidiarity the law-makers wanted to shape the citizens’ attitudes to integration and European institutions, but in practice its implementation encountered resistance to the pressure to harmonize.41 If some improvement could be reached here it would result in the balance between dynamic leadership and simultaneous increase of national and local democracy in action. In other words, a special combination of selective centralism and decentralization. Despite visible ‘blockage’ of the societies—their defiance against reforming key socio-economic and political institutions, in particular against departing from the European social model in the form of welfare state,42 In his later publication Anthony Giddens shows that the Union under the influence of the latest crisis has become the community of fate and its citizens and political leaders have become aware of their interdependence, which should lead—in a positive scenario—to the building of solidarity and the sense of belonging to the EU as a whole, and not only to the nations and regions which form it.43 We can agree with that on the condition that a big effort needs to be made because it is not going to happen by itself. And the notion itself (being doomed to a community?) does not sound very inspiring, either…

Unfortunately, the term ‘Europe’ does not appeal to the EU citizens. They can see how difficult it is for European politicians to agree on their position (it is only a little faster in the face of subsequent crisis), there is no democratic dialogue about key political, economic, social and ecologic challenges for the continent. L’Europe peine à enflammer les imaginations des citoyens—as Pierre Buhler puts it,44 The Report of Europe 2030 Reflection Group, which was formed by the European Council at the end of 2007 and headed by the former prime minister of Spain Felipe Gonzales, warned: “our conclusions do convince neither the Union nor our citizens […] we will not be able to face the challenges unless all politicians, citizens, employers and workers manage to unite around the new common vision.”45 Those phenomena can be evidenced by the decreasing voter turnout during the elections to the European Parliament or in referendums and their results. The situation is getting worse due to growing nationalistic and anti-European tendencies, particularly among radical right-wing and sometimes left-wing parties,46 not to mention Scottish or Catalan aspirations which weaken the position of their states in the EU as well as their own, even if the attempts of secession fail.47 The

45. Ibid, p. 399.
47. George Soros, “Britain needs greater unity, not a messy break-up,” FT, 11 IX (2014).

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Scottish one did not succeed, the Catalonian one so far has led to a preliminary referendum. “Most Europeans would not have defined themselves as living in ‘Europe’ until very recently […] The sense of being ‘European’ for purposes of self-identification is a newly acquired habit.”

“Being German […] I suppose I’d rather become at once a citizen of Europe. I would get rid of the idea of a national state. A more abstract European idea would allow me to identify more easily than the German eagle,” states Daniel Tkatch. After his wanderings from Russia via Israel he ended up in Germany, admitting at the same time *ubi bene, ibi Patria*. But is Germany the homeland of that Russian of Jewish origins who was born in Kazakhstan or one of his previous countries of residence or one of the countries where his family used to live is his homeland? He feels good in Germany (although “I have become German at least in the sense that I am starting to have a problem with being German”). At the same time he is an EU national and he owes his prosperity to the state (Germany). However, does not he draw a part of his—and his citizens’—welfare from belonging to the Union? One cannot separate that. According to the data of the European Commission of 2008, in the Union of 27 member states, on average less than half of the respondents declared their identification with (attachment to) the EU, 63% (second place after Belgium 66%) in Poland, 26% in Great Britain (last but one).

McCormick points out the fact that rejecting nationalism based on the state had the biggest influence on the emergence of European consciousness and Europeanism. However, the authority on the subject of the First World War, Margaret MacMillan and Timothy Snyder as well as Marcin Król unanimously warn that competing nationalisms (genuine and inspired) are as dangerous now as they were one hundred years ago. Media (e.g. *Financial Times*) support this opinion. The catalyst of those worrying opinions has been the events in Ukraine but also independence aspirations of Catalonians, Flemings and Walloons and the revival of nationalistic parties in many European countries, including the Union initiators.

