The Power of History: European Strategic Social Sciences and Humanities Research for Science Diplomacy

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Abstract

H2020 Inventing a shared Science Diplomacy for Europe (InsSciDE) was European strategic Social Sciences and Humanities (SSH) strategic research. The aim was developing European science diplomacy, the use of scientific relations for foreign and security policy purposes. Strategic SSH research is rare compared to strategic research in Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM), making InsSciDE a particularly innovative project. The article discusses the value of SSH science diplomacy research for science diplomacy strategy formulation, and it presents the strategic research task given by the European Commission (EC), which InsSciDE responded to. Social theory and concepts on power guided a continuous consortium discussion on science diplomacy between historical case studies and formulation of science diplomacy theory and strategy. The article outlines how social theory on power can structure analytical and strategic discussions on science diplomacy. InsSciDE shared these results in two online international Warsaw Science Diplomacy Schools with total of 52 participants, other outreach, and through the teaching of consortium members.

Keywords: Science Diplomacy – History – Science and Technology Studies – International Relations – Social Theory – Power – Strategy.
Introduction: H2020 InsSciDE as European Strategic Social Sciences and Humanities Research on Science Diplomacy

This article discusses the fundamental question of SSH basic research for addressing strategic questions and formulating strategy. H2020 *Inventing a shared Science Diplomacy for Europe* (InsSciDE) was an innovative example of strategic Social Sciences and Humanities research in general and on science diplomacy in particular. Strategic research is basic research to address a clearly defined strategic problem. As such strategic research is different from basic research for its own sake or applied research. InsSciDE responded to European Commission (EC) formulated Specific Challenge on the role of science diplomacy for Europe’s place in the world.

Science diplomacy is a contested concept with no agreed definition. A common, but contested, outline are the three categories presented by the Royal Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 2010 of science in diplomacy, diplomacy for science, and science for diplomacy. I follow the definition proposed by Björn Fägersten in the H2020 InsSciDE European Science Diplomacy strategy of science diplomacy as the use of science for foreign policy purposes.

Science diplomacy requires clarity about both, what is seen as science and as diplomacy. Science is here across SSH and STEM fields as in the German “Wissenschaft” or Danish/Norwegian/Swedish “videnskab/vitenskap/vetenskap.” Diplomacy is statecraft and pursuit of state interest.

It is a fundamental debate between historians and social scientists whether and how to integrate historical case study research with social science theorizing. Historians can be skeptical of attempts to draw general lessons outside the specific context of cases. It is the nature and purpose of social sciences to suggest general theory based on empirical insights. Applying historical insights and social theory to policy and strategy becomes a contested and stimulating debate between on one side hesitance to draw strategic lessons across time and contexts and on the other side insistence on basing strategy on explicit theoretical assumptions of actors and causalities.

Social theory on and concepts of power bridged contextualized historical science diplomacy case studies and reflections on science diplomacy strategy in H2020 InsSciDE. Producing European science diplomacy theory and strategy were deliverables of H2020 InsSciDE, which linked basic science diplomacy historical research with the strategic task given by the EC. The difference

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1 InsSciDE — *Inventing a Shared Science Diplomacy for Europe* — received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement n° 770523; 2017-2022) online: [www.insscide.eu](http://www.insscide.eu) [accessed 25 November 2022].


between EU Framework Program research addressing strategic questions for Europe and basic research solicited and funded by national research councils must be kept in mind.

H2020 InsSciDE initially proposed to formulate a unified European Science Diplomacy Theory as well as a European Science Diplomacy Strategy. H2020 InsSciDE produce a proposal for a European Science Diplomacy Strategy. However, H2020 InsSciDE highlighted the rich and contested nature of science diplomacy, which does not at the current moment lend itself to one unified theory of science diplomacy. There is not agreement on defining science diplomacy. This contested nature of science diplomacy adds itself to the stimulating debate between historians and political scientists to what extent contextualized historical case studies can form the basis for general social science theorizing.

