RADICALISM PUT TO THE TEST OF THE FATHER

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La radicalité à l’épreuve du Père

Abstract:
This article questions the real involved in “radicalism” and “radicalization”, understood as particular postmodern nominations, and confronts this real to the psychoanalytic perspective of nomination, as a radical coordinate of the structure operated by the father. The authors attempt to question the name “radical” and then to demonstrate and illustrate through clinical cases that contemporary forms of fanaticism are correlated, by the regimes of jouissance involved, with the capitalist discourse. These subjective solutions are comforted by a literal discourse arising from the rejection of the subject of love and politics, but not without something residual: the symptom.

Résumé:
Cet article questionne le réel en jeu dans le « radicalisme » et la « radicalisation », entendus comme des nominations postmodernes particulières et confronte ce réel à la perspective psychanalytique de la nomination, en tant que coordonnée radicale de la structure, opérée par le père. Les auteurs s’emploient à interroger le nom de « radical », puis à démontrer et à illustrer, au travers de cas cliniques, que les formes contemporaines du fanatisme sont corrélées, par les régimes de jouissance qu’elles engagent, au discours capitaliste. Ces solutions subjectives se confortent d’un discours littéral qui procède d’un rejet du sujet de l’amour et de la politique, mais ne sont pas sans reste : le symptôme.

Keywords: radicalization, Name of the Father, ab-sense, postmodernity, symptom
Mots clés: radicalisation, Nom-du-Père, ab-sens, postmodernité, symptôme

Plan:
Introduction
Uses and Misuses of a Term
The Psychoanalytical Approach: Radically Other
A Passive Process Against a Background of Ignorance
A Clinic of Ab-sense
The Radicalness of the Name of the Father
By Way of Conclusion
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Full text

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Introduction

Researchers in different disciplines in the human sciences and social sciences are in complete agreement when it comes to the diagnosis of our contemporary social bond, that is to say, when it comes to what ensures the coexistence of enjoying and speaking bodies. The fact that the said diagnosis is formulated in terms of anomy, of broadening to the masses, of unbinding, of dissolution, and so on and so forth, still brings us back to having to examine the reasons and the modalities of this unknotting. A close examination of the state of this social bond brings out its over-determination with regard to at least three factors: politics, science, and religion.

Contrary to what a certain positivism has allowed people to think – including Freud himself, Cf. his The Future of an Illusion (1927) –, religion has not been purely and simply effaced in favor of science and its discourse. In fact, it is very much the opposite. The development and the domination of the scientific discourse, through its effects of universalization, of homogenization, and of the shaking up of ideals and
semblants, has provoked, as a reaction, the return to what science had to exclude in order to be constituted: the subject, love, the Father, and meaning – in a word, religion. This is true with the proviso that this religion, or this religious dimension, is making a return in different forms, under new guises, with aims that are different than its older forms. Even if the political use of religion and the religious use of politics are as old as religion and politics, it would seem – but this is perhaps just a distorting effect of the greater visibility given by the marriage of techno-science and globalization, especially in the audio-visual domain – that the “new forms of disarray” of postmodern subjects, the failures and the deadlocks in postcolonial policies, the harshness of the economic consequences of neoliberalism, and so on, have led to new guises of the religious, of its investment, and of the functions that are assigned to it.

Among these are what has been called, rightly or wrongly, radicalization, without it being known, however, whether the process in question refers to religion itself or to certain subjects who, in becoming “radicalized,” promote a “radical” version of the religion to which they adhere and that they want to defend and to spread.

In the present article, we will seek, in the first section, to examine the choice, which is never an innocent one, of the terms “radicalism” and “radicalization.” In the second section, to the extent that at the heart of religion, as at the heart of any social bond, lies the question of the father, we will examine in a new light how the psychoanalytical doctrine of the father is able to clarify phenomena that are described as phenomena of radicalization. In drawing on these considerations and their discussion, we shall call upon what clinical practice with the so-called “radicalized” subjects can teach us. Lastly, we will end with a few considerations on the “radicalism of the Name of the Father” and the perspectives that it opens when it comes to the intelligibility of our contemporary social bond and, perhaps, for the future.