49. Daniel Tkatch “Ojczyzna jest tam, gdzie jest dobrze” (Fatherland is where you are fine), *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 21 VIII 2014.
51. Ibid p. 73.
52. Ian Johnson, “Is it 1914 all over again? We are in danger of repeating mistakes that started WWI, says a leading historian,” *The Independent*, 5 I 2014
“And disaster strikes when—as it now often happens in Europe—populism becomes a component of nationalism.”56 What is worse, pro-European parties, looking for votes, move into right-wing and even chauvinistic positions against their convictions. They also appeal to nationalistic reflexes which have not been totally eradicated in Europe and which manifest themselves by assigning everything that is evil to forces outside their own country, among aliens, including immigrants not only from outside the EU. Król again: “what have we achieved in the area of limiting the influence of nationalism? A lot in regard to words and binding behavioural norms […] very little as far as human mentality is concerned […] In lieu of patriotism nothing turns up, sometimes nationalism.”57

MacMillan reminds that after the end of the First World War, which devastated Europe, nationalisms revived and led to the next catastrophe.58 “When the Cold War ended In 1989 and Soviet Marxism vanished into the dustbin of history, older forces, religion or nationalism, came out of their deep freeze.”59 She warns against a toxic combination of various nationalistic aspirations and the false feeling of security which are generated by progressive globalization, comparing the situation of 2013/2014 to the one which occurred a hundred years ago.60 Snyder goes further and reminds how attractive fascism was for Europeans (and not only for them): he puts forward the hypothesis that the objective of Russian politics is—apart from the reconstruction of the Empire and the creation of the Euro-Asian Economic Union (modelled after… the EU)—to destroy our Union, if attempts to stir there disunity work as planned. With the support of the European radical right-wing parties.61

The Union is troubled by disintegrating tendencies in the form of putting national interest (real or alleged ones) over the Union interests, although they do not contradict each other yet, this may require a dose of European solidarity. In this way politicians are trying to gain political capital on their national politics. They may get applause at home while already poor sense of Europeanness among EU citizens will be further undermined. Europeans witness meanwhile the recurrence of nationalistic and protectionist atmosphere, of national egoism, populist attitudes, in other words, of everything that contradicts the ideas which laid the foundations for the Great European Project and which now contaminates the international relationships not just in Europe. Only now in the Union and generally in the West—facing the Russian attempt to undermine post-war geopolitical
order in Europe—one can observe the return of long-forgotten solidarity and unity in the form of sanctions against the Russians even though they hurt also the Union and societies of its member-states. The significance of national and European safety is finally appreciated, although we still sometimes count on the protection of the USA and NATO. The role of EU as the subject of coherent international politics and defence is emerging in the consciousness of both leaders and citizens. 62 “The role of creative thinking about the EU safety is now much bigger than before […] The postulates concerning empowering the EU in the area of safety were formulated by Poland before the Ukrainian crisis”—reminds Stanisław Koziej. 63

So far the European Union resembles rather a political dwarf on its own wish or on the wish of some influential member-states… Perhaps the awareness of this fact will result in more understanding and social support for the necessity to transfer a bigger part of sovereignty onto the Union. Maybe it will decrease the fear of an alleged loss of sovereignty of member states, which anti-European parties and movement warn us against? Perhaps, for the sake of common interest and values, we will finally manage to curb national egosims which destroy our abilities to cooperate not only in the economic sphere. 64 Perhaps the common European interest will be finally appreciated and established as a legitimate important objective? We do not predict the form (federalization or other) or the name (like Churchill’s “United States of Europe” of 1946); in fact, we do not think that the current name needs to be changed. “Europe is no longer mighty but has again become turbulent as conflicts and divisions spring up across the continent.” 65

George Soros formulates his view even more radically, speaking plainly about the perspective of a long-term stagnation in Europe, which is in the state of economic and political disintegration and suffers from the “European malaise”. The states which found themselves in a similar situation or crisis have a chance to survive but “the European Union is not a nation; it is a voluntary and incomplete association of nations that may not survive a long period of stagnation.” 66 Although, he admits, “the Project of European unification […] shaped a multinational generation which […] was living together in greater harmony than any generation before it.” 67