The richness of the InsSciDE historical science diplomacy cases highlighted the multidimensionality of science diplomacy, which complicates formulating a single theory of science diplomacy. Social theory on and concepts of power from political science and sociology contribute to bringing out the dimensions of the cases. This theory and these concepts equally serve to bridge between basic historical research and the strategic task posed by the EC and thus realizing InsSciDE as innovative strategic SSH research.

A critical, vibrant debate between History, Science and Technology Studies (STS), Archaeology, and International Relations on theoretical and strategic lessons from historical case studies was at the heart of this strategic SSH research for European science diplomacy. Social Theory on power greatly structured this debate. This article suggests the general value of SSH for strategic research and strategy formulation with the example of science diplomacy through InsSciDE and the use of social theory on power.

H2020 Inventing a shared Science Diplomacy for Europe (InsSciDE) was strategic research into how the European Union (EU) can use science diplomacy to strengthen Europe’s place in the world. InsSciDE was particularly innovative strategic research as it was based on case studies of basic History, STS, and archaeological excavations in the Middle East\(^4\). Social Theory on power from International Relations (IR) served to connect basic SSH research case studies with the European Commission (EC) strategic aims of this research. Social Theory on power provided a framework for InsSciDE to critically discuss the relationship between basic research into History, Archaeology, and STS themes, with EC strategic needs.

The strategic SSH research impact and legacy of InsSciDE was communicating the discussion across History, STS, Archaeology, and IR for thinking strategically

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\(^4\) Claire Mays, Léonard Laborie, Pascal Griset, eds., Inventing a Shared Science Diplomacy for Europe: Interdisciplinary Case Studies to Think with History (Zenodo, 2022) online: 10.5281/zenodo.6639894.
about science diplomacy. This impact and legacy were through the 2020 and 2021 online Warsaw Science Diplomacy Schools (WSDS), which brought together 52 international young scientists and professionals, as well as exchange with practitioners. The InsSciDE consortium members also pass on this legacy to their students – and students of their students – who may be future science diplomacy practitioners.

The Role of SSH Empirical Insights, Theory, and Concepts for Strategy

This article here argues the value of SSH concepts, theories and basic research for addressing strategic questions and formulating strategic responses, because of the value of explicit theory-driven reasoning. Subsequently this value is illustrated by InsSciDE.

SSH can often be ignored in strategy formulation, especially in politicized public settings, which can contribute to unintended or unwanted outcomes. However, SSH is valuable, because valid empirical insights and explicit theory and concepts are valuable for formulating policies and strategies for several reasons. Strategies link means to ends. Therefore, strategies rest on assumptions of causalities, on interpretation of facts, and assumptions of the importance of actors: how and why A leads to B, and what actors are (most) relevant. These assumptions can be conscious and explicit or unselfconscious (or unexamined) and implicit. Historical analogies and psychological biases can affect strategy formulation.

Conscious and explicit assumptions are clearer and can be discussed, tested, and operationalized; their internal consistency can be tested. Unselfconscious (or unexamined) and implicit assumptions can lead to unclear, incoherent, and unfounded policies and strategies. Explicit theoretical assumptions underpinning strategy are valuable for critically evaluating own policy and strategic thinking as well as that of others. An actor with explicit theoretical thinking can more easily conduct clearer, better structured, and reflexive policy and strategic thinking. That actor can also more easily hypothesize and evaluate the conscious – or unselfconscious (unexamined) – assumptions of other actors more clearly.

Strategies based on invalid empirical claims and with poorly specified and tested assumptions of causality carry a higher risk of leading to unwanted outcomes, though well-specified assumptions can be proven wrong. The invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 is an example of a strategy based on weak understanding of Iraqi society and history as well as unfounded assumptions about a welcoming response of Iraqi society to US-led occupation, which led to unwanted outcomes for the US and its allies. Testing the assumptions of the Iraq strategy against sociological and historical scholarship

on Iraq would have invalidated the strategy. It was easy to predict the adverse outcome of civil war and subsequent Iranian and Shiite domination of Iraqi society and politics⁶.

