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Abstract. In this essay I try to articulate the relationship between the ends of practice in Theodor Schatzki’s practice theory and my own understanding of goods in practice in an institutional logical approach. To do so, I return to the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger who fashioned the frame from which Schatzki has sought to theorize and locate the way he married his sociology of practice to it. I will provisionally suggest an institutional logical theory might both amend Schatzki’s understanding of the productive role of teloi and return us in a different way to the worldhood of the world by identifying the theoretical affordances and constraints that Heidegger has to offer.

Keywords: theory of practice, institutional logics, Heidegger, Schatzky

INTRODUCTION

Because we are speaking against “values” people are horrified at a philosophy that ostensibly dares to despise humanity’s best qualities. For what is more “logical” than that a thinking that denies values must necessarily pronounce everything valueless? Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism” (1993: 249)

It seems a commonplace when you think about it. But to put the good into practice has been a theoretical challenge. Value has been denigrated, marginalized and even excised or forbidden by a variety of theoretical and philosophical approaches (Arendt, 1958; Heidegger, 1962; Lizardo & Strand, 2010). Value’s absence in institutional theory has become a notable problem. Value, Bruno Latour recently remarked, cannot be derived from networks of mediators and intermediaries. Situated actor networks of heterogeneous beings cannot by themselves generate “the value that emanates from that situation” that defines its activity, provides its continuity, and grounds its mode of veridiction (Latour, 2013: 42-43).

The practice theory of Theodor Schatzki is one of the few theoretical traditions that has resolutely repositioned the good, more specifically human ends, as an analytic category worth grappling with as a productive lever for understanding social order.1 Schatzki, in many texts, most centrally in The Site of the Social (2002) and Social Practices (1996), has not only affirmed practice, bundles of doings and sayings, into the primordial site of the social, he has made their teloi a central constituent of their organization. Schatzki’s practice theory is being embraced by different strands of institutional theory, most recently in a call for a “practice-driven institutionalism, which casts this theory as its ‘basis’” (Smetts, Aristidou & Whittington, 2017: 385).
In this essay I want to try to articulate the relationship between the ends of practice in Schatzki’s approach and my own understanding of goods in practice in an institutional logical approach. To do so, I return to the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger, who fashioned what he termed a fundamental ontological frame, one that excluded the value term, from which Schatzki has sought to theorize sociologically about practice. My purpose here is to try to get greater clarity on Heidegger’s approach to practice and to understand the way it has anchored Schatzki’s site ontologies. So, the largest part of this essay is an effort at comparative exegesis. I will also explore the sociology embedded in Heidegger’s existential phenomenology. I will then turn to my own version of institutional theory and argue that there are offerings and concealments in Heidegger’s phenomenology that open possible and impossible uses for institutional theorists.

Schatzki seeks to build a consonant and potentially constitutive “existential *a priori* of philosophical anthropology” that Heidegger held out as a distinct and different project, but one that might also prove a pathway to an ontological constitution of being (Heidegger, 1962: 170). Heidegger fashioned a phenomenological ontology as a substitute for the Christian world of sinful Man offered divine revelation and the onto-theology of the philosophers who gave pride of place to a worldless thinking human subject in its wake. Heidegger sought to leave the theistic Christian God behind, but in the process he secularized Christianity’s religious terms, its forms and its energies, substituting being for God. I will argue that an institutional sociology provides a pathway both to widen the productive role of teloi in Schatzki’s practice theory, to institutionally re-position Dasein in Heidegger’s worldhood, and to restore the gods that Heidegger never really left behind. Institutional logics, I will argue, provide a way to “round out” Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology of practice with a religious sociology of institution. Contra Heidegger, I will suggest we are not, and have never been, too late for the gods (Heidegger, 1971d: 4).

THE ENDS OF PRACTICE THEORY: HEIDEGGER, SCHATZKI AND THE PURPOSES OF PRACTICE

There is a consonance between the practice theory variously articulated by Ted Schatzki and Davide Nicolini and my understanding of institutional logics (Nicolini, 2013; Schatzki, 1996, 2002). You wouldn’t presume that consonance based on the characterization penned by Nicolini in his 2017 essay, “Practice Theory as a Package of Theory, Method and Vocabulary,” in which he says that practice theory’s ontological domain is linked assemblages of material performances. He identifies institutional logics as part of the deadly whirlpool of “old structuralist notions” that threaten to suck down and destroy all analysts who mistakenly reach for it as a “safe haven” (Nicolini, 2017: 20). If institutional logics are posited as reified structures or impermeable entities available as pre-fixed templates, I would agree. But still I argue that Odysseus should take another look.

An institutional logical approach is, or should be, a theory of practice. Institutional logics are neither structures nor entities; they are neither grounded in persons nor groups. If anything, it is the reverse. They may be attached to or housed in larger structures of authority, in institutions as entities so to speak, or be particularly prevalent in fields whose actors

2. This is manifest in the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault, for example.
engage in or perform such practices, domains, but these structures and fields are not their primordial source. They are, if anything, their contingent outcomes. The institutional logical approach does not seek to explain individual practice, but to try to identify the observable grammars of practice available to her. In thinking about institutional logics with their emphasis on modalities of practice, rather than practitioners, I emphasize the ways in which they offer a way to restore value not only as a reason located in the subject, as embodied in the object, but as carried by practice, not as a validity claim for an interest, but as an objectified objective, a virtuality that inhabits the actualities of material practice. I term this virtuality an institutional substance, which I will explain below. Given that Schatzki is, as he says, “suspicious of ‘virtual’ structures that allegedly configure sociality without being contained in some causal or governing factor or mechanism at work in social life,” I can easily imagine his discomfort at and refusal of this concept (Schatzki, 2002: 95). What I am proposing, in fact, is a religious institutionalism based on ordinary mysteries.

The philosopher Schatzki rejects both individualisms and what he first dubbed socialisms, and later societisms, as distinct ontological levels. The latter macroscopy, big structures that you can supposedly see that cannot be reduced to individuals and their interactions, includes institutionalisms, institutions being conceptualized as “schemes of interlocked roles that determine individuals’ actions and interactions,” institutions in which individuals occupy “positions” (Schatzki, 2002: 128, 2005: 469). In its stead, he posits a “flat” ontology in which there is only the level of practice, both doings and sayings, as the site of the social (Schatzki, 2016). By site he means a location in a specific sense, not necessarily spatial, that is a context whose constituent entities are “intrinsically a part” (Schatzki, 2002: 44). “[F]or something to be or occur in a site context is for it to be or to occur as a constituent part of its context” (Schatzki, 2002: 65, 2005: 468). By practices, he means a “temporally evolving, open-ended set of doings and sayings linked by practical understandings, rules, teleoafective structures, and general understandings” (Schatzki, 2002: 87). Sayings, like Heidegger’s “signs,” are also practical equipment.3 These practices—bodily doings and sayings—are co-constitutively “bundled” with specific arrangements of material entities (Schatzki, 2016: 32). The social—all of it—is made up of these bundles which vary in their “largeness,” their spatial extension and complexity (Schatzki, 2016: 36), not in ontologically distinct, often seemingly virtual, systems or structures, whose touch is on our back and sight in our eyes.

Fashioning the sociology, some of whose elements are already immanent in Heidegger’s phenomenology, Schatzki creatively appropriates and builds upon central aspects of Heidegger’s philosophical frame, which I gloss here not only as the background of Schatzki’s project but as a vehicle through which I will reconsider the institutional logical project at the end of this essay. Recall that for Heidegger there was an essential ontological difference between being and beings, one that Western philosophy had effaced such that the basic question of being had been covered over. Here “being” refers to the basis upon which entities are “already understood,” there being three modes of being for self-subsistent things which are: present-at-hand, equipment which is ready-at-hand, and humans who exist (Heidegger, 1962: 27). The mode of being of humans is...
ontologically distinctive in that it is “an issue” for itself (Heidegger, 1962: 137, 182).

Heidegger’s transcendental project was to recover being through a fundamental ontology, an existential phenomenology that must precede and bracket any anthropological project, which never asks who man might be (Heidegger, 1962: 238; Heidegger, 1977b: 153). For Heidegger, the essence of human beings is an existential being in the world, a being that “is its possibility” (Heidegger, 1962: 68; 183). Dasein, Heidegger’s ontological category for the being of humans, is literally there-being. Dasein is “an entity whose Being is defined as being-in-the world, and to whose state of being, worldhood itself belongs” (Heidegger, 1962: 116). This is a social world. This is not just a phenomenology; it is simultaneously a sociological ontology of the being of human beings. Indeed, the two cannot be cleaved. “Dasein is its ‘there’, is equivalent to saying that the world is ‘there’; its Being-there is Being-in. And the latter is likewise ‘there’, as that for the sake of which Dasein is. In the ‘for-sake-of-which’, existing Being-in-the-world is disclosed as such, and this disclosedness we have called ‘understanding...’” (Heidegger, 1962: 182). Dasein is not closed off; it is itself a disclosedness of an existential spatiality of co-constitutive heres and yonders with which it has an “inconspicuous familiarity” (Heidegger, 1962: 137). The being of the human is inherently disclosive of the world. Its being and its there cannot be severed as an exterior subject–object relation. Dasein “understands itself in terms of possibilities,” possibilities that ground its being in the world in which those possibilities are also grounded (Heidegger, 1962: 32-33, 184-185). Dasein is both engaged in and by the world, with which it necessarily has a relationship not of external knowing of a thinking self but a co-constitutive care, both concern for useful objects and solicitude for other people engaged by those objects.

“Everyone is the other, and no one is himself” (Heidegger, 1962: 165). If on the one hand, Heidegger displaces power with care as the actual basis of the social organization of the production and use of equipment and our relation to each other, his phenomenology is here built into and from a dismal sociology of predominantly deficient modes of concern and solicitude. The everyday Dasein is subjected to an anonymous “they,” das Man, to whom one is inconspicuously subjected. In words that uncannily express the social ontology of Pierre Bourdieu, Heidegger writes:

In one’s concern with what one has taken hold of whether, whether with, for, or against the Others, there is constant care as to the way one differs from them, whether that difference is one that is to be evened out, whether one’s own Dasein has lagged behind the Others and wants to catch up in relationship to them, or whether one’s Dasein already has some priority over them and sets out to keep them suppressed. (Heidegger, 1962: 164)

The “they” maintains itself in an averageness, a levelling down, an erasure of difference, a deprivation of responsibility. The public is not a place for communicative rationality; it is a site into which one falls, in flight from finitude, “disburdened” of one’s being, a “downward plunge” into the
tranquillized supposition that it possesses everything, or that everything is within its reach (Heidegger, 1962: 165, 223). Embedded in the primordial “they-self” of Dasein is a normative understanding of practice, not the rules or explicit norms of regulism, but the regularities, the averageness, of regularism. “Dasein is for-the sake-of the ‘they’ in an everyday manner, and the ‘they’ itself articulates the referential context of significance” (Heidegger, 1962: 167). The sociological is a mass society, whose massness depends on something uncountable, and yet for that reason can be counted and numbered as a quantitative sociology, a way of knowing that mimes the distanciation of everyday Dasein, a misidentified social physics. Phenomenology here appears to offer itself as critical refuge.

In his fundamental ontology, Heidegger does not start with a subject, a Cartesian worldless thing, an “I-here” having a perceptual or cognitive external relation to objects. The who of the I appears ontically as present-at-hand, an “I-Thing” (Heidegger, 1962: 155, 254). This appearance is a covering up of its being-in the world on the one side, and the being of beings on the other, a secularized turning away from our existential soul one might say. Heidegger distinguishes the ontic, as the domain of the actuality of entities, of beings, whereas the ontological refers to the being of those beings (Heidegger, 1962: 31). The “substance” of man, he writes, is not Aristotle’s hylomorphic unity of soul and body; it is existence (Heidegger, 1962: 153). Heidegger is a phenomenologist of meaningful material practice, not a network materialist in which associations of entities have a certain immanent performativity or productivity. It is the doing, not the doers nor the objects, that have primacy. “Dasein finds ‘itself’ proximally in what it does, uses, expects, avoids—in those things environmentally ready-to-hand with which it is proximally concerned” (Heidegger, 1962: 155).

For Schatzki’s project, as for Heidegger, the “there” of Dasein is a place of practical possibilities, what he calls practical understanding; “understanding” for Heidegger is knowing what one is capable of based on the “whole of a possible interconnection of the ready-to-hand” (Heidegger, 1962: 184). Things reveal themselves not in perception, but in common use, and hence in our comportment towards them. “Things,” Heidegger writes, “are encountered from out of the world in which they are ready-to-hand for Others—a world which is always mine too in advance” (Heidegger, 1962: 154-155). Things first disclose or show themselves to us not as material objects for perception, but as things that can be “used” or put “to use” that Heidegger terms equipment, “something in-order-to” (Heidegger, 1962: 95, 97). This is the term for the entities of Schatzki’s “integrative practices”: “An integrative practice...carries interwoven understandings of interrelated equipment,” which he understands in the manner of Heidegger’s workshop as an “an objective space that devolves from the material arrangements of objects” (Schatzki, 1996: 114-115). Such things are constituted primordially by their uses, by what they are for, by the purposes and possibilities they afford, not cognitively vis-à-vis their material substantiality, the Cartesian understanding, to which value or meaning can be added.

For Heidegger meaning is the co-constitutive basis of intelligibility of entities located in the disclosure of the being of entities and our being in the world (Heidegger, 1962: 192). Meaning is located in the there-being of Dasein, in the practical conjunction of the being of human beings and the being of entities as these are understood and interpreted by Dasein. Heidegger writes:
Meaning is an *existentia*le of Dasein, not a property attaching to entities, lying 'behind' them, or floating somewhere as an 'intermediate domain'. Dasein only 'has' meaning, so far as the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world can be 'filled in' by the entities discoverable in that disclosedness (Heidegger, 1962: 193).

Our circumspective “[d]ealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of the ‘in-order-to’” (Heidegger, 1962: 98). These entities only appear because Dasein is being in the world whose ultimate for-the-sake of is its own potentiality for being (Heidegger, 1962: 119). Dasein projects its possibilities for being based on the deep structures of involvements of equipment – hammer for hammering for nailing for attaching wood for building a house-- for which equipment is ready-at-hand, involvements with which it is already familiar, in a “non-thematic circumspective absorption in references or assignments constitutive for the readiness-to-hand of a totality of equipment” (Heidegger, 1962: 107, 184-185, 187-189).

In Heidegger's understanding of equipment, usability is the "towards-which" and "for-which," that grounds the structure of involvements prior to “any single item of equipment” (Heidegger, 1962: 116). Equipment carries its significance in its “ready-to-handness” as a usability, serviceability or deterimentality to which it has been referred, in which it is involved, for which it is appropriate (Heidegger, 1962: 114-115). These involvements are already understood as possibilities before they are interpreted explicitly, “work[ed] out” as “possibilities,” through the “as” structure of the isness of an object—a door, a table, a balance sheet – and what one does with them (Heidegger, 1962: 188-189). Usability, and by implication the productivity of practice, the being of “ready-to-hand” entities, is co-constitutive with the being of Dasein as being in the world which lets these useful entities be (Heidegger, 1962: 117). Although the primordial site of meaning is Dasein, which in its disclosedness of the world is its “there,” it is our thrownness into and projection on to relations of practice that carries meanings as much as the practitioners or the entities through which that practice is effected. Heidegger writes: "When entities with-the-world are discovered along with the Being of Dasein – that is, when they have come to be understood – we say that they have meaning." (Heidegger, 1962: 192).

World is not an external environment composed of things and bodies. It is rather a material culture, a meaningful relational structure of equipment and people, into which one is thrown from the get-go, with which one’s familiar, pre-discursive, affectual involvements have primacy, and into which one non-thematically projects, or "threw," one’s possibilities of being. Worldhood is that "referential totality which constitutes significance," (Heidegger, 1962: 160). Significance refers to the purposes or projects around which the networks of equipment are organized, those "for-the-sake-of-which to which every 'towards-which' ultimately goes back" (Heidegger, 1962: 119). “Dasein always assigns itself from a ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ to the ‘with-which’ of an involvement; that is to say, to the extent that it is, it always lets entities be encountered as ready-to-hand” (Heidegger, 1962: 119). Indeed, the equipped structure of those purposes, “the structure of that to which Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the worldhood of the world” (Heidegger, 1962: 119). And it is the equipped “for-sake-of-which” that discloses Dasein that makes it an “issue for itself” (Heidegger, 1962: 182). Issueness inheres in possibility, not desire; in the potentiality of universal human being, not the possibilities of institutional being, in the tension between ontic beings who are disclosed
through use of an equipped environment and their ontological being that is
closed up in this disclosure, in mattering, not what matters, why, and how it
dePENDS upon and supports a mode of being. One “falls” into contentless
human possibilities of an equipped environment, not from nearness to God
nor the prospect of salvation. The telos of salvation founded in an ontology
of divine being has been displaced by the potentialities of being of Dasein,
and in those practices by which we might let our being be.