Uses and Misuses of a Term

“Radicalism,” “radicalization,” and other terminological derivations from “radical,” today constitute the usual terms of a dominant vocabulary that is being used to describe and to designate certain types of phenomena related to religious fanaticisms and forms of political violence that can result from them. In the French legal system, half a dozen legal texts have since 2012 made direct use of the term “radicalization.” In this way, the academic milieu has also invested in this: the human sciences and social sciences are being recruited to carry out the observation and theoretical and empirical interpretation of the phenomena that have been designated. Multi-disciplinary research is being undertaken. Credits are being allocated. There is, apparently, a demand for this. But what is this demand? And where does it come from?

These terms are particular signifiers of our contemporaneity, whose coordinates and aims remain ambiguous and contribute to a “catch-all concept.” From a lexical point of view, we are faced with a curious observation: in this context, the adjective “radical” is disconnected from its (grammatical) radical and, by virtue of this, is cut off from its signifying scope. It is as though, for example, a “radicalized element” could signify something without the thing... at the very least without the mention of the thing; the thing being elsewhere... By admitting that one is able to do without the root and to affirm that “radicalization” simply aims at signifying the substantial process of reinforcing a thing, we would have to consider an even more troublesome problem than the grammatical error, namely the inconstancy in the use of this error.

In effect, the modern acceptance of the syntactic units that have been derived from “radical,” even though they refer to that which forms a root/foundation, tends to signify the extremity rather than the root, that is, the extremes, the extremisms, and so on. Worse still, there is a conflation of what is extreme and what is radical, to the point that both are confused in the commonly regurgitated terms:
“radicalisms” and “fundamentalisms,” which today refer palpably to the same referent as “extremisms,” its drifts, and so on. However, the implications of both one and the other are not at all the same: if the condemnation of the “extreme” locates the corruption of the element in its derived use, in the distancing from its radical value, the condemnation of the “radical” and of the “fundamentalist” casts scorn on the very essence of the element, on what constitutes it most profoundly.

Through a differential approach to the majority of uses of the term, it appears that it constitutes much more of a disguised accusatory charge directed at cultural and religious elements, most of which are Arab and/or Muslim, rather than a precise conceptual construction that aims at forming a grasp of the causes, the reasons, and the processes that go to produce the element being described as “radicalized.” This nomination is not, therefore, a harmless one, and it is inscribed in postmodern subjectivity as yet another modality of the rejection of the religious dimension. This results in a lexical “catch-all” category, open to chancy and even dangerous uses and abuses, and which, in our opinion, ought rather to be used in both a measured and critical way.

The Psychoanalytical Approach: Radically Other

If we look at the elements contributed by the empirical research projects, especially in experimental psychology, we may note that the consideration of what is called “radicalization” is always inscribed into a problematic of “disturbance to the public order,” even of “terrorism” and the struggle against it. At the heart of these empirical studies, we shall distinguish two approaches: a majority approach, which has been described as (liberal) Anglo-Saxon, and which situates the question of radicalization at the level of action and not at the level of ideology, by focusing on the study of, the prevention of, and the struggle against behaviors of political violence; and a European approach, and in particular a French approach, which attempts to detect what is “radical” in the ideology itself, in order to find therein the clues for a potential passage à l’acte in the future. While this latter approach considers the adoption of a “radical ideology” as a preliminary to any engagement in violent action, and reproaches the former approach with directing its attention only to the “how?” rather than to the “why?,” the Anglo-Saxon approach underscores the absence of any convincing link between the two phenomena. The impact of these two perspectives on public debate is considerable, and has had an impact on both the academic and the psychoanalytical milieus. Now, the radical alterity of knowledge in the psychoanalytical ethic is precious. From this perspective, the divergences between the abovementioned approaches appear to be relative, since neither will surmount the barrier of the repressed, so as to take an interest in the unconscious movements that mean that a subject may find in such and such an ideology, or such and such a behavior, a zone of jouissance. We need, therefore, to examine first and foremost these taboos. And we also need to ask the question: what is the real that is at stake in radicalization insofar as it is a postmodern nomination?