The British academic economist and policymakers John Maynard Keynes set out the classical statement on the impact of deeply rooted unselfconscious or poorly specified and untested assumptions on policy. Keynes was himself an exceptional case of a social science scholar who combined basic research and derived application at the highest policy levels.

“[T]he ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately, but after a certain interval; for in the field of economic and political philosophy there are not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age, so that the ideas which civil servants and politicians and even agitators apply to current events are not likely to be the newest. But, soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.”⁷

Keynes’ historical context of the Great Depression showed the catastrophic results of economy policymaking based on invalid theory. Economic theory assumptions underpinning economic policy decisions, such as Keynesian vs monetarist, may be particularly clear. In foreign and security policy and decision-making, the assumptions may be less explicit and/or lack theoretical underpinning, but the observer or participant well-versed in history and social theory will be able to structure analysis, policy and decision-making based on clear and testable assumptions and hypotheses.

Observing the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine illustrates the importance of clear thinking, and the lack of it both in Russia and in the West. The Russian decision to invade Ukraine seems to have rested on poor Russian insight into current Ukrainian society and politics and false assumptions of Ukrainian and Western responses, of the combat effectiveness of Ukrainian forces, and of the extent of US and Western long-term willingness to provide material and intelligence support to Ukraine and to impose sanctions on Russia.

Faulty Western strategy includes US policy on NATO expansion to Georgia and Ukraine without acting on that policy ensuring membership. This strategy neither considered clearly stated Russian opposition to such expansion nor

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deterred Russian action to counter NATO expansion. Western discussion since the Russian invasion is clouded by biases, wishful thinking, and blame avoidance. There is lack of understanding of interacting effects between the US and Russia. There is limited Western credibility in the wider world because of inconsistent Western application of international law and human rights as evident in the 2003 US invasion of Iraq or support of authoritarian client states and allies. This limited credibility is reflected in United Nations Security Council and General Assembly voting on the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Clearly stated hypotheses for the Russian decision to invade Ukraine are useful for analysis, forming expectations, and formulating strategy. There are two main hypotheses explaining the Russian decision to invade Ukraine. In the first hypothesis, Russia was determined to counter the NATO-invitation to Ukraine and Ukrainian rapprochement with NATO. This hypothesis is supported by historically valid realist international relations theory, and clear Russian government statements dating back to the 1990s. In the second hypothesis, President Vladimir Putin’s views of Russian and Ukrainian statehood motivate the Russian invasion independent of US NATO-enlargement policy. The audience and context of President Putin’s statements are unclear, and the hypothesis is without a well-specified, general historically valid theory.

The two hypotheses have different implications. The first hypothesis predicts current escalation and identifies risk of nuclear escalation in case of Russian conventional battlefield defeat. The second hypothesis makes seeking Russian battlefield defeat in Ukraine less risky. The first hypothesis identifies balancing Ukrainian and Russian security as a prerequisite for ending the war. The second hypothesis opens the possibility for Ukrainian NATO membership after Russian battlefield defeat with less risk of nuclear escalation.

Based on this argument on the value of SSH for strategic research, I turn to the case of InsSciDE.

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The EU’s Strategic SSH Science Diplomacy Research Question

H2020 InsSciDE was an example of EU strategic research, where the European Commission tasks European research with addressing strategic questions for the EU through excellent, basic research. H2020 stands out from basic research typically supported by research councils or applied research.

What the European Commission expected from InsSciDE was better understanding of “how to best link scientific expertise and cooperation with diplomacy and political influence to tackle major global challenges, promote knowledge and improve international relations.” Specific Challenge and Priorities for EU science diplomacy were set out in the call motivating InsSciDE and reflected the Priorities of the EU Global Strategy:

“Europe is faced with numerous challenges that are increasingly global in nature and that have become of more immediate importance: peace and stability, migration, climate change, resource efficiency, health pandemics, etc. In many cases, responding to these challenges requires science-based evidence to inform decisions and joint international efforts that often include also scientific and technological cooperation. This is where science and diplomacy can join forces to form a ‘soft power’ tool in external policy – science diplomacy.