One of the central components that Schatzki argues organizes
practice—its teleo-affective structure—draws from and away from
Heidegger’s joining of significance and feeling. Heidegger argued that the
affectual is the primordial register in which Dasein is in the world, and by
implication, that worldhood, as a structure of significance, is also affective,
the way things “matter.” “Dasein’s openness to the world is constituted
existentially by the attunement of a state-of-mind” (Heidegger, 1962: 177).
Dasein’s being in the world, its “there,” is not primordially cognitive and
perceptual, but practical and affectual, based on a projective understanding
of the affordances, the possible purposes, of an equipped world on the one
side, and on what Heidegger calls “states of mind,” or “moods,” affective
states on the other (Heidegger, 1962: 174-175). “Mood,” Heidegger writes,
is “prior to all cognition and volition, and ‘beyond’ their range of
disclosure” (Heidegger, 1962: 173, 175). Moods are not choices; they
“assail us,” they “attune” or open us to world in which we are; they
spatialize that world and thereby sustain the “there” of our Dasein. They
are prior to and more disclosive than any cognition. Mood ontologically
discloses the world by letting Dasein be affected; mood is directional,
making “it possible to direct oneself toward something” (Heidegger, 1962:
176).

The conjunction of purpose and affect are essential to worldhood,
mood disclosive of the ready-to-hand. One brings things near in the way
that they matter, out of “becoming affected in some way” (Heidegger, 1962:
176-177). Affect here is a way in which we submit ourselves to a significant
world, a world that shows itself by our being “affected” or “touched” by it.
Meaning and mood, understanding of possible projects of an equipped
world and states of mind, or mood, are equiprimordial and interlocked. “A
state-of-mind always has its understanding… Understanding always has its
mood” (Heidegger, 1962:182). These affective states simultaneously
maintain the being of the “there” and “cover up” our own being, our
“thrownness” into that equipped world (Heidegger, 1962: 173-175, 182).

Heidegger clearly states that it is mood that allows Dasein to direct
to itself to something, to become affected, that mood allows and “outline[s] in
advance” whether and how entities matter to us, affect us (Heidegger,
1962: 177). This opens the empirical question of how the effects of
equipment, its usability and involvements, are afforded by and afford
certain kinds of affectivity, the emotional content of mattering, that is both
constitutive of what entities are and who we are in our being affected by
them. If nothingness of finitude occasions anxiety, what do specific
somethings occasion? It suggests indeed that there may be an affective
component of the teleo-ontologies that are part of the constitution of
equipment, modes of being harnessed to modes of doing.

In Heidegger’s account, there is a normativity of interpretation of
equipment and the appropriate mood by which it should matter. He writes:

The dominance of the public way in which things have been
interpreted has already been decisive even for the possibilities of
having a mood—that is, for the basic way in which Dasein lets the
world “matter” to it. The “they” prescribes one’s state-of-mind, and

Schatzki does not grapple with the constitutive and concealing role
of “idle talk,” nor the normativity of affect. While Schatzki, for example, links
greed and fear to the temporally and teleologically specific valuation of
day-trading, this is not something that Heidegger would do.

Heidegger does not join specific affects to specific teloi, a category
which is anyway absent in his ontology, nor to the involvements of
equipment. Mood is almost always a turning away from the enigmatic and
burdensome “that-it-is” of the there, not a turning towards its concealed
basis (Heidegger, 1962: 174). Heidegger’s dominant “moods” that maintain
the “there” read like an Augustinian catalogue of sins, the mammon of
manipulation of the appearance of the actual as opposed to the salvational
dwelling in and as beings of being. Our everyday being there is a “falling”
into the world in which we are distracted and curious just to “see,” engage
in idle talk, ambiguously know what everybody knows is up, tranquilized
and bored. The primordial state-of-mind is anxiety in face of absorption in
the world, an anxiety that does not respond to any entity, nor place within it,
but to the nowhere of the there, that entities in the world lack significance,
that indeed we find the ready-to-hand oppressive and ourselves not at

Anxiety discloses us as a being possible that is not at home in the
world, that does not abide there, a world that functions more like an anti-
depressant than an entity that we love or that affords an equipped habitat
where authentic being might abide, that nurtures and loves us, where, in
consequence, we might love each other. Loving others through the world
and the world through the others must be gathered from shadow dust in
the spine of the text, not through the black letters on its pages. It is such a
mattering that would suggest itself as a mechanism for the sustenance of
what Schatzki calls practical understanding, a non-thematic and typically
non-propositional understanding of what doing is and an inconspicuous
mode of its doing.

In Heidegger’s phenomenology the objective and the affective are
co-implicated, but typically where the subjectification afforded by the
objectification is a submission that conceals our possibilities for being, that
reveals our thrownness in our turning away, or fleeing, from them, that
does not let our being be (Heidegger, 1962: 175, 177-178). In Heidegger,
moods concealingly express our discomfiting distance from our own
being in practice, that we are not at home in the world or ourselves.
Indeed, in Heidegger’s casting, our dominant moods are anxious and
fearful attunements, an always potentially terrorized fragile Dasein,
“endangered and abandoned to itself” (Heidegger, 1962: 180). Through
states of mind we express our world and hence our own being as a
burden; we register an anxiety as a manifestation of the nullity of
significance and of the self-absorbed in, addicted to, or bored by, the world.
By using the construct “teleoaffective structure,” Schatzki’s deviates from
Heidegger’s position, in emphasizing the ontic content of the teloi,
their systematic conjunction with affect, and notably, letting the positive
affordances of affection be part of the active space of practice, the
revealing turning towards as opposed to the concealing turning away. He
also seems to subordinate the affective, even making it optional as, for

7. “Indeed from the ontological point
of view we must as a general principle
leave the primary discovery of the
world to ‘bare mood’” (Heidegger,
1962: 177). And a little later, he writes:
“The different modes of state-of-mind
and the ways in which they are
interconnected in their foundation
cannot be interpreted within the
problematic of the present
investigation” (Heidegger, 1962: 178).
8. “A state-of-mind not only discloses
Dasein in its thrownness and its
submission to that world which is
already disclosed within own Being; it
is itself the existential kind of Being in
which Dasein constantly surrenders
itself to the ‘world’ and lets the ‘world’
matter to it in such a way that somehow
Dasein evades its very self” (Heidegger,
example, he claims, in its absence in the case of cooking (Schatzki, 1996: 101).

Dasein is a being constituted by its being in the world, a world equipped with objects and instruments with which he has a familiar practical, pre-discursive, inconspicuous relationship of concern based upon the operability of his projects and a world of persons with whom he has a largely indifferent relation of solicitude. It is through concern and solicitude that objects and others are disclosed, or “laid open” (Heidegger, 1962: 161, 105). “The ‘here’ of an ‘I-here’ is always understood in relation to a ‘yonder’ ready-to-hand, in the sense of a Being towards this ‘yonder’—a Being which is de-severant, directional, and concernful” (Heidegger, 1962: 171).

This dense statement—filled with neologisms—points to the ways in which Dasein is “not closed off,” but open, or what Heidegger terms “disclosed,” or laid open, in its very being, that not only is the person disclosed through his projects, but the world is in him, disclosed through his projection of possibilities upon it (Heidegger, 1962: 188). Dasein is never just here and now; it is spatially and temporally always outside itself; having been “thrown” into a world in which it exists, and thus never able to get behind itself as a pre-existing subject who wills or sees himself, and projecting itself into the world as a set of possibilities, always before and after itself. Dasein is, as he puts it, ek-static.

Our relations to things and people are conjoined, disclosed and encountered together (Heidegger, 1962: 160). Heidegger writes:

"Since the worldhood of that world in which every Dasein essentially is already, is thus constituted, it accordingly lets us encounter what is environmentally ready-to-hand as something with which we are circumspectively concerned, and it does so in such a way that together with it we encounter the Dasein-with of Others. (Heidegger, 1962: 160)."

Nor are the two forms of care—concern and solicitude—separable in that our being with others is typically based on common relations to things. “Being with one another is based proximally and often exclusively upon what is a matter of common concern...” (Heidegger, 1962: 159). Schatzki appropriates these co-constitutive dualities of “human co-existence” or how “lives hang together” in the internal conjunction of commonalities of ends and common participation in “chains of actions” (Schatzki, 2005: 472). While Heidegger did not explicitly posit a “we,” Schatzki does: “A ‘we’ is an open-ended collection of people who behave mutually intelligibly” (Schatzki, 1996: 116).

Not only is a person disclosed through his projects, but the world is in him, disclosed through his projection of possibilities upon it (Heidegger, 1962: 188). Here is the ground for Schatzki’s flat ontology, which he links to Heidegger’s notion of a “clearing,” a space of appearance that is given to us, or as Schatzki conveys it, “an open place, prior to all determinateness (things being such and such) and representation, in which anything that is, including human beings, shows up” (Schatzki, 2002, 143, 2005: 469). For Schatzki, Heidegger offers an “intuition of a space of being and intelligibility in which entities are” (Schatzki, 2002: 141). “To borrow a phrase from the later Heidegger,” Schatzki writes, “[p]ractice is the house of being (Being and be-ing)” (Schatzki, 1996: 111). Practice—the bundling of action manifolds (both doings and sayings) and material arrangements—is the site of the social in that it opens “a space of places at which activities can..."
intelligibly be performed” (Schatzki, 1996: 115). Practices are actually “sets,” “manifolds,” “bundles,” “nexuses,” or “chains” of actions, each of which responds to its predecessor (Schatzki, 2002: 71-72, 2005: 471-472).

Like Heidegger’s equipment, objects take on practical meanings in the repeated performance, or doing, of “constituent actions” of a practice (Schatzki, 1996: 90, 113). Practices, by specifying uses of objects, confer meanings upon them (Schatzki, 1996: 115). Practices are situated in “settings,” material arrangements, which are “set up to facilitate the efficient and coordinated performance of its constituent actions. The layouts of the settings, as a result, reflect the interwoven meanings that the entities used in these actions possess by virtue of being so used (and talked about)” (Schatzki, 1996: 114). Material arrangements thus carry meanings conjointly with the practices of which they are places to perform. 11Places here are sites, contexts of which entities are an inherent part. “A place to X is a place where it is understood that X-ing occurs. Insofar, then, that the organizations of practices bestow normativized interrelated meanings upon entities, practices open spaces of interrelated places at which their constituent doings and sayings are correctly and acceptably performed” (Schatzki, 1996: 115). The practices themselves co-constitute the site to which they are integral (Schatzki, 2002: 70).

Schatzki’s understanding of place accords with Heidegger’s understanding of equipment having its “place,” “as one place out of a totality of places directionally lined up with each other and belonging to the context of equipment that is environmentally ready-to-hand...In each case the place is the definite ‘there’ or ‘yonder’ of an item of equipment which belongs somewhere” (Heidegger, 1962: 136). These interlocked places of readiness-to-hand are revealed by the concern of Dasein which has an “inconspicuous familiarity” with them. Place and purpose, spatiality and significance, are not separable (Heidegger, 1962: 137-138).

What is practice, the X-ing in which meaning inheres? Meaning, Schatzki argues, “arises from actuality: actual relations among entities, and what these entities actually do” (Schatzki, 2002: 57). But why do they do what they do? The doings and sayings that constitute particular practices are only such if they “express” what Schatzki calls its organization, an organization that accounts for the coherence of its doings and sayings and its bundling with particular material arrangements (Schatzki, 2002: 87). The relationship between doings and sayings, on the one side, and organization, on the other, is not one to one. The same doing can belong to several practices; practical life in situ is hybrid, composite. This is not a causal argument. Following Wittgenstein’s approach to mind as instituted within social practices both by oneself and in reaction to those of others, the use of the term “express” is meant to convey a making present in the world of the “way things stand and are going for someone” through the performance of practices, bodily doings and saying that are part of the constitution of individuals’ mental conditions of life (Schatzki, 1996: 22-24, 33).

Practices make the components of organization present in the world; they “express” it. This organization is a “cross-referencing and interlocked bundle” of four components: practical understanding or knowing how to do, the rules for doing by which it is oriented, the ends for which it can or should be performed, and general understandings that organize a multiplicity of practices within and across domains (Schatzki, 1996: 104,

10. Schatzki distinguishes dispersed and integrative practices, the first found everywhere, like greeting, unhinged from rules and from the teleaffective, but rooted in practical understandings alone, the latter integrative practices which are “constitutive of particular domains of social life,” like farming or business (Schatzki, 1996: 91, 98). I think we can make the same distinction regarding objects: those with some measure of practice specificity and those with little or none.

11. This recalls the duality of practice and identities of subjects, in which the meaning of the subject is given by the practices applied to him at the same time that the meaning of the practice is given by the subjects to which it is applied in 19th-century New York welfare services laid out by John Mohr and Vincent Duquenne (Mohr & Duquenne, 1997).
All the components of organization are normative: what is right to do. In most of the writings I have read, it is the second and third, rules and teleoaffective structure, that distinguish “integrative practices,” complex, interlocked actions establishing “domains,” from dispersed practices found and taking the same shape everywhere (Schatzki, 2002: 88).

The components of organization, first, are practical understandings, which are a knowing how, a capacity or a skill to X, to identify X-ings and to respond to X-ings (Schatzki, 2002: 77). Practical understandings are not one’s actual actions, but the capacity to do what is understood to be X-ing, learned by doing it in bodily and linguistic actions (Schatzki, 2002: 79). These practical “understandings are established, acquired, sustained, and transformed through the actions that compose these practices” (Schatzki, 2002: 135). They “cannot be disengaged from the practices” (Schatzki, 2002: 135). “The (conceptual) understanding, against which a particular behavior-in-circumstances constitutes X-ing, is carried by the practice of X-ing. …It is only to be expected that identity-bestowing understandings of action inhabit and thrive within the manifolds of doings and sayings in which the identities involved take hold” (Schatzki, 1996: 93). Understandings ground out in the ever-changing network of unit acts themselves. Like Heidegger’s casting of our “inconspicuous,” non-thematic relations of concern with equipment, these are not propositional understandings, nor beliefs (Schatzki, 1996, 2002: 135). Words are anyway always insufficient to their conceptualization. These are practical ontologies—what is this doing?—carried in and acquired through practice itself, in the as-structure it presumes.

Second are rules, explicit formulations about what one must or must not do in X-ing. These are sanctioned orderings of practices, for the “purpose of orienting and determining the course of activity, typically by those with the authority to enforce them” (Schatzki, 2002: 80), pointing to an apparatus of power alongside, inside, or outside the practice. The enforcement of rules provides the research evidence for the normativity of ends: “Evidence for a practice’s organization is thus found in the presence and absence of corrective, remonstrative, and punishing behaviors and in the verbal and nonverbal injunctions, encouragements, and instructions whereby neophytes are brought into line” (Schatzki, 1996: 101). Although he was a student of Max Weber’s Heidegger relegates authority and domination to the margins, perhaps as the ontic provenance of the positive social sciences.

Third are what he calls “teleoffective structure”: “normativized and hierarchically ordered ends, projects, and tasks, to varying degrees allied with normativized emotions and even moods” (Schatzki, 2002: 80). Ends govern practices. “A practice always exhibits a set of ends that participants should or may pursue, a range of projects that they should or may carry out for the sake of these ends…” (Schatzki, 2002: 80). It is a normative understanding of “which ends should be pursued, which projects, tasks, and actions carried out for that end” (Schatzki, 1996: 101). And whether and how a practice should affectively matter (Schatzki, 1996: 123). These are teleologies variably freighted with and animated by feelings. It is this element that shapes intelligibility, what makes “sense” to do, a mental phenomenon. Schatzki writes: “The determination of intelligibility by mattering…is a determination via emotions and moods,” by “how things matter” (Schatzki, 2001: 52). For Schatzki, unlike Heidegger, the ends that constitute significance do not ground out in the possibilities of Dasein’s being.
And fourth are general understandings, which take shape as general, shared “teleoaffective regimes” expressed in a multiplicity of practices (Schatzki, 2002: 86). The extent of this sharing is variable, but, Schatzki adroitly notes, they are “common” in the sense of “being available to and encountered by all participants” (Schatzki, 2010: 151). General understandings are thematic; practical understandings are not. Unlike practical understandings, the teleoaffective structure is “always subject to discursive determinations” (Schatzki, 2005: 475). In Schatzki’s central empirical case, Shaker herbal production, these general understandings are expressed in a multiplicity of their practices. Here they refer to a “religious faith in salvation” through the practices specific to the Shaker community, understood as a “heavenly kingdom” on earth such that labor is understood as a means of sanctification; the community, not the individual, has primacy as a sacred entity; authority hierarchically flows downward from the central ministry; property is communal; tasks are shared and rotated (Schatzki, 2002: 28-29). The meaning and effects of entities and practices—communal property, the ministry, offices, work, discipline, obedience, cooperation, task sharing—derive from the ways in which “general understandings combine with teleology in the determination of human activity. They specify ends and purposes, stipulate forms of activity, and inform how objects and events can be used in pursuit of particular ends and purposes” (Schatzki, 2010: 152). It is here in general understandings where institutional logics might live.