A Passive Process Against a Background of Ignorance

Important clues as to the fantasies that found postmodernity can be detected in the more frequent derivations of radical: “radicalization” and its past participle “radicalized.” On the one hand, there is the idea of a process and of an evolving mutation, which would thus follow a schema that it would be possible to describe, and on the basis of which a criteriology could be established. All the definitions of radicalization, which are so often put forward by security organizations, underscore the idea of a process. Assidity of religious practice, attendance of mosques, Internet contact with war zones, messages on social networks that make apologist arguments for “terrorism,” links with an organized gang, are, by way of example, the usual criteria for “radicalization.” This kind of criteriology is orientated by surveillance and, ultimately, by punishment: the eradication of the “radical.” Its ethic is “securitatist”
and non-scientific, even though it makes use of the language of science. It is bound to the reason of the state, to the extent that the reason of the state is sustained by the monopoly of legitimate violence. Another aspect has to do with the passive route of the appellation. “Radicalized element” sustains the imaginary of an exterior influence that would supposedly instrumentalize naïve minds, or even “ignorant” and “uncultured” minds, to the advantage of hateful ideological designs. This second aspect betrays how the repressed is held at a distance via the fantasy. Here, there is a projection of hateful motives onto an exotic and oriental other. “It comes from elsewhere and means us harm.” We can recognize here the Freudian coordinates, but also the Kleinian and the Lacanian coordinates of the fantasmatic paranoiac dialectic. This participates in a “paranoization” of the social bond, whose effects clamp down on the rejected body and on the rejecting body. In no respect whatsoever do we see this as an indicator of “generalized paranoia,” but much rather what H. Arendt situated as the denomination of the group on the inside by a group on the outside, a group that is dehumanized and onto which hate can be unleashed. All of this happens in a dynamic of identification. That is to say, the first crisis is a crisis of modern identity that pushes one to seek out discriminating limits, often in the form of the image, in the body, via the technical instrument, precisely in order to situate itself. These effects and their accentuation in postmodernity are also to be found in what Lacan formalized with regard to racism, the generalization of which in the social bond he foresaw, notably the fact of “the erring of our jouissance.” “Only the Other, the absolute Other, the radical Other, is able to mark the position of this jouissance, and to accentuate it as being the other. This means that, the other side of sex, we are separated from it.” By “race,” the finger is pointed at the Other that one cannot turn into one of one’s own. All that remains is to “think of him or her as underdeveloped, which of course we never fail to do, quite naturally.” The imaginary named “radicalization” perpetuates this condescending attitude towards an other, onto whom one projects one’s own hatred of not being able to pass over the barrier of sex. This is a hate that comes to the surface under the cover of Western values of democracy and freedom, and which Lacan qualifies as “empty forms of humanhysterianism [humanitairerie], which, it has to be said, has served only to disguise our extortions.”

Yet the contemporary fanatical dynamics go beyond the mere religious dimension. They draw on fantasies that, in spite of their relative diversity, present a strong formal similitude. Whether it is a matter of religious fanaticism, edifying a complete individual by faith, the pure application of the divine canon; or of fascist fanaticism, in which the national individual becomes a pure link in the chain of a governmental system, from which he or she draws a narcissistic glory; or even of techno-scientific fanaticism, establishing the augmented man, the transhuman, a pure cognitive system improved by algorithms; all of these systems maintain a homothetic relationship with each other. This homothetic relationship implies that a real relation projects different objects from a single invariant point. This invariant point is capitalism; this real relation is the rejection of the subject, of the symptom, of love, and of politics.

These postmodern subjective solutions, beyond their function as a Band-Aid on the narcissistic wound inflicted by castration, lead to the effacement of the subject in favor of a literal discourse, which tends towards a code. This “literalism,” which is sometimes holophrastic and which can be observed more and more in the contemporary forms of militantism – notably religious, transhumanist, and sectarian militantism –, is an operation that brings with it a leftover, because two different reals are necessarily rejected and/or foreclosed: castration and politics, which contradicts the established symbolic order. These reals will then have no other means of expression but the symptom.

In the case of Islamic fanaticism, this literalism is to be found again in the idea of Salafism (purity), which, even though it is exogenous to the cultural and historical complexity of Islam, finds numerous emulators among the postmodern youth. The reason for this attraction cannot be explained by mere ignorance of Islamic culture or by what these authors present as a modern form of feeblemindedness. The subjects who claim to adhere to Salafism who we met in the framework of our clinical practice were
anything but feebleminded, in that the quality of the statement that they elevated to the rank of a value system was less important to them than the function of containing and of displacing hate that it offered. Idiots, they may well be, in the Greek sense of the word, in the sense of “singular,” responding to a real that lies outside reality, but feebleminded they are not.

A Clinic of Ab-sense

When she returned from Syria, where she had gone in “search of truth,” Soraya, a young woman from a disadvantaged neighborhood of Toulouse, described for us a day-to-day existence that had become almost unbearable and in which she felt “surrounded by lies and futility.” For some months now she has been flagged as a national security risk and has been forbidden from leaving the national territory.