63. Stanisław Koziej “Pod presją Rosji” (Under pressure from Russia), Rzeczpospolita (The Republic daily), 7 VIII 2014.
65. Giddens, Turbulent and Mighty Continent, p. 3.
67. Ibid, P XIX.
Potential “systemic” change of the EU does not have to bring about withdrawal from the model that has been developed for the last fifty years—of a “normative” entity whose strength is based on soft power and persuasion. In the light of the Russian aggressive actions in particular against Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and most recent show of military capabilities, this change should consist in strengthening the EU strategic position vis à vis the big powers of the 21st century, especially Russia and remaining BRICS countries on one hand, and within the Western alliance on the other. Contrary to the opinions (we do not share) of Euro-skeptics, including Bootle (a moderate one) who maintains that the majority of EU citizens do not want the EU’s transformation into a political union and that raising such perspective puts them off the Union, which they want (or are told they do) re-nationalized in the sense of empowering (?) member-states at the cost of European institutions. According to him the emergence and/or strengthening of euro-skeptical parties in the Netherlands, Italy, Austria, Greece and Finland and even France and Germany is both the result and cause of the public opinion shift. He argues that the rejection of the draft Constitution in 2005 is the end of the dream of EU as a super-state. But Laqueur points out (and rightly so) that since the world has not become conflict-free after the Cold War, the belief in magical interaction (radiation) of the European model has been rather naïve and that “soft power” has its obvious limitations. Can any big power survive nowadays without its own reliable military force—and deterrence? In case of EU, what about an European army, the concept Jean-Claude Juncker has lately reanimated?

Anyway, is Europe (EU in corpore) a big power? Jacek Żakowski argues that “the EU is not a big power. It is a beautiful project thanks to which Western Europe [enlarged to include post-communist countries] has enjoyed half a century of peace […] so far it is an association of states [whose access to power politics comes very hard indeed]. It is even scary to expect too much from it, as it is easier to undo than to knit.”

68. Laqueur, After The Fall, pp. 70-74.
70. Bootle, The Trouble with Europe, pp. 1, 49-51 & 137.
71. Laqueur, After The Fall, pp. 72-74 & 155.
72. Jacek Żakowski “Pewna jest tylko niepewność” (It’s only uncertainty that is certain). Gazeta Wyborcza, 25 VIII 2014.
Why to take up now the subject of the European identity?

Returning to the main subject of a dissatisfying sense and knowledge about Europeanness among the EU citizens, one can conclude that not enough importance—to the detriment to the Union—has been attributed to disseminating this knowledge and a special kind of European patriotism. What is worse, this tendency lasts till now and the society—despite tangible benefits enjoyed by the EU membership, with considerable portion of the electorate largely indifferent to its fate and critical towards ‘Brussels bureaucracy’—tends to blame it quite often for the sins of others.

At the beginning of the integration effort the main objective was to bring closer the countries, including former enemies, to carry out political and economic tasks (common market)—with a strong emphasis on social issues—to rebuild the devastated Europe. Similar objectives were enshrined in the Marshal Plan, which according to *Time* of 3 January 1949,73 initiated a new and hopeful era in the European history, and in the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) which was formed for the same purpose.74 We share Soros’ opinion that the Plan paved the way to the Union as it “was setting up mechanisms for cooperation, reopening commerce, and building a European economy.”75 However, the issue of citizens’ integration has been dealt with in a minor—according to us definitely too small—degree, and too late. We have not instilled the sense of dual citizenship for the Europeans: including the Union citizenship not as an inferior or secondary one in relation to the national citizenship—even if the latter one comes first—but as *primum inter pares*, which is what we should strive for. Incidentally, the new President of the European Council in his first interview for the media said that he had actually four identities: the one of a Gdańsk dweller, a Kashubian one, as well as Polish and European one.76 As for Kuźniar, “a European will always be first French, Polish, Swedish or English.”77 No collision.