Notice that in teleoaffective regimes non-phenomenal ends are co-constitutive with the presence, the identity and the effects of entities and practices. In this later formulation of what he terms “teleoaffective regimes,” in a chapter entitled “The Dominion of Teleology,” Schatzki again, as in the Shaker case, turns to religion—specifically Eliade’s sacred cosmogenic centers as his template (Schatzki, 2010). He writes:

In sacred space, something’s meaning derives from its relation to extra-terrestrial reality; formulated in my language, its meaning reflects a general understanding that something is real only if it instantiates or repeats an extraterrestrial archetype. (Schatzki, 2010: 150)

Schatzki argues that “teleology and general understandings deeply entwine in the life of religious man” (Schatzki, 2010: 153). Moreover, he continues, this “entwinement characterizes human life in general.” Schatzki’s conceptualization here points to the co-constitution of ontology and teleology, distinct and external to each other, as combining to form a “complex.” It suggests that other practices as sites of the social may express something non-actual, indeed extraterrestrial. It suggests that religion may offer a template for thinking common practice far from its domain.

This, in fact, was the terrain from which Heidegger fashioned his philosophy of practice and worldhood. Indeed it opens, I would argue, a place where institutional logics express themselves, not as an entwinement, but as a virtuality immanent in the objectivity and subjectivity of practice (see also Smets, Greenwood & Lounsbury, 2015). As I will argue below, an institutional logic is grounded in an institutional substance, a general understanding that points to both an ontology, what something is, and a telos, the nature of its goodness. In the most important domains of practice, those also identified with integrative practices, there is a ...
primordial aspect where the teleological and the ontological cannot be riven. Given that I am just now first treading Schatzki’s intricate pathways through practice, I may have misunderstood, but a teleoaffective regime reads to me like an institutional logic. Thinking religiously about practice may re-articulate the relationship between ontology and teleology in the practical relation of subjects and objects, in manifolds of action where practice is also necessarily a site of the institutional. To understand what it might mean to do that, after I sketch out my institutional logical approach, I will return to the consonances and dissonances of Heidegger’s and Schatzki’s approaches to worldhood with my own.

INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS, INSTITUTIONAL SUBSTANCE AND THE ORGANIZATION OF PRACTICE

There are multiple castings of institutional logic out there. Here’s mine: an institutional logic is a grammar of meaningful material practice. The materiality of that practice is located in the corporeality of subjects and in the obdurate quality of objects. The meaning of that practice is located in non-phenomenal goods, goods immanent to practices that have particular effects and affects (Friedland, 2017, 2018). That “good” is an ambiguous term is a good thing. I am drawn to the polysemic quality of “good,” denoting both desirability as an adjective and material possession as a noun, in order to convey the fusion of subjective value and objective thing characterizing an institutional logic. The goods around which institutional logics are organized are not just subjective valuations, qualities that ground utility as in marginalist economics, they are teleo-ontologies that afford and are afforded by material practices which produce the worthy real. The productivity of those material practices, and hence the institutional objects through which they are effected, depend on those goods. And reciprocally, the actionability, the believability and the desirability of the goods depend upon these institutional objects.13

Institutional logics bind subjects, practices and objects in persistent constellations, as meaningful modalities of socio-materiality. The elements—subjects, practices and objects—of a logic are mutually constituted, or dually ordered, each dependent on its relation to the other two. These constellations afford and draw upon particular affects and effects. Who we are and what we do are co-implicated,14 as are what we do and the objects through and on which we do it. Both the who-ness of the subjects and the what-ness of objects (and the where-ness of sites of practice) obtain an ontological and teleological specificity from the meaningful practice of an institutional logic. Institutional logics are simultaneously practical orders of subjectification and objectification, that is, orders of material practice that depend on and afford the particular subjectivity of subjects and objectivity of objects, which in turn depend on these same orders of practice.15

It is in Schatzki’s organization of practice that I suspect an institutional logic approach might have something to contribute, or perhaps contravene—of this I am still uncertain (on this, more below). The consonances between Schatzki’s practice theory and my own are multiple. The co-constitutive, relational aspect of practice as a siting of the social is consonant with how I understand practice as a conjoint selfing and worlding, fashioning a who, both a self and a we, and a where, a site where this or these kinds of practices take place, indeed are places, where

13. Schatzki points in a similar direction: “Causal connections are part of a practice, however, only if they somehow ‘result’ or ‘follow’ from the practice’s organization, that is, the understandings, rules, and teleoffective structure linking the practice’s constituent actions…” (Schatzki, 1996: 89).
14. This was manifest in Berger and Luckmann’s original understanding of institution as an objectified and internalized typification consisting of meaningful co-constitutions of kinds of actor and action (Meyer, 2008: 519-520; Meyer, Boli, Thomas & Ramirez, 1997).
15. They thus suggest the representational adequacy of relational models which presume internal coherences of variables, observed in the duality of the ordering of individuals and variables, as opposed to net effects of exterior attributes of individuals in a causal logic.
I and we take on actionable and recognizable identities. Empirically, I have studied situated, embodied and equipped practices, whether young people’s intimate encounters, the politicized religious nationalist rites of sacred centers, and the fashionsing of a Manhattan modern museum (Friedland, forthcoming; Friedland, Mohr, Roose & Gardinali, 2014; Friedland & Moss, 2015). It is, in part, the primacy of practice, as opposed to the person, that warranted the use of multiple correspondence analysis in our study of young American love, given the corresponding primacy of the columns, the practices, as opposed to the rows, the persons, in the analysis (Friedland et al., 2014). Although my first formulations of institutional logics were cast as spheres or arenas (Friedland & Alford, 1991), I ultimately saw that these spatialized and territorialized forms were their contingent effect, not the ontologically separate ground of their operation. Institutional logics may give rise to what Schatzki refers to as “bounded realms,” or even institutional entities, but these are contingent consequences, not necessities (Schatzki, 2002: 152; see also Schatzki, 2005: 473, 479). I understand logics as mechanisms of field formation, not their derivatives. Hybridity—constellations of material practices that manifest heterogenous institutional logics—is not the exception; it is the rule, necessary and omnipresent, with variable mechanisms by which they are effected (Smets, Jarzabkowski, Spee & Burke, 2015; see Ocasio, Thornton & Lounsbury, 2017).

Institutional logics are constellations of material practice, practices which are, as Schatzki has argued, the site of the social. It is how one parses practice and its supplementary organization where I sense a different path. The possible deviation is not in the centrality of bundling of doings and sayings and material arrangements, with which I agree. Such bundlings of subjects-practices-objects are the observable core of an institutional logic (Friedland, 2018). For Schatzki, they are organized by practical understandings, rules and structures of teleo-affectivity. For me, they are grounded in a good, but this good is not just an actors’ external telos; it inheres in the double objectivity of practice (Friedland & Arjaliès, 2017). That good is the teleo-ontology of practice. It is not a value, understood as a subjective commitment or cognition, a property added to a thing, nor is it a validity claim for a positional relation to objects which are “already there” (Lizardo, 2017; Lizardo & Strand, 2010; Martin & Lembo, 2016: 25). It is the non-phenomenal basis of practice, a mysterious provocation to think practice otherwise.

I rather conceptualize this good as an institutional substance. Here, I am using the Aristotelian category from his Metaphysics, not his Physics. Substance translates the Greek term ousia, which means being, here an immanent form of being. For Aristotle, substance is not matter, but what makes matter a “this,” “that by virtue of which the matter is in the state it is in” (Aristotle, 1998: 167, 229). A substance is not Plato’s ideal form; it is a unity of form and matter. This points to an immanence in the object world, or an auto-causation or inherence as Spinoza would later understand it when thinking divinity. Aristotle’s concept of substance is not the Cartesian category of substance based on material extension. Unlike Platonic and Augustinian traditions that understand the soul as a substance separate from the body and ground cognition in universal concepts or revealed truth, Aristotelian form cannot be accessed except through the sensible manifestations of material entities, of things and bodies. Substance here implies sensuous appropriation. But substance...
cannot be reduced to materiality either. Unlike Kantianism, in Aristotelian epistemology and ontology a subject does not impose or apply his categories on/to the appearances of things; it is not a schema of representation imposed on external objects, not objects commanded by signs or a priori categories.

Institutional logics are grounded in ultimate goods which are praiseworthy "objects" of desire, signifieds to which elements of an institutional logic have a non-arbitrary relation, sources of and references for practical norms about how one should have, make, do or be that good, and a basis of knowing the world of practice as ordered around such goods. These goods are constitutive of, but cannot be reduced to, those material practices, a fact manifest in their transformations, renewals and variation which are all taken to be indices of the same substance, or when practices fail and are refashioned based on the same substance, as is evident in response to the collapse of market value, for example. An institutional substance does not fit our traditional Humean division of fact and value, of what and why: it is both an ontological assertion of what is or can be and a valuation, a good toward or around which one can organize some segment of one’s life, both object and objective. Institutional substances are unobservable, non-phenomenal: market value, property, God, salvation, nation, race, sovereignty, security, information, scientific knowledge, artistic beauty, popular representation, nature, accountability, romantic love. They are both virtual entities and goods through which we organize and animate our lives.

It is through institutional subjectification and objectification, the affective and the cognitive, on the one side, and the effective and the productive, on the other, that these goods are experienced as substantial, as real, as if the as-if jumps its conventional rails. Affect is a corporeal, non-linguistic ground to substantiate a non-phenomenal value, because affect is a corporeal metric that measures and specifies goods and bads without number, and because it is the feeling of being that a particular practice affords that is part of what animates its reproduction: this is who I am doing this, pursuing, performing and presuming this good, a form of being that phenomenologically co-constitutes the good (Friedland, 2018). It is not just that this matters to me; this kind of mattering is who I am. The institutional world is duplex, as phenomenal bodies and things that substantiate their non-phenomenal basis, and as metaphysical goods that animate the effects of those bodies and things.

An institutional substance is not an object upon which attributes stand. It is a no-body and a no-thing, an absent presence, a virtuality necessary to certain forms of objectivity. From this vantage point Schatzki has seemingly sacrificed the soul of Aristotle’s substance. Aristotle, the reader will recall, considered the soul the substance of a human being. An institutional substance bounds the ontological and the teleological, its reality as well as its orienting quality, its goodness. An institutional substance is both the basis of certain objects and their value, the ground of both objective fact and subjective desire. They are causal causes. An institutional substance presumes an ability to build a material world of bodies and things based on it, as its phenomenal manifestations, to make the substance real, to enact it in an object world, a realizable state.

An institutional substance points to what Aristotle dubbed the “final cause,” the significance immanent in its materialization, as a purpose worthy of enactment, and hence the ground of desire and care, that provides the energy of attachment which comes before and remains after any mere “having” or “doing,” an essential driver in what we label institutional. An institutional substance is the transcendent ground of the
immanent observable, a term that warrants a religious sociological approach, something a variety of social theorists are sneaking up on by way of example, but not explicitly as a mode of conceptualization (see Boltanski, 2011; Schatzki, 2010). The relation between substance and material practice is not a sign commanding exterior objects; it is a material symbolization, an interpenetration of the transcendent and earthly worlds, an absent presence that drives substantiation, from which justification is a derivative form. Substantiation operates through practice, in the profusion of specific words, the movement of particular emotions, and the assembly and effective deployment of particular things (Friedland, 2018). It is arguable that Schatzki’s practical understandings, too, knowing in practice what an action is in its doing vis-à-vis objects operate like affects and effects in substantiating the transcendent substance that is beyond and behind the words. In practice, people almost never act as if they are social constructionists.

While Schatzki also draws on an Aristotelian category of substance, his is a different sense of the term than the one I deploy. In the “spirit” of Aristotle’s Categories, Schatzki’s substance refers to “an abiding object that bears properties” (Schatzki, 2002: 23). These substances are entities—humans, artifacts, living organisms, things—which form “arrangements,” constituting social orders composed of entities “bundled” with practices organized by practical understandings, rules and teleoaffective structures (Schatzki, 2002: 24). The meaning of those entities is located in the “actual relations among entities, and what these entities actually do,” meaning being a Heideggerian understanding of entitative substances “expressed in the doings and sayings that compose practices that are directed toward [them]” (Schatzki, 2002: 54). The normative ends of the teleoaffective structure, what ends one ought or may pursue are expressed in the doings and sayings of practice (Schatzki, 2002: 80). This implies to me an externality between teloi and objects, which is consistent with Schatzki’s use of “entwinement” when explaining the teleoaffective regimes referenced above. It aligns with the way he compares his approach to that of Bourdieu who “collapses the organization of practices entirely into understanding” (Schatzki, 1996: 149). Bourdieu, he writes “dismisses a teleoaffectivity independent of understanding as irrelevant to both the determination of action and the organization of practices” (Schatzki, 1996: 149).

This reading is also consistent with his take on artifacts whose enablements and constraints derive from practice, “beholden to functions or uses that devolve from the tasks, projects and ends that organize the practice” (Schatzki, 2002: 99). As he says, the entities that form an order to which action is directed “are always already there” (Schatzki, 2002: 106). So, entities derive their meanings from practices which express ends. Although actions and objects are part of a “single mesh,” a “co-contexture,” Schatzki gives analytic and explanatory primacy to practices as the site of the social, “where the meanings of arranged entities are instituted” (Schatzki, 2002: 100, 113, 117). He writes:

...activities and objects are not equals here. The character of social existence is, in the end, much more the responsibility of practices than of orders...[P]ractices are largely responsible (directly or indirectly) for the meanings of both actions and objects...Objects lack the capacity to institute meaning. (Schatzki, 2002: 117)

And although “actions and objects are locked,” ends are not here internal to objects, but to the practices directed at them (Schatzki, 2002:
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107). They are, at base, “actors’ ends” (Schatzki, 2002: 117). While this is an adequate approach to the pressing of herbs, it is not, for instance, for profit-making. As I will argue, there are certain objects that are institutional, to which ends are internal, an internality essential to the practices they afford.

In my approach, institutional substance, non-phenomenal goods, are materialized through practices performed in and through institutional objects, a category I have been trying to develop with Diane-Laure Arjaliès at the Ivy Business School in Canada (Friedland & Arjaliès, 2017). Institutional objects are good-dependent. While objects can be institutionalized, as to their properties and their uses, most objects are not themselves institutional. We only know institutional goods through material practices afforded by and affording institutional objects that anchor institutional logics, their iconic infrastructure so to speak, a necessary constituent of what Schatzki refers to as sites, where “entities are intrinsically part of their own context” (Schatzki, 2002: 55). Institutional objects are things which cannot be just things but are treated as if they were, as though their affordances and constraints are located in their ontological objectivity. Institutional objects are good-dependent, grounded in institutional substances: accounts, money, property, corporations, market devices such as models of valuation, territorial borders, capitals, censes, information, offices, taxes, passports, parliaments, votes and ballot boxes, sacred centers, communion wafers, revealed texts, altars, experimental results, artworks, and family homes. It is through these goods that these objects are objective, that the material practices to which they are integral have effects and affords. It is through these objects, and the effective and affective practices that depend upon them, that these goods are objectified, experienced by participants as both metaphysically good and materially real, a signified “this” which is both teleological and ontological, values and facts, hence objective in the double sense of being an objective and being objectified. The infrastructural objects of an institutional logic are not always “already there” in Martin and Lembo’s (2016) formulation. That the institutional object appears at all is contingent upon the content of its significance: on what a good is, what is good, how it is produced, and how good it is.

Values, or goods, are objectified in material practices, not as normative deductions, but as objective immanences, not just as subjective ends, but as the presumptions of productive practice. Institutional logics are a meld of value and instrumental rationality, a belief and investment in a value—variously tacit or discursive, whether named or going without saying, on the one side and an instrumental regime for its institution, production, evaluation and territorialization on the other. It is the conjunction of the two that constitutes a good. Instrumental and value rationality, the reader will recall, are Max Weber’s terms, the first an instrumental orientation to the lawful consequences of objects, where the purposes are exogenous, and second, flowing from a subjective commitment to value independent of their consequences in the object world (Friedland, 2014; Weber, 1958: 151-154). In the case of institutional logics, value and instrumental rationality are in a co-constitutive relationship, each grounded in the other.