A main challenge is how to best link scientific expertise and cooperation with diplomacy and political influence to tackle major global challenges, promote knowledge and improve international relations. Science diplomacy has a particular added value in providing additional communication channels, particularly in stalemate situations and relations where few other mechanisms are feasible as well as on sensitive bilateral and multilateral issues. It promotes cooperation and conflict prevention, rebuilds trust and fosters shared understanding across countries, regions and cultures.

At the same time, the global context is characterized by competing understandings of central values and organizing principles of society, including the meaning and direction of politics, economics, culture and ultimately human life. This context, and Europe’s place in it, needs to be better understood and accounted for, from both a contemporary and a historical perspective, if the European Union and its Member States want to continue to constructively take part and strengthen their position in global discourses about what constitutes a ‘good society’ and to understand how European policy interventions have been understood and perceived globally.”

EU strategic research and the formulation of funding calls for such research reflect the context for Europe at the time. It is beneficial to understand the strategic question and context to deliver strategic research. The context is dynamic, but it is important to deliver a response to the originally stated Specific Challenge, which is relevant even as the context goes on evolving in real time.
The H2020 call behind InsSciDE published in 2016 reflected the years leading up to it. The Specific Challenge in this call reflects the 2016 EU Global Strategy, which illustrates the strategic research nature of the call and subsequent research. Previous EU strategy documents as the EU Global Strategy reflected the context of Federica Mogherini strengthening the European External Action Service (EEAS). The European Commission used the H2020 program to implement the EU Global Strategy and influence the execution of the strategy and other institutions. Assuming office in December 2019, Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, announced that her Commission would be the first geopolitical European Commission. Such a statement switches EU attention and focus to power competition from transnational problem-solving, which figured prominently in the 2016 call text and previous EU Global Strategy. The strategic situation of the EU is now immediately affected by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and in the longer term by the return of China as a predominant national economy in the world economy.

Also, EU researchers benefit from open, democratic, rule of law societies, which value academic freedom, so they can and should challenge and critically discuss the given task and question. Critical debate around strategic research task add to the research itself and the general policy debate, which is both valuable.

Social Theory and Concepts of Power for Science Diplomacy Theory and Strategy

The continuous debate between historians, STS scholars, archaeologists, and political scientists in InSciDE was at the basis of the theory and strategy work by InsSciDE. The above-mentioned different humanities and social sciences traditions concerning drawing general lessons from historical cases stimulated this debate. Here, the social theory and concepts on power, which structured drawing theoretical and strategic conclusions from historical case studies, is presented. Power is a key social theory concept, which is useful for strategic SSH research. Power is both useful for critical historical studies and for critically formulating strategy.

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14 Specific Challenge focus on improved international relations, cooperation, and conflict prevention addresses the strategy priority of Security of Our Union. The Specific Challenge focus on peace, stability, and transnational threats address strategy priorities in State and Societal Resilience to our East and South, An Integrated Approach to Conflicts, Cooperative Regional Orders, Global Governance for the 21st Century.
15 The EEAS is the diplomatic service of the EU and executes the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU.
16 "My Commission will be a geopolitical Commission committed to sustainable policies. And I want the European Union to be the guardian of multilateralism. Because we know that we are stronger by doing together what we cannot do alone", online: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_5542 [9 September 2019, accessed December 2022].
Strategic research into science diplomacy requires both a clear understanding of the strategic aim for the research and anchoring in basic theory and concepts. Clarity about theory and concepts is the basis for clear thinking about science diplomacy: what science diplomacy is, how it works, how it affects outcomes.