Risse contends, somewhat overoptimistically, that data confirm that EU membership counts and leads to a growing identification with Europe, that the EU has formed public opinion, defining what it means to be European—however, in the second place and... not always. Moreover, it can be seen that membership was a necessary but not sufficient condition even for the “European identity lite”

76. Wywiad prezidenta RE Donalda Tuska w dniu 1 grudnia 2014 r. (Interview of the European Council President, Donald Tusk, on December 1, 2014) http://m.wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,117915,17047627.Donald_Tusk_pierwszy_raz_po_angielsku__I_am_a_lucky.html
to emerge, whereby two national and European identities co-exist as two sides of the same coin.\textsuperscript{78} As an alternative he examines Europeanization of national identity of EU citizens as both identities naturally overlap, or superimpose, on each other. He refers to the research on European identity which exists in spite of a lack of common language in the EU or the European nation (\emph{demos}). He brings up illustrative models (like onion and marble cake). He seems to prefer the approach of two organically linked and in fact complementary identities. People do not have to encounter any problems with loyalties towards various groups or institutions and do not have to be afraid that one loyalty will deplete the other. It was confirmed by scientific experiments he describes. Most of the respondents opted for the supremacy of the national consciousness (‘nation first’). This research presents also the dominance among the EU citizens of ‘inclusive nationalists’, i.e. those who somehow smoothly incorporate their European identity in the national one. The proportions among various population segments from the angle of their identity differ much, depending on their country of origin, age, gender, education, religion, etc.\textsuperscript{79}

It seems, however, that a concept of Europeanization of the national identity may confuse or even deform the picture: \textit{firstly}, it can be perceived as something obvious (it is hard to be a non-European Pole or German); \textit{secondly}, it shifts the European dimension into the background (backyard?), as it concerns only a (recently acquired) feature of national consciousness. Hence, it is better to stick to a dual identity or to two intertwined identities concept to take care of both. “\textit{The world badly needs Europe’s soft power},”\textsuperscript{80} but the Union should apply such power also internally in the societies of their member states and not just enjoy the effect of their impact on the outside world…

An advocate of European federalization, Guetta argues that otherwise EU is going to function far away from its citizens.\textsuperscript{81} “\textit{The European nation is to be created—and this can only happen through European citizenship},” which does not have to and should not imply resignation from its diversity, something that federalism does not presuppose.\textsuperscript{82} Jan Zielonka, who propagates the vision of functional EU reconstruction, states that Europe must be built or rebuilt on a bottom-up basis as overcentralization and intergovernmentalism has resulted in the crisis of cohesion, imagination and trust in the EU.\textsuperscript{83} European integration is oriented towards effectiveness and not towards inclusive legitimization, i.e. citizens’ participation,

\begin{itemize}
\item 78. Risse, “A Community of Europeans?” p. 93-96.
\item 80. Soros, with Gregor Peter Schmitz, \emph{The Tragedy of the European Union}, p. 102.
\item 81. Guetta, \emph{Jak zostali Europejczykami}, p. 120.
\item 82. Ibid, 13-14, 119, 121 and 123-143.
\item 83. Zielonka, \emph{Is the EU Doomed?} pp. XI-XIII & 3.
\end{itemize}
"efforts to involve ordinary citizens in its work, however, have been sporadic, heavy-handed and artificial [...] it has lost support of most of Europe’s citizens." 84 Nothing more, nothing less.

Charles Zorgbibe rightly opines that “the EU nationality is not being formed.” The bond of natural persons (and legal ones) with the EU is related to the fact of possessing the nationality (citizenship) of a member state. The notion of a Community citizen (ressortissant communautaire) is implicit. From the perspective of a member-state, a citizen of another member-state, while enjoying the same privileges, is still an intermediate category between their own citizen (and thereby the EU citizen) and a foreigner from outside the EU. The second aspect inclines us to draw a somewhat risky conclusion that the EU citizenship, acquired automatically together with the national one by the citizens of member states, may look inferior in relation to the latter and, consequently, much less significant—despite valuable ensuing privileges (in fact from belonging to a given EU member state), such as freedom of movement, residence and work on the territory of the EU, a right to European initiative, etc. 85

Moreover, the legal acts which are mentioned above and the EU Constitution (blocked) do not enumerate citizens’ obligations towards the Union as other Basic Laws of member states do. Those obligations do occur but indirectly (for example a membership contribution to the EU budget is paid from taxpayers’ money) and in the way which is difficult to grasp for the majority of EU citizens, who are hardly aware, or unaware at all, of their dual citizenship.