Institutional objects are not just material signs of a category, translations or expressions of an idea (Jones, Maoret, Massa, & Svejenova, 2012), nor markers of a site where a particular good is pertinent (Boltanski, 2011: 28; but see Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006: 150). They are not just forms of evidence that justify worth (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006: 130-131). Nor can they be reduced to material agencies
that afford and can be yoked to particular social goals (Leonardi, 2013: 70). Objects may play all of these roles. Institutional objects are distinctive: they are performative, material symbols of the good.

Capital, the primary institutional object of capitalism, is a pertinent example. Capital both is and has an internal relation to the good of market value. Profit, and the contentions over its primacy, plays a prominent role in Schatzki’s account of Shaker herbal production. In a formulation which is resonant of Schatzki’s practice theory, Fabian Muniesa elaborates a pragmatist formulation of the financial valuation of a firm, following John Dewey, in which value is both a subjective prizing and an objective appraisal, a joining of an idea of something to be obtained and something to be done, a practice (Muniesa, 2012: 25-26). Here the “something” to be obtained is profit, valuation being the capitalization of earnings, a performative and “virtual” operation that creates an asset from an expected future stream of earnings, an operation coincident with ongoing investment and disinvestment in the firm in the capital market (Muniesa, 2012: 30).

Valuation is a performative practice, or as he says, “considering a reality while provoking it” (Muniesa, 2011: 32). In Muniesa’s casting, value, here an actual or expected market price, is “something to be obtained” through a relation to a “thing,” here the corporate securities of another “thing,” or “object” or “instrument,” here an organization “made fit for valuation”—a corporation (Muniesa, 2012: 31-32). Akin to Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006) orders of worth approach, Muniesa’s (2012, 2014) approach, in fact, brackets the production of market value. Valuation for him is the practice of market evaluation, as manifested in the prices at which corporate equities trade, there being a “correspondence between the act of valuation and the act of purchase” (Muniesa, 2012: 31). Yet capital, equity, corporation, and, of course money, are not “things” at all, nor is the profit for which the organization has been prepared simply a “purpose.” These are interlocked institutional objects, a constellation, that depend on the unobservables of market value and property, doubly objective, both goods and reals. The material practices of an institutional logic are not just, as Muniesa (2012: 32) translates valuation, “significations,” processes by which “something can hold as the sign (read “the value”) of something;” they are symbolizations in which values are rendered immanent through institutional objects. Market value is not just a subjective valuation based on a telos; it presumes an ontology, market value as an objective fact.

Performativity is typically used as model-dependent practice (MacKenzie, 2006) or as iterated authoritative practice (Butler, 2003). The category of performance is prominent in practice theory; that of performativity is not. Schatzki speaks of the performance of action, which refers to its doing (for example, Schatzki, 2002: 30 “All Shakers performed manual labor.”) Nicolini conceives of practices as “regimes of a mediated object-oriented performance of organized sets of sayings and doings. We call these performances ‘practices’ when they have a history, social constituency and hence, a perceivable normative dimension” (Nicolini, 2017: 21). For Schatzki, performance of action is only intelligible as practice through its ends; it is, as he says, “stretched out between end and motive” (Schatzki, 2006: 1872). “The happening that is the performance of action is at once an unfolding in objective time and a joining of the teleological past, present, and future.”

In their call for a practice-driven institutionalism, Smets, Aristidou and Whittington likewise write that the “world and phenomena within it come about only by being performed” (2017: 390). Unlike institutional theory, they argue, practice theory is more attuned to the “performative variation that characterizes everyday praxis.” By this they mean that
everyday routines can be generative, they “hold the seeds of their own continuity or change” (Smets, Aristidou & Whittington, 2017: 390).

In my thinking, institutional objects are performative in the sense that they produce effects based on belief in the good they are understood to materialize and the actions they authorize. Institutional objects organize practice through a meld of productivity and performativity. They are symbolic in the sense that the practical affordances of the object are understood to have a non-arbitrary relation to those goods; it is through these objects that one produces the good or puts the good into practice. In an institutional logic, the relationship between the materiality of practice and the good is internal, not external; a material symbolization, not a sign; a performative, not a representation. Schatzki approvingly cites Judith Butler’s performative theory of gender as conjoined citational and behavioral practices as the sayings and doings that constitute gender (Schatzki, 1996: 46-47). It is the performance of determinate actions that institute individuals with particular kinds of identities, indeed the person itself. “[I]ndividuals ultimately exist by virtue of the incorporation of human bodies into social practices wherein they become expressive bodies” (Schatzki, 1996: 47).

Institutional objects return us to the fourth of Aristotle’s four-fold causes—material, efficient, formal and final. Institutional substances are final causes, primary explanations of why things exist. For Aristotle, cause was an internal principle of ontological constitution, not just an external relationship between events (Crespo, 2016). In The Physics, Aristotle defines the final cause as the “end” or the “good for which they are done,” being healthy as the cause of walking in his example (Aristotle, 1996: 40). For Aristotle, the good “tends to be what is best.” In his ontology, the final cause had primacy. For Aristotle, the final cause was what is good for the substance, for the generation of an animal for example. The moderns have effaced the final cause, the end or purpose, making them, for instance, into effects of other causes (Crespo, 2016). For us, efficient causes reign supreme. This makes it difficult for us to think the institutional quality of such objects—that their purposes are real goods—a goodness that cannot be located just in the subjectivity of individuals and their beliefs, nor just in the material affordances—the form and matter—of objects. Institutional objects force us to think the fusion of the teleological and the ontological, a good which is a real, both desirable and actionable, the one tied to the other.

Grounded in and grounding goods an institutional logic is a grammar of valuation inferred from the repeated constellations of practice directed at and by certain objects. This grammar has four value moments: institution, the instituting of a good, a belief in or an understanding of its objective goodness; production, how the good is produced, what practices are productive of the good; evaluation, how good is the good, the practices and objects through which worth in terms of that good is determined; and territorialization, the domain of reference of the good, to what objects and practices a good can and does refer in its instantiations (Friedland, 2017; Friedland and Arjaliès, 2017). These moments—institution, production, evaluation and reference—phenomenonalize the good in practice; they substantiate the substance. They together articulate the grammar of practice, rendering the institutional logic coherent, legible and thereby institutionalized.18 Taken for grantedness, what Heidegger refers to through the inconspicuousness of equipment, typically understood as the essence of institution, is an effect of this grammar.

18. I am indebted to Sarah Friedland for this conceptualization of the grammar as an articulation of its practices. Articulation here is used in the sense of specifying distinct elements and their relationships to each other.
My conceptualization is close to Schatzki’s. Indeed, some of my formulations are uncannily like his own (see Friedland, 2017: 24). An institutional logic is a constellation of practices and objects grounded in institutional substances. To translate my language into his, the institutional aspect of practice looks like general understandings that inhere in practical understandings and intelligibilities, in its ontologies of action and practical pathways towards particular goods.\(^{19}\) These general understandings are simultaneously teleological and ontological, what is good and what a good is. In my understanding of an institutional logic, certain kinds of material practices—like voting, defending sovereignty, making love or a profit, and prayer—depend upon the immanence of transcendent virtual goods. It is the internal relation between teleology and ontology that grounds and is grounded in certain practical relationships between subjects and objects where I think the institutional is located. I do not want to give objects primacy; most objects can be treated in the way that Schatzki suggests, for me a question of production or reference, either for what goods objects are objectively good for or what objects can be referenced as subjective goods. Such objects are intermediaries, not mediators, in Latour’s terms (Latour, 2005). It is, I would suggest, through institutional objects that practices and objects are symmetrically co-contextural (Schatzki, 2002: 117). And it is through institutional objects that the ends of practice are kept thematically present in practice itself, as their productive material symbols, named, invoked and used even if they are not discussed except where the practice fails or is challenged legally, politically or in practice, typically grounded in other institutional substances.

Take Schatzki’s example of the practical understandings, rules and teloi of North American educational practices:

…organized by (1) understanding of how to grade, teach, mentor, supervise, conduct research, use electronic equipment, perform administration, impress instructors, obtain desirable grades, and the like; (2) instructions, requirements, guidelines, and rules of thumb about these matters such as regulations that govern syllabuses, the timing of exams, or department affairs, rules of thumb about teaching introductory courses or about gender relations and chair edicts; and (3) a teleoaffective structure that embraces such ends as educating students, learning, receiving good student evaluations, obtaining good grades, gaining academic employment and enjoying a successful academic career, a wide variety of tasks that can be pursued for these ends; and acceptable uses of such equipment as computers, blackboards, pointers, manila folders, coffee mugs, and telephones. (Schatzki, 2005: 472).

The joining of teloi and practical understandings points to a consonance with my understanding of an institutional logic. But it also points to the ways in which telos is not exterior to material practice, providing a bridge or a refutation—and I am not sure which—to the way I have distinguished his theory from my own. Schatzki joins the isness of practice to the oughtness of its ends, the ontology of action, what the X-ing is, to its teleologies, what are the appropriate ends of X-ing. A teleoaffective structure only obtains when “general agreement reigns about what is and is not acceptable in practice” (Schatzki, 2002: 83). The telos, he says, is not external to the practice; it is rather “inherent” in it (Schatzki, 2005: 478). As he says regarding education, “the ends and projects the teacher and

\(^{19}\) I disagree with Welch and Warde’s account of general understandings. “It is,” they write, “far less common for general understandings to directly shape practical understandings” (Welch & Warde, 2017: 187). They continue: “The Shakers are highly atypical of commonplace contemporary social conditions, in the extent to which their core religious understandings suffused and orientated all their everyday practices. Furthermore, the sociocultural group was coextensive with a complex of practices: an orthopraxy animated by an orthodoxy of general understandings” (Welch & Warde, 2017: 188). If I think about market value, or even more specifically financialization and accountability, they seem to pervade practices in the market world every bit as much as general understandings pervaded those of the Shakers.
students pursue in performing these actions—teaching, learning, impressing the teacher, demonstrating even-handedness etc.—are contained in the teleoaffective structure of educational practices: *to pursue them is ipso facto be carrying on the practice*" (italics mine) (Schatzki, 2005: 472). Ontology here appears to be derived from normative understanding of what one does as the determinant of what doing is. What a practice is is what a practice does, such that its isness is grounded in the "action understandings they express" (Schatzki, 2002: 96).

What its doing is is simultaneously a pursuit of particular normative ends. For Schatzki the telos is objectified in practice, an intention immanent, for example, in its causality, a meaningful temporality carried by practice, a pathway to a purpose. That includes, indeed must include, linguistic practice. Schatzki states that "[g]enerally speaking, what is acceptable or prescribed in any practice—its teleoffective structure—is always subject to discursive determination" (Schatzki, 2005: 475). New names are indicators and constitutive of changes in practical understanding (Schatzki, 2005: 476). Discursivity points to the non-phenomenal aspect of a telos, integrally tied to an agreement about what the practice is. The telos is also subjectified by becoming the basis of belief and desire, to internal phenomena that are themselves unobservable (Schatzki, 2005: 480). But ends are only subjective valuations because they are always already objectified in practice (Schatzki, 2005: 480). Schatzki looks to the complex sequences of actions that comprise practices not as that which causally connects distinct ontological levels of individuals, organization and institutions, but as what “dissolves” them into concrete complexes of objectifications and subjectifications organized by their purposes, and carried by those practices (Schatzki, 2018). This is consonant with Heidegger’s casting of entities that disclose themselves as “ready-to-hand,” purpose-built equipment through which Dasein assigns itself an “in-order-to.” Schatzki also apparently maneuvers around the instrumental accounts of means-ends relationships between practices and visible purposes, the kind of accounts of modern technology against which Heidegger railed. Neither the subject nor her end stand outside equipped and sited practice. Ends are both external effects of practice, in the manner of productivity, and internal to practice as objectified intentions, in the manner for instance that the affordances and constraints of artifacts are “beholden to functions or uses that devolve from the tasks, projects, and ends that organize the practice” (Schatzki, 2002, 99).

It is the action, not the actor that has analytic primacy. Ends, rules and understandings that organize action are “incorporated into participants’ minds” (Schatzki, 2005: 480). The “end of learning’ is a feature of the practice that cannot be divided up into the goals of participants; the latter are versions of the former” (Schatzki, 2005: 480). The objectification of practice is accomplished through a reciprocal subjectification: “the organization of a practice is an array of understandings, rules, ends, projects, and even emotions. This organization can be described as a normativized array of mental states: a normativized array of understandings, desires, beliefs, expectations, emotions, and so on.” These are not, however, attributes of persons, but of practices, constituting a “kind of objective mind” (Schatzki, 2005: 481). Individual actors are intentionally and affectively oriented to these ends by way of practical intelligibility, not practical understanding, but by what makes sense for them to do next in the chains of action that constitute practices, something

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20. “Teleoaffective structures are recurring and evolving effects of what actors do together with what determines this” (Schatzki, 2002: 81).
they learn "by way of the example, instruction, and sanction" to which they are exposed (Schatzki, 2002: 75, 81).

Unlike Bourdieu’s habitus, intelligibility operates through teleologically dependent significations, through Heideggerian understanding, or verstehen, that break into words that are adequate reasons for that action (Schatzki, 1996: 122). Ends, and the projects and tasks associated with them, intentional and desired objectives, normative mental states that make intentions objectified in practice into practical intelligibility (Schatzki, 2002: 75). Actors’ intentions are internal to the organization of practice; they are both carried by and carry it. “[I]ntentional relations...are beholden to the organizations of practices when the mental conditions by virtue of which they obtain are components of those organizations” (Schatzki, 2002: 98).

In his casting, a common teleology depends on a common ontology. Teleoaffective structures depend on participant consensus as to what we are doing and how we feel in its doing. I think in many domains of practice, it is also reciprocal. The ontology depends on the teleology, not as an externality but an internality, perhaps akin to what Karen Barad terms an “intra-active” relationship between apparatus and object (Barad, 2011). Just as he says of scientific practice that it depends on a “general telos” which pervades it—“understanding this or that portion or component of the world”—that telos depends on and constitutes particular ontologies of the world so understood (Schatzki, 2002: 113). In the case of education, for example, knowledge is a historically and situationally variable institutional substance that grounds the practices of knowing as particular teleo-ontological performances, and the essence of man as a knowing being. Blackboards, telephones and computers are not institutional objects; syllabi and courses arguably are.

We who plough institutional fields have much to learn from Schatzki’s practice theory. It is how one parses practice and its supplementary organization where I sense a division or a different path. It is the variable basis of bundling that I might amend, and of this I am still—after all this—still uncertain. “Truth (uncoveredness),” Heidegger writes in Being and Time, “is something that must always first be wrested from entities. Entities get snatched out of their hiddenness” (Heidegger, 1962: 265). The question is whether the truth of all entities can be uncovered in Schatzki’s practical way. It is, I am aware, reckless for a sociologist to revisit the philosophical basis for a social theory written by a philosopher, but I still have a suspicion that something is covered over in Schatzki’s uncovering of the teloi of practice. I am not sure about this, but like a detective I don’t want to discard the possibilities too soon. With the proposition that practice is the site of the social I agree. The question is whether, when and in what sense it is the site of the institutional? And whether the institutional is actually actual.

INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS AND THE WORLDHOOD OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER

With its emphasis on meaningful material practice, on the co-constitutive relation of subjectification and objectification, on the mutual substantiation of affect and effect, on the transcendent-immanence of institutional substance, and on the yet-to-come linkages between phenomenology and sociology, an institutional logical approach has

21. “As Hollister carried on herbal production practices, for example, all the obligatory and acceptable desires, beliefs, understandings, and intentions that he possessed about—and that were expressed in his actions toward—the herbs, equipment, co-workers, and horse were components of the organization of those practices.”
multiple consonances with Heidegger’s analysis. Heidegger’s existential phenomenology is not only sociological, as I have briefly pointed out above; it is a profoundly religious project that plays on revelation and concealment, the entwinement of good and evil, on the unspeakable name, on the tropes and pervasive directionality and earthly nearness of divine being. Institutional objects are not equipment, or use objects, in Heidegger’s terms. Nonetheless I espy in his later writings on equipment a basis for thinking institutional logics as a religious sociological way to think worldhoods.

The question of the materiality of the object, or more precisely the machine, was broached by Martin Heidegger as part of a 1949 lecture series, “Insight into That Which Is,” that evolved into a separate essay in the 1950’s called “The Question Concerning Technology” (Heidegger, 1977a). Paradoxically, thinking through the material in Heidegger’s explicitly anti-anthropological phenomenology provides resources for thinking the object in institutional terms and by implication freeing institutional being to be something other than the representation of a sum of subjects or the interlocking pathways afforded by objects. Heidegger’s understanding of what technology really is, its “essence,” displaces its materiality as a means to specific human purposes. For Heidegger, understanding technology as a means of human activity is the “instrumental and anthropological definition of technology,” immanent in a world governed by causality, that is, of predictable material effects (1977a: 5-6).