Social sciences concepts of power link the strategic aims and the basic research into science diplomacy. Theory and concepts of power are relevant for the purpose of this strategic science diplomacy research, where the EC tasks European research with linking science diplomacy with desired outcomes for Europe. Power is a key term in IR and Social Theory and brings the theoretical and conceptual clarity to discuss historical lessons of European science diplomacy with desired outcomes for Europe critically.

Power is A obtaining a desired outcome in B’s behavior, preferences, perceptions, beliefs, values, etc.\(^{17}\) A is the actor having (or not) power over B. In the science diplomacy context explored by InsSciDE, A is the EU or member-states, B is the third-party, where the EU or a member-state is seeking a desired behavior, preferences, perceptions, beliefs, values, etc., through science diplomacy. Power is here used synonymously with influence.

Theories and concepts of power contribute to structure the discussion of InsSciDE Case Studies and for stating the assumptions of causalities underpinning the proposed European Science Diplomacy Strategy\(^ {18}\).

The Sociology and Political Science debate on the concept and theory of power through the 20th century provides the basis to debate and analyze power\(^ {19}\). This debate has centered around three “faces of power” and subsequent concepts, which I use to link science diplomacy research with strategy. Power is a contested and controversial concept, and it is important to distinguish between the analytical and conceptual discussion and an ethical judgment of acts of power. The social theory debate on power contributes to understand the richness of the concept of science diplomacy, its practice, and the connection between independent and dependent variables involving science diplomacy. Concepts of power can overlap, but addressing the concepts consciously adds to clarity in understanding science diplomacy.

The historical and archaeological work of InsSciDE shows the theoretical and conceptional richness of science diplomacy practices. The long and varied history of European science diplomacy shows that science diplomacy touches and illustrates a multitude of sociology and political science theory and concepts. The

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historical cases serve to illustrate and discuss theories and concepts, which at term clarify and structure the case studies.

For clarity, we see science diplomacy and power as, respectively, independent, and dependent variable. European science diplomacy and European power are here connected in the following way: European science diplomacy is the independent variable and European power (attaining desired outcome in third-party behavior, etc.) is the dependent variable. European science diplomacy is a means for A (EU or member-states) to obtain desired behavior in B (third party). Science diplomacy can often be between EU member states, where one-member state is trying to obtain a favored outcome or favored behavior from another member state through science diplomacy. However, our focus is on Europe acting outwards.

For studying power — and science diplomacy —, it is important to distinguish between power-as-resource or power-as-relation. Power-as-resource is the outdated, but commonsensical way to look at power. It is the first approximation for power. The observer will ask what are the financial, technological, human, military, or other resources at the disposal of an actor and infer powerfulness or powerlessness from resources. However, resources may not translate into desired outcomes. Obtaining desired outcomes is the relevant indicator of power. If resources do not necessarily translate into desired outcomes, then resources are a misleading indicator. A typical example of misleading resources concerns the US war effort in Vietnam, where a much wealthier, more technologically advanced superpower was defeated by a developing country because the superpower’s resources were irrelevant. The US’s large arsenal of nuclear weapons may be seen as an indicator of power; yet it was of no value in the Vietnam war. Russian conventional military capabilities are also proving ineffectual in the war in Ukraine.

The modern and analytically relevant approach to power studies is power-as-relation or power-as-behavior. Power must be seen as a context-dependent relation between actors, where A manages (or not) to obtain desired behavior from B. For the question of science diplomacy, power-as-resource or power-as-relation remind us to distinguish between science diplomacy resources (financial, human, etc.) and science diplomacy as a relationship between Europe and third parties, where Europe obtains or not the desired behavior from the third party.
The Three Classical Faces of Power and Science Diplomacy

The first step in the debate on power is the first face of power (visible decisions). A makes B do what A wants B to do (Weber, 1921-1922; Dahl, 1961). Science and science diplomacy are also a domain of power asymmetries. Especially natural sciences and technology is materially very costly, and the costliest areas of science and technology as space, polar, deep ocean, nuclear, and similar fields, are the prerogatives of superpowers or great powers – and very well-funded private companies. Here, more powerful states or actors can make decisions in science and technology that immediately impose themselves on less powerful actors, such as smaller or developing countries, or less powerful companies, civil society, or even governments.