They want us to go but stop us from leaving... Go figure! They fill me with such hatred... In fact, it’s not even religion that binds us together, it’s hate.

Her parents, who do not approve of her ideological orientations, are perceived by Soraya as “weak,” even “servile,” especially her father, whom she describes as “someone who does not know how to assert himself.”

When I am face to face with him, I can’t manage to keep calm. I shout at him, and I overwhelm him. [...] He never responds when I ask him to do something. It’s like... It’s nothingness. He was different before, even though I don’t remember. He had a good situation back in his village, before he came to France, where he lost everything. So, my mother started working and he hit the bottle. That’s the father I’ve always known: an alcoholic. Then he turned to religion, but in fact it’s the same thing. The same silence. The same absence.

Paradoxically, this same behavior of avoidance and withdrawal was to be adopted by Soraya in a very pronounced phobic symptom and, inversely, she would displace her hate onto the Gouwers (Westerners) and onto French society, especially for having “made [her] father kowtow.” While she does not manage to speak about this hate – “there is no point in talking,” “it’s too much” – she lodges it in an imaginary of Salafist spiritual purity where injustices, wars, humiliation, and racism (of which she says she is a victim on a daily basis, especially in reaction to the full veil that she wears) would be a thing of the past.

The story that the twenty-four-year-old Salwa, from a Parisian suburb, tells us seems very similar, both in the portrayal of the paternal figure and in the type of symptom described, except that this time, rather than taking cover and isolating herself in a religious drift, she chooses instead liberal conformity: a business school degree in marketing and gala parties. By her own admission, she was no less veiled and isolated, the benefit that she sought having being that of melting into the mass so as not to be noticed. This she would never manage. Her scorn of social propriety and sophistication eventually got the upper hand, making her seem like “the strange one in the group.” She said that she deeply detested the French, the Westerners, “their condescending manners,” and fantasized about a future life in Dubai or in Qatar, where she could live “in luxury without having to be two-faced to the Gouwers.” “Over there, the French are nobody.” This defiance would become so intense during her second year of studies that she became convinced that people were saying bad things about her. She cut off all links with her group of “friends,” to the point of staying at home all the time. She had to repeat a year due to her high absenteeism, in spite of the high grades she was getting. She could no longer manage to take the bus as far as the business school, and soon she couldn’t leave the house at all. It was her fear of failing her studies, which she had financed herself with loans, that led her to consult.

When she speaks about her family context, she says that she is in a state of “constant hate:”

I detest coming from this family. I detest being part of this cliché: the Arab from an city suburb with an unemployed alcoholic father, a mother who does cleaning jobs, and a brother who deals drugs at the end of the
block and leads the cops back here. I’ve really had enough of it! I reject this entire reality, and so I’m the one who everything thinks is the crazy one in the family.”

With regard to her father, she adds:

As soon as I see him, I become annoyed. I can’t control it. I shout and I use aggressive language. I repeat constantly: “you are not my father.” He is not legitimate. I never listen to him... Because he never listened to me. He ended up giving in: he doesn’t speak to me anymore. I prefer to be free of him. I owe him nothing. I’ve crossed him out of my life. I crossed out my brother, at the start, because he is very aggressive and shouts all the time. I find him ridiculous. But now I accept him more because I know what he has been through. When he was a teenager and my father was hitting the bottle, he had to fill the void: “to be the father”... to take care of his children. I don’t know if it’s the authority of love... it’s a presence, I’d say. My brother grew up like... an orphan – A silence fills the room. – He grew up like my father, in fact! (Salwa’s father lost his parents during the early years of his life and was raised by his uncle’s family). History is repeating itself!

Salwa breaks out into an intense nervous laughter.

I could not hold anything against my mother, either: she cannot read or write. Any paperwork or administrative work, any problems, she should have been doing it but in the end I would do it for her. I was sometimes more of a mother for her than she was for me. That really got on my nerves and made my father’s absence even more painful.

Concerning her symptom, Salwa would say:

I have always felt out of step with others. I feel like I am odd in society. I don’t know how to position myself... My father was also odd with people. I could always see his awkward and strained expression whenever he spoke with someone he didn’t know... He could not bear to be with people who behaved falsely, with people who speak constantly without saying anything. And it is the same for me.

Salwa’s hatred of the world was thus to reveal its roots in the accusations leveled at her father, which, in turn, would reveal their essence in a question without response, there where a knowledge is destined to lack forever:

I would shout at him and I still feel like shouting at him: “Why are you like that!!? Why are you absent!!? Why are you good for nothing?”