These means-ends couplings anchor Max Weber’s understanding of the instrumental rationality that dominates our disenchanted modernity (Weber, 1978). Making means-ends instrumentality the essential quality of technology is not tenable, Heidegger argues, not only because ends must be considered part of any causality, but because causality is historically variable, and instrumentality is not the proper concept by which to access the essential practical quality of technology.

Technology, Heidegger argues, is typically understood as a kind of material object, instrument or tool that has particular effects. While such an understanding of technology is correct, Heidegger argues, it is not “true,” in the sense of uncovering, or unconcealing, its essence. To grasp what this means, we have to return to Heidegger’s earlier epochal work, Being and Time. The essence of technology cannot be separated from the essence of human beings to whom technology is of concern, that essence being an existential being in the world, a being that “is its possibility” (Heidegger, 1962: 68). Dasein, Heidegger’s ontological category for the being of humans, literally there-being, is that kind of being whose own being is an issue, who “understands itself in terms of possibilities,” possibilities that ground its being in the world in which those possibilities are also grounded (Heidegger, 1962: 32-33, 184-185).

The essence of an object is located neither in its material substantiality, nor in its external calculable objectivity, but in its interior relationship to the existential essence of the human beings to whom it is of concern. That essence is the being of these beings. The being of humans is never present to itself but located in between subject and object in the circumspective practices of Dasein, stretched along between being from birth and towards death (Heidegger, 1962: 426-427). We can only know objects through the ways in which they are constituted by human subjects who are themselves constituted—and concealed—by this mode of constitution. Modes of objectification and subjectification are co-implicated; object and subject are only apparently external one to the other. Modern technology reveals that conjunction and its effacement.
Heidegger rejects the utility of the value category. One cannot make a world out of just things. Heidegger recognizes that, unlike things of nature, “thinghood” becomes analytically problematic for things “invested with value” (Heidegger, 1962: 91, 190). Thinghood based on things of nature will not “reach the phenomenon that is the ‘world’.” But he also rejects the notion that “things invested with value,” entities with which Dasein “dwells,” offer any foundation for conceptualizing the world because such entities are always already “within” the world (Heidegger, 1962: 92, 190-191).

Value is a compensatory accoutrement of a representational mode of revealing, in which entities are objectified by subjects, calculable and incessantly measured, which thereby lose their being. As Carlson puts it, valuing “does not let beings: be. Rather, valuing lets beings: be valid—solely as the objects of its doing” (Carlson, 2008: 38). Value is a strategy to shore up the isness and self-same quality of subjects and objects:

From here it is only a step to making values into objects in themselves. Value is the objectification of needs as goals, wrought by a representing self-establishing within the world as picture. Value appears to be the expression of the fact that we, in our position of relationship to it, act to advance just that which is itself most valuable; and yet that very value is the impotent and threadbare disguise of the objectivity of whatever is, an objectivity that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values. (Heidegger, 1977b: 142)

But even if he rejects the notion that value is added to brute fact, as an exterior supplement to material things conceptualized substantially as present-at-hand, it is still a generic practical value, here usability or serviceability as constituted in work, immanent in the “as” structure of entities even when not interpreted explicitly as such, that is primordial in the constitution of equipment as an object of concern, of circumspection. It is the “usability” of the “work—that which is to be produced at the time”—which grounds our concern and which contains the “towards-which” for which it is usable (Heidegger, 1962:99). Productivity is conceptually baked into the ready-at-hand. Items of equipment emerge as perceptual objects in the disruption of their assignments, the failure of their involvements, by becoming socially inert, unready to hand. This notion will become a central methodological principle in actor-network theory where one identifies situations where the mediating, as opposed to intermediary, work of objects in re-assembling the social becomes visible: through innovation in objects, change in subjects, or “accidents, breakdowns, and strikes” when “all of a sudden, completely silent intermediaries become full blown mediators; even objects, which a minute before appeared fully automatic, autonomous, and devoid of human agents, are now made of crowds of frantically moving humans with heavy equipment” (Latour, 2005: 80-81). Things present-at-hand, as objects to be perceived and thought, only emerge into view, or “light up,” out of the disruption of, or exclusion from, their inconspicuous operability.

Although “for-the-sake-of-which” is central to worldhood, Heidegger does not parse the ontological possibilities of significance into which Dasein is thrown and into which it projects itself as constitutive of plural, phenomenologically distinct worldhoods. To regionalize worldhoods would be, he claims, at variance with his phenomenological project of revealing the “ontological foundations of anthropological problematicas” (Heidegger,
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1962:75). He tends, as in the case of techno-science, to remain at the level of a metaphysics of an age (Heidegger, 1977b: 127).

In Heidegger’s understanding, the anthropological is an outworking of the representational mode of a subject who objectifies the world in pursuit of mastery, who makes metric counts, who imagines the world as a picture, a worldview, and is therefore unable to ask the question of the truth of being, which is for him also the being of truth (Heidegger, 1997b: 140-141).

Representing is not an apprehension of that which presences. It is the truth of being that Heidegger is after. For Heidegger, practical value, the network of teloi embedded in interlocked equipment, is ontic, like hammering or sheltering; the possibilities of being ontological. Not unlike Marx who makes the reproduction of life the concealed basis of the exchange value of commodities, Heidegger evacuates the particular purposes of equipment by emphasizing their general use value, writing of “that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use,” in terms of “serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability” that has primacy in the constitution of equipment (Heidegger, 1962: 95, 97, 114, 179, 184).

Unlike Schatzki who makes ontic ends central in his understanding of the teloi of a teleo-affective structure organizing practice, Heidegger avoids the specificity of value, or substantive purpose, and brackets its positive mattering, the extent and nature of its desirability and our desire for it—not unlike a marginalist economist who commensurates value through the category of utility, measures it solely through price, and makes preference exogenous—by phenomenological reduction to the possibilities of being. Heidegger notes that the “totality of involvements” of equipment, their ontological mode of being once “freed” as ready-to-hand, “itself goes back ultimately to a ‘towards-which’ in which there is no further involvement,” that is, to “Dasein’s very Being as the sole authentic ‘for-the-sake-of-which’; for the present, however, we shall pursue this no further” (Heidegger, 1962: 117). Although Dasein as being in the world is disclosed through the “for sake of which” through understanding, Heidegger treats understanding as a “competence” by which equipment and others can matter as they affect its “potentiality-for Being” (Heidegger, 1962: 182-183). Understanding, at base, is a non-thematic Being of Dasein “in which it is its possibilities” (Heidegger, 1962: 185). Indeed, Dasein is the “possibility of Being-free for its own potentiality-for-Being” (Heidegger, 1962: 183).

In Being and Time there is no systematic consideration of the possibility that substantive teloi and the ontologies to which they are joined, the practices through which they are effected, the directionality they entail, and the affective aspect of specific understandings are institutionally ordered. The institutional is not an ontological constituent of the “wherein” to which Dasein assigns itself (Heidegger, 1962: 119). This is so even though Heidegger explicitly recognizes that our everyday experience of a subjective consciousness confronting exterior objects to be known as present-at-hand is sociologically constituted through an anonymous “they.” Indeed, Heidegger suggests that Dasein’s understanding of “the world,” not worlds, is a sociological, tacit understanding of the possibilities of its specific “there,” “possibilities...which are sketched out beforehand within the range of what is essentially disclosable in it,” of what one can do based in the everyday on what an anonymous “they” regularly do, a notion that

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22. Heidegger describes the task of an “existential analytic of Dasein” as: “laying bare that a priori basis which must be visible before the question of “what man is” can be discussed philosophically. The existential analytic of Dasein comes before any psychology or anthropology…” (Heidegger, 1962: 71).

23. Heidegger writes: “Now if science as research is an essential phenomenon of the modern age, it must be that that which constitutes the metaphysical ground of research determines first and long beforehand the essence of that age generally. (Heidegger, 1977b: 127).
will become vital in Pierre Bourdieu’s formulation of doxa and habitus, where we direct ourselves towards the possibilities that our place in, or our inhabitation of, different social locations in the world afford (Heidegger, 1962: 184, 186).

One becomes what one factically is, as being “thrown” or “delivered over” into a “burdensome” world of entities whose usages are already established, a world of entities “that it is and has to be,” an always already submissive mode of being towards entities which is not itself observed (Heidegger, 1962: 174).24 It is out of this mood a modality of our “there,” that entities “matter” to us (Heidegger, 1962: 177-178). “In its factual Being, any Dasein is as it already was, and it is ‘what’ it already was. It is its past, whether explicitly or not” (Heidegger, 1962: 41). The “there” of that “that it is” is experienced as a primordial “enigma,” effacing the disclosive power of the “whence” or the “whither” (Heidegger, 1962: 175). One finds oneself in a mood that is a covering over, a fleeing from the burdensome world of entities and from the potentialities of our own being. Facticity is eminently sociological, entities disclosed based on the normative expectations of the “they,” entities whose “involvements” are set within the limits “established with the "they's" averageness” (Heidegger, 1962: 167). The possibilities of one’s being and one’s world are conjointly disclosed through one’s thrown projections, the non-thematized projects into which it throws itself, not as plan but as a constitutive element of being-in-the-world. The “there” for-the-sake-of which Dasein is is a capacious empty place of largely contentless possibilities, out of which everything and nothing, authentic and inauthentic Being, a fullness of which nothing can be, and by the authentic, is said. The ultimate “towards-which” and “sole authentic ‘for the-sake-of-which’” is the being of Dasein itself and its potentialities of being (Heidegger, 1962: 117, 119). The place of value, an ontic quality at the sociological level, is taken over by the possibilities of being, an ontological quality at the phenomenological level. And the salvation offered by the highest divine being is superseded by the potentialities of being.

The question is whether, as Heidegger maintains, a phenomenological ontology does, or can, precede an anthropologically constituted value, or any anthropology for that matter? This is particularly problematic if there is no access to an ontology except through ontic sources. As Derrida has noted of Heidegger desire to think being “under the ontic sedimentations”:

As being is not a being, it is nothing outside beings, it is not another being, therefore it is nothing ontically—outside its ontic determinations, therefore outside its totality and the totality of its history. Thus to ask questions about being outside historical reference to the totality of its ontic determinations and their explication in the history of metaphysics is to miss the meaning of being itself” (Derrida, 2016: 27).25

The issue appears explicitly and acutely in Heidegger’s later understanding of modern technology, and in his earlier phenomenology of Pauline Christianity. Modern technology, he argues, must be understood not as a making of a thing, but a particular way of revealing a real. Heidegger argues that the essence of technology is not a material capacity to produce effects, effects integral to the significance and its as-structure that constitutes worldhood, to what one can do, but a particular way of

24. Facticity is Heidegger’s term for the factuality of Dasein which is being-in-the-world and thus bound up with entities in that world (Heidegger, 1962: 82).
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"revealing" (Heidegger, 1977a: 12-13). What is distinctive about modern technology is not its material productivity, but the nature of its relationship to the natural world, the way it "brings what presences into appearance" (Heidegger, 1977a: 10).

Heidegger’s doorway to modern technology is primordially epistemological, but, as we will see, much more than that. Modern technology involves not a particular way of making, but of revealing, where an "uncovering happens" and "the true comes to pass" (Heidegger, 1977a: 6). "Technology," he writes, "comes to presence in the realm revealing and unconcealment take place, where altheia, truth, happens" (Heidegger, 1977a: 13). Truth, for Heidegger, does not consist in the correctness of assertions, their correspondence to things in the world, but to an ancient Greek conception of unhiding or unconcealment, a coming into presence of things as they are. Unconcealment implies a concealment, the hiddenness of truth. Assertions about the ways things appear are grounded in unconcealment of the essence of entities, an essence grounded in the conjoint disclosure of Dasein and the world (Heidegger, 1962: 263-265).

Heidegger follows Aristotle in understanding production, what the latter termed "art," a "bringing something into being"—as a way in which "the soul arrives at truth" (Aristotle, 2004: 147). Technology, as techne, is a "bringing-forth" that does not bring itself forth, does not, like a tree or a rainbow, come to presence on its own. Plato and Aristotle understood it as a poiesis, a term for the kind of activity involved in the craftsmanship of manufacture as well as art and poetry. Bringing-forth, a way of revealing, is a poiesis that "gathers" the four elements of causality, those "responsible" for bringing an object into appearance (Heidegger, 1977a: 9): the material cause, the material out of which an object is made; the formal cause, the shape in which the material is fashioned; the final cause, the end to which the object will be used determining its material and form, such that it "bounds the thing," known by the Greeks as telos; and the efficient cause, the maker who effects the object, but here, according to Heidegger, not solely by his making, but as one "co-responsible" or the "first-departure" of that "bringing-forth" (Heidegger, 1977a: 6-8).26 "This revealing gathers together in advance the aspect and the matter of ship or house, with a view to the finished thing envisioned as completed, and from this gathering determines the manner of its construction" (Heidegger, 1977a: 13). Bringing-forth here is a revealing, an unconcealment, which takes place where "truth...happens" (Heidegger, 1977a:13).

Modern technology, in Heidegger’s account, is no longer a poiesis. The essence of modern technology is nothing technical; it is a new way of revealing, specifically an "ordering the orderable" (Heidegger, 1977a: 17). Modern technology is not a "bringing-forth," but a "challenging-forth," in which the "energy concealed in nature is unlocked" and "everything is ordered to stand by" (Heidegger, 1977a: 17). Heidegger terms this way of revealing, which also—his text makes clear—"gathers" its practices, its ontology, its causality and its techniques of representation as enframing. "Technological activity," he writes, "merely responds to the challenge of Enframing" (Heidegger, 1977a: 21). A way of knowing grounds and generates a way of producing.

Heidegger treats modern technology as a practical logic, indeed I would argue, as a teleo-ontological institutional logic. Enframing, a way of revealing, transforms the subject, its practices and the object world in which it operates, each of which depends on its relationship with the others. Modern technology has a distinctive regime of practices:

26. The four causes, he writes, "all belonging at once to each other, of being responsible for something else" (Heidegger, 1977: 7).
"Unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about are ways of revealing" (Heidegger, 1977a: 16). Modern technology is not grounded in, nor does it ground, classical causality, which gave primacy to the efficient causality of the maker who "brings forth" an object from nature, in the classical sense of poiesis. Enframing is a coherent practical logic where things are "ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering" (Heidegger, 1977a: 19). Its causality, Heidegger argues, is no longer linked to a representation of external objects, but "is shrinking into a reporting...of standing-reserves that must be guaranteed either simultaneously or in sequence" (Heidegger, 1977a: 23).

This is an institutional sociology of practice, not a phenomenology. With the historical rise of enframing there is a simultaneous shift in ontology, practice and telos: standing reserve as energy, ordering and challenging-forth, and systemic order. Moving from objectification to orderability, the external object in nature is recast as a "standing-reserve," not an object to be transformed, but things that only exist to the extent that they are "on call" for ordering. The telos, or final cause, which once gave "bounds to the thing," was once responsible "in advance" for "what" a thing is, "for what as matter and what as aspect are together co-responsible" in its being a particular kind of thing, for a particular kind of use, (a chalice "in the realm of consecration and bestowal" in Heidegger's example), is transformed into the generic category of ordered resources, a pervasive and systematic assault on nature. The real reveals itself not as external objects refashioned according to the internal image of a craftsman, but only as standing-reserve, or resources, constituted by the machines themselves (Heidegger, 1977a: 19, 21). This way of revealing does not reveal any object, only its "own manifoldly interlocking paths" (Heidegger, 1977a: 16). The poiesis of making crumbles, opening to a worldhood of an endless form of practice, in which both subjects and objects have collapsed into pathways of practice.

"In Enframing," Heidegger writes, "...unconcealment comes to pass in conformity with which the work of modern technology reveals the real as standing-reserve. This work is therefore neither only a human activity nor a mere means within such activity. The merely instrumental, merely anthropological definition of technology is therefore in principle untenable." Modern technology is linked to a historical causality, to an epistemic culture. Its practices are constituted by the combination of a particular ontology of nature and practices of signification, in which on the one hand, nature is "a coherence of forces calculable in advance" (Heidegger, 1977a: 21), and on the other science is no longer a representation of objects, but a non-representational "system of information" (Heidegger, 1977a: 23). One easily conjures the new forms of orderability: algorithm, strings of code, networks, and artificial intelligence.