Only cars registered in member states have acquired ‘citizenship’ in the form of registration plates on which there is a EU logo (emblem?) and the abbreviation denoting the state of the owner. In a registration book there are inscriptions “European Community” with the full name of a member-state concerned. It is a pity that only this sphere has been uniformly and adequately regulated while in case of half a billion of Europeans formal confirmation—at least in the domestic identity cards—of their EU nationality has not been settled as yet. We do not postulate additional parallel in the EU passports but only including that ‘dual’ citizenship in the identity cards. At best, we can find the EU emblems there.

Nota bene in new Polish identity cards (introduced in the beginning of 2015) there will be a field “nationality” (Polish), as EU officials supposedly had problems with identifying the nationality of the Poles travelling with them, although in the current identity cards the name of the state is there (all passports have both the names of the Republic of Poland and European Union). Although the identity cards are valid for crossing the borders within the Schengen Area, we

84. Ibid, pp. 32, 42 & 101.
cannot find in the new cards any reference to the EU citizenship or even to the EU emblem…

The emblem, flag and hymn, currency, passports and awards—those are the so called state identity symbols and also the symbols of such special groups of states as the EU. The Union has many such symbols but not all of them are commonly associated with Europe, they are not popular and not well recognized. The Union enjoys a positive image but this also requires a wider promotion in order to strengthen the sense of European identity. Therefore, it seems that, firstly, current symbols should be more widely and better used and, secondly, the activities promoting European identity should be intensified by the Union and national political elites with the help of ‘soft persuasion’ methods. Existing (inadequate and not up-to-date) research shows that there is a discrepancy between politics and approach to those issues at the EU and at the national level and that this discrepancy occurs with varied intensity in different member states, e.g. small in Germany and much bigger in Great Britain. This should be taken into account during the formulation of Europeanization programs and their implementation.86

Giddens quotes Václav Havel here: “When I pose myself the query ‘to what extent do I feel European?,’ my first thought is, why didn’t I ponder it a long time ago? Was it because I regarded it as of no importance, or was it something I simply took for granted? It was essentially the second of these, but there is an additional factor: I have a feeling that I would have looked ridiculous if I had written or declared that I was European and I felt European […] until very recently. Europe paid so little attention to its own identity […] Hence ‘conscious Europeanism’ had little tradition until recently.”87 We think that this still remains true.

Not just the citizens but also the member states themselves (and their governments) have problems with Europeanness. Union institutions have become more European while politics is becoming re-nationalized, i.e. it shifts to national states again, thus weakening EU position on the global scene down to “geopolitical oblivion.”88 The crisis which took place in 2007-2008 gave an additional impulse for the comeback of a state, often seen as a last resort. However, during the crisis on the old continent it was the Union which (though mainly in relation to the eurozone) supported the countries and forced solidarity for quasi-bankrupt states. In the long run Ian Morris can be right saying “states and empires, which have sovereignty only within their own frontiers, cannot address effectively global problems that require global solutions.”89 He claims that the next forty years are

88. Kupchan, No One’s World, pp. 154-158 and 176-177.
going to be the most important in the history as a period of geopolitical and geo-economic reorientation.\textsuperscript{90}

Giddens presents an interesting opinion in this juncture, advocating lean federalism understood as a new system which would strengthen leadership in the EU and lead to more democratic participation of EU citizens, boosting, by the same token, their European consciousness.\textsuperscript{91} His plea directed at citizens of the EU—the United Europe—to get more involved in the processes of reforming the Union is showing a bottom-up initiative that seems even more vital to us.\textsuperscript{92} However, we repeat, that this will not happen by itself, it requires much effort particularly in the field of education as well as a lot of creativity in order to make the recipients aware of that concern.