The second face of power concerns invisible decisions. A can keep B’s interests off the agenda (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962, 1963). This further step in the debate on power follows closely from the first face of power. More powerful states or non-state actors often have the means to define international agendas of science and technology to reflect their interests. International organizations or international civil society may give agenda-setting power to weaker states or non-state actors, which is the aspiration of, for instance, sovereign equality at the United Nations. However, more powerful states and non-state actors are also privileged in such settings.

With the third face of power, B perceives its interest as congruent with A’s. The difference between the second and third face of power is that concerning the second face of power, B is aware of its interest being kept off agendas, etc. whereas here such awareness is lacking. The third face of power is conscience-controlling and manipulative power. A can manipulate B’s perception of own interests21. This third face of power connects to social psychology questions of socialization, perception, judgment.

Education at all levels and research hold potential to shape others’ perceptions through socialization. Here first, second and third faces of power come together. The more powerful actor can make direct (first face of power) decisions concerning the education of a weaker counterpart. The more powerful can make overt decisions on the content of this education (second face of power), and thereby seek to socialize the weaker counterpart into holding a certain view of the world and his/her own place and interests (third face of power). Colonial power and great powers have a long tradition of using education of others for such purposes, so do faith-based organizations.

A can attract B to agree with A’s interests22. In the late 1990s and 2000s, there was an active research and policy debate around Joseph Nye’s concept of soft

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power, or power of attraction, although much of this debate misunderstood the concept. During the post-9/11 (2001) War on Terror years, soft power was an attractive alternative to hard, military, violent power to combat Islamist fundamentalism. The US and allies invested (to a very limited degree compared to needs) in Middle East (higher) education.

Nye’s soft power concept was the public and policy-debate friendly version of the complex and cumbersome long social theory debate on the faces of power, which has not penetrated neither public nor policy-debates. My research shows the very limited ability to shape host-societies’ perceptions of their own interests through higher education soft power. For instance, Arab populations approving of US or earlier French Middle East policy is not a question of informing them better, they see the effects of these policies in their own societies.

Structure, Knowledge, Capital, Power and Science Diplomacy

The above views of power as a relation between actors assumes their agency and implies intention on the part of A seeking to obtain a desired behavior from B. Power can also be vested in structures giving some actors leeway and constraining other actors. European science diplomacy may therefore also affect structures which have consequences for Europe and third parties’ power. Another concept of power is the (sometimes unintended) structural power from decisions on structures. Science in its broadest Wissenschaft sense is a global, complex system with myriad incentives, disincentives, open and shut doors and windows, gatekeepers, etc. Influencing these structures yields far-reaching intended and unintended consequences. The status of the English language in the global language system is an example of structural power.

Concepts of power inform each other, and the clear and conscious application elucidates practices of science diplomacy. The first and second faces of power above can often contribute to shape structures of science with wide-ranging intended and unintended consequences. Languages, experiences, traditions,

perspectives in research can be promoted or marginalized. Outcomes either from agency or structure may be intentional or unintended. Europe seeks intended outcomes through science diplomacy (as outlined in the H2020 call). However, there may also very well be unintended outcomes of European science diplomacy.

Michel Foucault contributed significantly to theorize and understand the relationship between power and knowledge. Foucault in his archaeology of knowledge concerning punishment, sexuality, mental health, and other areas of society, showed how knowledge is a source of power, which then contributes to shape what is considered truth and knowledge. For science diplomacy as the foreign policy application of science and science collaboration, this interaction between power and knowledge is important. Again, concepts on power overlap and elucidate each other. Power to shape what is consider truth and knowledge between and within societies is an important strategic instrument. Knowledge as a source of power also becomes a foreign policy instrument between countries and societies. The materially more powerful may be the less knowledgeable and have their power curtailed. The defeat of imperialism is perhaps an illustration of materially superior colonizers, but with inferior knowledge, defeated by the colonized with superior relevant knowledge.