Heidegger understands modern science as a "solidity of procedure and attitude with respect to the objectification of whatever is," that identifies truth with the certainty of representation based on the premise of a "groundplan," or "world-picture" (Heidegger, 1977b: 126). It also appears, based on the frequency with which he invokes its terms of profitability, that the appearance of modern technology also depends on capitalism, as in the "forester...today commanded by profit-making in the lumber industry...made subordinate to the orderability of cellulose" (Heidegger, 1977a: 18).27 Object as information and nature as resource are linked to value as price.28

27. See also: writing of the challenging-forth of the energies of nature: "that expediting is always itself directed from the beginning toward further something else, i.e., toward driving on to the maximum yield at the minimum expense" (Heidegger, 1977: 15).
28. The financialization of capitalism suggests itself either as driver, or even driven, of this formation.
Modes of causality are tied to ways of revealing, embedded in institutional conditions—in the constellation of the practices of science, industry and capitalism. The “merely instrumental” is indeed insufficient.

Enframing is a regime—Heidegger uses the term “realm”—of subjectification and objectification, here the transformation of both the subject and the object of classical metaphysics, where the subject is reduced to his practices of challenging-forth and the object to standing-reserve. It “sends” us on a path of practice as a way of revealing. The maker is made by the way he makes; those who challenge-forth nature are themselves challenged-forth (Heidegger, 1977a: 24). It has “affected man in his essence” (Heidegger, 1977a:28). Enframing is a “realm” that orders human behaviors and attitudes; it “claims” man; it “sets upon man, i.e. challenges him forth,” it “gathers man thither to order the self-revealing as standing-reserve” (Heidegger, 1977a: 19, 21, 24, 25). The technological subject is transformed by this form of objectification, one who knows himself only through the practices by which he constructs an external world, at the same time that man himself is reduced to a resource, “taken as standing-reserve” (Heidegger, 1977a: 27). In a revelatory and shocking bit of text Heidegger cut from later versions he writes:

> Agriculture is now a motorized food industry—in essence the same as the manufacture of corpses in the gas chambers and extermination camps, the same as the blocking and starvation of nations, the same as the manufacture of hydrogen bombs. (Caputo, 1993: 132)

Enframing is a potentially horrific hegemonic order, the orderability of resources indifferent to making live and making dead, a realm that conceals its essence as a way of revealing at the same time that it “holds complete sway over man” (Heidegger, 1977a: 25). We do not see it because it affords our way of seeing, of being in the world. It is how we are in the world; it is inconspicuous and dangerous. Heidegger understood it to have destroyed the possibilities of a new order of revealing he had originally approvingly espied in National Socialism (Caputo, 1993).

Enframing, like all ways of revealing, conceals as it reveals. Its concealment is double: first, it conceals that it is a particular way of revelation, that we mistake it as the sole way of making “true” and that what it reveals—its ontic objectifications—as the sole “truth.” It thereby conceals this concealment, and thus revealing itself. It is the doxa immanent in practice. Second, it conceals that revelation is both the essence of human existence, hence our “needed belonging to revealing,” and that revealing is grounded in an “open space” of freedom (Heidegger, 1977a: 25-26). “Only the true brings us into a free relationship with that which concerns us from out of its essence” (Heidegger, 1977a: 6)

Freedom is not about human willing. Freedom here on the one side is part of the constitution of Dasein, a phenomenological prior inherent in our openness to the world required for entities to appear to us, such that through the disclosedness of Dasein, we are “in the truth” (Heidegger, 1962: 263). We have been granted a “share in revealing which the coming-to-pass of revealing needs” (Heidegger, 1977a: 32). Our freedom is an openness to the open, to the clearing of being. On the other hand, it is a “realm” or a “clearing” in which the “happening of revealing” takes place, and hence the unlocatable immanent in every way of revealing, an
opacity essential to the coming to light (Heidegger, 1977a: 25-26). "That which frees”—the ungrounded and incalculable ground of being, which he terms "the mystery"—must necessarily be concealed (Heidegger, 1977a: 25). In his technology essay, Heidegger writes: "[a]ll revealing belongs within a harboring and a concealing. But that which frees [entities for intelligibility]—the mystery—is concealed and always concealing itself.... Freedom [sense-making, the revealing of beings] is that which conceals in a way that opens to light, in whose clearing shimmers the veil that hides the essential occurrence of all truth and lets the veil appear as what veils" (Heidegger, 1977a: 25).

Wolfson puts it this way: "To speak of the mystery as the highest configuration of truth means that every act of unconcealing is at the same time an act of concealing: what is exposed is the hiddenness of the exposure...For this mystery to be revealed as mystery, it must be revealed in its veiling power..." (Wolfson, 2018: 117). Or, further, that "naming cannot be severed from the nameless that defies naming." It is not simply that the concealed is always a clearing against the opacity of the unconcealed, that the known stands out against the unknown, but that the ground of this unconcealment can never itself be unconcealed, that the hiddenness of entities is itself hidden.

This is a phenomenological, and mystical, approach to a religious space, the space of possibility, "[t]hat wherein unconcealment, ie. Truth, comes to pass" (Heidegger, 1977a:27).31 “The essence of the sacred” he writes elsewhere, “is to be thought out for the first time in terms of truth of be-ing” (Heidegger, 1949). Thus, Heidegger immediately points to the probability that we will “quail at the unconcealed,” one symptom of which is that we understand “even God” as an efficient cause, as a maker, and thereby erase the “mysteriousness of his distance” (Heidegger, 1977a: 26).

Heidegger here spatializes the impassible difference between possibility and actuality. God is a figure for that which frees, the “open space of destining,” a name for the mystery of the ground of revelation, of possibility, a mystery which is likewise located within us, in that Dasein is itself the clearing for being, that place where the world opens and is disclosed as Dasein opens and discloses itself (Heidegger, 1962: 264-265). Dasein’s openness to the world, Heidegger argued in Being and Time, its ability to be its “there,” depends on its being “cleared,” to be illuminated, indeed, to be “itself the clearing,” such that it is simultaneously the site through which the world is disclosed, revealed, or unconcealed, at the same time that it is itself the revelation (Heidegger, 1962: 171). We ourselves are the space of the revelation, and hence, as he writes in his essay on technology, that we “belong” to revealing. The essence of being, he writes in his “Letter on Humanism,” is a “giving, i.e. grant, its truth” (Heidegger, 1949).

When Heidegger writes that the unconcealment of enfurning “... cannot be rounded out by being referred back to some metaphysical or religious explanation that undergirds it” (Heidegger, 1977a: 21), this may be true, but it is not correct. The philosopher indicates otherwise. The telos has certainly shifted from salvation to knowledge. But not only is Heidegger’s understanding constructed out of a religious conceptual architecture, a conversion of the ontic into the ontological, in which the revelation of Christ has become revealing tout court, the source of certainty displaced from divinity to the human self, he himself has pointed to the

31. While Heidegger’s Christian sources have been salient to scholars (Derrida, 1995: 23; Carlson, 1999), Elliot Wolfson has shown the uncanny parallels with Kabbalist mysticism. Just as the kabbalists “identify the root of judgments...as the capacity for limits lodged in the heart of the limitless,” for Heidegger the “evil of the Other Side” is a “manifestation of the nonessence that belongs to the essence of being,” expressing the tragic nature of being. Indeed Wolfson argues that Heidegger appropriated these ideas through the work of Friedrich Schelling, an 19th century German philosopher who was himself steeped in kabbalist thought (Wolfson, 2018: 122-126). Understood spatially, it conjures up the “desert within the desert” in Jacques Derrida’s writing, as an unscathed space of inscription. For Derrida the very logic of address contains both sources of religion, the faith that must undergird the promise to respond, the promise to tell the truth, that presumes an absolute witness guaranteeing the social iterability of truth and the iterable truth of the social, and the sacred, or the unscathed, in which the singularity of both self and other, as well as the property of their names, which presumes an abstract space of inscription, what Derrida calls “a desert in the desert,” in which the finite, embodied self and other, as well as every other event of revelation, take place. This is the uninhabited space upon which collectivities must reside, but will never access, never apprehend (Derrida, 2002).

32. This is obviously not a metric distance, but nor is it the distance dictated by an absence of concern along the lines of the spatiality defined in Being and Time.
ways in which modern technology is grounded in an onto-theology, an outworking of the model of making that also undergirded the pre-Christian Greek concept of poiesis. Modern technology derives, Heidegger argues in Contributions to Philosophy, from a Christian onto-theology in which God, as the highest being, is maker, because thinker, of “all beings” (Carlson, 2008: 40-41). Truth as correspondence has a Christian genealogy. Carlson writes:

Just as the Creator God represents in his mind that which he creates, such that the truth of creation consists in its correspondence to the divine archetype, so the modern subject, by means of its representational activity, turns productive in a technological sense, within a metaphysics counting truth as correspondence. (Carlson, 2008: 41)

The being of beings will become being thought and thence created, and consequently being caused.

Heidegger posits his position not as a third way, but as a phenomenological prior to an instrumental materialist anthropology on the one side and a religious idealism on the other. But rather than a phenomenological reduction, it is arguable that Heidegger lays out a religious anthropology, one based on religious possibility. On the one side, Heidegger reduces science, technology and capitalism, like God, to a particular way of revealing, the inner logic of a civilization in which every realm of disenchantment conceals a comparable inner enchantment, a groundless ground of revealability, a dark, unnamable space of mystery. “Metaphysics grounds an age,” he writes, “in that through a specific interpretation of what is and through a specific comprehension of truth it gives to that age the basis upon which it is essentially formed” (Heidegger, 1977b: 115).

On the other side, if one tracks out the premises of his own intellectual production, his phenomenology is a veil both revealing and concealing a mystical, non-theistic form of Christianity. Being and Time is both a phenomenological critique of Christian theism as a philosophical frame and a replication of its premises.33 Heidegger writes in Being and Time that “the jumbling together of Dasein’s phenomenally grounded ‘ideality’ with an idealized absolute subject” is one of the “residues of Christian theology within philosophical problematics which have not as yet been radically extruded,” (Heidegger, 1962: 272). By making Christianity the portal by which to unearth philosophy’s onto-theology through recasting the phenomenology of religion, he both reveals its role and replicates its order. There is a “religious” undergirding to the argument, in the triple sense of his religious understanding of social life through the non-phenomenal mystery of revelation that grounds it; because, as Heidegger argues, that social life is religious in its actual formation; and because Heidegger secularizes the Christian terms of the phenomenological way, making the ontological into a sacred space set apart from the merely ontic.

Heidegger developed his phenomenology as a secularization of Christian, and particularly Pauline and Augustinian, understandings of one’s relationship to revelation and the possibility of salvation (Carlson, 2008; Heidegger, 2004). Central to both Christian thinkers was the insufficiency of human will or volition in establishing the conditions for salvation, for the necessity of an external divine grace. It is God who gives us the possibility of being truly ourselves, by being already interior to us from our beginning. Augustine, in his Confessions, writes of God: “But you

33. In 1937, Heidegger wrote: “And who would want to ignore the fact that a confrontation with Christianity silently accompanied me on my entire path hitherto—a confrontation that was and is not a ‘problem’ that was taken up to address, but rather at once a preservation of and a painful separation from the provenance that is most my own: the house of my parent, my homeland and my youth.” (Davis, 2010: 247).
were more inward than my most inward part and higher than the highest element within me” (Augustine, 1998: 43). For Heidegger, being replaces the divinity in whose image we are made, which is so near to us that it does not and can never appear. One’s fallen state, like one’s sinfulness and rebellion against God, is an inauthentic “falling,” an absorption in the present world, a preoccupation with its whence and whither, filled with idle-talk, lustful curiosity, distraction, ambiguity where the truth cannot be determined. Heidegger’s apotheosis of being-towards-death as a confrontation with the “possible impossibility of its existence” (Heidegger, 1962: 310), an evacuation of significance, replicates the mystical abysmal ascent in which one accedes, in the words of the 6th century mystic Pseudo-Dionysius, like Moses who “plunges into the truly mysterious darkness of unknowing,” “beyond every name,” “beyond all things, to “Being itself” (Dupré and Wiseman, 2001: 84, 88). Or as the 13th century German mystic Meister Eckhart sermonized that one should empty one’s soul, “free of his own knowing as he was when he was not,” to be “so poor that he should not be or have any place in which God could work” (Dupré and Wiseman, 2001: 168, 170). Is it not this darkness suffused with light, beyond word and talk, a “simple silence,” that is the ground of revealability?

The template for Heidegger’s institutional sociology of practice is already contained in his phenomenology of Christian religiosity, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, written six years before Being and Time. The analysis is not grounded in a conceptual object, in a theology or belief, but in a pattern of practice, a form of “comportment” (Heidegger, 2004: 43, 48). The primordial practice is proclamation that one has become a Christian, turned towards Christ and received the revelation (Heidegger, 2004: 65-66). One sustains the knowing of one’s “having become” in the present, repeating the decision, and hence not waiting for the return, as the way of knowing that one will be saved in an anticipated, but indeterminate and unknown, future. “Paul is not concerned at all about answering the question of the When of the Parousia. The When is determined through the How of the self-comportment, which is determined through the enactment of factical life experience in each of its moments” (Heidegger, 2004: 75). It is the shared temporality of having turned towards God, not a memory of a past transmission, but a present past that already projects salvation as a possibility in the future, that is the phenomenological core of Christian religiosity.

Religiosity for Heidegger is not a commitment to a set of ideas, of beliefs about the nature of God; it is a way of being. It is hopefully and painfully living within this possibility that is Christianity’s phenomenological essence. It is not the when or the what of God; it is how one lives in, with, for and through God. Christian religiosity is located in the possibilities inscribed in practice. In Heidegger’s understanding, the true Christian is somebody who lives the possibility that entered their lives through Christ’s coming and resolutely does not center his faith or his identity based on a past present of having come or a future present of when Christ will return, but on a past which is both present and futural. A true Christian, in other words, does not reduce possibility to actuality, just as the truth of technology cannot be reduced to the actuality of its objective effects.

This temporalizing will constitute the unity of the structure of care in Being and Time: the future of existence, the past of facticity, and the present of falling. Heidegger writes: “Temporalizing does not signify that ecstases come in a ‘succession’. The future is not later than having been, 34. For a systematic treatment of ecstatic being in Pseudo-Dionysus, see Carlson’s chapter “Transcending Negation: The Causal Nothing and Ecstatic Being in Pseudo-Dionysius’s Theology,” pp. 155-189, in Carlson, 1999.
and having been is not earlier than the Present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future which makes present in the process of having been" (Heidegger, 1962: 401).35

Heidegger’s ecstatic temporality, authenticity, anticipation, resoluteness and historicality will all become secular transfigurations of this understanding of Christian religiosity, an authenticity disclosed by one’s being-towards-death, an anticipated, not awaited, finitude that affords us a way—without God or the prospect of resurrection—to uncover our possibilities of being. Being-towards-death is a central provocation for both, but with a different valence: if for the Christian loving life is a fallen state, enjoying what should only be used, loving that which will be lost, for Heidegger’s authentic Dasein, it is the very prospect of a non-transferrable, ineluctable death, disclosing the world as a no-where and a no-thing, manifest in a latent anxiety that expresses a "being-free for one’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being," that can individualize you and enable you to live your being-in-the-world as one’s ownmost. It is one’s being-towards-death, the possibility of impossibility, that, by affording us the possibility of being “wrenched away from the ‘they’,” through true anxiety, allows us “the possibility of understanding one’s ownmost and uttermost potentiality-for-Being—that is to say, the possibility of authentic existence” (Heidegger, 1962: 307), “Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself,” to access the truth of being (Heidegger, 1962: 232). The Christian and the moderns both make death the existential provocation and template for that which conceals the basis of concealment and offers a portal to access the true being of beings; both cover up possibility by actuality; in both the entities of the world to which we are attached obscure potentiality; both make beings uncanny bearers of being, whether of God or human being. The telos is no longer salvation grounded in God from which we fall away, but authenticity grounded in being from which we normally flee.

Through the phenomenological reduction, God, the source of all possibility, becomes being, revealed truth the “truth of existence,” Dasein’s “ownmost potentiality-for-Being” covered over by our falling into the “they,” by clinging to entities in the world, and the actualities of factical existence parallel to Augustinian understanding of the chattering, curious and distracted who fail to understand the divine source of human existence (Carlson, 2008: 51-56; Heidegger, 1962: 264). In terms that copy those of Augustine, Heidegger writes:

"Being”—that is not God and not a cosmic ground. Being is farther than all beings and is yet nearer to man than every being, be it a rock, a beast, a work of art, a machine, be it an angel or God. Being is the nearest. Yet the near remains farthest from man (Heidegger, 1949: 234).

Rather than responding to the gift of grace, to the divine call, one responds to a "call" that "comes from me and yet from beyond me and over me" (Heidegger, 1962: 320). It is being that calls us, whose revelation conceals as much as it reveals, that is so ontologically near and so ontically far, which withdraws from and yet supports us, that calls us home, yet makes this world unhomely and periodically insupportable.