We can agree with Bootle\textsuperscript{93} that the Union is now in the turning point (or period), which demands from national elites a new look and reforms in order to deepen the belief in European institutions, prevent a growing xenophobia and sprouting racist attitudes and incidents. Nevertheless, the direction of those changes should be seriously discussed, and the development perspectives of the geopolitical and geo-economic situation (‘after the Crimea’) should be taken into consideration, and not just passe recent.

We also agree with Charles Kupchan\textsuperscript{94} who claims that the main challenge for Europe is the reversal of the mentioned trend of re-nationalization of politics and not finding more enthusiasm for deeper EU integration. And with Zbigniew Brzeziński,\textsuperscript{95} who enumerates ageing of the EU society, low growth rate, significant debt and lack of unity and of common European drive to act as a major power (and relevant strategies). He complains that the Union is threatened with progressive irrelevance and that it looks as if its fate might be to become a resort for the elderly, or an open-air museum, following—incidentally—on the footsteps of Venice, which after the flourishing period at the turn of the 13\textsuperscript{th} and 14\textsuperscript{th} centuries, had closed to reforms and new tendencies in business and administration, turning away from progressive inclusive institutions towards conservative extractive ones...\textsuperscript{96} That’s what can happen if we continue to ignore that there is no alternative to the Union and that membership in the Union is important not only for weaker states.

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid, p. 608.
\textsuperscript{91} Giddens, 2012, pp. 32-33.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{93} Bootle, The Trouble with Europe, pp. 201.
\textsuperscript{94} Kupchan, No One’s World, p. 175.
Conclusions

Outside observers like Brzeziński and Soros warn: “The EU is an unfinished Project of European states that have sacrificed part of their sovereignty to form an ever-closer union based on shared values and ideals. Those shared values are under attack on multiple fronts. Russia’s undeclared war against Ukraine is perhaps the most immediate example but it is by no means the only one. Resurgent nationalism and illiberal democracy are on the rise within Europe, at its borders and around the globe,” 97 “the Europe of today is still unfinished business.” 98

Why then not to invoke, and appeal to, a dormant sense of Europeanness which would complement and strengthen the EU internal cohesion? Giddens rightly assesses that the Union has copied some solutions of national states but ignored an emotional feedback which could occur on that level. Consequently, EU citizens treat membership in an instrumental manner. Only EU opponents are driven by emotions. Attachment to the EU needs to be established and consolidated. It is going to acquire key significance if we want the EU to play an important and assertive role on the international scene. 99 Paradoxically, the EU attracts people from the outside and cares little for its image among its own inhabitants. Soros also perceives this problem in regard to the EU future: perhaps in order to make a breakthrough EU should go in the direction of a political union—just like the USA after the proclamation of independence—and simultaneously towards a social union based on common obligations which stem from the European citizenship? 100 The latter proposal would stimulate the sense of responsibility for the Union and of all-European solidarity. It would fill the existing gap on the side of obligations of its citizens which are not really cognizant of them.

Isn’t a high time to examine this issue in depth and in a novel way, and to launch practical measures in order to deepen a human dimension of the European integration: integrating EU citizens and instilling European consciousness and pride of being a European—something that various European institutions and CIFE in particular have been fighting for? Pride of being the citizen of the Union of like-minded 28 countries sharing common values? OECD, to which most EU member-states belongs to, rightly makes a focus on like-mindedness. When will EU citizens adequately appreciate—as Timothy Garton Ash 101 points out—that everyone can feel at home in any member state, while being, in

97. Soros, “Britain needs greater unity.”
98. Brzeziński, Strategic Vision, s. 132.
100. Soros & Schmitz. The Tragedy of the European Union, p. XXII.
fact, abroad. In other words—if and when the EU becomes the Union of conscious Europeans proud of their Europeanness?