A long silence then precedes her sudden awareness:

This “good for nothing” reminds me of what I hear people saying about me when I am in “isolation” mode... In fact, I am asking my father why I am good for nothing.

Here “for nothing” serves the signifier, where subjectivity, narcissistic consistence, and the relation to other people and to knowledge find themselves conjugated by the absent verb: the ab-sense of the father. This ab-sense of the Father constitutes the real in these clinical vignettes, in a form that is full of radical significance when it comes to the subjective position, much more so than any behavioral coordinate that might be isolated. We need then, from this point forth, to examine this radicalness more precisely in order to grasp the place-holders of the embodiment of THE father by A father and to understand its limits. Let us say right away that the “I” of the enunciation, rather than an “I” of the statement, the crucible of the identification with the father, does not solicit the symptom of the subject in the same way.

The Radicalness of the Name of the Father

Let us assert, first and foremost, that the radical function of the Name of the father is to give a name to things, which is no straightforward matter, given that this implies binding/knotting the fundamentally distinct registers.

From the beginnings of psychoanalysis, the psyche was to be conceptualized as attached to and dependent upon a symbolic order that exists prior to the subject. From Totem and Taboo (1913) to Moses
andMonotheism...(1939), going via Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), Freud constantly underscores the position of the father in the enunciation and the embodiment of this order, whether this should be necessary and universal as far as the prohibition of incest is concerned, or, more trivially, familial and local as far as its contingent forms are concerned within any given culture. This Freudian construction, relative to the Oedipus complex and its derivatives, thereafter reveals itself inscribed in the Lacanian field of the discourses, as being an idealization that conceals the castrated condition of the original father, turning the Oedipus complex into something that is ultimately quite light, faced with the real of the structure.\textsuperscript{18}

From the Seminar on Transference up to the Seminar on Anxiety, going via the Seminar on Identification, Lacan brings about a series of subversions that touch on the position of the father in psychoanalysis and on its function in the structure of the subject. This series marks a major conceptual turning point in his teaching, which will first be translated by the designation of that aspect of the father that is at stake in what is commonly called the “paternal function,” namely the “real father.”\textsuperscript{19} It is this real father that is the agent of castration. This does not refer to – though this has been said and is still often repeated – a symbolic order or pure signifier that castrates the subject via the father and introduces him or her into the community of humanity, but rather to the real aspect of the father, that is to say, the site of a painful impact of this order and, at the same time, a site of resistance, of rebellion, and of symptom.\textsuperscript{20} The subject and his or her symptom are forged not in the image of a father that is unarily [unairement] complete – the father as a perfect agent and representative of the law –, but instead upon its inconsistency, upon that which betrays the price of the fact that the father is subjected to this law, and the price of what does not stop being subjected to it; the price of what cannot be translated and reduced by the signifier. From this point of view, the symbolic father is a dead father, insofar as he is merely the tuning fork of a law that crushes him and submits him to it. Through the operation of language, by naming, the signifier kills the Thing.\textsuperscript{21} The Thing being the Freudian Thing, das Ding, or even the Urverdrängt, the primary repressed, that is to say, “something to which we can never give meaning.”\textsuperscript{22}

This leads us to the second radicalness, which is developed in Lacan’s teaching between the Seminar Les Non dupes Errent up until the Seminar on The Sinthome, including the intermediate Seminar on R. S. I. This radicalness encompasses the first and is generic to it. It is a matter of the radical foreclosure of meaning, in the sense that Lacan will say that “in the end, the Name of the Father is something slight.”\textsuperscript{23}

This radicalness grounds THE Name of the Father at the center of psychic reality, inasmuch as it is the torus that knots the three fundamental registers together, to be distinguished from the Names of the father, which correspond to the different nominations of this psychic reality, which Lacan will also call “religious reality.”\textsuperscript{24} The father that ensures the paternal function is not, therefore, to be sought out on the side of meaning, but rather on the side of ab-sense: this is the absence of the (symbolic) father that lies beyond meaning; and Lacan will say, paradoxically, that this is what is most present in neurosis. Making do with this ab-sense of the father is due to the fact that the ethics of psychoanalysis tries to provide an orientation within a treatment, when the positivism that is all around gives rise, on the contrary, to the shimmering possibility of filling this void,\textsuperscript{25} the preference being to do so quickly and thoroughly... which certainly cannot be done.