I can read Heidegger as implying that one can cast religion as an ontic outworking of an ontological phenomenology. But what if we read his work as a religious sociology; what if Christian problematics offer a way to re-think an institutional sociology, that we should reconsider the effort to

35. Heidegger is using the Greek word ekstasis, to stand outside of oneself, here in terms of the temporalities of past, present and future.
leech out these Christian residues, to work with an odorless, skeletal subtle body? If Heidegger’s phenomenology is not a sociology in phenomenological drag, it seems consonant with an institutional logical theory. Heidegger takes social practices—the worship of God in anticipatory prayer, the determination of scientific truth by certain representation, and the making of useful material objects by “bringing” or “challenging” forth—and interprets them as modes of disclosure and concealment of the potentialities of being.

Rather than a phenomenological reduction of religiosity to modes of revealing of the real that tend to conceal its groundless ground, what if one reads these modes as necessarily religious revealings, enactments of particular grounding, but groundless, “deities”? For the Christian, God is the source of all possibility, the source of our being, and hence a figure for the possibility of human being. Institutional logics, too, have their god-terms, their names that either go unsaid or that cling to our throats when we try to give them voice. The institutional logical approach posits institutional substances, the teleo-ontological ground of a logic, as the god-terms of practical modalities, and sometimes spheres, of action. Like God, they are neither entities, nor beings, but something given, unmade and unmakable, the basis of made entities and beings, of objects and subjects. That the Western subject is onto-theological is a refraction of the institutional logical nature of subjectification, that the Western subject is a trans-institutional substance, not a failure of metaphysics to capture the essence of existence, the “truth” of being, perhaps not necessarily even a monotheistic path-dependence. Institutional substances are not just ends, or values, exterior to material nature, grounded in subjective commitments as in Weberian value rationality; nor are they material objects, materialized representations subject to an external lawfulness. Heidegger is right to reject the sufficiency of an instrumental account of technology, an approach that led Max Weber to largely efface the value rationality of capitalism and the bureaucratic state (Friedland, 2013).

Institutional logics are modes of revealing substances in practice, concealed as their absent presences are substantiated through modalities of our being in the world. Institutional logics are effective and affective, the be-causes, and the “theres” of, our being in, which as Heidegger says, are “that for-the-sake-of-which Dasein is” (Heidegger, 1962: 182). Institutional substances are the no-things and no-bodies for-the-sake-of-which we are. Institutional logics express the conversion of causes into causal orders, a phenomenalization of invisible substances into visible regularities.

Institutional substances are the never present-at-hand significances for-the-sake-of-which and within-which we live our lives, that structure the worldhood of particular worlds, that offer us possibilities of being that can never be reduced to or exhausted by actualities and that disclose our being in these worlds. Institutional substances are disclosed in our being and we in theirs, in the countless conjunctions of biography and history; they do make our being an issue for itself as we are always working out the possibilities of our institutional existence and the existence of our institutions. They are paradoxically overfull and empty. Institutional substances are final causes that gather objects and subjects, configurations of equipment and persons, both ready-at-hand and concerned and solicitous in pursuit of purposes. We are thrown into a world composed of institutional logics which both bring forth entities and authorize beings, the made and the makers, final and efficient causes, logics that establish the conditions of possibility of instrumental rationality by its co-implication with substantive rationality.
Institutional substances are the sacred core of each field, unobservable, but socially real. They are the god-terms of social life, the limited set of things "for-the-sake-of-which" we live our lives, what Augustine referred to as that thing which is "enjoyed," or loved for its own sake, unchangeable, eternal and majestic—the Trinitarian God in his case—as opposed to those changeable and uncertain things which are loved because they enable one to possess other objects, and hence not enjoyed, but used (frui vs. uti) (Heidegger, 2004: 203-205). But unlike this hierarchical division, substances can be used precisely because they are enjoyed, available for poeisis because they grant forms of praxis. Substances are not actual objects, and thus elude a materialist understanding of an object world; nor are they free-floating ideas or ideals that are so easily assimilated to an idealist subjectivist stance, grounded in the convictions of worldless selves.

The "hiddenness" of entities can also be located in institutional substance, covered over by the ordinary ruses of institutionalization, in the co-constitution of subjects and objects in which they are grounded. Institutional substances, like "hidden" or transcendent gods, are invoked by name, as though they are eternal subjects who act in this world or as though they refer to knowable objects to which one has an instrumental or possessive relation. But an institutional substance is not, and cannot be, an object—observable, manipulable, instrumentalizable—cannot be had or even known. We must, as Heidegger says of the divinities of the four-fold, both preserve and "await the divinities as divinities" and "not mistakes the signs of their absence" (Heidegger, 1971a: 148). Nor is it a subject, an anthropomorphic, theistic god, let alone a subjective representation externally added to things present-at-hand. It is rather like a God beyond being, a God not modeled in the mirror of a human being as a superior being, but that which is beyond predication, neither true nor false (Carlson, 1999). Like an apophatic deity who is known by what it is not, a non-theistic deity who, in mystical theology is understood not as a cause, but a cause beyond causes, as a transcendent ground of immanence, an immanence which can never be separated from its creator, a creator whose nature can never be fully apprehended through the senses.36

Such institutional substances both exceed and outlive the finite persons whose practice approaches them in that they are given from elsewhere, institutional substances that depend on others for their enactment, on a prior and projected history of enactment. Eternity is immanent to institutional logic because the substance must be perpetually enacted, symbolized through practice in order to exist at all. Institutional logics also entail the genetic possibility of idolatry because members—and analysts—are apt to conflate practice and substance, to reduce substance to human purpose, to locate it—Thévenot has pointed out the tendency37—in the exterior materiality of practice or of persons, to deny substance by pointing to interest and power of bodily beings as universal equivalents, rather than as pragmatic avatars of those substances.

Like God, institutional substances afford an indeterminate and infinite source of possibility, kinds of toward-which which must be actualized to be a constituent of worldhood but can never be reduced to those actualities. They ground, as Tom Carlson speaks of Heidegger’s existence, not an existent actuality as opposed to the possibility that inheres in essence, but the actuality of possibility (Carlson, 2008: 65). Institutional substances do not objectify man and efface the sacred, as Heidegger

37. The faith required of a regime of engagement is denied through a form of a “substantialist reduction” covering its tracks by believing that a quality secured through qualification inheres in the person, that an individual plan inheres in the physical attributes of its objects, or that the confidence of attachment derives from features of the body or material elements of a milieu (Thévenot, 2011: 56).
claims of "values," a neighboring term. They subject him to their call, offering a direction whose only coordinates are to be found in the kind of being one can be in their practice, calling him to service, granting him more than he is by offering him a plurality of habitable sacred places which can never be reduced to physical locations and whose practical potentialities can never be securely identified with actualities. They are in him, but not of him, the concealed bases of the "theres" of his world. Perhaps I am abusing the hospitality of the text, but I would suggest that institutional substances, as Heidegger says – via the poet Holderin-- of the gods, are the unknown ones, the alien in the sight of the familiar, and indeed and nonetheless, the mysterious "measure of man" (Heidegger, 1971b: 220). We dwell institutionally, "guarding the concealed in its self-concealment" (Heidegger, 1971b:221).

Heidegger secularizes Christian revelation. In his understanding of modern technology, like Christian revelation, it is the "coming to presence" that is always concealed, the "mystery" to which neither the profit-driven industrialist nor the pietistic priest, will ever have access (Heidegger, 1977a: 22). The unconcealment, he writes, "within which ordering unfolds, is never a human handwork" (Heidegger, 1977a: 18). It is to this "call of unconcealment" that all respond, thereby allowing particular ways of unconcealment, of revealing the real, to claim them (Heidegger, 1977a: 19). In every case, disclosure entails a concealment, a covering over, of being, and of the nature of possibility in particular, by one's falling into what the "they" think and do, a succumbing to socially accepted and ratified patterns of practice that reduce possibility to actuality, to a substantial presence-at-hand of persons and objects, to a voluntarism of sovereign subjects on the one hand or a materialism of casually ordered objects on the other. Through the "they," one responds to nobody in particular, but to what sociologists would term a generalized other, that is, what "one" does.

Given the way in which subjectification and objectification are co-constitutive in Heidegger’s account, his critique of the sufficiency of making on the basis of an idea or representation as a way of thinking worldhood, and his excavation of the onto-theology that serves as the deep background of our secular understanding of truth as correspondence, it is curious that Heidegger does not critically engage the sufficiency of Aristotle’s category of poiesis. Indeed, he repeatedly looked to poetry, which the Greeks understood as a form of poiesis, as the antidote for our dark times, as an alternative mode of revealing of the truth of being, as a way for us to participate in our “belongingness…within granting,” and hence our “share in revealing which the coming-to-pass of revealing needs” (Heidegger, 1977a: 32). The "granting" that Heidegger holds out as the “saving power” secreted within the logic of revealing points to an explicitly religious phenomenology. Grounded in the inherent poetics of dwelling – in which the awaiting of divinities is an essential constituent – along with saving the earth, receiving the sky and initiating mortals, for Heidegger poetry imagines the gods as figures by which that granting is understood, makes appear what is concealed by still concealing it. Poetry is part of the practice of dwelling, its “original admission” (Heidegger, 1971b:225).

Aristotle distinguished between poeisis and praxis, which he also distinguished, respectively, as production and action (Aristotle, 2004). Both are ways of "arriving at truth" (Aristotle, 2004: 146). In the former, an act is derived instrumentally from an idea or end external to the act, as in the case of a craftsman who uses his skill, or techné, to execute a pre-existing...
representation or plan for a chair, or as Heidegger puts it “a view to the finished thing.” Word and act are related as a “making.”

In praxis, in contrast, the standards of action are internal to the action, and the goal of the action is the action itself. Word and act are related as a doing, or a performance. Speaking of prudence, one of the virtues, Aristotle writes:

…prudence cannot be science or art…For production aims at an end other than itself; but this is impossible in the case of action, because the end is merely doing well. What remains, then, is that it is a true state, reasoned, and capable of action with regard to things that are good or bad for man. (Aristotle, 2004: 150)

Whereas poeisis is governed by a means-ends logic; praxis is not. In praxis, subject and object are both immanent in the act. Praxis, unlike production, is a self-contained order of action. In production, the actuality of the making is in the thing being made; in action, the actuality of action is located in the actor himself.

Heidegger’s maintains the centrality of poeisis, when praxis seems a more adequate frame for our being in the world, in which our subjectivity is co-implicated with our object world, and although Heidegger does not analyze it, the ways in which our being with objects and the practices to which they are tied is co-implicated in our being with others. Heidegger’s analysis of technology makes it clear that neither craftsmanship nor modern technology can be understood only in terms of poeisis. Both are modes of subjectification and objectification mediated by particular regimes of practice, of a bringing-forth or a challenging-forth. Makers are made by the way in which they make, in which the made obscures the hegemony, and the valuation, of that kind of subject, which is also a way of being in the world. Objects depend on practices of objectification that afford particular kinds of objectifiers. His analysis points to the inadequacy of the distinction between poeisis and praxis.

Praxis is organized around ontologically subjective objects, objects that can only approximate appearance through practice, through the acts of subjects whose actions and subjectivities depend on them. In praxis, subjectification and objectification are co-constitutive. From an institutional logical view, the institutional objects of praxis – money, ballots, boundary lines, information, accounts, religious icons, revealed text -- are not just objects at all, but rather constituted by, infused with, and animated by substances, non-observable reasons that cannot be reduced to rationality or sense, that can only be phenomenalized through practice (Friedland, 2017). One can never arrive at them, only repeat the approach through practice, practices that themselves depend for the effects and their affects on institutional conditions, conditions typically concealed by the apparently autonomous and continuous course of interlocked-practices. In practice, one does not speak for them, nor do they speak for you; one speaks through them and they through you.

By comparison to the presence of things, an institutional substance is an absent presence towards and around which practice incessantly moves, known only through this movement. Institutional logics are tele-ontological enactments, a wny-what done through a how, popular sovereignty through democratic election, justice through juridical practices that classify actions according to the binary of legal and illegal, divinity through pilgrimage and prayer, romantic love through intimate exchange of

39. When he does use the Greek term praxis, he opposes “manipulation in our concernful dealings” to a theoretical attitude (Heidegger, 1962: 409).
body and word. Institutional logics depend on making the invisible substance visible; substance is every institution’s groundless ground. Institutional practices are the visible face and the condition of possibility of institutional substances, and hence the source of their identity across time. The worldhood of the world is composed of a configuration of institutional logics. An institutional approach regionalizes significance, granting content and giving primacy to the term Heidegger eschews—value, rather than making these various ontic domains into ciphers or sites through which a single hegemonic metaphysics and its grounding phenomenology concealingly reveal themselves. Heidegger eschews the category of value because of its onto-theological and metaphysical baggage, its imagining man on the model of God as the ruler of all being, who makes value, a subject who constructs value as his object. In his “Letter on Humanism,” he writes:

...by the very characterization of something as a “value,” what has been judged to be such a “value” has been robbed of its worth. That is to say, through the evaluation of something as a value, what has been judged to be so becomes accepted as merely an object for valuation by man...All valuing, even where it values positively, is a kind of subjectifying. (Heidegger, 1949)

The truth of being, like the value of God, can be no object. The world cannot be derived from sovereign subject makers, which I presume, is why Heidegger recalled the gods to worldhood and the possibilities of dwelling.

But if value, like substance, is understood as that which subjectifies, which gives us being only as a kind of being to be, as a kind of subjectification which must exist before the truth of being can even be posed, that the phenomenological only lights up in the obtrusiveness of the institutional, in its disruption and dying, as well as its regeneration and renewal, then the onto-theological critique gets recast as a reflection not of God’s afterlife, but of the hiddenness of all the gods. Rather than a phenomenological being concealed in the ontic order of beings, it posits institutional modes of being, which can better be captured in praxis than poiesis. 40 Rather than the “shining-forth” of a “more primal truth,” “the splendor of radiant appearing” a “dialogue of divine and human destinings” (Heidegger, 1977a: 28, 34), it points to a multiplicity of gods, of possibilities of being, of specific worldhoods which afford not only beauty, but varieties of justice (Caputo, 1993).

Institutional substances are each sources of possibility that can never be reduced to actuality, revealed in practice, a practice that depends on human belief, on discourse, talking about and naming the nameless. Each involves a way of revealing the real that depends on belief in the reality of that real, and hence on an unconcealment that is, as Heidegger puts it, “never a human handiwork” (Heidegger, 1977a: 18). Each involves a “granting that lets man endure” (Heidegger, 1977a: 33). Each depends on being called, on a kind of grace, of being given, by the substance, of being offered a good which one can never have, never control, never master, something which—like God—can never be made. Rather, it is we who are made by its making in the particular image of this “god.”

Each institution involves a covering over in very the way it affords possibility, the withholding of being, of what Heidegger calls the “mystery” of revelation. As in Heidegger’s treatment of technology, the materiality in each enables while it conceals. Technology appears as an instrumental

40. Heidegger, of course, rejects this position. “For ontology is precisely what always thinks about the kinds of be-ing in their be-[ing]. However, as long as the truth of be-[ing] is not thought, all ontology is without foundation” (Heidegger, 1949).
fabrication of means to human ends, an application of knowledge about the causal order of nature, when, in essence, Heidegger argues, it is a way of revealing of the real. Just as technology's machines conceal their way of revealing through the veil of their materiality, both as causes and consequences, so does every institutional realm depend on material objects to both substantiate and render inconspicuous its way of revealing, of making true. So it is with love, which depends on double beds, babies and wedding rings; sovereignty on borders, passports, uniforms and firearms; property on cadastral mapping and surveyor's tools, commodities on coins, vaults, contracts and ledger-books; gods on chalices, candles, text and sacred spaces. One's subjectivity is constituted by the mode in which objectification takes place, not by the objects themselves, nor by the willful and cognitive qualities of the subject.

Rather than a project to provide a basis for authenticity by a non-relational ownmost, a being wrested from the “they,” potentially encountering both the essence of the self and a self-presencing natural world out of human anxiety in response to human finitude, “unsupported by concernful solicitude” (Heidegger, 1962: 311, 320-325), an institutional approach points to the existential quality of an institutionally constituted “we,” whose freedom is located in institutional multiplicity, the alternative bases of truth, critique, exit and organization it offers, and the unbridgeable gap between possibility and actuality, and hence in the ever immanent and imminent possibility of institutional, not human, death, and most ordinarily miraculously, rebirth. An institutional approach would join the phenomenology of finitude to amplitude, to ways in which institution harbors, nurtures and indeed loves us in parallel to the creation and sheltering of new life, would think the reciprocal ties between letting life be and our taking it away, as demographic actuality and as a critical event and limit of our being. It would allow us to approach the mysterious bringing new collective life forth as we bring new beings forth, of loving and living. An institutional approach would join the phenomenology of finitude to amplitude, to ways in which institution harbors, nurtures and indeed loves us in parallel to the creation and sheltering of new life, would think the reciprocal ties between letting life be and our taking it away, as demographic actuality and as a critical event and limit of our being. It would allow us to approach the mysterious bringing new collective life forth as we bring new beings forth, of loving and living.