For Kuźniar “we should on one hand learn to identify our raison d’État in conjunction with the European one [...] on this foundation two patriotism should be intertwined: the Polish [meaning national] and European one.” For Marek Beylin “presently the most important thing seems to be building European political representation—political European people, since right now Europeans understand their Europeanness only as a comfortable lifestyle. We should initiate a big debate about it.”

Grzegorz Kolodko paints the picture of the world two generations forward, which will be the collection of various regional groups (plus China) out of which the EU should be the most powerful, and for that reason it should move in the direction of a federation. It should become a multinational and multicultural superpower, without usurping exclusive ownership of the term ‘Europe’ and the term ‘Europeans’ when referring to the EU and its citizens. Risse raises the necessity of the debate about what Union and what politics the citizens want.

At the same time even declared proponents of a closer integration (Lamers & Schäuble) in fact ignore the human dimension (except for the improvement of standard of living) and, consequently, half a billion electorate of the EU. Giddens, however, postulates replacing a weakening concept of the welfare state with the more dynamic one: of a social investment state. He points out that such ostentatious initiatives as the over-advertized European Year of Citizens (2013), which hardly anybody noticed or even heard about, will contribute little if at all. Should we not talk first about a social union formed for the citizens and co-created by the citizens instead? Should we not draw a right conclusion from the well-taken Zielonka’s postulate to strengthen democratic legitimization and community (together with intergovernmental) method and only then continue the Union political integration? Because the latter one either in the form of a federalization or some other is not going to guarantee the increase of the citizens’ engagement in the European matters.

It is high time for a serious debate and research program in the field of promoting and solidifying Europeanness, i.e. the strengthening of a human dimension within the EU for internal purposes (like increased support for European politics and consolidation of European solidarity), as well as for external purposes

102. Kuźniar, My, Europa (We, Europe), p. 214.
103. Marek Beylin, “Nie będę się bić w piersi za winy liberalizmu” (I don’t feel guilty for the sins of liberalism). Kultura Liberalna (Liberal Culture), vol. 286, 1 VII 2014. p. 3.
104. Kolodko, Świat na wyciągnięcie ręki, pp. 160-161
107. Giddens, Turbulent and Mighty Continent, pp. 44 and 52.
through efforts targeted at the states and societies outside the Union. “The education establishments in all member states are [or, rather, should be] amongst the leaders in pushing forward a European identity Project.”

The governments should make sure that national identities include a strong European ingredient, and both national and the EU institutions should think about new social programs devoted to the formation of European consciousness together with the national one. It is not going to happen by itself or—at best—it is going to happen too slowly. And it would be conducive to the formation of the pro-European alliance—the counterbalance for the openly or de facto anti-European forces.

The debate about Europeanness, which we propose, cannot be limited, therefore, to the otherwise crucial human factor, as it cannot be separated from still small and inadequate debate about the identity of the EU itself, here and now, and tomorrow. The fall of the Iron Curtain has initiated the period when Europe must face its radical indeterminacy; “after giving the world the curse of the nation-state, Europe should now offer the global antidote. The European Union is a model of how nation-states can overcome their differences, in a law-based transnational community of peaceful cooperation.” In our article “The European Union must survive” we wrote about the importance of such a wider debate for the future of the Union and Europe as well as for the future global configuration, which is at the turning point. The current text has been prepared so as to pick up, and expand on, the topics we had developed in our previous article.

It is high time for Europe to redefine itself and get united—not only on the international (intergovernmental) platform—but, in the first place, to integrate internally on the level of key significance: interpersonal. As Brzeziński rightly noticed, “only a dynamic and strategically minded America, together with a unifying Europe, can jointly promote a larger and more vital West, one capable of acting as a responsible partner [to the Russians and] to the rising and increasingly assertive East.”