Faced with this radical epistemological contrast between capitalistic positivism and the real of psychoanalysis, it is curious to observe the position of certain psychoanalysts, partisans of the thesis of the presumed decline of the paternal function in the contemporary social bond, also drifting, through a kind of injunctive positivism, to the site of an authority that is held to be lost and to be reinstated by calling upon the values of yesteryear. Even though we do not necessarily reject this thesis – not, at least, at the level of the clinical observation that it posits with regard to the fragility of identifications and of fault lines in the cultural transmission in matters of the sexes and the generations –, we nevertheless contest its presuppositions with respect to the implied centrality of the symbolic dimension. In effect, it seems to us that it is not so much that in our postmodernity there is no
more order, but, on the contrary, because this order is hegemonic, because everything is meticulously regulated, because there is no more place left for the subject to be able to lodge something of his or her singular jouissance. Let us put this more directly: the youth in France, and more widely across the capitalist world, is not lacking a symbolic order, nor is it lacking any apparatuses. On the contrary, it is choking on them; it is crumbling beneath them; and it is precisely desire that is leading these young people, by different paths – some of which are creative, but others of which are destructive –, to let the Thing say something, to leave a trace. It is, indeed, desire – or at the very least in a will to jouissance – that is the point of departure for these motions; and if there really is desire here, then the law is already operative. Perhaps, then, desires are being born from new matrices: perhaps the end of the grand narratives or, in Weberian terms, the disenchantment of the world, is making it so that desires no longer find their point of origin in structuring myths and no longer build laws that simultaneously conceal and sanctify these founding narratives. But perhaps we are dealing with new forms of desire, postmodern desires, which are born upon the corpses of forgotten divinities, at the glacial dawn of the laws of the machine. These are laws that are no longer based on anything but algorithms, that are no more than coding, no more than the pure management and automated organization of humanity. We have no cause for astonishment, then, that the symptom, which carries within it “the radical of the subject’s singularity,” no longer finds any refuge here.

By Way of Conclusion

The real of radicalization, insofar as it is a nomination, is perhaps nothing more than the postmodern rejection of the religious. The phenomena that this nomination designates seem to respond, for their part, to another real, that of subjects’ regimes of jouissance. These regimes do not share any categorical criteria, except perhaps that of having to work within the limits of the capitalist discourse, the limits of being reduced to the surplus jouissance and, more radically, to the limits of language, that is to say, to the foreclosure of meaning. The society of pure management, the capitalist discourse, biopolitical scientism, stem from a rationalist social bond that is following a slippery slope towards what is being accomplished and achieved by the transhumanist project. In the face of this radical opposition between the discourse of full meaning and the real of the subject that escapes from this, the position of the real father, the agent of castration, is in fact, also radical, because it embodies this impossible aspect of the signifier, this failing. The contemporary forms of the regimes of jouissance testify to the violence that conceals the unknown that founds subjects, to the point of depressive collapse, as a reminder of the denigrating of unconscious life, or even increasingly often, to the extent of a brutal passage à l’acte, whether this might be of the self-destructive or the amok type. This psychic destiny does not concern a specific youth culture, and is not limited to a foreign religious or cultural structuration, but describes precisely the discontent in capitalism that leads subjects to lose all hope of being able to live with their symptom in a world that, with the esth(eth)ics of living together, has lost all hospitality. A world that tries ceaselessly to cover over a radical gap in the human, while it uses the name radicalness, with no irony at all, to describe that which, in this gap, surges up in fury to signify its desire to be. Or to no longer be. A question that opens up here, therefore, is that of knowing, or of decoding, what each subject can still have in the way of a symptom.

Bibliography:

We may mention in particular the bill of December 21st 2012 and the bill of November 13th 2014, the Intelligence Act of July 2nd 2015 later replaced on May 9th 2016 by the action plan against radicalism and terrorism of June 3rd 2016 and the "plan de lutte" of April 24th 2015, the bill reinforcing the fight against organized crime and terrorism of June 3rd 2016 and the Intelligence Act of July 2nd 2015 later replaced on May 9th 2016 by the action plan against radicalism and terrorism of June 3rd 2016 and the "plan de lutte" of April 24th 2015.
19. This doctrinal point, which is still giving rise to conflicts among the schools of psychoanalysis, has been particularly thoroughly documented by P. Bruno in *Le père et ses noms*, Erès, 2012. The present article owes a great deal to this precise instruction.