An institutional approach would join instituting to birthing, effaced by Heidegger, the originary there-being, exposing mothers and children equally to dying, would join individual and collective reproduction, milk and “ego ideals” (in Lear’s terms, see below) as sources of both the worst and the best of which humans are capable. To cut natality, the act of beginning, from birthing, as Hannah Arendt did, is an analytically murderous move, a ghettoization of the materiality of care, an ownmost relationality. To give death primacy as one’s ownmost is not only incomplete; it is pernicious and misogynistic, a covering over the central background to the granting of our being.

EATING CROWNESS

I am not alone in thinking that Heidegger’s framework can be refashioned in a more sociological, if not institutional, manner. Schatzki’s incorporation of the teleo-affective opens the prospect of another anxiety, a collective phenomenon that calls us in the collapse of our world, as a death of collective intelligibility, of the inoperability of our affects, the material practices which they animated and that organized them, and the teloi to which they were yoked. This anxiety may not only individualize us as it discloses our being-in-the-world as “nothing and nowhere” (Heidegger, 1962: 233), it can collectivize us as it discloses a world as a “there” which conjointly grounds both collective possibility and the possibility of the collectivity.

41. In Being and Time, Heidegger recognizes that he has not yet analyzed being from birth in his existential analytic (1962: 425).
The philosophical anthropologist Jonathan Lear shows the ways in which in the indigenous Crow world, divinely chosen North American nomadic hunters for which the “there” was most risky, decomposed into an unknown uncertainty in which their temporality, their exemplary acts, and their very identity became unintelligible as their Sioux and white American enemies subdued, reduced and confined them over the course of the 19th century (Lear, 2008). Previously an individual’s being towards death in war and hunting functioned as the risky basis of that world, as the basis of Crow distantiality, the measuring of honorable distance between each other. But confined to the reservation, one could no longer “count coups”; shame and honor would no longer compute. The buffalo and the wild horses were no more. Crow informants no longer could make sense, could not account for happenings in the categories grounded in former interlocked practices, ends and affects. After the buffalo were gone, Plenty Coup, the exemplary and prophetic center of Lear’s analysis, declared, “nothing happened” (Lear 2008: 2). Lear seeks to provide a Heideggerian basis of this truth in the account of Plenty Coup, a man whose dreams allowed his community to re-imagine the cardinal virtue of courage once tied to the affect of shame and the boundary-fixing of a “there” – through the planting of “coup-sticks” where one pledged to die before an enemy would pass, or striking an armed enemy with it before killing him – in the absence of war and the end of hunting:

The death of Dasein is thus the collapse of that way of life, and being-towards-death is the way we relate to that possibility of collapse. In particular, students of Heidegger can read this essay as an inquiry into being-towards-death: Plenty Coup’s way of comporting himself in relation to the death of Dasein (Lear, 2008: 162).

While this is meant as a fitting homage, I read his text as immanent critique. The death of Dasein and a way of life cannot be cleaved by Heidegger’s central term, the there-being, of his phenomenology. But Heidegger’s interpretation of human finitude centers on the first, the death of Dasein, not the second, the way of life; on the individual possibility of impossibility of being which cannot be outstripped, delegated or shared, on the “indefinite certainty” of death as potentially freeing individual beings of the “they” (Heidegger, 1962: 310). Death’s anticipation, Heidegger writes, “brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom towards death—a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the ‘they’, and which is factual, certain of itself, and anxious” (Heidegger, 1962: 311). “If Dasein stands before itself as this possibility, it has been fully assigned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. When it stands before itself in this way, all its relations to any other Dasein have been undone” (Heidegger, 1962: 294). In Heidegger’s understanding, anticipating death “individualizes Dasein down to itself…It makes manifest that all Being-alongside the things with which we concern ourselves, and all Being-with Others, will fail us when our ownmost potentiality-for Being is the issue. Dasein can be authentically itself only if it makes this possible for itself of its own accord” (Heidegger, 1962: 308).

It wasn’t the prospect of Plenty Coup’s own death that brought him his childhood visions, but the collective anxiety of the Crow who faced the collapse of intelligibility and the actionability of their ideals, which had gone hand in hand with their actual decimation. For Lear, unlike Heidegger, it is the collapse of the telos, the Crow conception of the good-life, that is key to
this collapse, to the pervasiveness of their anxiety (Lear, 2006: 57). As Lear remarks:

"Sometimes it is said that anxiety is "about nothing," but this claim seems too strong. Rather, with anxiety there is a systematic and enigmatic unclarity as to what it is about. Anxiety would thus have been an appropriate response of people who were sensitive to the idea that they were living at the horizons of their world (Lear, 2006: 76)."

In facing up to the death of the Crow subject, of Crowness itself, Plenty Coup was able to free himself from everyday practical Crow conventions, and particularly the way "they" interpreted being towards death in agonistic practice, to embed the logic of courage and honor into new practices of listening of the chickadee revealed in the dream, to accept the coming disastrous death of the Crow way of life, and to believe in the return of a new kind of as-yet contentless good life that will be revealed by their one god (Lear, 2006: 51, 80, 92). Courage is here neither pliancy to powerlessness nor rebellion that will fail, but to act as if there is a good to come, to listen carefully to the white man and watch for the way, a "radical hope." Plenty Coup and his tribal elders committed themselves to a goodness they could not yet understand, without specifying the conditions of its actionability or the actions that would make it a practical ideal. They courageously committed themselves to the bare life of institution. They not only saved the collective "we"; they held open its capacity to institute.

The co-implication of Dasein and world does not in the Crow case, in my view, imply a Heideggerian phenomenological understanding of being-towards-death. It suggests, rather, a more institutional account and one based on the problematic of the "we," not the "they," on the possibility of being a collective, not just the collective possibility of being, on the projection of an unknown good. It was not the individualization of the anticipation of individual death in the case of the Plenty Coup, but the collapse of collective understanding and interpretation of everyday deaths as manifestations of a willingness to risk not being-in this world that made a new "we" as Crowness possible. It was the "possible impossibility" of collective existence that made the possibility of these individual deaths meaningless as the basis of the Crow world. This collapse points to the way in which the possibility of courageous individual Crow dying, their good deaths, always already belonged to the collective; when they no longer did it marked their unintelligibility and the death of the good itself.

Heidegger argues that although representation, delegation and substitutability of one Dasein by another is constitutive of our sociality, our being with others, he is insistent that, when it comes to dying, such representation fails. "No one can take the Other's dying away from him," he declares in all italics (Heidegger, 1962: 284). True, but I would argue that in this case such dying is a representation of the "there" for, in and by which we live. It is a collective representation; it belongs to us because it is our basis, both as mechanism and symbol, a phenomenological substantiation of the no-thing and no-where of our collective existence, of our worldhood. For the Crow anxiety was not primarily an individualizing disclosure of one's ownmost, non-relational potentialities of individual being, but a potentially collectivizing hope courageously organized around new sets of practices and the potentialities of collective being. For the

42. The "they" certainly did not disburden Plenty Crow; "they" afforded his struggle towards a new decision, a life-affirming thrown projection. It was simply not true that "[e]veryone is the other, and no one is himself." Heidegger's account hardly aligns with this case: "Yet because the "they" presents every judgment and decision as its own, it deprives the particular Dasein of its answerability. The they' can, as it were, manage to have 'them' constantly invoking it. It can be answerable for everything most easily, because it is not someone who needs to vouch for anything. It was' always the "they" who did it, and yet it can be said that it has been 'no one'. In Dasein's everydayness the agency through which most things come about is one of which we must say that "it was no one" (Heidegger, 1962: 164). Plenty Coup spoke for god, for the ancestors, for the wisdom of beings that were not Dasein.
Crow, as Lear takes pains to show, the affects of shame and honor had always been based on an anonymized and inconspicuous “they,” an internalized generalized other. These affective operations of this “they” did not afford a fleeing from death, but a binding oneself to its possibility, in the counting of coup, publicly touching the prospect of a fatal encounter before the encounter, a manifestation of the manifesting power of Crow reality, as a making a “there” before the spear punctured the flesh, in which each warrior’s body was a body politic. Shame and honor do not appear in Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, a striking omission for a man who published it a decade after the end of a personally and collectively shameful world war in which the author lost many of his high-school friends, a war in which he was not able to fight because of his heart condition. The link here between being towards individual death a là Heidegger and the death of the collective basis of Dasein for the Crow was not a covering over of death as an actuality, but its thematizing as a possibility. The possibility of death was the basis of Crow ground as it was in Heidegger’s world.

In anxiety as a “state-of-mind,” Heidegger writes, “Dasein finds itself face to face with the ‘nothing’ of the possible impossibility of its existence” (Heidegger, 1962: 310). Heidegger means the existence of Dasein, but focuses only on its being, not the collective basis of its there. It was through anxiety that Plenty Coup and the Crow who interpreted his dreams found the courage to face the impossibility of their former existence and the unknowability of a good life to come. 43

The link here between the anxiety of individual and collective death is analytically problematic. It is perhaps artifactual because the central practices by which the Crow effected Crowness organized the meting out of death – to invading enemies and roaming animals. Perhaps it is the ontic nearness of death in these practices that provided an opportunity, as Heidegger says, for “those who reach into the abyss,” who can “know the marks that the abyss remarks...the traces of the fugitive gods” (Heidegger, 1971c: 90-91), who could – like Plenty Coup in his dreams -- thereby presence Crow divinities and re-birth themselves, legitimately institute anew, dwelling and letting being be another way. Or perhaps there is a phenomenological consonance between the nothing of our individual finitude, the concealment it illuminates which evokes the anxiety of our groundlessness, the nowhere of our “there,” the unknown promise and danger of possible worlds, the hope and apocalyptic terror of incommensurable pathways of projection; and the location that it clears, where we easily join death and life, of destruction and creation, the twinned exceptions of sovereign authorities and the gods. Whatever the source of affinity what saved the Crow from collective death was, as Heidegger himself enjoins, a poetry – Plenty Coup’s enigmatic dream visions -- that enabled the tribe to move beyond being towards individual death as the modality in which the being of the collective was disclosed, in which the Crow might newly dwell.

Heidegger, it appears, was himself a more traditional Crow. But when he wrote *Being and Time* his *poeisis* was not that of Plenty Crow. The problematic analytic relation between individual death and the death of a way of life that centers Lear’s analysis of the fate of the Crow haunted Heidegger himself. For much of his life he stood in the line of Sitting Bull and the others who would imagine that the Crow might continue to fight in the old way, not the inheritance of Plenty Crow who imagined otherwise. *Being and Time* was published ten years after the end of World War I, where millions of Heidegger’s countrymen, including his own high school

43. “Even if shame and its motivations always involve in some way or other an idea of the gaze of another, it is important that for many of its operations the imagined gaze of an imagined other will do.” (Lear, 2006: 85).
friends, lost their lives in an industrial dying, a militarist culture built, like that of the Crow, around honor, and leaving as its legacy the end of empires, nationalist independence, mass suffrage, and in Germany a collective shame about the end of their world and anxiety about what “there” there would be. Heidegger experienced a double shame: that he had never fought and that Germany had been subdued, hobbled, drained of its treasure and stripped of its proper land. Being and Time is suffused with death, but no mention of killing nor war. Heidegger wrote Being and Time, it has been suggested, as a funeral oration and a politicized phenomenology that would provide resources for future wars, for the choosing of the one destined by the gods to show a way different from what “they” had already mapped out: liberal capitalism and communism (Altman, 2012). It is arguable that the resolute anticipation of death is the standing-reserve of fascism, a subjectless and objectless state-of-mind that can only be grounded in place. Heidegger, in Being and Time, urges his readers to return towards one’s being towards death, to “be free for its death,” so that they might “take over its own thrownness and be in the moment of vision for its time’. Only authentic temporality which is at the same time finite, makes possible something like fate—that is to say, authentic historicality” (Heidegger, 1962: 437). For Heidegger, as for the Crow, being-towards-death is the “hidden basis of Dasein’s historicality” (Heideger, 1962: 438). Plenty Coup’s contra-vision was to listen to the chickadee out of a desire to live on as a powerless collectivity. Although he too will turn towards “releasement,” Heidegger’s long-time impulse was to listen to the leader out of a desire to approach dying authentically and to restore that collectivity to military power. “The authentic repetition of a possibility of existence that has been-the possibility that Dasein may choose its hero—is grounded existentially in anticipatory resoluteness; for it is in resoluteness that one first chooses the choice which makes one free for the struggle of loyally following in the footsteps of that which can be repeated” (Heidegger, 1962: 437). His existential phenomenology transmuted the anxiety of his people into a philosophy that helped call some of his countrymen to a murderous future and a “joy” in this potentiality for being (Heidegger, 1962: 358). The contentlessness of possibility is the liability of a phenomenology devoid of institutionality.

THE INSTITUTIONAL GOODNESS OF LIFE

The most basic aim of this long essay is to have put Schatzki’s practice theory, Heidegger’s existential ontology, and my own institutional logics in relation to each other, so we can begin to understand what we have to learn from and use from each other, the commensurabilities and incommensurabilities of our projects and our tools. I have emphasized the exegetical as opposed to the comparative simply because it is the first undone task. I have argued that there is a sociology of practice immanent in Heidegger’s phenomenology, but as in Bourdieu’s theory, it is an endless project (Friedland, 2009). Schatzki articulates that sociology of practice, among other things, making ontic significance, normative ends, the teloi of practice, much more explicit in his interpretation of the organization of practice.

The human project, I would agree, is not to not “quail” before the unconcealed; it is to decide how we shall live together, as Caputo bitingly remarks, in our choice of institutionally conditioned bios, not our reverent dwelling in a natural physis (Caputo, 1993). It is Heidegger who fails to engage the substantive possibilities of institutional plurality by his heroic,
and, purposively amoral, retreat into and search for a universal transcendence through phenomenological reduction. To allow oneself to be claimed and called by nameless being, to dwell on this earth in a poetic poiesis that lets being be, Heidegger’s critical response to onto-theology’s totalizing trajectory, to the nihilism that opens up in the omnivorous maw of enframing, does not offer a way to reconstitute the public sphere populated with reticent beings who rarely have much to say (Heidegger, 1949: 223).

Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, rather than the ground of the anthropological, may be its effect, its expression, if not its symptom, and perhaps provides a way to arrive, at least, at its sociological complement, and even, just possibly, its source. In my view, the world is composed of a vast what Schatzki calls a “plenum” of configurations of institutional logics, whose singularity and plurality each take us out of ourselves, offering perpetual possibility and the constitutive risks of ekstasis. From the truth of being itself, the light of being (Heidegger, 1949), let alone poetic dwelling, one will never arrive at this world.

Heidegger charted a phenomenology of being in the world as a network of equipped practices and their involvements which is a project that institutional theory is just now taking up. But to theorize worldhood we must return to the ends of practice, to something like value, a long-forbidden term in our lexicon. Value was repudiated by Heidegger and embraced by Schatzki as teloi. Reading Schatzki and Heidegger together suggests the dual project of an institutional phenomenology and a phenomenological institutionalism, that works the compossibilities of phenomenology and sociology, of the ontological and the ontic, operations that explore the co-implication, if not the binding, in practice of teleology and ontology, of subjectification and objectification, being and doing.

And the gods are calling us. And here Heidegger offers us a pathway out of which we might think them analytically in a religious phenomenology of institutional life. We would, I think, be advised to return again to the challenge of the war of the gods of Max Weber, with whose incommensurable logics Heidegger also grappled, to face up to the responsibilities of living with and through an institutional polytheism, not just to seek authenticity and a primordial temporality in our common being-towards-death and the apparently revelatory letting being be. A politics based on the latter—embraced by Heidegger himself—already almost killed us all in part because it sought to efface that multiplicity in the service of authentic resoluteness and a dwelling in place. It is not racial or religious, but institutional, multiplicity -- the birth, death, settlements and war of the gods -- that is the greatest political and theoretical challenge of our time.

44. Elliot Wolfson puts it this way: “[C]ritical aspects of his philosophical anthropology intersected with the political goals laid out by the National Socialist agenda. That intersection led Heidegger to believe that the party would serve as a good practical platform to propagate his thought, and, consequently, he would rescue the German people at a critical juncture and help them retrieve their destiny as the ethnos that would bring about the new beginning marked by meditative thinking—to gather oneself into reflection—as opposed to the calculative thinking that shaped Western metaphysics. …Heidegger viewed National Socialism as a movement that had the potential to advance his notion of a contemplative openness to the essential occurrence of truth wherein what is true has its ground, the opening in which beginnings are manifest in the concealment of their being” (Wolfson, 2018: 27-28).
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