In the light of recent events and the attempts to undermine the Union and turn Europe against the USA, the unity of Europe is becoming essential for the West, the world and for Europe itself. For the survival of the Great European Project and for the peace in Europe, which is the basic value and result of the European integration. We think that governmental efforts to achieve coherence of the European politics and optimal relations between partners within EU are

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112. Ibid, p. 81.
114. Brzeziński, *Strategic Vision*, s. 4-5.
not enough if their electorates do not support them, if the Europeans—along with the national identity—do not acquire European consciousness and the sense of belonging to the European Community, if they do not win European hearts for Europe which is epitomized by EU. “For the EU to flourish [...] there must be a community [...] A community should have an overall sense of purpose and, a rationale.”¹¹⁵ Unless the EU citizens get together associated by the sense of European identity, the threat of EU erosion will become real. Neither loosening or lowering the current state of integration nor even maintaining the status quo of integration will guarantee the Union its role as it stands today and, above all, its effectiveness in the eyes of its members and societies. We cannot go back—the price would be too high. We can only go forward.

Our hypothesis about the role of Europeanness and threats for the EU future resulting from underestimating the European identity by the EU citizens has been confirmed. The significance of Europeanness, understood as the sense of European identity on the same level as the sense of national or local belongings, is acknowledged in the literature and—more importantly—in the social reality. Therefore, we believe that the issue has been correctly put forward and that it is necessary to take action aimed at facilitating revival and consolidation of European identity consciousness.

The implementation of the vision of peaceful and strong Europe of the 21st century will not occur if the opinions and condition of the European citizens do not accompany the ambitions and proposals of pro-European elites and leaders, and if Europe does not become transparent, understandable and friendly enough for them. Otherwise their openness to harmful anti-European slogans of neo-nationalistic politicians would increase. And, beyond any doubt, we can observe already now the accumulation of various European problems.

A new opening in 2014 among the governing bodies, including the election of the Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk for the post of President of European Council and Jean-Claude Juncker as Head of European Commission, gives hope for the unity beyond divisions, which is urgently required. Member states, which detest to be called ‘newcomers’, constitute half of the EU and are interested in the far-reaching reforms which would deepen the integration and strengthen the EU role on the geopolitical and geo-economic arena. Their older and stronger EU partners also see those challenges for the Union and for the West in corpore, but unlike the first ones they lack faith in the Union and euro-enthusiasm. Top decision-making bodies in the EU understand that one cannot go back—the price of disintegration or even disintegrating tendencies in the EU would be too high.

The time for changes has come. Otherwise in the light of new political (particularly in the area of safety) and economic (getting out of the crisis, geo-economic

¹¹⁵. Giddens, Europe In the Global Age, p. 220-221.
competition) challenges Europe and European countries will not avert further loss of their historic position. Otherwise the Union will not regain its energy, will not become an authentic social and political community. For that reason we consider the deficit of wide societal sense of Europeanness both significant and worrying. And, consequently, we find it necessary to take multidimensional actions for the promotion of Europeanness.

Abstract
Till today we have the European Union without Europeans. The majority of EU citizens take membership in an instrumental manner (Schengen, Erasmus, European funds etc.). Attachment to the EU needs to be established—and consolidated. It is going to acquire key significance if we want the EU to play an important and assertive role on the international scene. In fact, EU attracts people from the outside and cares little for its image among its own inhabitants. Many experts perceive this problem in regard to the EU future: perhaps in order to make a breakthrough EU should go in the direction of a political union—just like the USA after the proclamation of independence—and simultaneously towards a social union based on common obligations which stem from the European citizenship.

Résumé
Jusqu’à aujourd’hui, nous avons l’Union européenne sans les Européens. La majorité des citoyens de l’UE traite l’adhésion d’une manière instrumentale (Schengen, Erasmus, fonds européens, etc.). L’attachement à l’UE doit être établi et consolidé. Il va acquérir une importance clé si nous voulons que l’UE joue un rôle important et affirmé sur la scène internationale. En fait, l’UE attire des gens de l’extérieur et se soucie peu de son image auprès de ses propres habitants. De nombreux experts perçoivent ce problème en ce qui concerne l’avenir de l’UE. Une avancée pourrait peut-être venir d’un progrès dans le sens d’une union politique, comme aux États-Unis après la proclamation de l’indépendance, et simultanément d’une union sociale fondée sur des obligations communes qui découleraient de la citoyenneté européenne.