Pierre Bourdieu contributed significantly to understand social, cultural/educational, and financial capital. He showed how the educational system reproduces such capital, thereby preserving and promoting upper class and upper middle-class groups while excluding working class groups. The apparent meritocracy of such processes was termed symbolic violence.

International education and research are also marked by social, cultural/educational and financial capital. Western elite education, especially Anglo-Saxon, accrues the greatest social and cultural/educational capital, while being exclusive and prohibitively cost in financial, but also social and cultural/educational capital. Educational and science diplomacy in terms of giving foreign nationals access to such education and research bestows or denies these different forms of capitals to foreigners. Colonial powers did so deliberately, and the US has equally used access to US education and research as a foreign policy instrument during and since the Cold War.

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InsSciDE Innovations: STS, Feminist Theory and Science Diplomacy

InsSciDE brought together IR and STS, where Sheila Jasanoff’s work on co-production contributes to understand science diplomacy. STS sheds a clear and critical light on perceptions of science as neutral or objective. Jasanoff’s co-production concept illuminates how social and natural order is co-produced in complex ways, where one should be cautious of unidirectional or monocausal explanations. STS problematizes the science in science diplomacy, just as International Relations for its part critically discuss any overtly optimistic or normative beliefs regarding diplomacy. The co-production concept in STS contributes to understand how science and diplomacy are co-produced and co-constitutive in international politics. Science and technology contribute to ordering international politics, security, diplomacy, etc. Diplomatic practices in turn contribute to ordering science and technology.

The February 2019 review of InsSciDE raised the question of feminist theory and science diplomacy. Feminist study of science diplomacy is underdeveloped, but emerging. A literature search of “feminist theory science diplomacy” does not reveal any results. Karin Aggestam and Ann E. Towns point out that, diplomacy is historically and still a highly gendered activity. Men are particularly overrepresented among ambassadors, but also among diplomats in general. Aggestam and Towns propose a research agenda on gender and diplomacy, where they do not mention science diplomacy.

Conclusion: Critical Vibrant SSH Debate for Strategic Research

InsSciDE stands out as innovative SSH strategic research bridging basic historical science diplomacy case studies answering a strategic task given by the EC how to use science diplomacy to strengthen Europe’s role in the world. InsSciDE answered the strategic question by, among other deliverables, European Science Diplomacy Theory and European Science Diplomacy Strategy. The sequence of deliberation was historical case studies, theorizing, and a theoretically conscious and informed strategy. The richness and contestedness of science diplomacy does not currently led itself to a unified theory. InsSciDE connected basic historical case studies with theorizing and strategy through a vibrant critical debate around social theory on and concepts of power and science diplomacy.

Keynes spelled out the dangers of unselfconscious policymakers and strategists acting based on outdated theories, the “[m]admen in authority, who hear voices in the air.” InsSciDE ensured a vibrant and critical debate between History, STS,

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29 Note, for example, InsSciDE partner, Professor, Dr. Maria Rentetzì, Chair of Science, Technology and Gender Studies, online: https://www.stgs.fau.de [consulted December 2022].
Archaeology, and IR on historical lessons for science diplomacy theory and strategy through the concept of power.

Science diplomacy continues to be a contested issue, as power, with a dynamic empirical, conceptual, theoretical, and strategic debate, which is far from settled. It is not a question at the present time of arriving at a theory of science diplomacy. The vibrant debates in InsSciDE contributed to critical, deeper understanding of the empirical, conceptual, theoretical, and strategic dimensions of science diplomacy.

A strategic contribution of InsSciDE is more critical, reflexive science diplomats, policymakers, and strategist through the outreach via the two Warsaw Schools for Science Diplomacy, many other outreach activities, and university teaching of future science diplomats or teachers of future science diplomats.